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A HISTORY OF  
THE CIVIL WAR  
IN THE UNITED STATES  
1861-5

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# A HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES 1861-5

BY

W. BIRKBECK WOOD, M.A.

LIEUTENANT (CADET CORPS) 2ND VOLUNTEER BATTALION DEVON REGIMENT

AND

MAJOR J. E. EDMONDS, R.E., P.S.C.

D.A.Q.M.G., HEADQUARTERS

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

SPENSER WILKINSON

WITH THIRTEEN MAPS AND ELEVEN PLANS

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## PREFACE

THIS book has been compiled in the hope that it will prove of assistance to those who are commencing the study of the Civil War by providing within a reasonable compass an impartial account of the events of the four years of hostilities.

In dealing with such a wealth of material the method pursued has been necessarily somewhat eclectic. For the first two years of the War the ground was covered by the late Mr. Ropes' *Story of the Civil War*, and the authors were well content to follow the guidance of that talented writer, one of the ablest military historians that any country has ever possessed.

Colonel Henderson's *Stonewall Jackson* has been freely consulted for the operations in Virginia up to the battle of Chancellorsville. Not only does the present work owe to that model of military biographies, and to the stimulating influence of its author's Staff College lectures, much of its inspiration, but the earlier chapters were directly submitted to Colonel Henderson, and the writers wish to record as a small tribute to his memory their grateful acknowledgment for advice and criticism.

Although no direct references have been made in the text to Colonel Allan's *Army of Northern Virginia*, the authors are greatly indebted to that excellent work in

forming an estimate of Lee's strategy in the campaigns of 1862.

It is a great misfortune that three writers of such exceptional ability have been removed by death with their work unfinished. In consequence, the authors found themselves at a distinct disadvantage when dealing with the second half of the Civil War, owing to the lack of such luminous guidance.

Throughout the narrative, recourse has been had to Scribner's Campaigns of the Civil War. The volumes of this series are of a very varying value both from a literary and a historical standpoint, and, coming as they do from Federal pens, display a certain sectional bias. This bias, it is hoped, has been counteracted by reference to the articles by Southern writers in the four volumes of *Battles and Leaders*. To one volume of the Scribner Series, Humphreys' *The Campaign in Virginia in '64 and '65*, the authors are under special obligations, finding it an invaluable guide for the operations in the East during the last twelve months of the War.

Besides the books to which explicit reference is made in the footnotes a large number of others have been laid under contribution, particularly the memoirs of Grant and Sherman, and the works on General Lee by General A. L. Long and Colonel W. H. Taylor.

In the compilation of the plans, recourse has chiefly been had to the *Topographical* maps of the *United States Geological Survey*, and the "*Atlas to accompany the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies.*"

The authors desire also to express their personal obligation to G. H. Putnam, Esq., himself a veteran of the War, for his kindly assistance and encouragement.



## INTRODUCTION

THE history of a war may be approached in three different ways corresponding to three planes of thought. In the first instance, perhaps, it is a pastime. People read of a war in order to gratify their taste for the excitement of action, much as they read any well-composed story of adventure or travel.

The ambitious officer, determined to make himself master of his business, sooner or later discovers that the only way of understanding war during peace is by the study of its realities contained in the records of past wars. For this purpose the histories of the popular kind avail him little. He requires an accurate record as the basis of his thinking, and the educational value of his study consists in the exercise of his judgment upon the facts after he has ascertained them. Military history of this kind involves enormous labour, for it is made up of several processes, each of which is possible only after a special training. The officer's object is to prepare himself to direct in war an army or a portion of an army. He wishes to clear his mind completely as to the form and substance of the orders which, in case he has the command of a body of troops, he ought to issue in any given contingency. He has, therefore, to familiarise himself as far as he can with the various possible situations that may arise in war; to think out for each situation the different solutions that are

possible, and to know the advantages and disadvantages of each of them. Unless he has done this there is little probability that in the actual emergency he will be able to act rightly and promptly. If he is to extract the necessary practice from military history, he must, in the first instance, ascertain the real facts. He must be able to put himself as fully as possible into the precise position of the general whose action he is considering, must know how the problem presented itself to that general's mind, and what data were accessible to him. In other words, he must know what troops the general had and where they were, what information he had about the enemy's troops and movements, and what was the spirit of the instructions he had received from his government, or from some commander in a position of higher authority than himself. These data are not usually to be found in popular histories. They are fully ascertainable only in those cases where the records have been preserved, where the official correspondence, the field-states, the reports, and the orders can be examined. To collect, verify, and arrange these documents is the first business of the student of a war, and its satisfactory performance implies a familiarity with the laws of historical evidence.

When the facts have been ascertained and arranged in their casual connection the real criticism, or exercise of the judgment, begins, for the student then has to consider whether a particular move made by the General whom he is studying was, in the circumstances, the right move or the best move. It may have been the right move, though unsuccessful; it may, though successful, have been by no means the best that was open to the commander.

The full benefit of this method of studying a past war can be obtained only when the student puts himself, from day to day, in the general's place, and each time, after ascertaining the exact situation, makes up his mind as to the orders which he himself would have issued in the same situation. When he then proceeds to study the orders which the general actually gave, he derives inexhaustible instruction from the comparison between his own ideas and those of the man who was at the moment responsible. This method of historical study has, within the last generation, been adopted in every progressive army in the world as the highest form of self-discipline which, during peace, is open to the professional officer as a preparation for the responsibilities of command. It forms a fine training both of the mind and the will. If the British Army is in future to maintain its great traditions, this form of study will have to be naturalised among its officers. Yet among the recent so-called "reforms" at the headquarters of the Army, the creation of a historical department of the General Staff is conspicuous as a change which has often been talked of but never been carried out. When, however, that department has been created, it will in time produce books not for the amusement of the public at large, but for the laborious study of those comparatively few officers who mean at all cost to qualify themselves for command.

There is a third and still higher plane on which the history of a war ought to be and can be treated. It assumes as its material the completed work of the technical military historian, and upon that basis examines a war as an act in the historical sequence of the world's life. It asks the questions: How did this war come about? what



were the causes at stake? and what the nature of the settlement produced? It is an exercise not of the military, but of the political or historical judgment, weighing in the balance the conduct of nations and governments, and recording for the benefit of living statesmen the errors, the blunders, sometimes the crimes, and sometimes also the noble work of their predecessors.

To write the history of a war on this highest plane, from the point of view of statesmanship, is of course the aim of every political historian who treats of a war; but such writers do not always rise to the level required, partly because, in too many cases, the technical history has never been adequately treated, and partly because the political historians, as a rule, have not the trained military judgment without which they cannot command the military reader's confidence for their general deductions.

Some twenty years ago I tried to call the attention of the officers of the Volunteer Force to the American Civil War as the one which they could study with the most profit. It has for officers whose knowledge of foreign languages is, for the most part, limited, the great advantage that the original documents, of which an enormous mass has been preserved and published, are, without exception, in English. Its long duration and the great extent of the theatre of the operations, both by land and sea, make it a storehouse of almost every type of military action. The changes in weapons which have taken place since its conclusion have been so great as to preclude any student from supposing that he can anywhere find in it actions to be precisely copied, a temptation to be avoided, the object of military history being not to provide patterns to be copied mechanically, but to stimulate independent thought.

Since then much has been done to utilise this war for the technical instruction of officers, but there has been, so far as I am aware, hardly any attempt to review the great struggle as a whole in order to learn its political lessons. Yet of those political lessons I believe that English statesmen are much in need.

I believe that all serious wars in or between civilised communities are struggles between right and wrong, and that on the whole, and as a rule, it is the cause of right which prevails. The American Civil War appears to me to be a striking illustration of this belief. The cancer from which the body politic of the United States was suffering during the first half of the nineteenth century was the institution of negro slavery. The Civil War was the operation which provided the needed relief. That slavery was the main cause of the war has been repeatedly denied, and there are many who hold that the vital issue lay in the controversy between the advocates of state rights and those of federal unity. Political theories like those in question are, as a rule, only the forms by which men seek to justify their deeper purposes. The theory of State rights and of the legality of secession was originally the weapon forged by some of the New England States when they dissented from a portion of the foreign policy of the Federal Government. One of the greatest difficulties which the statesman has to face is that of seeing through the political doctrines and theories under which, very often, the vital matters of national life and welfare are obscured. It is part of the tragic humour of fate that sometimes the noblest characters are the champions of lost causes. The brilliant personalities of men like Lee and Stonewall Jackson have, for too many English readers of American history, been the

magnets which have biassed the judgment and hidden the truth. The great figure of the story is that of President Lincoln, whose honest purpose of heart enabled him not only to grasp the true nature of what was taking place, but to bring the cause of right to its triumphant conclusion. Lincoln was the statesman who conducted the war, and beside him the figures even of such great generals as Grant and Sherman sink into comparative insignificance. Yet it is probable that if at any period of his life Lincoln had had the opportunity to make himself acquainted with the true nature of war, if before he was elected to the Presidency he had read and pondered over the half-dozen chapters in which Clausewitz discusses the relations between war and policy, he would have better estimated the resistance which he had to expect and the effort needed to overcome it. As it was he had to learn in the bitter school of experience. That which marks him out from later statesmen of our own day is that he learned his lesson. What a contrast between such a man and the present Prime Minister of England, who, at the close of the great struggle in South Africa, thought, or professed to think, that the cause of the difficulties had been not in the political blindness of the government, but in the technical imperfections of a War Office which, after all, had without any breakdown of moment, provided and maintained a force five times as large as it had ever been authorised to contemplate.

It is because I am convinced that the true nature of war and its relation to national life can be learned from a study of the American Civil War as a whole, that I venture to commend to English readers the work of Mr. Wood and Major Edmonds. The technical aspect of the war has



been sufficiently explored by a great number of professional writers of several nationalities. The writers of this volume, therefore, have had the benefit of abundant preparatory labours. They may be trusted for the accuracy and completeness of their story though the judgment of individual men and special events is, in every case, their own. To draw the moral and learn the lesson is the reader's business.

SPENSER WILKINSON

*May 1st, 1905*

## LIST OF WORKS TO WHICH REFERENCE IS MADE IN THE FOOTNOTES

War of the Rebellion, Official Records and Atlas . . .	Quoted as Official Records.
Nicolay's <i>The Outbreak of Rebellion</i> . . .	„ Nicolay.
Force's <i>From Fort Henry to Corinth</i> . . .	„ Force.
Webb's <i>The Peninsula</i> . . .	„ Webb.
Palfrey's <i>The Antietam and Fredericksburg</i> . . .	„ Palfrey.
Doubleday's <i>Chancellorsville and Gettysburg</i> . . .	„ Doubleday.
Cist's <i>The Army of the Cumberland</i> . . .	„ Cist.
Greene's <i>The Mississippi</i> . . .	„ Greene.
Pond's <i>The Shenandoah Valley, 1864</i> . . .	„ Pond.
Cox's <i>Atlanta</i> .	
Cox's <i>March to the Sea</i> .	
Humphreys' <i>The Virginia Campaign of 1864 and 1865</i> . .	Quoted as Humphreys.
Phisterer's Statistical Record . . .	Sometimes quoted as Statistical Record.
Livermore's <i>Numbers and Losses in the Civil War</i> . . .	Quoted as Livermore.
Mahan's <i>The Gulf and the Inland Waters</i> . . .	„ Mahan.
Dodge's <i>A Bird's-eye View of Our Civil War</i> . . .	Sometimes quoted as Dodge.
General J. B. Gordon's <i>Reminiscences of the Civil War</i> . .	Quoted as Gordon.
<i>Battles and Leaders</i> , 4 vols. . . . .	„ B. & L.
Henderson's <i>Stonewall Jackson</i> , 2 vols. . . . .	„ Henderson.
Fiske's <i>The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War</i> . . .	„ Fiske.
Taylor's <i>Destruction and Reconstruction</i> . . .	Sometimes quoted as Taylor.
Fitzhugh Lee's <i>General Lee</i> . . . . .	Quoted as Lee's <i>Lee</i> .
Maury's <i>Recollections of a Virginian</i> .	
Allan's <i>Jackson's Valley Campaign</i> . . . . .	Quoted as Allan.
White's <i>Lee and the Southern Confederacy</i> . . . . .	Quoted as White's <i>Lee</i> .
Longstreet's <i>From Manassas to Appomattox</i> .	
Hamlin's <i>Battle of Chancellorsville</i> . . . . .	Quoted as Hamlin.
H. W. Wilson's <i>Ironclads in Action</i> . . . . .	„ Wilson.
Ropes' <i>Story of the Civil War</i> , 2 vols. . . . .	„ Ropes.
Sheridan's <i>Memoirs</i> , 2 vols. . . . .	Sometimes quoted as <i>Memoirs</i> .
J. E. Johnston's <i>Narrative</i> . . . . .	„ „ <i>Narrative</i> .
Hamley's <i>Operations of War</i> .	
Schouler's <i>History of the United States</i> , vol. vi. . . .	Quoted as Schouler.
Swinton's <i>Story of the Grand Army</i> . . . . .	„ Swinton.
Morris's <i>The American Navy</i> .	
Burgoyne's <i>Submarine Navigation</i> .	
Keifer's <i>Slavery and Four Years of War</i> , vol. ii. . . .	Quoted as Keifer.
Channing's <i>A Student's History of the United States</i> . . .	„ Channing.
Bryce's <i>The American Commonwealth</i> , vol. ii. . . . .	„ Bryce.
Massachusetts Military Historical Society, vol. 10 . . .	„ M. H. S.

# DIARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS IN THE TWO THEATRES OF WAR

1861

- Mar. 4. Inauguration of President Lincoln.  
April 12. Bombardment of Fort Sumter.

## EASTERN THEATRE OF WAR

- May 10.  
July 21. Battle of Bull Run.  
Nov. 1. McClellan appointed General-in-Chief.  
„ 19.

## WESTERN THEATRE OF WAR

Lyon compels surrender of Camp Jackson.

Halleck takes command of Department of the Missouri, and Buell of Department of the Ohio.

1862

- Jan. 19.  
Feb. 6.  
„ 16.  
Mar. 9. Battle of the *Monitor* and *Merrimac*.  
„ 16.  
„ 17. Embarkation of troops for the Yorktown Peninsula commenced.  
„ 23. [Jackson attacks Shields at Kernstown.]  
„ 29.  
April 2. McClellan arrives at Fortress Monroe.  
„ 6-7.  
May 1.  
„ 8. [Jackson defeats Milroy and Schenck at McDowell.]  
„ 25. [Jackson defeats Banks at Winchester.]  
„ 31. Battle of Seven Pines.  
June 1. Lee takes command in the field.  
„ 8. [Jackson defeats Frémont at Cross Keys.]  
„ 9. [Jackson defeats Shields at Port Republic.]  
„ 17. [Jackson leaves the Shenandoah Valley.]  
„ 26. Jackson arrives on McClellan's flank.  
Battle of Beaver Dam Creek, commencement of the "Seven days' fighting."

Battle of Mill Springs.  
Grant captures Fort Henry.  
Surrender of Fort Donelson.

Halleck appointed to supreme command in the West.

Albert Johnston assumes command of the Army of the Mississippi.

Battle of Shiloh and death of Albert Johnston.  
New Orleans occupied by Federals.

## EASTERN THEATRE OF WAR

- June 26. Pope placed in command of Army of Virginia.  
 „ 27.  
 July 1. Battle of Malvern Hill.  
 „ 2. McClellan reaches the James River.  
 „ 11. Halleck appointed General-in-Chief.  
 August.  
 „ 29-30. Second battle of Bull Run or Manassas.  
 September.  
 „ 4. Lee crosses the Potomac into Maryland.  
 „ 5. Pope relieved of command and McClellan reinstated.  
 „ 17. Battle of the Antietam.  
 „ 19. Lee recrosses the Potomac.  
 Oct. 3.  
 „ 8.  
 „ 26. McClellan crosses the Potomac.  
 Nov. 7. McClellan superseded by Burnside.  
 „ 24.  
 Dec. 13. Battle of Fredericksburg.  
 „ 29.  
 „ 31.

## WESTERN THEATRE OF WAR

Bragg appointed to command Confederates in the West.

Grant takes command of the Armies of the Tennessee and Mississippi. Kirby-Smith invades Kentucky.

Bragg invades Middle Tennessee.

[Battle of Corinth.]  
 [Battle of Perryville.]

Grant's first movement towards Vicksburg.

Sherman defeated at Chickasaw Bluffs. [Battle of Murfreesborough.]

## 1863

- Jan. 11.  
 „ 26. Burnside superseded by Hooker.  
 February.  
 April 30.  
 May 2-4. Battle of Chancellorsville.  
 „ 10. Death of Stonewall Jackson.  
 „ 12.  
 „ 16.  
 „ 17.  
 June 15. Lee crosses into Maryland.  
 „ 28. Meade supersedes Hooker.  
 July 1-3. Battle of Gettysburg.  
 „ 4.  
 „ 9.  
 „ 14. Lee withdraws across the Potomac.  
 Sept. 7-8.  
 „ 19-20.  
 Oct. 16.  
 „ 19. Meade advances to the Rappahannock.  
 Nov. 1.  
 „ 24-5.  
 „ 26. Meade crosses the Rapidan.  
 Dec. 1. Meade retires to north of the Rapidan.

McClernand captures Post of Arkansas.

Yazoo expedition.  
 Grant crosses the Mississippi at Bruinsburg.  
 Grant occupies Port Gibson.

Battle of Raymond.  
 Battle of Champion's Hill.  
 Pemberton withdraws into Vicksburg.

Surrender of Vicksburg.  
 Surrender of Port Hudson.

Bragg evacuates Chattanooga.  
 Bragg defeats Rosecrans at Chickamauga.  
 Grant appointed to command Military Division of the Mississippi. Sherman to command Department of the Tennessee.

Bragg sends Longstreet against Burnside at Knoxville.  
 Battle of Chattanooga.



1864

EASTERN THEATRE OF WAR

- Feb. 14.  
March.  
,, 9. Grant appointed General-in-Chief.  
May.  
,, 4. Grant crosses the Rapidan.  
,, 6. [Butler lands at Bermuda Hundred.]  
,, 5-6. Battle of the Wilderness.  
,, 8-12. Battles round Spottsylvania Court House.  
,, 12. Death of J. E. B. Stuart.  
,, 16. [Beauregard drives Butler back to his lines.]  
June 1-3. Battle of Cold Harbour.  
,, 12. Grant withdraws to cross the James River.  
,, 13. Early sent to the Shenandoah Valley.  
,, 15. Grant's army on south side of the James River.  
,, 15-18. Attack on Petersburg.  
,, 27.  
July 9. [Early defeats Wallace on the Monocacy.]  
,, 11. [Early before Washington.]  
,, 14. [Early recrosses the Potomac.]  
,, 17.  
,, 20.  
,, 22.  
,, 30. Failure of the Petersburg mine.  
Aug. 5. Battle of Mobile Bay.  
,, 7. [Sheridan appointed to command in the Shenandoah Valley.]  
Sept. 2.  
,, 19. [Battle of Winchester].  
,, 22. [Battle of Fisher's Hill.]  
,, 29.  
Oct. 19. [Battle of Cedar Creek.]  
Nov. 15.  
,, 20.  
,, 30.  
Dec. 15-16.  
,, 21.

WESTERN THEATRE OF WAR

- Sherman at Meridian.  
Banks' Red River expedition.  
Sherman succeeds Grant in the West.  
Failure of Red River expedition.  
Sherman commences to move from Chattanooga against Atlanta.

Battle of Kenesaw Mountain.

- Hood supersedes Johnston.  
Battle of Peach Tree Creek.  
Battle of Atlanta.

Hood evacuates Atlanta.

Hood moves against Sherman's communications.

- Sherman leaves Atlanta on his march through Georgia, leaving Thomas in Tennessee.  
[Beauregard orders Hood against Thomas].  
[Battle of Franklin.]  
[Battle of Nashville.]  
Sherman enters Savannah.

1865

- Feb. 1.  
,, 9. Lee appointed Commander-in-Chief.  
,, 17.  
,, 18.  
,, 22.  
,, 27. [Sheridan moves up the Valley.]

Sherman commences his march through the Carolinas.

- Sherman reaches Columbia.  
Fall of Charlestown.  
[Fall of Wilmington.]

EASTERN THEATRE OF WAR		WESTERN THEATRE OF WAR	
Mar.	19.	Battle of Bentonville.	
"	23.	Sherman at Goldsboro.	
April	1.	Battle of Five Forks.	
"	2.	Lee abandons Richmond.	
"	6.	Battle of Sailor's Creek.	
"	9.	Lee surrenders at Appomattox Court House.	
"	14.	President Lincoln assassinated.	
"	26.	Johnston surrenders at Greenboro.	
May	10.	Jefferson Davis captured.	

# A HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES, 1861-1865

## CHAPTER I

### SECESSION AND SLAVERY

The right of Secession—The Southern view of Secession—The Northern view—No compromise possible—The slavery question—Northern view and Southern view—Attacks on slavery—Clamour for emancipation—The real difference between North and South—Plutocracy *v.* Aristocracy—General causes of Secession.

IN considering the causes of the American Civil War it is necessary to touch, however lightly, upon two questions—the right of Secession claimed by the South, and the part played by slavery in bringing about the conflict. It is most important to bear in mind, that as regards the relation of the individual States to the Union diametrically opposite views were held by the peoples of the North and South. The theory put forward by the South was, that the Union was an artificial compact made by thirteen separate Sovereign States, who by their own free act created a central Government, to which for the common good of each and all they delegated certain powers. Such powers as they did not expressly delegate were, it was claimed, reserved by the individual States: there was no article in the Constitution forbidding Secession: that was a right reserved by the Sovereign States and might be legitimately exercised by any State or States, if the powers entrusted to the central Government seemed likely to be used for any other end than the welfare of the individual States: it was essential that some such power should be retained by the States to prevent this Government of their own creation being converted into a despotism such as they had originally fought against, when they sundered themselves from Great Britain.

In support of this theory the Southerner argued that at the peace of 1783 the British Government recognised the revolted Colonies as "free sovereign and independent States": that the Constitution of 1787 required ratification by nine of the thirteen

States before it could come into being, and that no State which refused to ratify it, could be bound by it: that as a matter of fact it was not accepted by either North Carolina or Rhode Island until some time after the other eleven States had ratified it, and that during that interval those two States remained independent sovereign powers: that certain States<sup>1</sup> expressly reserved the right of withdrawal, when accepting the Constitution, in case it were perverted to their injury: that the framers of the Constitution had never contemplated the tie, which bound the different States to the Union, as other than a moral one: consequently the Constitution of the United States gave no legal power to the central Government of coercing any State, which might choose on whatever grounds to withdraw from the Union: and that it was in the North among the New England States that the threat of Secession had first been heard at the time of the war with Great Britain in 1814.

The theory held in the North was, that the revolted Colonies passed direct into States of an Union: that the Union, as Mr. Lincoln declared in his Inaugural Address, was much older than the Constitution, that it dated back to the Articles of Association in 1774, was matured and continued by the Declaration of Independence and still further matured by the Articles of Confederation in 1778: that the faith of all the then thirteen States was pledged to maintain its perpetuity, and that one of the declared objects for establishing the Constitution of 1787 was "to form a more perfect Union."<sup>2</sup> It followed therefore from the statement of President Lincoln, that the States at the moment when they declared themselves independent were already united: that so far from the States having artificially created the Union, the Union was the mother of the States and only through it had they any life of their own: that the peace with England in 1783 had called into existence not thirteen separate nations, but one nation only—the nation of the United States. Each State was in a sense a sovereign State, but in a very different sense to that which was attached to the phrase by the South. They were Sovereign States in as much as their political rights were not derived from any superior power: they retained their political identity: they were autonomous communities: yet they constituted only one nation: from the first they had been thirteen United Communities, and the powers which each separately had exercised or claimed to exercise fell far short of those which belong to a National Government.

Between such diametrically opposite views no compromise was possible: eventually the sword had to cut the Gordian knot. Into

<sup>1</sup> e.g. Virginia, Massachusetts, South Carolina, and New York. Lee's *Lee*, 80.

<sup>2</sup> 1 *Ropes*, 75, 88-9.



the bottomless controversy as to which view was the right one, it is needless to enter here. But two remarks may be made. First, even granting that the right of Secession belonged to the thirteen original States which accepted the Constitution, it is hard to see on what grounds such a right could be claimed by States like Mississippi or Alabama, which entered the Union subsequently to the ratification of the Constitution by the original thirteen.<sup>1</sup> Secondly, the right of Secession, as it was not explicitly affirmed, may be regarded as implicitly denied by the framers of the new Confederate Constitution.

Equally difficult of solution is the question of the part played by slavery in bringing about Secession. Was the Southern Confederacy an attempt to found a slave empire? Was the one right, which it claimed as dearer to it than all others, the right to hold others in slavery? This was the view generally held at the time by the North and since repeated by many writers.<sup>2</sup> They argue that slavery was forced by its very nature to be aggressive: slave labour was wasteful and extravagant: especially when applied to the cultivation of tobacco, it tended to exhaust the soil: consequently slavery was compelled to find fresh fields to conquer: hence the aggressions of filibusters encouraged by Southern sympathy in Cuba and Central America: hence the annexation of Texas and the Mexican War: hence the attempt of slavery to evade the compromise of 1820 and to establish itself in the Territories north of the 36° 30' line: hence the theory of Squatter Sovereignty, voiced by Douglas and embodied in the Kansas-Nebraska Act, which turned Kansas into a field of blood: hence the Secession of the slave States, when a President was elected pledged to resist the aggressions of slavery and keep it within its Constitutional bounds. And as a final proof such writers point triumphantly to the speech of Alexander H. Stephens, the Vice-President of the Confederacy on March 21st, 1861. "Our new Government is founded upon exactly the opposite idea: its foundations are laid, its corner-stone rests, upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man: that slavery, subordination to the superior race, is his natural and normal condition. This our new Government is the first in the history of the world based upon this great physical, philosophical and moral truth."

On the other hand it is not difficult to show that this view is in many ways too sweeping. In the first place the South was not a nation of slave-holders. Of the 8,300,000 whites in the fifteen slave States (including besides the eleven, which seceded, Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri and Delaware) only 346,000 owned

<sup>1</sup> 1 Ropes, 26.

<sup>2</sup> Nicolay may be taken as a fair representative of the Northern view.

slaves, and of these 69,000 owned only one slave apiece.<sup>1</sup> Slave labour was a positive disadvantage to the large majority of whites, who were not slave-owners. A distinction, too, must be drawn between the seven States which seceded first, and the four—Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee and Arkansas—which only seceded after President Lincoln's call to arms, when they were summoned to provide troops to crush what they regarded as a perfectly legitimate movement. It is impossible to regard their Secession as an attempt to found a slave empire. It was not an aggressive but a defensive step, to uphold the principle of State Sovereignty which they cherished as their birthright. The feeling which thinking men in those States held towards slavery was that it was an evil which must be tolerated. In the slow course of time emancipation would come. But when that time should be must be left to Providence with its inscrutable ways, to the mild and mellowing influence of Christianity. Any attempt to precipitate that hour by an appeal to force could only serve to aggravate the evil. Any appeal to force was a violation of the right of State Sovereignty and must be resisted to the bitter end.

Nor do the sweeping charges made by Northerners hold good even of the seven States, which originally seceded. They too might claim that in their case Secession was a defensive step. There was a party in the North, Abolitionists as they styled themselves, "Black Republicans" as their enemies termed them, which year by year with gathering force and increasing violence denounced slavery as the crime of all crimes, and the slave-holder as the worst of criminals. Slavery was guaranteed by the Constitution as a domestic institution: therefore the orators of this party denounced the Constitution as "a covenant with death and an agreement with Hell": they were prepared to sweep away the Constitution in order to carry out emancipation. It is small wonder, if under such fanatical attacks the slave-holder hardened his heart. He knew what horrors attended a slave insurrection, and he saw the Abolitionist virtually inciting the slave to rise. Throughout the South a deep and abiding resentment spread. But besides justly condemning the violent language and revolutionary tendencies of the Abolitionists, the Southerner saw clearly that as a policy emancipation was fraught with enormous difficulties. The slave-holder practically had his capital locked up in his slaves. The British Parliament had recognised the rights of ownership, and had granted £20,000,000 as compensation to the West Indian planters, but to compensate the slave-holders on the North American Continent would have imposed upon the United States Treasury a burden which it could not bear. Moreover, the Abolitionists denounced all compensation as collusion with crime.

<sup>1</sup> I Henderson, 106.

Looking again at the British solution of the problem in the West Indies it was clear, that before complete emancipation could take place, the negro must pass through a probationary period of several years' apprenticeship. But it was emancipation complete and immediate, for which the Abolitionist clamoured: and the more extreme members of the party went even further: they demanded for the negro the political rights of full citizenship. Such a grant would have placed the slave-holder in many places politically at the mercy of his former slaves. Nor did the instances of the British West Indies nor Hayti afford any convincing proof that the negro himself would be any better off for emancipation. But, it may be argued, the Abolitionists, if the loudest, were not the largest or most influential party in the North. There was a much wider section, whose idol was the Union. Even for the sake of emancipation they would not imperil its precious life: and of this section, strong in numbers and sane in counsel, Abraham Lincoln was the fitting representative. The new President spoke with no uncertain sound in his inaugural address: he declared that he had "no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States, where it exists": he expressed his belief that he had no lawful right to do so.

Why then should the Southern States manifest such unreasonable alarm, and seek to destroy the Union in order to avoid an imaginary danger? The answer is that Mason and Dixon's line of  $36^{\circ} 30'$  was something more than an artificial boundary between slavery and emancipation. It had come to be the geographical boundary line between two separate peoples. The character, institutions, and interests of the North and South were as different as those of any two neighbouring nations. Southern Society was an aristocracy based upon a rigid observance of class-distinctions: the North was a plutocracy, and even wealth carried with it little claim to social recognition unless accompanied by merit.<sup>1</sup> The South was an agricultural community, and enjoying as it did a virtual monopoly of the cotton market, demanded free trade. The North was largely devoted to manufacturing industries, and in its own interests enforced a protective tariff, which told heavily against Southern prosperity.

Thus the two sections fell further and further apart: material interests made them alien the one to the other: as time went on they grew to know less and less of each other, and what they knew were the bad points in each other.<sup>2</sup> The South easily mistook the loudest voice for the most authoritative: had the Democratic candidate failed at the Presidential election of 1856, it would have seceded then.<sup>3</sup> When in 1860 the Democratic vote was split and a President elected, who only represented the

<sup>1</sup> 1 Henderson, 102.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Henderson, 103.

<sup>3</sup> White's *Lee*, 75.



minority, the time for action seemed come. The Union was obsolete: the moral tie, which in Southern eyes was all that it had ever represented, was grown too weak to hold together in an artificial alliance conflicting interests and different stages of society. Secession was a step which had long been contemplated by the South: and it was a step taken deliberately not by a minority of slave-owners for their own selfish ends, but by a nation which almost unanimously believed that the time had come for a new order of things. Without slavery there might perhaps have been no Secession; but slavery was only one, though the most powerful, of the causes which rendered Secession inevitable.

Besides the slave-holders as a class there was another body of men who had a direct interest in Secession. These were the office holders and professional politicians, who, owing to the Republican victory at the polls in 1860, found their occupation gone and their emoluments forfeited. It was to their direct interest to establish a new order of things in which they could return to their old functions and draw their old incomes.<sup>1</sup> It is frequently claimed by Northern writers, that the Secession movement was the work of a conspiracy of an entirely unscrupulous clique, who overawed individual opinion and gained their ends by fraud and deceit: in Texas alone of the Cotton States was the Ordinance of Secession submitted to a direct vote of the people:<sup>2</sup> in all the others the loyal and law-abiding majority was coerced and betrayed into Secession. But such an explanation, though containing a certain element of truth in as much as there were certain classes which had a direct interest in Secession, fails to explain the unanimity and unflinching resolution, with which all the people of the Southern Confederacy fought through the four long years of strife. The majority of an Anglo-Saxon people will not let itself be coerced for long into a course of action entailing all the horrors and trials of war, unless it genuinely believes that its own interests are assailed and its own safety endangered.<sup>3</sup> The Cotton States seceded, because the people of those States believed that under a Republican President their existence as Sovereign States was in peril.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> There was also another class at the South with a direct interest in Secession. This consisted of the numerous planters who were heavily indebted to Northern factors. To them a rebellion was the best mode of wiping out their debts.

<sup>2</sup> Nicolay, 11.

<sup>3</sup> Henderson, 113.

<sup>4</sup> Lincoln, when a candidate in 1858 for the United States Senate, had used language which might well excite misgivings in the South. "I do not expect the Union to be dissolved. I do not expect the house to fall [an allusion to 'a house divided against itself']. But I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction."



## NOTE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMPROMISES

The framers of the American Constitution deliberately put aside two questions for the solution of time, viz. States' Rights and Slavery. To have forced either of these to an issue would have been fatal to the adoption of the Constitution. That itself was based upon the principle of compromise. To prevent the smaller States being swamped by the larger, it was provided that any State, whatever its size, should have equal representation in the Senate. In the House of Representatives representation was to be proportional, but as a concession to the Slave States three-fifths of the slaves in any State were to be included in the estimate of the population, and the existence of the Slave Trade was secured for twenty years. The question whether any State ratifying the Constitution retained the power of rescinding that act of ratification and withdrawing from the Union was silently ignored.

During the next half-century the assertion of States' Rights was three times made, by the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798-9, by the New England Convention at Hartford in 1814, and by South Carolina in 1832. The Resolutions were drawn up by Madison and Jefferson in opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts of the Adams Administration. They styled the Constitution a "compact," and declared the States Sovereign and independent with the right to judge of the infraction of the Constitution and to remedy such infraction by an Act of Nullification. This doctrine of the States' Right of Nullification, then enunciated for the first time, was strongly condemned by the North, and met with no further support in the South.

The Hartford Convention was due to the indignation of the New England States with the war policy of the Madison Administration. Resolutions were passed proposing that these States should be allowed to undertake their own defence, and for that purpose to retain a reasonable proportion of the Federal taxes levied upon them. The right of Nullification was again asserted, and there were even hints of Secession. The speedy termination of the war put an end to this agitation.

In South Carolina a State Convention declared the Tariff Acts of 1828 and 1832 null and void. The masterful President, Andrew Jackson, was determined to enforce the Federal authority, and hostilities were only averted by a compromise, which whilst satisfying the demands of South Carolina, preserved the dignity of the Federal Government.

Three great compromises were made with slavery. The first was that of 1787, already referred to. The second is known as the Missouri Compromise of 1820. When in 1818 Missouri applied for admission to the Union as a Slave State, sectional feeling was violently excited. Hitherto the balance between the Slave and the Free States had been maintained by admitting them in pairs, thus securing them an equal representation in the Senate. But if Missouri were now admitted as a Slave State, slavery

would be established west of the Mississippi to the north of the prolongation of the Ohio line, which till then had served as the boundary between Slavery and Freedom. If Missouri's claim were admitted, other Territories west of the Mississippi might in time make a similar demand, and the whole of the Trans-Mississippi might be ultimately given over to slavery, in which case the political balance would be destroyed. The Compromise of 1820 admitted Missouri as a Slave State, whilst to preserve the balance Maine was brought into the Union as a Free State, and with a view to the future it was provided that "in all that territory ceded by France under the name of Louisiana, which lies north of  $36^{\circ} 30'$ , not included in the limits of Missouri, slavery is for ever prohibited." The result of this second compromise was to continue Mason and Dixon's line<sup>1</sup> to the west of the Mississippi as the boundary between Slavery and Freedom, and to state explicitly that the presence of Missouri as a Slave State north of that line was to be regarded as an exception and not as a precedent.

Thirty years later a third compromise became necessary. The annexation of Texas, in itself a political victory for slavery, was followed by a war with Mexico, and over the Mexican spoils party feeling was fiercely stirred. Once more Henry Clay, the author of the Missouri Compromise and of the compromise with South Carolina, came forward with an arrangement, which for a while sufficed to avert sectional strife. By the Compromise of 1850 it was provided that California should be admitted as a Free State, but that the Territories of Utah and New Mexico, recently acquired from Mexico, should be organised without any restriction as to slavery: at the same time a more stringent Fugitive Slave Law was passed.

Four years later Stephen Douglas, a Democratic Senator from Illinois, brought forward a Bill for the organisation as the Territory of Nebraska on similar lines of all the Louisiana Purchase north of the Missouri Compromise line, and west of the States of Missouri and Iowa. Such a proposition was a clear violation of the Compromise of 1820, and the passing of the Kansas-Nebraska Act led to a state of civil war in Kansas.

In 1857 Chief Justice Taney, in the Dred Scott case, delivered judgment to the effect that the slave was a form of property, and as such had just as strong a claim as any other form of property upon the Federal Government for protection. He pronounced that Congress had no power to legislate against property, and therefore the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional. With this decision of the Supreme Court the theory of "Squatter Sovereignty," advocated by Douglas, came into collision. Douglas, when seeking re-election to the Senate in 1858, was entrapped by Lincoln, the rival candidate, into uttering the "Freeport heresy." He declared that the Legislature of a Territory had the power, if it chose, of forbidding absolutely slavery within its limits. This doctrine was a flat contradiction of the Dred Scott decision and lost Douglas the support of

<sup>1</sup> Mason and Dixon determined the eastern portions of Delaware, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, and ran the line westward for some distance (1762-7). The line was afterwards continued to the western limit of Maryland and adopted by Pennsylvania and Virginia as limiting their respective territories. The Ohio line was practically a prolongation of Mason and Dixon's line (Channing, 116).

the South at the election of 1860. The Southern Democrats rejecting Douglas, nominated J. C. Breckinridge, whilst the Northern Democrats supported Douglas. A third Democratic candidate was Bell, nominated by the so-called Constitutional Union Party, which hoped to save the Union by ignoring the question of slavery altogether. The Democratic vote was hopelessly split. Breckinridge received 72 electoral votes, Bell 39, and Douglas 12. The Republican candidate received 180, and was thus elected by an overwhelming majority, but at the polls a million less votes had been cast for him than for the three Democratic candidates.

## CHAPTER II

### FORT SUMTER<sup>1</sup>

The election of President Lincoln and Secession of South Carolina—President Buchanan and his Cabinet—The Charleston Forts—President Buchanan decides not to reinforce the garrison—South Carolina sends Commissioners to Washington and Major Anderson occupies Fort Sumter—Steamer with supplies for Fort Sumter is fired on—President Buchanan evades giving a decision—Anderson's position—Other States secede and seize United States property—The Confederacy formed February, 1861—Failure of negotiations for the surrender of Fort Sumter—Both sides endeavour to avoid war—Inauguration of President Lincoln—Fort Sumter asks for assistance—Bombardment and surrender of Fort Sumter.

ON November 6th, 1860, Abraham Lincoln was elected President of the United States. His election was the signal for the Cotton States to secede. In this movement South Carolina, as might be expected from its past history, took the lead. As far back as October 5th, Governor Gist of that State had addressed a circular letter to the Governors of the other Cotton States, inquiring what would be their attitude in the event of Lincoln's election.<sup>2</sup> When their fears were confirmed, the South Carolina Legislature took prompt action. A Convention was ordered, a new Governor elected, who was a more fiery Secessionist even than his predecessor, and bills passed organising the military forces of the State. On December 17th the Convention met, and on the 20th passed an Ordinance of Secession declaring "the Union between South Carolina and other States under the name of the United States of America dissolved."

Lincoln's term of office would not commence till March 4th, 1861. Till that date President Buchanan continued to hold the reins of power. He was a Democrat and a sympathiser with the demands of the South; three members of his Cabinet were Southerners, and the Secessionists counted upon his acquiescence in the new order of things. But in his Message to Congress on December 3rd, President Buchanan expressly denied the right of Secession;<sup>3</sup> and though he added that in his opinion no right was given by the Constitution to the Government to coerce a seceding State, he declared his intention of collecting the revenue and

<sup>1</sup> See Map I.

<sup>2</sup> Nicolay, 1.

<sup>3</sup> 1 Ropes, 19.



holding the forts and other public property of the United States throughout the whole country. After this declaration two of the Southerners in his Cabinet resigned.<sup>1</sup> But Floyd, Secretary of War, continued to hold office in the hope of influencing the President in Southern interests.

The right of Secession claimed by South Carolina as a Sovereign State carried with it the further right to resume possession of the forts, arsenals, and other public buildings within its territories after arriving at a financial settlement with the Government of the States still remaining in the Union. Consequently, on the forts in Charleston Harbour the interest of the moment centred. If South Carolina was really, as it claimed to be, a Sovereign State, then it was intolerable that any other Power should hold forts commanding its principal harbour; and, if Secession was followed by war, it became a military necessity to secure possession of them. These forts were three in number: Castle Pinckney, a small island less than a mile from the city, whose fortifications were too old-fashioned to be capable of defence; Fort Moultrie, on Sullivan's Island, on the north side of the harbour, about four miles from the city; and Fort Sumter, lying in the centre of the harbour channel on an artificial island. To hold these forts there was a wholly inadequate force of about a hundred officers and men of the United States Army under Major Anderson.<sup>2</sup> This small garrison was stationed in Fort Moultrie, which against an attack from the land side was incapable of offering a prolonged resistance. There were no troops in either of the other two forts. In view of possible hostilities Anderson's natural course was to move his command from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter, a post of considerable strength and of great importance as commanding the entrance to the harbour. It was, however, obviously the interest of the South Carolinians to prevent Anderson leaving a position where he and his troops were practically at their mercy; and the South Carolinian representatives in Congress had endeavoured, though without success, to gain a promise from President Buchanan that Anderson should not move from the one post to the other.<sup>3</sup>

The question with which Mr. Buchanan's cabinet had to deal was, whether or not Anderson should be reinforced. From a military standpoint there could be no doubt of the necessity of the step. Both the Commander-in-Chief, General Scott, and the Secretary of State, General Cass, urged it. But on political grounds it might well seem inexpedient. Any attempt to reinforce

<sup>1</sup> Cobb of Georgia and Thompson of Mississippi.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Ropes, 37. Nicolay, 63, says that the garrison consisted of nine commissioned officers, sixty-eight non-commissioned officers and men, eight musicians, and forty-three non-combatant workmen.

<sup>3</sup> For the controversy between the South Carolinian representatives and President Buchanan, see 1 Ropes, 56-60.

Anderson was very likely to precipitate the collision, which, above all else, President Buchanan sought to avoid. His one aim and object was, whilst doing his duty to the Union and refusing to countenance Secession, to defer the inevitable struggle (for inevitable it was, if the right of Secession were refused recognition) until his own term of office was ended. It was not difficult, therefore, for Floyd so to play upon the President's fears, that he was induced, at a cabinet council of December 13th, to put aside all military considerations and decide against the sending of reinforcements.<sup>1</sup>

The South Carolina Convention, after passing the Ordinance of Secession resolved to despatch commissioners to Washington, in order to bring about a general settlement of those questions which their action had given rise to, with the United States Government. The commissioners reached Washington on December 26th. But the following morning the position was entirely changed by the news that the previous night Anderson had transferred his command from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter. This important step Anderson took in accordance with the instructions of the Government, which authorised him to transfer his command, whenever he had "tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act." Though Anderson undoubtedly believed that a hostile act was in contemplation by the authorities of South Carolina, it is quite clear that he was mistaken in his belief.<sup>2</sup> At that date, when the Convention was sending commissioners to Washington, an act of open hostility would have stultified their whole position. At Charleston Anderson's action was condemned as a breach of faith and construed as an act of war. Governor Pickens seized the Arsenal, Castle Pinckney, and Fort Moultrie, and gave orders for the erection of batteries commanding Sumter and the harbour entrance. At Washington the commissioners violently demanded an explanation and apology, and a withdrawal of Anderson's troops altogether from Charleston Harbour. On December 31st the President gave them their answer in a letter couched in very moderate language, in which he pointed to the hostile acts committed by Governor Pickens in seizing United States property, and declined to order the withdrawal of Anderson. Thereupon the commissioners left Washington, and Floyd, who had vainly hoped to induce the President to recall Anderson, sent in his resignation.<sup>3</sup>

The Cabinet, thus rid of its last Southern member, now took up a much more decided attitude in view of the unquestionably

<sup>1</sup> Nicolay, 24-6.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Ropes, 39.

<sup>3</sup> Floyd's resignation had been sent in on the 29th, and was accepted on the 31st. He was already in bad odour for a financial transaction, which closely resembled official theft. See Nicolay, 31.

hostile acts committed by the South Carolina authorities, and resolved to reinforce Sumter at once. An unarmed steamer, the *Star of the West*, was chartered, and sent to Charleston with reinforcements and provisions. But, as it was entering the harbour on January 9th, it was fired on by the batteries which Governor Pickens had caused to be erected, and forced to retire. Anderson immediately sent to the Governor, demanding an explanation of this insult to the United States flag. The Governor as promptly assumed entire responsibility for the act, and insisted that the continuance of United States troops in Charleston Harbour was an "act of positive hostility." Anderson's hands were tied by the instructions of his Government, which limited his military operations to those required for the defence of his post. He accordingly informed the Governor that he should send an officer to Washington to ask for further instructions. Pickens, emboldened by Anderson's indecision, on the following day made a formal demand for the surrender of the fort. Anderson naturally refused compliance, but suggested that they should both send representatives to Washington to refer the demand for the surrender of the fort to the President. This suggestion was readily accepted by the Governor, who despatched Mr. Hayne, the Attorney-General of the State, as his envoy, and he was accompanied by one of Anderson's officers.

The arrival of this fresh ambassador only added to the embarrassment of President Buchanan. It was of course impossible for him to allow Fort Sumter to be surrendered after his declaration of December 3rd, yet, if he gave a downright refusal, open war might ensue, and war he was bent on avoiding at all costs. However the action of the other Cotton States caused Hayne to modify his plan of operations: the case of South Carolina became merged in that of the Southern Confederacy. Meanwhile Anderson was ordered to hold Sumter, but not to take any steps, which could be construed as hostile, unless his own safety were clearly endangered. Reinforcements and provisions were promised him, if he thought it necessary to ask for them. He had provisions, which would last him over March 4th, and stated his belief that he could hold his position against any force, which could be brought against him. President Buchanan was only too glad to leave the question of Fort Sumter to his successor for solution.

In the meanwhile, till that successor should assume office, all the responsibility for the safety of Sumter was thrown upon Anderson. He believed rightly that any attempt to reinforce or provision his command would lead to hostilities on the part of South Carolina. Like the President he wished at all costs to avoid war, believing that it would fail to restore the Union. Consequently he allowed his political convictions to overrule his



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military judgment and made no demand for the promised reinforcements, although he was keenly alive to the ignominy of his position, and quite aware that the hostile batteries rapidly nearing completion would shortly render any attempt to reinforce his post impracticable.

The other Cotton and Gulf States were not slow to follow the example of South Carolina. The method of procedure was the same. A State Convention was summoned, which passed an Ordinance of Secession. Following upon this ordinance, sometimes even anticipating it, the State authorities proceeded to seize all forts, arsenals, and United States property lying in their territories. As almost the whole of the small United States Army was employed on the Indian frontier, the commandants at the different posts were unable to resist the demands of the State militia for their surrender: and thus all the southern forts, with the exception of Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbour, Fort Pickens in Pensacola Harbour and the forts at Key West and Tortugas off the southern extremity of Florida, were speedily lost to the Union. Mississippi seceded on January 9th, Florida on January 10th, Alabama on January 11th, Georgia on January 19th, Louisiana on January 26th, and Texas on February 1st.

Hayne, the envoy from South Carolina, arrived in Washington on January 13th. He found in the capital many of the Senators and Representatives of the States, which had already seceded, or were on the point of doing so. Their representations induced him to delay presenting his demand for the surrender of Fort Sumter, until the preparations for forming the new Confederacy were complete. Although the different States had seceded independently, they recognised that their only chance of successfully maintaining the right of Secession lay in their uniting together into a single Confederacy. President Buchanan was already committed to a policy of non-coercion, and it was clearly to the interest of the seceding States, that South Carolina should not by precipitate action endanger the peaceful establishment of the new Confederacy. A Provisional Congress of delegates from these States met at Montgomery, Alabama, on February 4th, and on the 8th adopted a Provisional Government, on the 9th elected Jefferson Davis of Mississippi President, and Alexander Stephens of Georgia Vice-President, and on March 11th completed and adopted what was intended to be a permanent Constitution.

Hayne delayed presenting his demand for the surrender of Fort Sumter till January 31st. Holt, who had succeeded Floyd as Secretary of War, was charged by President Buchanan with the task of conducting the negotiations with Hayne. Whilst disclaiming all hostile intentions against South Carolina, even alleging that Fort Sumter was held by the United States for the



protection of South Carolina against the possibility of a foreign attack, he refused to take into consideration at all the demand for the surrender of the fort.<sup>1</sup> Finding his mission vain, Hayne left Washington on February 8th. Governor Pickens at once hastened his preparations for attacking Sumter.

But before these preparations were completed, on February 12th the Confederate Congress passed a resolution entrusting to the Confederate Government the settlement of all questions between the different seceding States and the United States Government, and three Commissioners were shortly afterwards despatched to Washington for the purpose. Governor Pickens on the 13th wrote to the Government at Montgomery, impressing upon them the necessity of prompt action and the importance of gaining possession of Fort Sumter before President Buchanan's term of office ended.<sup>2</sup> He stated the position with admirable clearness. "President Buchanan cannot resist, because he has not the power. Mr. Lincoln may not attack, because the cause of quarrel will have been, or may be, considered by him as past." But the Confederate Government was almost as anxious as President Buchanan himself to avoid giving any pretext for war. In their view every day's delay was a day gained. The longer the existence of the new Government continued unchallenged, the better seemed the chance of ultimate recognition, both by the Government at Washington and by the European Powers. On the 15th a resolution was passed by the Confederate Congress, leaving to the President the duty of taking the necessary military steps for securing the possession of Forts Sumter and Pickens, and on the 20th Jefferson Davis wrote to Governor Pickens that he would very shortly send an engineer officer to examine the position at Charleston, and two days later in another letter expressed the hope that the Governor would do nothing which might prevent the issue of peace or war being decided solely by the newly constituted Confederate Government.

On March 3rd General Beauregard arrived at Charleston as the officer charged by the Confederate Government with the duty of reducing Fort Sumter, if necessary. The day after Beauregard's arrival at Charleston, Abraham Lincoln was inaugurated as President of the United States at Washington. His inaugural address was couched in distinct but moderate language. The right of Secession was denied; all Secession ordinances declared legally void; the President's determination expressed "to hold, occupy and possess the property and places belonging to the Government"; "acts of violence within any State or States against the authority of the United States," pronounced "insurrectionary or revolutionary." On the other hand, Lincoln used no menaces.

<sup>1</sup> 1 Ropes, 67.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Ropes, 69.

He did not propose to invade the seceding States; he denied that his policy need lead to either bloodshed or violence. If either ensued, it would be the act of the Secessionists, not of the Government. "In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen," he concluded, "and not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. The Government will not assail you. You can have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors."

Thus Lincoln's policy laid upon the new Confederacy the necessity of striking the first blow, if it hoped to extort by force the recognition which he refused to grant it. Such a blow was speedily forthcoming. On March 5th a letter was placed before the Cabinet at Washington from Anderson, in which he stated that the garrison of Fort Sumter would soon be in danger of starvation, and that to permanently secure the position in Charleston Harbour a force of 20,000 men would be necessary.<sup>1</sup> General Scott, when consulted upon the point, declared an expedition on such a scale to be impracticable. It would be impossible to raise so large a force within the time. He expressed himself in favour on military grounds of withdrawing the garrison from a post which could not be permanently held. But on political grounds it was possible to make out a strong case in favour of attempting a merely temporary relief. To evacuate the post would seem too like granting in act that recognition which in word was refused to the new Confederacy; and if the attempt to send temporary relief led to an outbreak of hostilities, then the odium of commencing the civil war would be thrust upon the South, and a more united resistance might be looked for from the North. Lincoln summoned two Cabinet Councils to consider the question. The first, summoned on March 15th, decided by a majority of five to two against making any such attempt. But at a meeting of the Cabinet a fortnight later, four out of the seven members expressed themselves in favour of a relief expedition. It would seem that in the interval the influence of the President had prevailed over that of his Secretary of State, Mr. Seward. The latter, whom many had expected to be the real head of the Government, held the strangely optimistic view that the Secession movement was on the wane,<sup>2</sup> and if treated in a conciliatory spirit would shortly die a natural death. Captain Fox was appointed to the command of the expedition, which he had from the first urgently recommended.

It was determined that in the first instance the attempt should be limited to provisioning Fort Sumter. Such a step could not be regarded reasonably as an act of war, and to resist it by force would certainly put the Secessionists in the wrong. That there might be no possible pretext for any resort to violence, President

<sup>1</sup> Nicolay, 50.

<sup>2</sup> Nicolay, 52.

Lincoln on April 8th officially informed Governor Pickens that an attempt would be made to supply Fort Sumter with provisions only, and, if this attempt were not resisted, no effort to throw in men, arms, or ammunition would be made without further notice. The Southern Confederacy immediately resolved to resist the attempt. It might well seem to them that, as the burden of taking the offensive was laid upon them, the first blow might just as well be struck in Charleston Harbour as anywhere else. On April 11th Beauregard sent to Anderson, formally demanding the surrender of the fort. On his refusal the Confederate batteries opened fire at 4.30 a.m. on the 12th.<sup>1</sup> The larger and more effective half of the guns of Fort Sumter were mounted *en barbette* on the rampart, and it was found impossible in the face of the Confederate fire to work these.<sup>2</sup> On the 13th, as the barracks had been set on fire by red-hot shot, and the conflagration caused the magazine to be closed and deprived the gunners of a sufficient supply of powder,<sup>3</sup> Anderson offered to surrender. Part of the fleet had appeared off the harbour on the 12th, but the absence of the *Powhatan*, which had been detached on other service<sup>4</sup> by an unwarrantable piece of interference on the part of Seward, prevented it coming to the help of the hard-pressed garrison. On the 14th, at noon, the United States flag was hauled down and the fort evacuated.

<sup>1</sup> 1 Ropes, 84.

<sup>2</sup> Nicolay, 63.

<sup>3</sup> Nicolay, 68.

<sup>4</sup> The *Powhatan* has been ordered to the Gulf of Mexico. Her absence forced Fox to abandon his original plan. But he intended to make an attempt to enter the harbour on the night of the 13th. Sumter, however, was surrendered on the afternoon of that day (1 Ropes, 85, note). A severe storm also rendered it difficult to enter on the 12th (Nicolay, 66).



## CHAPTER III

### THE BORDER STATES

The extent of Secession—The effect of Lincoln's call for troops—Secession of Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas—Importance of Maryland—Lincoln's forces—Events in Missouri—Events in Kentucky—Attitude of West Virginia—General McClellan in West Virginia—His successes at Rich Mountain and Carrick's Ford.

THE Southern Confederacy as established at Montgomery in February embraced a territory larger than that of France, Spain, Portugal, and Great Britain combined, with a population, white and black, of over five millions.<sup>1</sup> In his inaugural address President Davis intimated that the non-seceded Slave States would be permitted to join the Confederacy. These States were eight in number: Virginia, North Carolina, Arkansas, Tennessee, Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri, and Delaware, but in the last named the institution of slavery had almost disappeared. The first four of these States subsequently joined the Confederacy, almost doubling the territorial area, population, and material resources of Secession.<sup>2</sup>

When the news of the surrender of Fort Sumter reached Washington, President Lincoln, on April 15th, had issued a proclamation calling out 75,000 militia for the purpose of putting down the insurrection. Calls for the proper quota of troops were made upon all the States which had not yet seceded. This call was indignantly refused by the Governors of all the eight Slave States with the exception of Maryland and Delaware. The Border States had hitherto held aloof from Secession. Though Slave States, they held fast to the Union. Lying nearer the North, they knew that the fears entertained by the seceding States were exaggerated: they believed that the Abolitionist outcry did not represent Northern public opinion, and considered that the institution of slavery was not in such danger as to justify a rupture of the Union. But when President Lincoln clearly announced his intention of applying coercion to the seceded States, and called upon the Border States to furnish their contingents for the

<sup>1</sup> A. H. Stephen's Savannah speech, March 21st.

<sup>2</sup> Nicolay, 81.



purpose, the position was entirely changed. The cherished principle of State Sovereignty was now in peril. No alternative was left to these States but to obey the call of the President for troops, and thereby to assist in the coercion of Sovereign States lawfully exercising their right of Secession, or themselves to join the ranks of Secession. Neutrality was impossible.

On April 17th the State Convention of Virginia, by eighty-eight votes to fifty-five, passed an Ordinance of Secession, and the Governor of the State, Letcher, took immediate steps to seize the military arsenal at Harper's Ferry and the Gosport navy-yard near Norfolk. The example of Virginia was followed by North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas. A similar course was attempted in the other three States: Missouri, Maryland, and Kentucky. But their proximity to Free States prevented their attempt being successful. It was of vital importance to the Federal Government at Washington to prevent Maryland seceding. For in that case the position of the Capital, hemmed in between Maryland and Virginia, would have been one of the greatest peril. Baltimore, the capital of Maryland, was violently Secessionist, and it was through Baltimore that the railway connecting Washington with the North ran. On April 19th, the anniversary of Lexington, the 6th Massachusetts Regiment reached Baltimore on its way to Washington. Marching from one railway depôt to the other, it was attacked by a furious mob. Shots were exchanged and lives lost on both sides. The regiment succeeded in making its way to the train, and reached Washington that evening; but the mob took possession of Baltimore. Hicks, the Governor of the State, who was pledged loyally to support the Union cause, found himself powerless to resist the wave of popular indignation. He suffered himself to be persuaded to call out the militia, which was largely officered by Secessionists. The City Council appropriated half a million of dollars to purchase and manufacture arms.<sup>1</sup> On the same night the bridges on the Harrisburg and Philadelphia railroads, which connected Baltimore with the north, were burnt. From the capital the fever of Secession spread to the country towns; the United States flag virtually disappeared from Maryland.<sup>2</sup> On the 21st Washington found itself cut off from telegraphic communication with the North, and on the following day there was a stampede of Southern sympathisers southwards. For a few days the United States capital wore the aspect of a beleaguered city. But on April 25th the 7th New York Regiment, which had been conveyed by water from Philadelphia to Annapolis, and after a twenty-mile march had gained railway communication with Washington, entered the capital in triumph. It was closely followed by the 8th Massachusetts Regiment. The

<sup>1</sup> Nicolay, 89.

<sup>2</sup> Nicolay, 89.

crisis was passed, and a steady stream of Northern regiments commenced to pour into Washington.

These troops were the three months' militia called out under the President's proclamation of April 15th. Lincoln, recognising the growing strength of the Southern Confederacy, on May 3rd called for three years' volunteers to the number of 42,034, and ordered that the regular army should be increased by 22,714 men, and the naval forces by 18,000.<sup>1</sup> These steps showed Lincoln's appreciation of the military situation, but in the meantime the work immediately to hand had to be undertaken by the three months' militia. General Scott, Commander-in-Chief of the United States forces, recognised the impossibility of conducting offensive operations on a large scale with such troops, and wished to confine himself to securing the line of the Potomac from the mountains to the sea.<sup>2</sup> This included the re-establishment of Federal authority in Maryland, and if possible the recapture of Harper's Ferry. But little organised opposition was encountered in Maryland. A large proportion of its inhabitants were faithful to the Union; and when Baltimore, the centre of Secession, was occupied by General Butler on May 13th, open resistance to the United States Government promptly came to an end. The more ardent Secessionists, finding themselves unable to carry their State out of the Union, betook themselves to the South, and Maryland regiments were subsequently found fighting under the Stars and Bars.

Jackson, the Governor of Missouri, being a strong Secessionist, made a determined effort to take his State over into the Southern Confederacy. He encountered, however, a powerful opponent in Frank P. Blair, junior, whose elder brother, Montgomery Blair, was Postmaster-General in Lincoln's cabinet, so that the demand of the Missouri Unionists for help and protection quickly made itself heard at Washington. Governor Jackson hoped to gain possession of the United States arsenal at St. Louis, but being thwarted by the arrival of reinforcements under Captain Nathaniel Lyon, instructed one of his militia generals, Frost, to organise volunteer companies in a camp of instruction at St. Louis. Application was made to President Davis for cannon, muskets, and ammunition. They arrived in the camp on May 8th. On the 10th Lyon, with his own battalion of regulars and some volunteer regiments raised by Blair from the Unionists in the State, surrounded Camp Jackson, in the west of the city, where Frost had begun to collect his Secessionist regiments, and compelled its unconditional surrender. Jackson, when he learnt the news at the State capital, Jefferson City, having persuaded a compliant Legislature to pass a Militia Bill constituting him an irresponsible

<sup>1</sup> *1 Repes*, 111.

<sup>2</sup> *Nicolay*, 107.

military dictator, adjourned it on May 15th, and prepared for open hostilities, taking Sterling Price, an ex-Governor of the State, as his Commander-in-Chief in place of Frost. On May 11th General Harney, commanding the Department of the West, had returned to St. Louis and taken over the direction of affairs. Instead of continuing the offensive movement begun by Lyon, he favoured a policy of compromise, and let himself be entrapped into an agreement with Price, by which he remained inactive, whilst the other was left at liberty to carry out his revolutionary programme.<sup>1</sup> Blair was fortunate enough to secure from the Washington Government permission to supersede Harney, if such a step seemed advisable. Accordingly, on May 30th, Lyon was restored to command. As Governor Jackson refused to disband the militia, which he and Price had raised, Lyon sailed up the Missouri to Jefferson City and occupied it on June 15th. The Governor fled without attempting resistance, but joined Price at Boonville some fifty miles up the river and prepared to make a stand there. Lyon hastily re-embarked his troops, numbering about 2,000, landed four miles below Boonville on June 17th, and the same day routed the Secessionist forces. This defeat practically terminated Jackson's Governorship. The State Convention reassembled on July 22nd, and on the 31st elected and inaugurated a Provisional Government with St. Louis as its official headquarters and Hamilton Gamble, a loyal supporter of the Union, its Governor.

Magoffin, Governor of Kentucky, also refused to obey the President's call for troops. This State, stretching the whole distance from Virginia to Missouri and bordering on the three Free States of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, held a very important position. The Legislature, which contained an Unionist majority, on May 16th passed a resolution of neutrality. But neutrality was quickly proved to be an impossibility. Neither North nor South could for military reasons be content with such an attitude. Recruiting within the State was carried on for both causes. On either side of Kentucky hostilities were going on both in West Virginia and in Missouri, where a Confederate invasion from Arkansas was repelled. Frémont, just appointed commander of the Department of the West, was preparing a grand expedition down the Mississippi. It was to check this threatened advance that the Confederates resolved to violate the neutrality of Kentucky. On September 5th the Confederate general, Polk, commanding on the Mississippi seized Hickman, a town lying on the river in Kentucky territory. The Federal general, Grant, commanding at Cairo made prompt reply by occupying on September 6th the important post of Paducah, lying at the junction of the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers with the Ohio. On the 7th Polk, push-

<sup>1</sup> Nicolay, 121.



ing further up the Mississippi, occupied Columbus, and on the 9th formally notified Governor Magoffin of his presence on Kentucky soil. On September 14th the Legislature, in which, since a general election in August, the Unionists had gained an overwhelming majority, called upon Polk to withdraw his troops, and a little later passed further ordinances finally identifying the State with the Northern cause.

Although the State Convention of Virginia had passed an Ordinance of Secession on April 17th, yet the western portion of that State was strongly Unionist in sentiment. Geographically, Virginia was divided by the Alleghanies into two parts; and modes of life, commercial interests, and, to some extent, sectional jealousy combined to render the geographical division a political one as well. The inhabitants of the western portion of the State, a land of mountain and forest, were mainly hunters or lumbermen: the plantation system was impossible, and consequently only a very small part of the population consisted of slaves. Material interests caused them to look towards the Ohio and Mississippi rather than the Atlantic coast. By interest and sentiment they formed part of the Great West. But the richer and more populous eastern part of the State outvoted the western half and had acquired complete control of the State Government. It is not surprising that West Virginia saw in the Ordinance of Secession an opportunity for breaking loose from the very one-sided connection with her eastern neighbour. If the State of Virginia could secede from the Union, then West Virginia would secede from Secession. On May 13th delegates met from twenty-five counties of West Virginia at Wheeling to deliberate upon the necessary steps to be taken for the repudiation of the Ordinance of Secession. The State Government at Richmond was, however, by no means disposed to relinquish its hold upon West Virginia. It was valuable not merely for recruiting purposes and as a source of supplies, but strategically, because through it ran the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, the main line of communication between Washington and the West.

Probably the Richmond authorities underestimated the strength of the Unionist feeling on the other side of the Alleghanies. A very small force under Colonel Porterfield was sent from Staunton in the Shenandoah Valley across the mountains to Beverly,<sup>1</sup> to raise recruits, check the spread of Unionist feeling, and, if possible, break up the railway. But West Virginia was very favourably situated for receiving help from the Federal Government. Its nearest neighbour was the large State of Ohio, which had responded with alacrity to President Lincoln's call for troops and had raised thirteen regiments under the command of

<sup>1</sup> See Map II.



Major-General George B. McClellan. This officer was a personal favourite of General Scott, who, in the beginning of May, appointed him to the command of the Military Department of the Ohio, including Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. He at once realised the importance of securing West Virginia to the Federal cause, and promptly despatched a force south, which on June 3rd surprised Colonel Porterfield's command at Philippi, whither it had advanced with a view to menacing Grafton, an important junction on the railroad, and routed it so effectually that the engagement came to be known as "the Philippi races." On June 11th delegates duly elected from forty counties met in formal Convention at Wheeling, reorganised the State Government, appointing E. H. Peirpoint provisional Governor; and on August 20th passed an ordinance creating the new State of Kanawha, which was two years later formally admitted into the Federal Union as the State of West Virginia.

The Confederate Government, loath to abandon such an important military position, and fearing lest McClellan should advance by the Beverly and Staunton turnpike into the Shenandoah Valley, despatched General Garnett to relieve Porterfield. Garnett posted his force of about 4,000 men so as to command the two roads leading to Beverly from the north-west. But McClellan confronted him with greatly superior numbers, and on July 11th surprised the detachment of Colonel Pegram at Rich Mountain, holding the more southern road, and forced him to capitulate with his whole command. Garnett, cut off from his base at Beverly, was forced to retreat in a northern direction, was closely pursued and killed in a rearguard action at Carrick's Ford on July 13th. With the fall of the Confederate general, McClellan's campaign in West Virginia came to an end. Insignificant as were the two engagements in themselves, yet they had very important results. The northern portion of West Virginia was thereby permanently secured to the Union, and McClellan's success was so magnified by public opinion, that after the rout of Bull Run he was summoned to Washington to direct operations in the main theatre of war.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE MILITARY OUTLOOK

The opposing forces—The task of the North—The existing United States Army—Comparison of the raw material available—Difficulties of the offensive—The command of the sea—Jefferson Davis—Abraham Lincoln ; his selection of generals.

THE Secession of the four Border States caused the Confederacy to remove its seat of Government from Montgomery to Richmond. Jefferson Davis entered his new capital on May 29th. Thus the two combatants were face to face with less than one hundred miles dividing their respective capitals.

At first sight the North seemed far the stronger. Twenty-two States were arrayed against half that number. The population of the North numbered twenty-two millions, including less than half a million of slaves. The population of the Southern Confederacy amounted to five and a half millions of whites and three and a half of blacks.<sup>1</sup> It was hoped by the North that the negroes would prove a serious embarrassment to the Confederates, but this was very far from being the case. The slaves were loyal to their masters, watched over the women and children whilst the men were away fighting, tilled the fields, raised the crops, and were largely employed in building fortifications. Still the white population of the North was four times that of the South. In material resources, in business capacity, and in mechanical skill, the South could not compare with the North. The North was largely a manufacturing community ; the South was almost entirely agricultural. The South depended upon the North for many of the necessities of life. The North had almost entire control of the military and naval resources of the country. The United States Government retained possession of whatever there was of organised preparation for war. It is hardly surprising that it was the popular belief of Northerners that Secession would be crushed in ninety days.

But to the shrewd observer it was plain that the North had undertaken an enormous task in attempting to subjugate the South. It would not be sufficient to win victories as a preliminary to dictating advantageous terms of peace ; it was necessary to

<sup>1</sup> 1 Ropes, 98. But Henderson (i. 129) states the white population at seven millions.

crush piecemeal the national spirit of resistance in a country nearly four times the size of France.<sup>1</sup> From the Potomac to the Gulf of Mexico was 800 miles; from the Rio Grande, the western frontier of Texas, to Charleston on the Atlantic coast was 1,700.<sup>2</sup> Throughout this vast distance the means of communication were very limited: the railway system of the South was very much less developed than amongst the Northern States. Nor were there any great cities whose capture would necessarily bring about the downfall of the Confederacy. New Orleans, the commercial capital of the South, fell early in 1862, but the war lasted three years longer. It seemed as though the North had embarked upon a task even more stupendous than Napoleon's when he undertook the conquest of Russia.

As regards military preparedness the North was but little further advanced than the South. Both powers alike had really to create their military forces from the very beginning. Before the outbreak of war the United States Army numbered about 16,000 officers and men.<sup>3</sup> The native American scorned service in the army except as an officer. The uniform was a badge of servitude.<sup>4</sup> The cutting down of military expenses was a favourite theme of the pushing orator, seeking to win a cheap popularity. The rank and file were almost entirely composed of Irish and Germans. Naturally they had no State ties, and consequently, when Secession came, the non-commissioned officers and men of the United States Army almost to a man stood fast by the Union, and refused to desert their paymaster.<sup>5</sup> But this force of regulars, small as it was, was not available for the work of crushing the South. By far the greater part of it was stationed in the Far West and scattered among the many small forts, which guarded the Indian frontier. Only 3,000 could be spared for the actual operations of war in the East.<sup>6</sup> So parsimonious had been the Government's treatment of its unpopular army that provision for transport, supply, and war organisation was almost entirely lacking. Of the 1,200 officers who, having received a military education at West Point, were available for service in 1861 about one-fourth were Southerners;<sup>7</sup> and the vast majority of these, with one or two notable exceptions, such as General Scott and G. H. Thomas,<sup>8</sup> went with their respective States, and resigned their commissions in the United States service. Thus the South secured at once a body of officers who had all received a sound military education, to which many of them added an experience of actual warfare gained in the Mexican campaigns. Some of these officers had been the

<sup>1</sup> Nicolay, 81.

<sup>3</sup> *I B. & L.*, 7.

<sup>5</sup> *I Henderson*, 127.

<sup>7</sup> *I Henderson*, 127.

<sup>2</sup> *I Henderson*, 131, 132.

<sup>4</sup> *I Henderson*, 128.

<sup>6</sup> *I Henderson*, 135.

<sup>8</sup> Scott and Thomas were both Virginians.



most conspicuous men in the United States service. Robert E. Lee, Albert Sidney Johnston, and Joseph E. Johnston would probably have been regarded as the three soldiers in America best qualified for holding large independent commands. The last-named had been Quartermaster-General in the United States Army, and to Lee General Scott had proposed to give the command of the army which was to conquer the South.<sup>1</sup>

The two combatants were similarly situated, in so far as they both had ready to hand a body of competent officers and both had to create a volunteer army for the trained soldiers to command. But the Southern volunteers were better fighting material than the Northerners. The Southerner loved fighting for its own sake: to him, born and reared under an aristocratic régime, war seemed the best and noblest of sports: he was a born horseman, a skilled shot, and trained by his mode of life to become an excellent scout.

The Northerner had none of these natural advantages. He hated war as dragging him from his business and commercial pursuits: the stern joy of battle had no home in a heart devoted to the search for wealth. His daily vocations did not fit him for a military life: the counting-house and the store were but a poor school for the future soldier. Only in the West, where man was still engaged in a struggle with Nature, and the work of civilisation was but half completed, was there anything like military enthusiasm to be found. There the conditions of life more nearly resembled those of the South, and the military instinct was more easily engendered. But, though the Northern soldier fought not from love of fighting, but from stern necessity, yet his purpose was just as resolute as that of his Southern foe. War had been forced upon him, and he was determined to see it through. No half measures would satisfy him now: he must see the South beaten to her knees. Thus, though the Southerner would more quickly develop into a soldier, the Northerner, if only he were given time, would learn the lesson of military discipline, and, animated by a stern sense of duty, would prove no contemptible antagonist. If the war lasted for any considerable length of time the quality of the Northern armies would improve steadily, more and more nearly approaching to the higher standard of Southern efficiency, whilst throughout the whole struggle the advantage of a great superiority in numbers would be with the North, an advantage which would make itself felt the more as time went on.

Yet, since the North, by the very nature of its task, was obliged to assume the offensive and undertake the invasion and conquest of the Confederacy, it was certain to find it most difficult to make its numerical superiority fully felt. Every forward movement would carry its armies further from their base and expose longer

<sup>1</sup> Schouler, 66.



lines of communication to attack. It would be quite possible for the Southern leaders with ordinary military skill to concentrate at the actual points of contact a force fully equal to that of their opponents. The Confederates were acting on the defensive, operating on interior lines, and this gave them an advantage which has been reckoned at the proportion of five to two.<sup>1</sup> Thus the defensive position of the Confederacy went far to counter-balance the numerical superiority of the North. From a military point of view the odds were not very much in favour of the North. The South might even gain such successes at the first as would lead to a reaction at the North, or to the intervention of foreign Powers. Time alone would enable the Federal Government to make its vast superiority in numbers and material resources fully felt, and it could not count with any certainty upon having that time.

Yet at one point, and that a vital point, the Southern Confederacy was singularly vulnerable. The North had entire command of the sea. Very few naval officers seceded from the United States Service. The products of the South were carried across the seas in Northern vessels, owned, built, and manned at the North. The Federal Government found no difficulty in manning the very large fleet, which in the course of the war was called into existence: admirable material could be found in the crews of the trading and fishing vessels. But the South had practically no naval resources at all. Only the very smallest part of her population was engaged in maritime pursuits: she had no shipbuilding industry. She could neither build nor man ships, and so was powerless to break through the iron belt with which the fleets of the North ringed her round.

President Lincoln, at the very outbreak of the war, on April 19th declared the Southern coasts in a state of blockade. Cotton, which was the chief source of Southern wealth, could no longer be exported: the ammunition, arms, and equipments of war, which were so sorely needed, could not be imported. It is true that the blockade runners did a considerable business; but it was a business which steadily decreased with the greater vigilance and growing numbers of the Federal ships, and from the first it was inadequate to supply the needs of a nation. The command of the sea enabled the North to destroy her opponent by slow starvation: sooner or later her internal resources must be exhausted, and the Confederacy collapse from sheer inanition. The North reaped a twofold advantage from its naval supremacy. Not only did it blockade the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, but by gaining possession of the Mississippi it severed the main artery of the Con-

<sup>1</sup> The country was singularly adapted for defensive warfare, and the attacking force would be continually obliged to assault strongly entrenched positions.

federacy. The loss of the control of the Mississippi deprived the Confederate Government of the supplies both of men and provisions which it could otherwise have drawn from Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas, all of them great cattle breeding districts, whose inhabitants displayed military aptitude in a marked degree.

In forecasting the chances of the two combatants, it is necessary to glance for a moment at the characters and qualifications of the rival Presidents. Jefferson Davis, both as soldier and politician, had had a thorough training in public life. He had received a military education, having graduated at West Point in 1828; he retired from the army, but served with distinction through the Mexican War as colonel of a Mississippi regiment of volunteers; he had sat in the National House of Representatives, had been an United States Senator, had served as Secretary of War in President Pierce's administration, and had been chairman of the Military Committee in the United States Senate up to the outbreak of the Civil War. When Mississippi seceded, it elected him Commander-in-Chief of the State forces: when the Southern Confederacy was formed, the almost unanimous voice of the South chose him as its first President.<sup>1</sup> It is possible that his own ambition was for a military rather than a political post, and that he would have preferred to command armies in the field rather than be President of the Confederacy. But as President, just as under the Constitution of the United States, he was also Commander-in-Chief of all the forces of his country. He was thus enabled to exercise a direct control over all military operations. With such a good record as his, it was certain that the first steps in military organisation would be wisely taken.<sup>2</sup> The troops were at a very early stage formed into brigades, military rank was carefully graduated to suit the size of the various commands. Generals commanded armies, Lieutenant-Generals army corps, Major-Generals divisions, and Brigadier-Generals brigades. These careful distinctions of rank secured a subordination and discipline among the higher officers of the Southern armies, which was not to be found at the outset in those of the North, where at first there was no rank higher than that of Major-General, and consequently officers of the same rank were to be found holding commands of very different importance. With his experience in the Mexican War and as Secretary of War President Davis was enabled to make a judicious selection of his

<sup>1</sup> The Georgia delegates first voted for Howell Cobb, but finding that the other States supported Jefferson Davis withdrew their candidate, that the election might be unanimous (1 B. & L., 103).

<sup>2</sup> Yet his subordinates did not realise all the necessities of the struggle. When J. B. Gordon, afterwards the Confederate General and Corps Commander, telegraphed offering to raise a squadron of cavalry, he received the alliterative reply, "No cavalry now needed" (Gordon, 4). This is an interesting precedent to Pall Mall's "Unmounted men preferred" in 1899.

higher officers. The Confederate armies were from the first well led, and in but very few cases did those selected for high commands prove inadequate to the task.

But at the same time there were distinct disadvantages in having for President a man who had been trained as a soldier. He was inclined to interfere with his generals, and hamper their operations in the field on military as well as political grounds. General Lee's strategic genius was constantly thwarted by President Davis's military judgment, and still more was this the case with the operations of General Joseph Johnston. From the first he formed two false conceptions; he believed that European Powers would intervene on behalf of the new-born Confederacy to avert the cotton famine, with which the blockade of the Confederate ports threatened the manufacturers, and he failed to see that a defensive policy may often best be served by offensive measures.

In all respects Abraham Lincoln was a direct contrast to the Southern President. He had no military experience save such as could be gained from having served in a single Indian campaign; his political training was confined to service in his State Legislature and a single term in Congress. He had started in a very humble station of life; he had tried various professions and employments without achieving marked success in any;<sup>1</sup> he had never been engaged in business on a large scale. His natural limitations mainly displayed themselves in an unnecessary despondency<sup>2</sup> on the one hand and a feverish haste for action on the other, which tended to bring him into collision with his generals. But to counterbalance these defects he had an unfailing supply of sound common sense, and a wonderful gift of political insight; with an accuracy which few statesmen have surpassed he was able to gauge the state of public opinion at various critical moments; and from the first to last he showed a magnificent and unfaltering devotion to the Union. He was fully aware of his own military ignorance; if he interfered with his generals it was on political grounds; as far as possible he left them to form their own military plans and did his best to help in carrying them out.

And when once he had found a general who inspired him with confidence, he placed implicit trust in him and gave him a whole-hearted support. But with his military inexperience it took him a long time to find such a general. The earlier years of the war tell a tale of successive disasters due to the incompetence of the Federal generals. Leader after leader was tried in command of the army of the Potomac, and each only proved as great a failure as his predecessor. A grievous error was committed by President Lincoln at the opening of the war in making important military

<sup>1</sup> But as a political lawyer he had made himself a name in his native State of Illinois.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Ropes, 224.

appointments on purely political grounds—a practice which sooner or later led to well deserved disappointment and defeat.<sup>1</sup> Thus it came about, that the Confederate armies fought throughout the war more or less under their original leaders, whilst the generals who led the Federal hosts to ultimate victory belonged to a different generation to those who had commanded at the beginning of the war. Yet with all his shortcomings it may well be doubted whether Lincoln's mistakes in the conduct of the war were as costly as those of his infinitely more experienced rival in the South.

<sup>1</sup> 1 Ropes, 112, 113.



## CHAPTER V

### BULL RUN<sup>1</sup>

Situation in Virginia—Harper's Ferry—Clamour for action in the North—General McDowell's advance—The Bull Run position—McDowell's plans—General Patterson withdraws from the Shenandoah Valley—Junction of Johnston's and Beauregard's forces—McDowell's orders—Beauregard's plans—The battle—Attack on Beauregard's left—McDowell determines to press his advantage—Succession of isolated assaults and Jackson's counterstroke—Flight of the Northerners without pursuit—Results of the battle.

ON neither side were the military authorities disposed to take the offensive. General Scott was not in favour of using the three months' militia for any but defensive operations. General Lee, when he assumed command in Virginia, instead of making any attempt to push across the Potomac either to assist Baltimore or to attack Washington, concentrated his attention upon putting Northern Virginia in a state of defence. The same policy was pursued by President Davis, when on arriving at Richmond at the end of May he took over the control of all the military forces of the Confederacy. Forces were gradually collected and stationed, some at Harper's Ferry to protect the Shenandoah Valley, and others at Manassas Junction to cover the Orange and Alexandria railroad, and at Aquia Creek to defend the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad. Manassas Junction was of great strategical importance, as the main railroad there connected with the Manassas Gap railway running to Front Royal in the Shenandoah Valley. As long as the Junction was covered, the Confederate forces would be operating on interior lines and troops could be brought from "the Valley" to reinforce those on the Orange and Alexandria railroad and *vice versa*. So absorbed were the Confederate authorities in defensive preparations, that no attempt was made to secure possession of Arlington Heights, which, rising on the south side of the Potomac, commanded Washington. Nor was it till May 24th that the Federal Government felt itself in a position to occupy these Heights so vital to the capital's security.

<sup>1</sup> (See Map III.) The Confederates called the battle of July 21st the Battle of Manassas, and dignified the engagement of the 18th with the title of the Battle of Bull Run.

General Scott's defensive measures included an attempt to recapture Harper's Ferry as a necessary step for the protection of Maryland. Major-General Patterson, a veteran of the 1812 and Mexican Wars, was selected to command the force detailed for this purpose. General J. E. Johnston, with a force of about 11,000 men and twenty<sup>1</sup> guns, was holding Harper's Ferry for the Confederates, and at Manassas Junction General Beauregard, fresh from his triumph at Sumter, was in command of an army of 22,000 men and twenty-nine guns.<sup>2</sup> General Scott's original plan was to make the main attack upon the smaller force at Harper's Ferry, and for this purpose Patterson was strongly reinforced, whilst McDowell was to detain Beauregard at Manassas Junction and prevent him sending help to his colleague in the Valley.<sup>3</sup> Johnston, however, had no intention of risking a battle for the possession of Harper's Ferry. He considered that the position was in itself indefensible, being commanded from the north side of the Potomac by the Maryland Heights,<sup>4</sup> and on the south side by the Loudoun Heights. As Patterson slowly advanced from Chambersburg in Pennsylvania towards Williamsport, twenty miles above Harper's Ferry, the Confederate general made his preparations for evacuating his post, and on June 15th fell back to Winchester, the key of the communication with North-East Virginia. General Scott thus succeeded in regaining Harper's Ferry.

But in the meanwhile a new plan of operations was being forced upon the Government at Washington. Popular opinion demanded that some bold stroke should be attempted before the three months' militia were disbanded. The real worthlessness for offensive purposes of these militia was not understood by men who had no experience of warfare. It was believed by the ignorant public, that a success gained against Beauregard's army would lead to astonishing results; the fall of Richmond was regarded as the logical consequence of a victory at Manassas Junction. "On to Richmond" was now the cry, and to the popular clamour the President and his Cabinet yielded. On June 24th, Brigadier-General McDowell, commanding the Federal forces south of the Potomac, by the orders of General Scott laid before the Cabinet a plan of operations. McDowell, who had served in Mexico and previous to the outbreak of the Civil War held the rank of Major in the United States Army, was just as much opposed to an advance as was the Commander-in-Chief. However he had no course but to submit the required plan of campaign, undertaking with a force of 30,000 men to fight Beauregard, provided that Johnston was kept fully occupied in the

<sup>1</sup> 1 Ropes, 124.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Ropes, 125. This estimate includes Holmes' brigade at Aquia Creek.

<sup>3</sup> Nicolay, 172.


<sup>4</sup> See Map IV.

# BATTLE OF

## BULL RUN

21st July 1861 (morning)

Scale of Miles



Federals  
Confederates  
Contours at 50 feet intervals







Shenandoah Valley. It was never contemplated that McDowell alone should fight Beauregard and Johnston combined. General Scott undertook that, if Johnston did succeed in joining Beauregard, Patterson should be close upon his heels.

In presenting his plan of campaign, McDowell asked permission to form his troops into brigades, a striking commentary upon the state of military efficiency as yet attained by the militia army.<sup>1</sup> It is not surprising, therefore, that it was not till July 16th that McDowell felt himself in a condition to take the field. On the afternoon of that day he marched out with 35,732 men and forty-nine guns;<sup>2</sup> of these eight companies of infantry, one battalion of marines, and nine batteries belonged to the regular army. By the morning of the 18th the greater part of his army was concentrated at Centreville, twenty-two miles from Washington and five and half from Manassas Junction.<sup>3</sup>) His advance, as was only to be expected, had been very slow. The troops had not learnt to march any distance: six miles was as much as they could do in a day: they had no idea of discipline, and left their ranks to pick blackberries, fill their water-bottles, and even to take a few hours' rest in the shade of the woods which bordered on the road. If their marching powers were bad, their fighting capacity was not likely to be much better. Only brigaded a week before, they had never been exercised in mass; deployment for battle had not yet been practised; they had received no musketry instruction, and many of the regiments had never fired ball cartridge until they met the enemy in open battle.

Between Centreville and Manassas Junction flows the river of Bull Run: behind it Beauregard had taken up his position. (See Plan.) It was likely to prove no slight obstacle to raw troops, being about as broad as the Thames at Oxford,<sup>4</sup> with wooded precipitous banks; its several fords were carefully guarded by the Confederates. On the 18th Tyler, commanding the first division of the Federal army, pushed forward a brigade to reconnoitre the lower fords, but exposed it to a heavy fire, with the result that the brigade fell back in considerable confusion. This incident was unfortunate, as it discouraged the Federal troops from the outset, and the men of one regiment and one battery, whose period of service was just completed, insisted upon their immediate discharge. The 19th and 20th were spent in collecting the stragglers, bringing up supplies, and reconnaissance work.

The affair of the 18th convinced McDowell that a direct frontal attack on the line of Bull Run was too hazardous. He determined therefore to turn the Confederate flank. His first intention was to move to his own left and outflank their right, but reconnaissances

<sup>1</sup> 1 Ropes, 127.

<sup>3</sup> 1 Henderson, 166.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Ropes, 127.

<sup>4</sup> 1 Henderson, 166.

showed him that the country on that side was too wooded and difficult for the attempt.<sup>1</sup> It remained therefore to operate against the Confederate left, and his engineers were busy till late on the 20th searching for an unguarded ford. Sudley Ford was at last fixed upon as suitable for the purpose, about two miles above the Stone Bridge, where the Warrenton turnpike crosses Bull Run. From Sudley Springs, close to the Ford, a road runs parallel to the river to Manassas. McDowell's plan was to swing his right wing across the river at Sudley Ford, march it down the Sudley-Manassas road till it uncovered the Stone Bridge, where his centre would cross, and with two-thirds of his army annihilate the Confederate left and roll up their whole line from left to right. His own left was to be stationed at and near Centreville, covering the roads leading thither from the fords of Bull Run.

The defects of this plan were, that it involved a tedious march of from ten to twelve miles for the right wing before that force could reach the battlefield; that it depended upon the co-operation of the right and centre and required considerable skill on the part of the inexperienced officers commanding divisions and brigades; and finally, that it exposed the weakly held base and line of communications to a concentrated attack from the enemy's right and centre. McDowell's plan of campaign required, as an absolutely essential condition of success, that Johnston should be detained in the Valley and prevented from joining Beauregard.

But General Patterson completely failed to carry out his allotted task of holding Johnston in check. When the Washington Government determined upon the forward movement to Manassas Junction, part of Patterson's army was recalled to join in the advance. Finding himself deprived of some of his best troops and batteries, that general displayed a degree of caution which was quite uncalled for, as he still retained numerical superiority over Johnston's army. But like so many Federal generals after him, he had formed an exaggerated estimate of his opponent's strength, and was afraid to attack him in any position of his own selection. He had returned to the north side of the Potomac after his reinforcements were withdrawn. But under pressure from Scott he again crossed the Potomac at Williamsport<sup>2</sup> with 14,000 men on July 2nd, and "crawled on" to Martinsburg. Johnston moved out from Winchester and took up a position waiting to be attacked. At the end of four days, as Patterson made no movement, he again withdrew to Winchester. Patterson, repeatedly urged by General Scott to keep in close touch with Johnston, at last, on the 15th, advanced from Martinsburg in the direction of Winchester, and on the 16th was at Bunker Hill, but the following day moved to his left and occupied Charlestown, considerably increasing his distance

<sup>1</sup> 1 Ropes, 136-7.

<sup>2</sup> See Map V.

from Johnston, and leaving that general to carry out, without any fear of interruption, the movement which he was ordered to execute on the 18th.

As Johnston and Beauregard held quite independent commands, it was difficult to ensure co-operation between them, especially as Beauregard was full of enterprise and in favour of offensive operations, whilst Johnston was a cautious general preferring to act on the defensive. Each expected that he would be attacked by superior numbers, and urgently pressed for reinforcements from the other's army. Beauregard's information received through spies in Washington was reliable, and President Davis had determined at the fitting moment to reinforce him with the whole of Johnston's army. But both the President and General Lee, his military adviser, saw that the junction must be delayed until McDowell was fairly committed to a forward movement, otherwise he would fall back to the defences in front of Washington and the Valley would be left at the mercy of Patterson. Indeed, they delayed so long, that, had not unforeseen circumstances prevented McDowell from attacking till the 21st, the reinforcements would have come too late. On the 17th Beauregard telegraphed to Richmond, that McDowell's advance had begun the previous day. At 1 a.m. on the 18th Johnston received a telegram ordering him to move at once to Beauregard's assistance. Jackson's brigade led the march, and passing the Blue Ridge at Ashby's Gap took the train at Piedmont, and reached Manassas Junction at 4 p.m. on the 19th. A collision on the single line of railway prevented the other troops following as rapidly as was expected,<sup>1</sup> and on the morning of the 21st only three of the four brigades of Johnston's army were with Beauregard.

On the night of the 20th McDowell ordered Tyler to move at 2.30 the following morning with three of the four brigades constituting his division along the Warrenton turnpike to the Stone Bridge. He was to be followed by Hunter's and Heintzelman's divisions, which at a certain point were to leave the turnpike and take a wood-road branching off to the right and leading to Sudley Ford. Miles' division with Tyler's 4th Brigade was to remain at Centreville, guarding the line of communications and observing the lower fords of Bull Run. Runyon's division had been left to guard the line between Centreville and Washington, and was not available for the battle of the 21st. There was considerable confusion and delay in commencing the movement owing to the fact that the brigade camps had not been pitched with any reference to the intended operations, and the narrow streets of Centreville were

<sup>1</sup> Henderson, 165. But Johnston, *Narrative*, 58, denies that the railway track was obstructed by any collision, and attributes his failure to bring up all his troops in time to the "miserable mismanagement of the railroad trains."



blocked by troops of all three divisions entering simultaneously. At 6 a.m. Tyler arrived in front of the Stone Bridge, which was guarded by a demi-brigade under Evans, and at 6.30 a.m. commenced the demonstration, which was to keep Evans at the bridge until the Federal right wing was ready to fall upon his flank and rear. Evans, however, was an experienced soldier, and soon suspecting, by the cloud of dust which marked the advance of the Federal right, that Tyler's demonstration was a mere feint, and that an attempt was being made to turn his left flank, about 9 a.m. moved with six of his ten companies and a battalion called the Louisiana Tigers<sup>1</sup> to his left and rear, and took up a position north of Young's Branch on the Matthews Hill across the Manassas-Sudley road.

Johnston, who had only reached Manassas Junction the previous day, had wisely allowed Beauregard to fix the plan of battle. The latter had settled to throw the bulk of his troops across the river by the lower fords, and bearing down by converging roads on Centreville to gain possession of the enemy's line of communications. Orders had been sent before 6 a.m. to the brigadiers commanding at the lower fords for an early advance. But General Ewell, who was to have led the advance, never received his orders, and consequently no forward movement took place at all. Johnston and Beauregard vainly waited for two hours on a hill near Mitchell's Ford to see the movement commenced.

At 10.30 word came from Ewell explaining the cause of delay, and at the same time it became plain that heavy fighting was in progress on the left. Beauregard was obliged to abandon his intended attack from the right and concentrate all his efforts upon repulsing the Federal advance against his left. As early as 7.30 he had ordered Bee, Bartow, and Jackson to move their brigades to the left to reinforce Evans at the Stone Bridge, where Tyler had commenced his demonstration, and Bee and Bartow took up a position on the Henry House Hill south of Young's Branch. About 9.30 the Federal turning column, having advanced a mile from Sudley Ford, came into action against Evans on the Matthews Hill.

Evans made a gallant resistance against Burnside's brigade, which was leading the advance, and finding himself being overpowered by superior numbers called on Bee and Bartow to cross Young's Branch and come to his help. They hurried their troops across the valley of the stream and took position on the Matthews Hill. But the Federal attack was steadily developing itself, fresh brigades were coming up on Burnside's right, and Sherman, commanding one of Tyler's brigades, had led his troops across Bull Run by a ford above the Stone Bridge and was threatening

<sup>1</sup> Henderson, 174; 1 B. & L., 206.



the Confederate flank.<sup>1</sup> The Confederates were forced to abandon their position and fall back to the Henry House Hill. The Federal artillery opened upon them with great effect as they were recrossing Young's Branch, and the retreat threatened to become a rout.

But by this time (11.30) Jackson's brigade had arrived upon the scene and taken up its position not on the crest, but on the eastern edge of the Henry House Hill, some 500 yards to the rear in the woods, which covered the lower slopes of the hill on its eastern and southern faces.<sup>2</sup> The new position was a strong one: for it was but little exposed to artillery fire, unless the Federal guns should cross Young's Branch, ascend the hill to the crest, and then come into action within 500 yards of the Confederate riflemen. It was behind Jackson's brigade, "standing," as Bee cried, "like a stone wall," that the retreating Confederates began to rally. At noon Johnston and Beauregard reached the Henry House Hill, bringing with them two batteries. They at once realised the very serious state of affairs. The first part of the Federal movement had been successfully executed: the right wing and centre had joined hands, whilst the Confederate generals found themselves surprised, their left wing in danger of annihilation, and no reserves within four miles.<sup>3</sup> Both galloped to and fro, freely exposing themselves, whilst they tried to rally the fugitives and form a connected line of battle. That accomplished, Beauregard remained in command on the hill, and Johnston went back to superintend the bringing up of reinforcements.

The whole force of Confederates on the hill at that moment amounted to 6,500 infantry, a handful of cavalry, and sixteen guns. To crush this force McDowell had available 16,000 men and twelve guns.<sup>4</sup> The superiority of the Federal artillery more than counterbalanced the greater number of the Confederate guns. Seven out of the eight brigades which made up McDowell's right and centre were on the south side of Bull Run: Schenck's brigade was still on the further side unable to clear away the abattis, with which the Confederates had obstructed the bridge, but it could have been brought across by the same ford by which Sherman had crossed. Keyes' brigade of Tyler's division had crossed the Run, but after a faint-hearted attack against the Confederate right marched down Young's Branch, apparently in the hope of turning the enemy's flank, and took no further part in the engagement. Howard's brigade of Heintzelman's division had not yet come upon the field, and Burnside's brigade, which had led the advance, was allowed by McDowell to withdraw, in order that it might rest and replenish its ammunition.

<sup>1</sup> It is however stated (1 B. & L., 186) that Sherman's advance had nothing to do with the Confederate retreat, as Sherman's brigade did not begin to cross Bull Run till noon, and the Confederate position on Matthews Hill was abandoned before 11.30 a.m.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Henderson, 178.

<sup>3</sup> 1 Henderson, 179.

<sup>4</sup> 1 Henderson, 181.

Consequently McDowell, to continue the work so successfully begun, had only four brigades actually to hand, numbering about 9,000 men.<sup>1</sup> Realising the necessity of pressing the enemy and giving them no opportunity to rally, and fearing lest at any moment reinforcements might reach them, he determined not to halt and reform his somewhat disorganised troops, but to continue the advance without pause. He made no attempt to form a properly connected line of battle with supports for the purpose of carrying the Henry House Hill. With such inexperienced officers and men it would have been a waste of valuable time. For the same reason he did not attempt to turn the enemy's flanks; but deeming it all-important not to damp the ardour of his victorious troops by delay, sent them forward, just as they came up, to a direct frontal attack on the Henry House Hill. Knowing how great is the moral support which infantry derive from the near presence of artillery on the field of battle,<sup>2</sup> he ordered two of his batteries to cross Young's Branch, ascend the hill, and come into action on the south-west side of the plateau, which lies between the crest and the woods where Jackson's line was established. The two batteries, on coming into position and opening fire upon the Confederate batteries, which were posted on the east side of the plateau, found themselves exposed to a harassing rifle fire from the woods. A charge of Stuart's handful of cavalry put to flight an infantry regiment coming up in support of the batteries. One of Jackson's regiments moved out from the woods and, being mistaken for a Federal regiment advancing to support the artillery, was allowed to approach within seventy yards,<sup>3</sup> when it poured in a point-blank volley which put the two batteries out of action. For the rest of the day these guns stood silent on the plateau, the prize repeatedly gained and lost again, for which the two armies contended.

The loss of these two batteries, which occurred about 1.30 p.m., was a serious blow to McDowell, but by no means destroyed all hope of ultimate success. The Federal troops, still believing that victory was in their grasp, kept up a succession of assaults, which, though almost wholly lacking in unity, as the brigades and even the regiments delivered their attacks quite independently of each other, nevertheless gradually forced the Confederates back. Three times the deserted guns were taken and retaken,<sup>4</sup> and about 2.45 almost the whole plateau was in the hands of the Federals.<sup>5</sup> Jackson's brigade was still lying sheltered in the belt of pine-woods; and at this stage its commander ordered a bayonet charge. The Federal centre was broken. At the same moment Kirby Smith's brigade of Johnston's army, which had at last reached

<sup>1</sup> 1 Ropes, 147.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Ropes, 149.

<sup>3</sup> 1 Henderson, 183.

<sup>4</sup> Nicolay, 193.

<sup>5</sup> 1 Henderson, 185.

Manassas Junction and hurried from the station to the battlefield, bore down upon the Federal right, and Beauregard, seizing his opportunity, ordered a general advance.<sup>1</sup> The Federals were driven back over the crest of the hill down into the valley. Howard's brigade was brought into action in a vain attempt to change the fortunes of the day.<sup>2</sup> Along the line of Young's Branch, about 3.30 p.m., McDowell made his last stand with a battalion of regulars forming a strong centre.<sup>3</sup> But Early's brigade coming up from the lower fords of Bull Run outflanked the Federal right, and the volunteer army, recognising the uselessness of further resistance, about 4 p.m. quickly melted away.

It was not a panic rout; but the men, whose martial ardour for so many hours of the hard-fought day had supplied the place of discipline,<sup>4</sup> when they saw all chance of victory gone, acted on their own individual judgment and left the ranks. (All organisation was lost both in brigades and regiments: here and there some of the officers succeeded in rallying a few of their men, and these small bodies formed upon the battalion of regulars, who admirably preserved their discipline amid the general scene of confusion. Thus a small rearguard was formed which covered the retreat of the rest of the army streaming away in the direction of Centreville by the roads, by which the different divisions had marched in the morning. The Confederates were in no condition to maintain a vigorous pursuit. The troops, which had been fighting all day, were thoroughly exhausted, and the brigades of Kirby Smith and Early were somewhat fatigued by the hasty march, which had only just brought them to the battlefield in time, and considerably disorganised by the sudden victory. In truth, the Confederates did not at once grasp the extent of their success. Beauregard was even afraid that McDowell might deliver a second attack and try to force the lower fords.

The pursuit was left to the cavalry, who were unable to make any serious impression on the rearguard, although they captured a considerable number of stragglers.<sup>5</sup> When, however, the Confederates brought a battery to bear upon the bridge, by which the Warrenton turnpike crossed Cub Run, a small stream running into Bull Run from the north, the retreat of the Federals degenerated into a panic. It was at this point that the capture of guns and wagons was chiefly made. It was found impossible to make the disorganised mob rally at Centreville, as McDowell had intended. Without waiting for any orders the fugitives streamed

<sup>1</sup> 1 Henderson, 185.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Henderson, 186; but see 1 B. & L., 190 and 212, and note at end of chapter.

<sup>3</sup> 1 Henderson, 186.

<sup>4</sup> 1 Ropes, 155.

<sup>5</sup> Bonham's and Longstreet's infantry brigades were ordered to intercept the Federal retreat on the turnpike. But Bonham "found so little appearance of rout as to make the execution of his orders seem impracticable." (Johnston, 1 B. & L., 249.)



on and knew no rest until they had again reached the fortifications of Washington. The division of Miles which had been left at Centreville stood firm, and with the battalion of regulars and Richardson's brigade of Tyler's division covered the precipitate retreat. The Federal loss was 460 killed and 1,124 wounded and 1,312 missing; total, 2,896. The Confederates lost 387 killed, 1,582 wounded, and 13 missing; total, 1,982.<sup>1</sup> The Confederates captured 25 guns. Besides the main battle, which raged on the Confederate left, a sharp engagement took place on the other wing, where Jones' brigade crossed Bull Run at McLean's Ford, but was driven back by Davies' brigade of Miles' division with a loss of 76 killed and wounded.<sup>2</sup>

Such was the battle of Bull Run, a battle which will always have a special interest as being the first of the Civil War, and because the combatants on both sides were raw and untrained volunteers, who had yet to learn the soldier's trade. The battle itself did not lead to any very important results. To the Northerners the unexpected reverse was a terrible shock: but it only served to brace them to the struggle and make them more determined to carry it through to the end. The very day after the defeat the House of Representatives voted the enlistment of 500,000 men. To the South the victory did more harm than good. It gave them an exaggerated idea of the superiority of their own soldiers: and it caused their Government to rely more upon the hope of foreign intervention, as it was believed that the victory had greatly impressed the European Powers, than upon the natural resources of the Confederacy.

It is a matter of controversy, whether the Confederate victory of Bull Run ought to have led to the capture of Washington. Later on in the year there seems to have sprung up a feeling at the South, that more ought to have resulted from the rout of the Federal army, and a somewhat unjust attempt was made to put the blame upon the President. General McClellan, who was summoned to Washington the day after the battle, considered that up to July 26th there was nothing to prevent even a small force of Confederate cavalry riding into the City, and that an attack might have been made with every prospect of success upon the Arlington Heights. On the other hand Johnston, the Confederate Commander-in-Chief, stated that his army was more disorganised by victory than that of the United States by defeat: and though it is true that a considerable part of the Confederate army had not been engaged, there were still the two divisions of Miles and Runyon, the brigade of Richardson and Sykes' battalion of regulars to be dealt with. These troops could have held the fortifications of Washington—and the Confederates would have

<sup>1</sup> 1 Ropes, 153.

<sup>2</sup> Nicolay, 199.



found storming entrenchments a very different thing to repulsing an attack in the open field—until Patterson's army could have been brought up from the Valley. It is probable that McClellan exaggerated the defenceless state of the capital. A more vigorous pursuit might perhaps have been made, but the Confederate generals would not have been justified in attempting a *coup-de-main* against the fortifications of Washington.

### NOTE ON BATTLE OF BULL RUN

Though the various accounts of this battle present very different views of its details, yet its main features are tolerably clear. The first stage of the battle was fought out on the Matthews Hill, where Evans' small command, subsequently reinforced by Bee and Bartow, repulsed Hunter's division but was forced to retire across Young's Branch, when Hunter was reinforced by Heintzelman's division and McDowell brought up his artillery. Probably also the Confederate retreat was hastened by the advance of Sherman's and Keyes' brigades across Bull Run. This however is denied by General Fry (1 B. & L., 186), who says that the first stage of the fight was over by 11.30 a.m., and that it was not till noon that these two brigades began to cross Bull Run. The Confederate retreat was covered by Imboden's battery and the Hampton Legion.

The main feature of the second stage was the struggle for the Henry Hill, though McDowell's superiority in numbers caused the Federal line to extend beyond the Confederate left, and some fighting took place in the belt of wood which crossed the Sudley-Manassas road.

The mischance which befell the two Federal batteries enabled Jackson with the remnants of Evans', Bee's, and Bartow's commands to hold on to the Henry Hill, whilst the Confederate generals were bringing up reinforcements. Henderson regards Jackson's bayonet charge as the main factor in the Confederate success on that part of the field. Beauregard speaks of two bayonet charges made by his orders, and seems to regard Jackson's charge as part of the first general advance, which he directed. Most writers, however, consider Kirby Smith's advance from Manassas Junction along the Sudley road as the cause of the Confederate success in the second stage of the battle, since it turned the Federal right.

There is considerable controversy as to the time when Howard's brigade was brought into action. Beauregard and Fry state that it was "put in" after the annihilation of the Federal batteries and that it took part in the struggle for the Henry Hill. Henderson, however, thinks that it was not brought up till the Henry Hill had been finally lost by the Federals.

The third stage of the battle took place on the further bank of Young's Branch. McDowell had established a strong line in this new position, but the arrival of Early's brigade from the lower fords turned the Federal right, and the battle came to an end.

Longstreet says that his brigade and Bonham's were ordered across Bull Run to cut off the retreating army from Centreville, and that their artillery was just going to open fire, when Major Whiting, in his capacity as Johnston's staff officer, ordered the withdrawal of the two brigades.

## CHAPTER VI

### MCCLELLAN REORGANISES THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC—DISCUSSION OF PLANS FOR THE NEXT CAMPAIGN

McClellan appointed commander of the Northern forces in the East—Formation of a new army—The Southern plans—General Scott resigns, and McClellan is appointed commander of all the armies—Criticism of McClellan's plan—Failure of Frémont west of the Mississippi—Military Departments of the Missouri, under Halleck, and of the Ohio, under Buell, formed—Buell's view of the situation—McClellan's objection—Northern victory at Mill Springs, January, 1862—McClellan's moves during November and December, 1861—Lincoln commences to interfere with McClellan's plans—Lincoln issues orders—McClellan's plan to transport his army by sea—Plan approved with certain restrictions—Lincoln appoints Army Corps Commanders—The *Monitor* and the *Monitor*—Modification of McClellan's plan; his command reduced to the Army of the Potomac—Relations of Lincoln and McClellan—General R. E. Lee appointed to the Southern command in West Virginia.

IT was inevitable after the rout of Bull Run that the Federal Government should seek without delay a new commander. On the day after the battle General George B. McClellan was summoned from West Virginia to the capital and assigned under General Scott to the command of all the forces in and around Washington. The new commander was in his thirty-fifth year:<sup>1</sup> he had had a brief but brilliant military career. He had graduated at West Point 1st in the class of 1846: entering the Engineers, he had served with distinction in the Mexican War, and had been appointed one of a board of three officers sent to the Crimea to note and report upon European methods of warfare and military administration. In 1857 he retired from the army to take up railway work, and was residing at Cincinnati when the war broke out. The successes which he had gained on July 11th and 13th over Pegram and Garnett, though small in themselves, were decisive in effect, and moreover were as yet the only victories which the Federals could lay claim to. General Scott had a very high opinion of him; and under the circumstances his selection was natural and judicious.

In a remarkably short time McClellan achieved the task of restoring confidence at Washington. Whatever may have been

<sup>1</sup> Born December 31d, 1826.

his limitations as a soldier, he was undoubtedly a first-rate organiser. The three months' militia had just been disbanded, and a new army had to be built up out of the three years' volunteers. No man was better qualified for the work than McClellan. Possessed of extremely winning manners, he had a knack of impressing himself upon men.<sup>1</sup> He very early won the confidence of his soldiers, and for the first few months at least possessed the full confidence of the Government. Profoundly convinced of the truth that it takes time to make a soldier, he made elaborate preparations for training his army into a serviceable weapon of war. Between August 4th and October 15th at least 100,000 men poured into Washington.<sup>2</sup> These new levies on arrival were kept in camps on the north bank of the Potomac, formed into provisional brigades, and trained, equipped, and drilled until they were sufficiently advanced to be transferred to the south side of the river, and there to take their place among the regular brigades already formed. A further stage was reached when the brigades were organised into divisions. With such a system and such an organiser, the Army of the Potomac grew rapidly in numbers and efficiency.

It became plain to the commanders of the Confederate army encamped at Manassas that if McClellan were allowed to pursue his work of organisation undisturbed, the following spring at the latest would see a Federal army of overwhelming numbers taking the field, against which they would have no reasonable chance of contending with success. They therefore invited President Davis to a conference, and on October 1st the President and his generals held a council of war at Fairfax Court House to consider whether any offensive movement was practicable before the approach of winter should put an end to military operations. All three generals—Johnston, Beauregard, and G. W. Smith<sup>3</sup>—were in favour of an advance into Maryland: they argued that in that case McClellan would be obliged to take the field against them with an army as yet only half trained, and that it was probable that the victors of Bull Run would be more than a match for any such force. They asked, however, for a reinforcement of 20,000 trained troops, to bring the numbers up to 60,000.<sup>4</sup> President Davis declared himself unable to send them the required number of reinforcements: the troops already equipped could not be spared from the posts which they were then occupying, and there were not enough weapons in the Confederate arsenals to arm more than 2,500 of the raw recruits who were gathering at Richmond.<sup>5</sup> Consequently the proposed plan was abandoned. President Davis preferred to maintain a

<sup>1</sup> 1 Ropes, 165.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Ropes, 167.

<sup>3</sup> Beauregard commanded the 1st Corps and G. W. Smith the 2nd Corps of the Confederate army at Manassas, of which J. E. Johnston was Commander-in-Chief.

<sup>4</sup> "Smith was content with a force of 50,000" (1 Ropes, 196).

<sup>5</sup> Lee's *Lee*, 133.



strictly defensive policy, with its very much smaller chances of success, instead of concentrating all his available troops for a bold stroke which might have had far-reaching results. There can hardly be a doubt, from a military point of view, that the Southern President was guilty of a grave error when he thus condemned his generals at the head of a victorious army to a policy of inactivity, which was certain as the winter advanced to act unfavourably upon the *moral* and health of the troops.<sup>1</sup>

At the end of October General Scott resigned his command. He was too old for his post;<sup>2</sup> his experience in the field had been almost entirely with regulars, and unfitted him for dealing with volunteers; he was plainly a drag upon the activity of his younger subordinate. On November 1st McClellan was appointed to the command under the President of all the armies of the Federal Government. The change of general was attended by a change of plan. General Scott had been in favour of making the main movement down the Mississippi. General McClellan, soon after he was summoned to Washington, had suggested the following plan to the President.<sup>3</sup> He proposed to raise a force of 273,000 men: he asked for the co-operation of a strong naval force and a fleet of transports. With this enormous army he intended to invade Virginia and march through the Atlantic States, landing troops from the fleet at various points, and to occupy Richmond, Charleston, Savannah, Montgomery, Pensacola, Mobile and New Orleans, to move into the enemy's country and crush the rebellion in its very heart.

It is worth considering, this scheme put forward by McClellan, because it illustrates very well the weak side of his military character. With him the imagination was all-powerful; unless facts impressed themselves strongly upon his imagination they were not likely to be allowed their full significance. He had conjured up the picture of an invincible army sweeping through the Confederacy and reducing all the towns on or near the coast. But even had it been practicable, such a scheme would not have destroyed the Southern armies—they would have withdrawn inland, and the heart of the Confederacy would have remained untouched.<sup>4</sup>

It must soon have become plain to McClellan that public opinion would not let him wait till he had collected his enormous armament. At the beginning of October the Confederates established batteries on the lower Potomac and practically closed the navigation of the river. Public opinion demanded that McClellan should march against Johnston at Manassas, a movement which would compel the withdrawal of the batteries; or that at least he should

<sup>1</sup> 1 Ropes, 170-3.

<sup>2</sup> August 4th, 1861.

<sup>3</sup> Born in 1787.

<sup>4</sup> 1 Ropes, 178.



cross the river and drive off the batteries. McClellan did neither. He knew his army was not yet fit to take the field, and his belief, that Johnston had just double the number of troops which he really had, naturally made him decline to run any risks. But he ought certainly to have organised an expedition against the batteries commanding the river. With the resources which he had at his disposal he could have ensured practical certainty of success—and such an undertaking was admirably adapted to test the efficiency of his army and to improve its *moral*.<sup>1</sup> But he refused to undertake any movement at all, until his army was completely equipped for the execution of his own carefully matured plan. In the same spirit he turned a deaf ear to the entreaties of the naval authorities that he should send an expedition to recapture Norfolk. As a consequence, the Confederates were able to raise the sunken *Merrimac* and transform her into a formidable ironclad.

As Commander-in-Chief, McClellan controlled the other Federal armies which were in the field. At the beginning of the war President Lincoln had appointed Frémont to the command of the Western Department, which embraced all the country west of the Mississippi. This was one of the political appointments which so richly deserved censure. Frémont had gained considerable fame as an explorer in the far North-West: as “the Pathfinder” he had been the Republican candidate in the Presidential Election of 1856. But he had no experience of regular warfare: yet President Lincoln conferred upon him the rank of Major-General in the regular army, and put him in command of a most important department. The state of affairs in Missouri was critical. Governor Jackson, after his defeat at Boonville, had fled to South-West Missouri. He there received considerable reinforcements from Arkansas and Texas, and was enabled to take the field again with a force numerically superior to that of the Federals. On August 10th General Lyon was killed in an indecisive battle at Wilson’s Creek.<sup>2</sup> The disagreements of the Confederate generals

<sup>1</sup> 1 Ropes, 182.

<sup>2</sup> Battle of Wilson’s Creek. (See Map IX.) After the engagement at Boonville on June 17th, Sterling Price abandoned Lexington on the Missouri and retreated to the south-west to join Governor Jackson. A small Federal force under Sigel was sent in pursuit to prevent the junction of the two Confederate leaders. But on July 5th Sigel encountered a greatly superior force under Jackson, and was forced after a sharp engagement to fall back on Springfield. On July 13th he was joined by Lyon. Whilst the Federal commanders vainly waited for reinforcements, which Frémont failed to send, Price had been reinforced by Arkansas and Texas troops. The Confederate army numbering from 10,000 to 12,000 men under General McCulloch assumed the offensive, and Lyon, who had barely half the strength of his opponents, was obliged, in the hope of securing an uninterrupted retreat, to take the bold step of attacking the enemy. With the bulk of his forces he attacked the enemy’s front, whilst Sigel was sent to fall upon their right rear. The latter was not strong enough to make much impression, and Lyon in the heat of the battle was killed. The Federals then retired, but in spite of their leader’s death made good their retreat to Rolla, the terminus of the St. Louis railway.

prevented them making the most of their opportunities. But Frémont proved himself utterly incompetent, and on November 2nd was relieved of his command.

When in September Kentucky abandoned the attempt to remain neutral, and definitely declared herself on the side of the North,<sup>1</sup> the theatre of war in the West was greatly enlarged, as the whole country between the Mississippi and the mountains of West Virginia became available for military operations. McClellan therefore determined to form two military Departments in the West. To the Department of the Missouri, which besides the States of Arkansas and Missouri included that part of Kentucky which lies west of the Cumberland, Halleck was assigned in command, whilst Buell was put at the head of the Department of the Ohio, which embraced Tennessee and the rest of Kentucky.<sup>2</sup> McClellan expected Halleck to open up the Mississippi, and Buell to bear help to the distressed Unionists in East Tennessee. For in that mountainous district, just as in the neighbouring district of West Virginia, the majority of the inhabitants were staunch supporters of the Union. President Lincoln naturally desired that speedy assistance should be sent to them, and the success which had attended the Federal arms in West Virginia encouraged him to hope that like results might be attained in East Tennessee.

McClellan readily fell in with Lincoln's wishes, because he had convinced himself that the success of his intended advance on Richmond depended upon the occupation of East Tennessee by a Federal force. Buell, however, took a very different and far sounder view of the military position. He saw that a direct advance into East Tennessee would involve immense difficulties.<sup>3</sup> There was neither railroad nor river in that district to serve as a line of communications: the movement would have to be made by country roads, which would soon be impassable, through a more or less hostile territory, and exposed throughout the whole distance to a flank attack from the main Confederate army of the West. For the Richmond authorities with a just appreciation of the case had placed all the operations in the West under the control of a single leader, Albert Sidney Johnston, one of the most experienced and distinguished officers in the Confederate service. Buell urged that the defeat of Johnston's army must precede any attempt to reach East Tennessee. To ensure success, he recommended that Halleck should organise two flotilla columns to make their way up the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers: this movement would strike the Confederate line, reaching from Columbus on the Mississippi to Bowling Green, in the centre at its most vulnerable

<sup>1</sup> In spite of this decision on the part of the Legislature, several thousand Kentuckians joined the Confederate cause.

<sup>2</sup> 1 *Ropes*, 197.

<sup>3</sup> See Map VI.

point: simultaneously his own army would advance against Nashville. Not only would the Confederate line be forced, and Nashville, the capital of Tennessee, be captured, but, if the movement were vigorously followed up, the Federal armies might gain Chattanooga, and thus secure a position on the Tennessee and Virginia railroad which would enable them to render much more effective aid to the Unionists of East Tennessee.

There can be no reasonable doubt that Buell's view of the situation was the correct one.<sup>1</sup> The movement which he advocated was the one adopted the following year with striking success. It enabled the Federals to make full use of their control of the rivers, whose course pierced the centre of the Confederate line, and it compelled the Confederate Commander either to fight at a disadvantage or else abandon to the enemy the greater part of the important State of Tennessee. But McClellan, entirely absorbed in the plan of campaign for his own army, could not be brought to see the advantages of the course advocated by Buell. The utmost concession that could be wrung from him was that Halleck might, if he could, despatch the suggested flotilla columns up the rivers to draw attention away from Buell, who was still to advance with the bulk of his forces into East Tennessee. Halleck declined to take any part in the movement. He had quite enough to do in Missouri repairing the consequences of Frémont's incompetence.

Accordingly Buell prepared to carry out the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, and in January ordered one of his divisions under General Thomas to move against a Confederate force under General Zollicoffer which had advanced through Cumberland Gap into Kentucky. The two forces encountered each other at Mill Springs. The Confederate army was totally defeated with the loss of twelve guns.<sup>2</sup> Though the forces engaged on either side did not exceed 4,000 this victory, as the first success gained since the disastrous day of Bull Run, was received by the North with great rejoicing. Any further advance in that direction was, however, prevented by an unexpected move on the part of Halleck, presently to be recounted.

It seems very doubtful whether General McClellan had any real intention of taking the field before the spring of 1862.<sup>3</sup> He had

<sup>1</sup> For an appreciation of Buell's strategic plan, see 1 Ropes, 200-8.

<sup>2</sup> The Confederate force on the actual day of battle was commanded by General Crittenden. Zollicoffer, second in command, was killed during the engagement.

<sup>3</sup> 1 Ropes, 183, says that "McClellan unquestionably intended as late as the latter part of November, 1861, to advance directly upon the Confederate army, whether at Manassas or wherever he might find it. About this time, however, he began to consider several plans for removing the army to the lower Rappahannock." But the Comte de Paris (2 B. & L., 112-22) considers that from October 21st, the day of the unfortunate affair at Ball's Bluff, McClellan was seized with "a fatal hesitation." It was part of McClellan's plan not to advance with the Army of the Potomac until the western armies were ready to assume the offensive. Shortly after assuming the supreme control of all



certainly encouraged the Government to believe that he would move out towards Manassas Junction before the roads became impassable. But the large number of Confederate spies in Washington compelled him to keep his plans absolutely secret. He dared take no one into his confidence. If General Johnston had discovered that his position was not likely to be attacked that year, he would have been enabled to detach troops to various threatened points. As it was, the main Confederate army was detained at Manassas waiting for the attack, which never came, whilst McClellan was enabled to carry out without encountering any serious opposition, his plan for descents upon various points of the enemy's coasts. In November, Beaufort, in South Carolina, was occupied by a Federal force of 12,000 men, and in the following March a force of about the same strength under General Burnside took possession of Newberne in North Carolina. Both these movements were based upon the co-operation of army and navy. McClellan hoped that from Beaufort an advance might be made upon Charleston and Savannah, whilst Newberne was intended to serve as a base for a movement upon Wilmington. But in neither case was the land force sufficiently strong to carry out the contemplated movement.

In December General McClellan fell seriously ill, and it was not until the middle of January that he was able to resume his official duties. During his illness President Lincoln took the somewhat irregular step of consulting with various of the most important officers in Washington, especially Generals McDowell and Franklin. The President was at the time in a state of great despondency, which there was really nothing in the existing state of affairs to justify.<sup>1</sup> To use his own expression, "The bottom would be out of the whole affair," unless some important movement were quickly undertaken. In December the Joint Committee of Congress, consisting of three Senators and four Members of the House of Representatives, was created. This body was strongly infected with the general distrust of McClellan, which had been steadily growing ever since it was seen that no attempt was being made to reopen the Potomac to navigation, and lost no opportunity of pressing the President to force his reluctant general into action. Both McDowell and Franklin had declared themselves in favour of a movement upon the Confederate army at Manassas.<sup>2</sup> Public opinion was unanimous in demanding that the disgrace of Bull Run should be wiped out by a victory won on the same spot.

the Federal armies on November 1st, he found it impossible for the western armies to commence operations before the following spring. The seizure of the Confederate envoys on board the *Trent*, news of which act reached Washington on November 16th, also compelled McClellan to take into consideration the possibility of having to face an invasion of a British force operating from Canada.

<sup>1</sup> *E. J.*, 224.

<sup>2</sup> *Wells*, 17.



But McClellan, believing the reports of his secret service agents, had estimated Johnston's army at twice its real strength, and even before he was taken ill had begun to consider plans for transporting his army by sea to the neighbourhood of Richmond.

On his recovery McClellan laid his new plan before the President. The latter absolutely refused to accept it, and in the hope of forcing McClellan's hand issued on January 31st a special order commanding the Army of the Potomac to advance and seize a point on the railroad south-west of Manassas Junction. He had already issued on January 27th a General Order directing that Washington's birthday, on February 22nd, should be signalised by a general advance of all the Federal land and naval forces. These orders can hardly have been regarded by the President as final.<sup>1</sup> For on February 3rd he wrote to McClellan to the effect that he would willingly yield his own plan, if McClellan would give him satisfactory answers to certain questions, and thereby prove that his plan was the better one.

Answering the President's letter on the same day, McClellan stated his own plan at length. Its fundamental conception was that the mass of the army should be transported by sea to some point whence Richmond could easily be threatened. As to the exact point of disembarkation he offered three suggestions.<sup>2</sup> The troops might land at Urbana, on the lower Rappahannock, where they would be but one day's march from Westpoint, and from there within two marches of Richmond.<sup>3</sup> By this movement he expected to cut off a Confederate force under Magruder in the Yorktown Peninsula (between the York and James Rivers), and to capture Richmond before Johnston could come to the rescue.<sup>4</sup> Mob Jack Bay, an arm of the sea north of the York River, was the second point proposed, whilst the third, "if the worst came to the worst," was Fortress Monroe, at the extremity of the Peninsula. A very serious objection to this plan, in the eyes of the President, was that it would uncover Washington and expose it to the danger of an attack from the main Confederate army, which the President, accepting McClellan's information as accurate, probably reckoned at twice its real strength.<sup>5</sup>

On February 27th, after a period of hesitation extending over three weeks, the Government gave a general assent to McClellan's plan of a movement by sea without settling the actual point of disembarkation. Early in March the President, who was evidently still very uneasy, ordered McClellan to call his divisional Commanders to a Council of War, and they decided on March 8th, by eight votes to four, in favour of the Urbana route. On that

<sup>1</sup> 1 Ropes, 229.

<sup>2</sup> See Map VII.

<sup>3</sup> 1 Ropes, 230.

<sup>4</sup> This latter idea was "simply preposterous" (1 Ropes, 267).

<sup>5</sup> 1 Ropes, 232.

same day President Lincoln issued his third War Order, directing in the first place that a sufficient force should be left to garrison Washington; in the second place it was ordered that not more than two corps should be moved from Washington until the Confederate batteries on the lower Potomac had been taken; thirdly, ten days only were allowed for the reduction of the batteries, as it was expressly stated that McClellan would be held responsible that the movement down Chesapeake Bay should commence on March 18th, and it was not likely that McClellan would undertake that movement with only half his army.<sup>1</sup>

Likewise on the same day the President, on his own initiative, without consulting the Commander-in-Chief, named the Commanders of the four Army Corps, into which the Army of the Potomac had been organised.<sup>2</sup> The appointment of these corps-commanders had been the subject of some correspondence between the President and McClellan; the latter wished, not unnaturally, to appoint them himself, but not until he had had the opportunity of seeing his officers tested by actual experience in the field. Lincoln's independent action in this matter showed how much he had lost confidence in McClellan. But the following day the situation was changed by the sudden withdrawal of the Confederate army. In such haste was the movement carried out that a large quantity of supplies and some of the heavy guns had to be abandoned. President Davis, frightened by the fall in Western Tennessee of Fort Henry on February 6th, and Fort Donelson on February 16th, had insisted on Johnston retiring from his advanced position. The Confederate authorities would seem to have anticipated that McClellan would make his advance by way of Fredericksburg, in which case Johnston's army would have been dangerously exposed.<sup>3</sup>

On the same day, March 9th, a still more dramatic event took place; the *Merrimac* and the *Monitor* fought their famous action in Hampton Roads. Thanks to McClellan's refusal to undertake any expedition for the recapture of Norfolk, the Confederates had been able to raise the *Merrimac*, a wooden vessel which the Federal authorities on abandoning the naval yard had sunk, and had converted her into a formidable ironclad. On March 8th she steamed out against the Federal squadron lying in Hampton Roads, and destroyed two of the finest wooden vessels in it without suffering any injury herself. The next day the *Monitor* arrived, and a battle immediately took place between these two entirely different types of ironclad; neither vessel was able to do the other any injury, and the net result of this trial of strength

<sup>1</sup> 1 *Ropes*, 234-5.

<sup>2</sup> The four Army Corps commanders were McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes.

<sup>3</sup> Webb, 25.

was that, whilst the James River was undoubtedly closed by the presence of the *Merrimac*, Federal naval officers considered that with the addition of the *Monitor* they were strong enough to prevent her assuming the offensive and making any fresh attempt against the shipping in Hampton Roads.<sup>1</sup>

There is some evidence to show that the Federal Government had finally forbidden the Urbana route and left McClellan his choice between the overland route and a movement by sea to Fortress Monroe.<sup>2</sup> McClellan in his letter to the President had clearly expressed his opinion that of the three proposed landing places Fortress Monroe was the worst; and it is highly probable that the Government hoped, by forbidding any movement by sea except to Fortress Monroe, to force him into adopting the overland route. McClellan summoned his four Army Corps commanders to a Council of War on March 13th, and a decision was come to in favour of the Fortress Monroe plan on the following conditions: (1) that the *Merrimac* should be neutralised; (2) that adequate means of transport should be provided; (3) that a naval force should be ready to co-operate in an attack on the Confederate batteries in the York River; (4) that a sufficient force should be left to cover Washington.<sup>3</sup> The force which the generals considered sufficient for this last purpose was, roughly speaking, about 35,000 men.

Shortly after the withdrawal of Johnston from Manassas, President Lincoln had relieved McClellan of the control of all the armies of the United States, and confined him to the command of the Army of the Potomac alone.<sup>4</sup> This step was justifiable enough in itself, as the Commander-in-Chief was about to lead an army into the field; but the President was guilty of grave discourtesy in giving McClellan no intimation of his intention, and in leaving him first to learn of the change through the newspapers. Although McClellan showed no open resentment at the slight put upon him, it probably rendered him more than ever disinclined to pay due attention to the President's wishes, and led him to postpone the consideration of the arrangements for the defence of Washington until the very last moment. It was not until he was actually on board his steamer, and on the very point of starting for the Peninsula, that he wrote to the Secretary of War, informing him of the arrangements which he had made. That letter must have come as a startling blow to the Government. McClellan was found to have left only 18,000 men to garrison Washington. This was barely half the number which the Council of War had fixed as the minimum, and it was largely composed of troops which were still

<sup>1</sup> See Chapter XXVI., "Naval Operations."    <sup>2</sup> 1 Ropes, 240.    <sup>3</sup> 1 Ropes, 245-6.

<sup>4</sup> When McClellan with the greater part of his army moved out to reoccupy Manassas, Lincoln seized the opportunity to relieve him of the supreme command of all the Federal armies.



in the process of training. Of skilled artillerymen there were very few. It is true that McClellan maintained that besides the force detailed as the actual garrison of Washington, he had left a large number of troops<sup>1</sup> at Manassas, Warrenton, and in the Shenandoah Valley, a considerable part of whom might be relied upon to assist in the defence of the Capital. In fact, he claimed to have left behind him a force of over 73,000 men. It is enough here to say that General McClellan's arithmetic could not stand a close inspection, and that in any case, whatever the number of the troops he left behind him, still he had evaded the President's distinct injunctions and the declared opinion of his own Council of War, and had attempted to achieve the desired end by means other than those prescribed.<sup>2</sup>

It has been necessary to consider at some length the relations between President Lincoln and General McClellan in order to form a proper appreciation of the difficulties which confronted and baffled the latter at various stages in his conduct of the Peninsular campaign. To sum up, General McClellan was called to the post of Commander-in-Chief amid general acclamations, in which the Government heartily joined; but by the line of conduct which he thought fit to adopt he deliberately alienated from himself the confidence of the Cabinet, on whose loyal support and co-operation he ought to have known that the success of his campaign largely depended.

The Southern President for his part adhered steadily to the policy of standing on the strict defensive both in East and West. Only in West Virginia<sup>3</sup> did the Confederates make any attempt to assume the offensive. In the command of that Department McClellan had been succeeded by Rosecrans. The Confederates had four brigadiers in the field: Floyd and Wise in the Great Kanawha Valley, Loring and H. R. Jackson on and near the Staunton-Parkersburg turnpike. In order to ensure unity of action President Davis determined to send an officer of high rank to take the supreme command. He first offered the post to Joseph Johnston, who declined it, preferring to remain in command at Manassas. General R. E. Lee, who had been hitherto acting as military adviser to the President, was then selected for the command and left Richmond at the end of July. His campaign proved a failure. He first endeavoured with Loring's and Jackson's troops to crush a Federal force under General Reynolds, which was divided into two portions seven miles apart: one holding the Cheat Mountain Pass, through which runs the Staunton-Parkersburg turnpike, and the other at Elkwater, on the Huttonsville road. But a very heavy rainstorm and a lack of co-operation between the Confederate wings caused his carefully devised plan

<sup>1</sup> Map III.<sup>2</sup> 1 Ropes, 263-4.<sup>3</sup> Map II.



of attack to be abandoned. Having failed to surprise Reynolds, Lee next turned his attention to the Kanawha Valley, where Rosecrans was pushing forward towards Lewisburg, and the dissensions of Floyd and Wise were paralysing the Confederate powers of resistance.

Rosecrans entrenched himself in a strong position on Big Sewell Mountain. Lee concentrated a somewhat smaller force on a parallel ridge about a mile distant, and also threw up entrenchments. Neither general was willing to attack the other. For twelve days they confronted each other, each hoping that the other would attack. On the night of October 6th Rosecrans withdrew his forces. Lee's army was in no condition to pursue. With this second failure to strike the enemy a heavy blow Lee's campaign came to an end, and he returned to Richmond to his old place by the President's side.<sup>1</sup> During the winter months the Confederate interest in West Virginia died away, and no further attempt was made to weaken the Federal hold on that Department.

<sup>1</sup> For Lee's campaign in West Virginia, see White's *Lee*, 114-25, and Lee's *Lee*, 116-27.

## CHAPTER VII

### THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN UP TO THE BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES<sup>1</sup>

Situation in the Yorktown Peninsula—The Navy cannot co-operate—Lincoln stops McDowell's Corps—McClellan lingers over the siege of Yorktown—Johnston withdraws the Confederate troops—Battle of Williamsburg—Pursuit by water fails—McClellan's slow advance—Part of McDowell's Corps is promised him, but is not sent—McClellan bases himself on White House—General Johnston takes advantage of McClellan's position—Battle of Seven Pines—Johnston's orders—Longstreet misunderstands the orders, but the Confederate right is successful—The left wing is unsuccessful and Johnston is wounded—Battle is renewed on the 1st June—Lee takes command—Result of Battle of Seven Pines.

ON March 17th, 1862, the embarkation of troops for the Peninsula commenced, and on April 2nd General McClellan arrived at Fortress Monroe. He found assembled there the best part of three Corps, the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th, under the command of Generals Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes, numbering in all 58,000 men.<sup>2</sup> For the Confederates General Magruder was holding the Peninsula with 13,000 men.<sup>3</sup> He had constructed three lines of entrenchments across the Peninsula. The first line, from Ship's Point to the mouth of the Warwick River, was abandoned about the beginning of March, and the troops were arranged upon the second line, reaching from Yorktown along the Warwick to Mulberry Island and the James River.

McClellan, from the outset of the campaign, was hampered by his ignorance of the topography of the Peninsula. He knew that Yorktown was held by the Confederates. But he had no idea that the Warwick River ran right across the Peninsula, but supposed that its course was parallel with the road which he intended to follow up the Peninsula. He imagined that the Confederate forces in the Peninsula would be massed in Yorktown and Gloucester on the north bank of the York, and that no provision would have been made by the enemy to prevent this position being turned by an advance along the roads on the south side of the Peninsula. This conception is an excellent illustration of the mental view which McClellan generally took of military

<sup>1</sup> See Map VII.

<sup>2</sup> Webb, 34.

<sup>3</sup> 2 Ropes, 104.

possibilities. His fertile imagination only took into account his own operations. He seemed constitutionally incapable of allowing to his adversary sufficient sagacity to take even the most ordinary precautions.<sup>1</sup> The very fact that Yorktown was, as he knew, strongly held, should have warned him that the Confederates would be certain to have a strong position on the James, and that the intervening space would be as securely guarded as their numbers permitted.<sup>2</sup> But such an idea never crossed his mind. He intended to advance in two columns; the left column, under Keyes, was to move straight up the Peninsula and take position at the Halfway House, some six miles from Yorktown; whilst the right column, under Heintzelman, would advance on and lay siege to Yorktown.

When in the beginning of March McClellan decided upon the Fortress Monroe route, he expected to have the assistance of the navy. His original plan was to make a combined movement of land and naval forces upon Yorktown, and he believed that such a movement would quickly lead to the reduction of the place. But the naval force in Hampton Roads had quite as much as it could do watching the *Merrimac*, and no vessels could be spared for a movement up the York River. Even if they could have been spared, they would have been powerless against the batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester, which were placed so high above the water as to be virtually unassailable by ships.<sup>3</sup> Before he left for the Peninsula, McClellan knew, or at least must have anticipated, that he could expect no co-operation from the navy.<sup>4</sup> He therefore determined to lay siege to Yorktown; for that purpose he had brought a siege train with him. But he also intended to land the 1st Corps under McDowell, which had not yet sailed from Alexandria, on the north bank of the York, and to make short work of the Confederate resistance by capturing Gloucester, and flanking the Confederates out of the successive positions which they might take up in the Peninsula. The plan was based upon sound principles, and, if it had been immediately carried into effect, would probably have compelled the Confederates to evacuate the Peninsula.

The advance commenced on April 4th: on the following day Keyes, commanding the left column, found his further advance towards Halfway House barred by the unexpected obstacle of the line of the Warwick evidently held in some strength by the enemy. The same day a second and far greater disappointment befell McClellan; he was officially informed that President Lincoln had detained McDowell's Corps for the defence of Washington.

<sup>1</sup> 2 Ropes, 102.

<sup>2</sup> Webb, 54.

<sup>3</sup> 2 Ropes, 101.

<sup>4</sup> Ropes (10 Massachusetts M. H. S., 103) quotes a letter dated March 20th to McClellan from General Barnard sent in advance to the Peninsula to make arrangements with the navy, in which it is distinctly stated that the navy could do no more than cover a landing.



As soon as the President learnt that McClellan had failed to carry out his promise, that he would leave for the defence of Washington such a force as his Army Corps commanders deemed sufficient for the purpose, he at once proceeded to provide himself for the defence of the capital by detaining McDowell's Corps. On political grounds the President was perfectly justified in taking this step: the fundamental understanding, on which alone the Peninsular campaign had been sanctioned by the Government, was that the safety of Washington should be absolutely secured. Not even on military grounds is it clear that the President was open to censure. At that time the safety of McClellan's army in the Peninsula did not depend upon the presence of McDowell's Corps. Its absence did not imperil that army: it only made its progress somewhat slower. The reduction of Yorktown could still be effected by siege operations, but it would take time.<sup>1</sup>

It took McClellan just a month. But for this delay he was largely himself to blame. He made no attempt to escape from the necessity of laying regular siege to Yorktown. Although it was obvious that the health of his troops would suffer from a protracted delay in an unhealthy district, he omitted to push forward a determined reconnoissance in the hope of finding a weak spot in the enemy's lines. That weak spots existed was extremely probable. Until April 10th Magruder received no reinforcements, and after placing adequate garrisons in Gloucester, Yorktown, and Mulberry Island, was left with not more than 5,000 men to hold a line five miles long. Nor was there lacking actual proof that such a weak spot could be found. For on April 16th a small force, under the direction of a divisional general,<sup>2</sup> who was far more energetic than the Commander-in-Chief, forced its way across the Warwick, and held the enemy's front entrenchments for nearly an hour, until recalled.

Instead of making any attempt to break through the Confederate lines, McClellan settled down to a formal siege of Yorktown, although it was perfectly plain that as long as the enemy retained possession of the line of the Warwick, it was a siege only in name; for the enemy could evacuate their position whenever they judged expedient. At the same time he had not lost sight of his original plan of turning the Yorktown defences by a flanking column landed on the north bank of the York. He continued to beg the President and the Secretary for War that McDowell's Corps should be restored to his command, that at any rate two, or at the very least one division should be sent to him for the purpose of carrying out this flanking movement. The President, who had vainly urged McClellan to force the Warwick line, at last in despair sent him Franklin's division. Although that division arrived on

<sup>1</sup> 2 Rep., 213-15.

<sup>2</sup> General W. F. Smith.



April 22nd, a fortnight was spent over the preliminary steps, and the expedition was not ready to start until the Confederates had rendered such a movement unnecessary by evacuating their lines.<sup>1</sup>

About April 14th General Johnston arrived at Yorktown, and took over the chief command.<sup>2</sup> He was himself opposed to sending any reinforcements to the Peninsula, but would have preferred to concentrate as large a force as possible round Richmond by drawing in all available troops from the Atlantic coast, and so confront McClellan for the decisive encounter with an army approximately equal to his own. But Johnston had been overruled by the President, who was supported in his decision by General Lee, acting at the time as his Chief-of-the-Staff:<sup>3</sup> and during the second half of April the various divisions of Johnston's army were marched to the Peninsula and placed in the Yorktown lines.

Johnston's intention was to hold his position until the Federals were ready to open the bombardment: and when he saw that their preparations were on the point of completion, he ordered the evacuation of the Confederate lines on the night of May 3rd. McClellan was far from expecting the withdrawal of the enemy: he had determined to open the bombardment on May 5th, and was quite taken by surprise to find that Johnston had preferred not to wait for that event. Consequently there was some delay in organising the pursuit. About noon on the 4th, the 3rd and 4th Corps preceded by the cavalry started up the Peninsula, whilst McClellan himself remained at Yorktown to superintend the despatch of the other divisions by water to West Point, whence they were to strike across to the main roads leading from the Peninsula to Richmond, and thus intercept the retreating Confederates.

Johnston's army had, however, got a start of twelve hours; all the heavy guns and a large quantity of ammunition and supplies had been abandoned. By noon of the 4th, when the Federal pursuit was just beginning, the Confederate troops had all reached Williamsburg. On the 5th a sharp encounter took place, known as the battle of Williamsburg. The Federal pursuit came up with Longstreet's and D. H. Hill's divisions, which were holding the third line of entrenchments constructed by Magruder across the Peninsula, in order to cover the retreat of the rest of the Confederate army. A very scrambling engagement conducted by the Federal commanders without any concerted plan of action ended without either side gaining a decided success. The Federals lost five guns,<sup>4</sup> and Hooker's division, which bore the brunt of the

<sup>1</sup> 2 Ropes, 107.

<sup>2</sup> Johnston assumed formal command on the 17th. See his *Narrative*, 117.

<sup>3</sup> Lee opposed Johnston's plan, because it would expose Savannah and Charleston (2 B. & L., 203).

<sup>4</sup> 2 Ropes, 110.

fighting, was severely punished. In the night Longstreet drew off his troops and continued the retreat to Richmond.

The movement by water met with no greater success than the pursuit by land. Not until May 6th did Franklin, with his division, get away from Yorktown. He disembarked at Eltham's Landing above West Point, and the transports were sent back for the next division. Franklin's orders were simply to remain where he was till he received further instructions. On the 7th he was attacked by a considerable force under General G. W. Smith. The object of the attack was to prevent any movement being made by Franklin to interfere with the trains of the retreating Confederates. The attack was repulsed and Franklin's division held its ground at the Landing. Nevertheless Smith was so far successful in his attempt that the Confederates were enabled to withdraw their whole force to Richmond without molestation.<sup>1</sup>

After his failure to cut off the Confederate retreat McClellan moved slowly forward. Forty miles from Williamsburg runs the Chickahominy River, which forms the northern defence of Richmond. It took the Federals a fortnight to cover those forty miles. In the meanwhile, on the 16th, McClellan had established his headquarters at White House on the Pamunkey. On the 20th the direct advance on Richmond was resumed. Between that day and the 24th Keyes' Corps was crossed over the Chickahominy, and it was quickly followed by Heintzelman's Corps. McClellan had deliberately divided his army. Two Corps lay south of the Chickahominy and three were encamped on the north bank. Since his arrival in the Peninsula McClellan had formed two provisional Corps, the 5th and 6th, under Fitz-John Porter and Franklin. The reason why he thus divided his forces was, that President Lincoln had at last consented to his urgent request and promised to send McDowell's Corps to his assistance, provided that Washington was not uncovered by any such move. McDowell had assembled his corps opposite Fredericksburg.<sup>2</sup> He was less than sixty miles from Richmond and could advance to join hands with McClellan by the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad without exposing Washington to an attack. In order to compensate for Franklin's division, which had been sent to the Peninsula in April, Shield's division of Banks' army in the Shenandoah Valley had been ordered to report to him, and after receiving that reinforcement which would bring his whole strength to over 40,000 men,<sup>3</sup> he proposed to advance towards Richmond on May 26th.

It was in order to co-operate with McDowell and make a joint

<sup>1</sup> Both sides claimed to have achieved a success in this engagement. The Federal loss was 186; the Confederates, 48. Cf. 2 B. & L., 222.

<sup>2</sup> See Map III.

<sup>3</sup> Webb, 85.

movement on Richmond that McClellan had encamped his army athwart the Chickahominy. But on the 24th McClellan for the second time received the disquieting intelligence that he could not reckon on the co-operation of McDowell's Corps. "Stonewall" Jackson was in hot pursuit of Banks down the Valley, and McDowell had been ordered to send 20,000 men at once to the Shenandoah to co-operate in a movement with Frémont from West Virginia for the capture of Jackson's entire army.<sup>1</sup>

It was open to McClellan to choose either the York or the James as his base and depôt of supplies. The abandonment of the Yorktown lines by the Confederates had necessitated the evacuation of Norfolk and the destruction of the *Merrimac*, which could not be brought up the river, and so the James lay open to the Federal gunboats as far as Drewry's Bluff some seven miles from the Southern capital. A determined attempt was made on May 15th by the Federal ironclads to force a way past the fortifications at this point, but abandoned after a four hours' contest.<sup>2</sup> Before McClellan received news that he was not to have the co-operation of McDowell's Corps, he had determined to send a force against a Confederate brigade under Branch, which was stationed at Hanover Court House north of Richmond. The object of this movement was to drive Branch away from the line of McDowell's advance, and by destroying the bridges on the Virginia Central Railway to cut one great line of the enemy's communications. Watching McDowell in the vicinity of Fredericksburg was another Confederate brigade, under J. R. Anderson. McDowell could safely be left to deal with Anderson's force, and with Branch swept out of the way there would be no obstacle left to prevent the two Federal armies uniting.

After McClellan learnt that the co-operative movement was abandoned, he determined to carry out the movement against Branch in order to prevent that general attacking his own line of communications. The Federal depôt of supplies was at White House, on the Pamunkey, and the camp was connected with the depôt by the Richmond and York River Railway. But the position of the right wing of the Federal army fronting west towards Richmond did not entirely cover the line of communications from an attack coming from some point north of Richmond. The movement was ably carried out by Fitz-John Porter, and met with complete success. For a time, at any rate, McClellan felt quite secure as to his line of communications, and thought no more of transferring his base from the York to the James.<sup>3</sup> It would, however, have been wiser on McClellan's part to change his base as soon as he heard that McDowell was for the second time withheld from him. As it was, his army was in a dangerous

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Chapter IX.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Ropes, 112.

<sup>3</sup> 2 Ropes, 135.



position, divided by the Chickahominy, a stream which, though insignificant in itself, was liable to be converted by heavy rain into an impassable obstacle. There would have been no difficulty in moving the supplies collected at White House by water to the James, and from his new position McClellan would have had the choice of advancing on Richmond by either bank of the river. On the south bank Petersburg lay quite defenceless, and its capture would have rendered the Confederate position in Richmond untenable.<sup>1</sup>

General Johnston was not slow to take advantage of McClellan's exposed position. He saw that if Richmond was to be saved, McClellan must be fought and defeated before he could be reinforced by McDowell. Whilst he supposed McDowell to be advancing south, he had prepared a plan for an attack with the bulk of his forces on the Federals north of the Chickahominy, hoping to break what was really the centre of the united Federal host. But as soon as he learnt that McDowell had been called away to the Valley, he determined upon the simpler plan of falling upon the Federal left on the south of the river.<sup>2</sup> He waited until the left wing had advanced far enough from the Chickahominy to give him a fair chance of crushing it before reinforcements from the opposite bank could arrive. The attack was fixed for May 31st. On that day the Confederate commander proposed to concentrate the three divisions of Longstreet, Huger, and D. H. Hill in a combined attack on Keyes' and Heintzelman's Corps, whilst Whiting's and Magruder's divisions were to guard the left flank and prevent any reinforcements being sent across the river.

The disposition of the two Federal corps south of the river was decidedly faulty. Casey's division of Keyes' Corps lay about three-quarters of a mile west of Seven Pines,<sup>3</sup> which is the point within five miles of Richmond at which the Nine-mile road runs into the Williamsburg road:<sup>4</sup> about half a mile to the rear lay the second division of the 4th Corps, under Couch. Some slight entrenchments had been thrown up in front of Casey's command, but were in a very incomplete condition. The 3rd Corps had not advanced far from the Chickahominy. Kearny's division was five and Hooker's seven miles from Casey's front.<sup>5</sup> Heintzelman, who commanded the whole force south of the river, had neglected to concentrate his command. Fortune was on the side of the Confederates. For all through the night of the 30th such heavy rain fell that next morning the Chickahominy was in flood, and the bridges which McClellan had built over the river were in momentary danger of being swept away.

<sup>1</sup> 2 Ropes, 113, 216-17.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Ropes, 137.

<sup>3</sup> See Map VIII., the top of which is east.

<sup>4</sup> Webb, 97, but Smith (2 B. & L., 220) says seven miles.

<sup>5</sup> 2 Ropes, 138.

Johnston had therefore an excellent chance of not only crushing Keyes' Corps, but of also involving the 3rd Corps in its rout. So confident did he feel of success, that he entrusted the command of the right wing to Longstreet, and himself took post with his second-in-command, G. W. Smith, on the left, considering that the task of preventing reinforcements getting across the river would be the more arduous work. His dispositions for the attack on the right were in themselves admirable. Longstreet's division was to move down the Nine-mile road:<sup>1</sup> D. H. Hill was to take the Williamsburg road, and thus a force of over 23,000 men would be brought to bear upon the front and right flank of the 17,000 men of Keyes' Corps. Huger with his three brigades was to follow the Charles City road, and when he had reached a suitable point on it to turn off to his left, and marching across the intervening country towards the Williamsburg road, to come in on the Federal left flank. Johnston, however, only gave verbal instructions to Longstreet, although the movement by the three separate roads was a somewhat complicated one, and the country which Huger would have to cross from road to road was rendered very difficult by the swampy nature of the soil. Nor did he inform Huger that he was to consider himself under the command of Longstreet, who was his junior in the service.<sup>2</sup>

Longstreet certainly misunderstood his orders. Instead of advancing down the Nine-mile road towards the York River railroad, he marched his division across to the junction of the Charles City and Williamsburg roads. There he had a lengthy altercation with Huger, and having left three of his brigades with that general on the Charles City road, moved down the Williamsburg road with the other three in support of D. H. Hill, whom he ordered to attack shortly after 1 p.m.<sup>3</sup> Hill conducted the attack with great vigour, and Casey's division was quickly driven from its lines. Couch's division was moved up to its support, and the struggle was continued for some hours, until the Federal centre was broken, and Couch found himself, with only four regiments, cut off from the rest of the Corps. He fell back to Fair Oaks Station on the railway, where two regiments and a battery had already been posted. As the Federals fell back, Kearny's division of the 3rd Corps came up and re-established the line of battle. One of his brigades<sup>4</sup> made a flank attack on the Confederates and gained ground. But Hill now applied to Longstreet for assistance; R. H. Anderson's brigade was sent in, and the Federals were forced back until about 6 p.m. they took up a fresh position, which they successfully maintained, until the approach of night put an end to the battle.<sup>5</sup> The net result of the fighting at Seven Pines was that the Federals

<sup>1</sup> 2 Ropes, 140.

<sup>4</sup> Berry's

<sup>2</sup> 2 Ropes, 142.

<sup>5</sup> Webb, 107.

<sup>3</sup> 2 Ropes, 142-3.

were driven back more than a mile on the Williamsburg road and lost ten guns.

In the course of the afternoon the left wing came into action also. That wing was under the command of G. W. Smith, and consisted of Whiting's division<sup>1</sup> posted at the point where one branch of the Nine-mile road turns off to New Bridge, with Magruder's division in reserve, watching the bridges on the Upper Chickahominy. Thus Whiting's division was available either for defensive purposes, in case reinforcements came from the Federal right, or for a co-operative move with Longstreet's command against the Federal left. Johnston, who had taken up his position with Whiting's division, intended to advance it towards the York River Railroad as soon as the sound of musketry assured him that Longstreet's attack had fairly commenced. But the wind prevented him hearing the musketry, although he was only three miles distant from the battlefield, and he waited until about 5 p.m., when, in answer to a message from Longstreet, begging him to come in on the enemy's right flank and complete the victory, he moved south and found himself fired upon by a Federal force posted a little east of Fair Oaks Station. This force Johnston assumed to be that portion of Couch's division which had been driven northward away from the rest of the 4th Corps by Hill's advance. He therefore turned upon it, with the expectation of easily crushing it. But on attacking he found it far stronger than he had expected. Sumner, the commander of the 2nd Corps, had succeeded with great difficulty in getting Sedgwick's division across the swollen river, and it arrived just in time to reinforce Couch. The Confederates, knowing that they were victorious elsewhere, attacked with great spirit and renewed the assault again and again. But the Federals repulsed every attack, and finally delivered a counter-attack themselves, which drove the Confederates from the field. Thus the Confederate success on the right was counterbalanced by their failure on the left. Whiting's division lost heavily, including the commanders of three out of the four brigades engaged.<sup>2</sup> Just before the close of the fighting General Johnston was severely wounded and the command devolved upon General G. W. Smith.

The Confederates prepared to renew the battle the following day. Although they had failed to annihilate the two exposed corps on the 31st, a large part of their army had not been engaged that day, and there was hope that a properly combined movement might yet drive the Federals into the Chickahominy. In the meantime the Federals had been reinforced by the arrival

<sup>1</sup> Whiting was temporarily in command of G. W. Smith's division.

<sup>2</sup> Hatten killed, Hampton wounded, Pettigrew wounded and taken prisoner (2 *Rapids*, 146).



of Richardson's division of Sumner's Corps, which was posted on the left of Sedgwick's division. Smith, judging that any advance of Longstreet in pursuit of the troops, which had been defeated the day before and had fallen back towards Bottom's Bridge, would expose him to a flank attack from the Federals holding the railway, ordered Longstreet to advance against the latter force and attack Richardson.<sup>1</sup> He himself had suffered too severely the day before to renew the battle with Sedgwick, until Longstreet should have thoroughly developed his attack. Longstreet, however, carried out his orders in a very half-hearted manner. He made the attack upon Richardson's division with apparently only three brigades, and seems to have convinced himself that he had in his front the greater part of the Federal army. There was some sharp fighting, as is proved by the losses in Richardson's division, which numbered 900;<sup>2</sup> but there was nothing in the way of concerted movement by the Confederate forces, and all the fighting was over before noon of June 1st. At 2 p.m. General Lee arrived from Richmond at General Smith's headquarters, and under an order of President Davis relieved him of the chief command. The new commander allowed the troops to remain where they were for the rest of the day, and at nightfall withdrew them to Richmond.

In the two days' fighting the Federal loss was slightly over 5,000, and that of the Confederates over 6,000.<sup>3</sup> The latter had signally failed to achieve their object. Keyes' Corps ought to have been annihilated on May 31st, and Heintzelman's Corps at any rate driven back across the Chickahominy. Even on June 1st a vigorous attack with all their forces might have succeeded, and the work begun the previous day might have been completed if Longstreet had set himself in earnest to carry out his commanding officer's plan of battle. As it was, the Federals could fairly claim the victory. The Confederate attack had been repulsed, and their subsequent withdrawal to Richmond was a tacit confession that they could not hold their own against the Federals in the open field. The Confederate soldiers were discouraged; the *moral* of the Federals was improved, and their hopes of ultimate success rose high.

One result of the battle of Seven Pines, or Fair Oaks, as it is indifferently called, was to keep the Federal army quiet for some time to come. The state of the weather also contributed to produce the same result. McClellan was fully occupied with building bridges across the Chickahominy. He also made a fresh disposition of his forces. Sumner's Corps was permanently encamped on the south side of the Chickahominy, and Franklin's Corps was also brought across. Porter alone remained on the north bank, protecting, not very efficiently, as the event proved,

<sup>1</sup> 2 Ropes, 148.<sup>2</sup> Webb, 116.<sup>3</sup> 2 B. & L., 219.

the line of communications with White House. A formidable line of entrenchments was thrown up by the troops on the south side of the river, stretching from Golding's Farm to the White Oak Swamp,<sup>1</sup> and rendering their position practically impregnable.

<sup>1</sup> Webb, 118. Many of the details of the two days' fighting at Seven Pines have been the subject of much controversy. General G. W. Smith's account of the battle where he was second in command on May 31st, and Commander-in-Chief during the morning of June 1st, is very clear, and contains several points of special importance (2 B. & L., 220-63). (1) Longstreet was ordered to attack the Federal right on the Nine-mile road. He misinterpreted Johnston's verbal order, and moved his troops along the Williamsburg road in rear of D. H. Hill's division against the Federal front at Seven Pines. Johnston, thinking that he was perhaps partly responsible for Longstreet's mistake, generously suppressed in his official report the fact of the original order. (2) Huger was in no way responsible for the delay in attacking. His orders were to aid D. H. Hill if he found no strong force in his own front, but in any case to keep a strong reserve to cover the Confederate right. Longstreet, after assuming command of the right wing, kept five brigades (three of his own and two of Huger's division) marching and countermarching on the Charles City road, and struggling through the White Oak Swamp in the vain attempt to reach the Williamsburg road. Only five brigades of the Confederate right wing were engaged on May 31st, viz. the four brigades of D. H. Hill's division and R. H. Anderson's, of Longstreet's. (3) On June 1st the only troops actively engaged on the Confederate side were three regiments each of Armistead's and Mahone's brigades, which attacked the left of Richardson's division, but after gaining some ground were repulsed by a flank attack from Birney's brigade, and Pickett's brigade, which repulsed the attack of four Federal regiments. Wilcox's and Pryor's brigades were also slightly engaged with part of Hooker's division on the Williamsburg road.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN<sup>1</sup> (*continued*)

General Robert E. Lee—The necessity for action—Stuart's ride round McClellan—The raid has little effect on McClellan—He commences to advance—Lee's plans—He calls up Jackson to attack the Northern right—What McClellan might do—Lee's knowledge of McClellan—Where Lee's plan failed—Jackson's advance is delayed—Fight at Beaver Dam Creek—McClellan determines to shift his base if pressed—The position of the Federal right—Battle of Gaines' Mill—Result of the battle—McClellan orders a retreat—Federal movement on the 28th June—Confederate plans for the 29th—Fight at Savage Station—The 30th June—Battle of Frayser's Farm—Absence of McClellan—Battle of Malvern Hill—Confederate defeat and McClellan's wasted opportunity—Federals retreat and Lee follows slowly—Reasons for the failure of McClellan's Peninsular campaign—The losses.

THE new Commander of the Confederate army, General Robert E. Lee, was in his fifty-sixth year. He had graduated at West Point 2nd in the class of 1829, and obtained a commission in the Engineers. In the Mexican War he served on General Scott's Staff as his Chief of Engineers; and there was no one in any branch of the service who won greater or more deserved renown in that war than Lee. Unlike many other distinguished soldiers, he did not leave the army after the Mexican War and return to civil life, but continued in the service, eventually, however, leaving the Engineers. At the outbreak of the Civil War he was Colonel<sup>2</sup> of a newly raised cavalry regiment quartered in Texas. General Scott, who admitted that his successes in Mexico were largely due to Lee's genius,<sup>3</sup> had formed the highest possible opinion of him. He had hoped to see him commanding the army which was to crush Secession; but Lee went with his native State Virginia, when she declared herself out of the Union, and took the post of Commander-in-Chief of the State Militia. President Davis, an ex-Secretary of War, knew well Lee's worth, and during the first months of the war kept him by his side as his military adviser. His campaign in West Virginia was a failure, and with a considerable section of

<sup>1</sup> See Map VIII.

<sup>2</sup> Lee was colonel, not lieutenant-colonel, as is frequently stated. Lee's *Lee*, 87, 134.

<sup>3</sup> Lee's *Lee*, 42.



Southerners his reputation suffered accordingly. Nevertheless, in March, 1862, President Davis appointed him to the general control, under himself, of all the Confederate forces in the field, and when Johnston was incapacitated, immediately placed him in command of the Army of Northern Virginia.<sup>1</sup> In Lee, more than in any other general on either side, was to be found that happy combination of qualities which go to make up a great commander.<sup>2</sup>

The change of commander, quite apart from any question of the relative military capacity of the two generals, was a great gain to the Confederate cause, because Lee possessed the full confidence of President Davis, which Johnston certainly had never won.

The reinforcements from the Atlantic coast, which had been refused to Johnston, were hurried up to Richmond as soon as Lee took over the command. Fifteen thousand men from North Carolina, five thousand from South Carolina, and six regiments from Georgia reached Richmond in the first half of June.<sup>3</sup> It was absolutely necessary for Lee, just as it had been for his predecessor, to strike a blow at McClellan before McDowell's Corps should again become available for the combined movement on Richmond. He at once saw that a movement against McClellan's lines of communication might be attended by great results. In order to find out exactly how far Porter's right flank extended, and on what it rested, J. E. B. Stuart was despatched on his famous raid.

Early on 12th June Stuart, with twelve hundred cavalry and two guns, rode out of Richmond. That night he bivouacked twenty-two miles north of Richmond, far out of the reach of any Federal patrols.<sup>4</sup> Next day he turned east in the direction of Hanover Court House, and made his way round the Federal right. He quickly ascertained what he had come to find out. The Federal right only extended a short distance from the river, and rested on no natural obstacle, and could therefore be easily turned. Judging it safer, however, not to return by the way by which he had come, as the Federals were by this time aware of his presence, he continued on his way across the York River Railroad, where he did much damage, on to the Chickahominy, which he found great difficulty in crossing, thence nearly to the James River, and reached Richmond early on the morning of the 15th,

<sup>1</sup> In November Lee had been charged with the fortification of the Atlantic coast in South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. He was summoned to Richmond on March 2nd, and assigned to his new post on the 13th.

<sup>2</sup> 2 *Kepes*, 158.

<sup>3</sup> 2 *Kepes*, 164. This movement had commenced before Lee assumed the command of the Army of Northern Virginia (cf. Johnston's *Narrative*, 142).

<sup>4</sup> 2 Henderson, 7.

having made a complete circuit of the whole Federal army on both sides of the Chickahominy. As soon as Lee received Stuart's report, he determined to fall upon McClellan's line of communications.

McClellan failed to realise the significance of Stuart's raid. He saw that his communications were insecure and that it might be necessary to change his base to the James. With a view to this possibility he ordered some transports laden with supplies to sail round from White House to Harrison's Landing on the James, and also directed that maps should be prepared of the country between the Chickahominy and the James. But he was so absorbed in his own plan of operations, which as he believed was about to be crowned with success, that he could not allow its full significance to Stuart's reconnaissance. Else he would not have lost a moment after such a warning, but at once have set his army in motion for the James. But McClellan believed that he was at last in sight of the end; he was about to deliver the long-deferred blow. In the first half of June, in answer to his persistent entreaties, McCall's division of McDowell's Corps, 9,500 strong, had been sent him: and he had received other reinforcements to the number of about 11,000, which made his whole force amount to over 105,000. After making the necessary deductions he could rely on having over 90,000 men for active operations.<sup>1</sup>

On 25th June Hooker was ordered to push his piquet-line forward on the Williamsburg road. This movement brought the Federal outposts within four miles of Richmond: and the success was at once telegraphed to Washington, as indicating that the great forward movement, which should compel the evacuation of the Southern capital, was at last beginning.

But even as McClellan was preparing for the final move on Richmond, the storm was gathering which was about to burst with tremendous force on his right flank beyond the Chickahominy: and the Army of the Potomac, which believed that its foot was firmly set on the threshold of success, was about to be driven in hasty retreat to the James, and forced to fight, not for the capture of Richmond, but for its own existence. For Lee had resolved to take the offensive himself and deal his opponent a counterstroke on the largest possible scale. He proposed to bring Jackson's victorious army from the Shenandoah<sup>2</sup> Valley and hurl it against the Federal line of communications beyond Porter's right flank. He had had this movement in his mind before he sent Stuart on his raid. On 11th June, to mystify his opponent, he sent 7,000 troops under Whiting and Lawton as if to reinforce Jackson in the Valley, but in a letter of the same date told him that the object was to enable him to crush the forces threatening Richmond.

<sup>1</sup> 2 Ropes, 159.

<sup>2</sup> For the account of Jackson's operations, cf. Cap. IX.

"Leave your enfeebled troops to watch the country and guard the passes, and with your main body move rapidly to Ashland by rail or otherwise, and sweep down between the Chickahominy and the Pamunkey, cutting up the enemy's communications while this army attacks McClellan in front."

On the 16th, after receiving Stuart's report Lee wrote again to Jackson urging speed: and on the 23rd Jackson rode through Richmond to the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief to attend a Council of War, which should settle the plan of battle. Besides Jackson, Lee had summoned to the Council Longstreet, A. P. Hill, and D. H. Hill. These were the four commanders who were to carry out a combined movement against the Federal right. It was Lee's intention to concentrate their forces against Porter's isolated corps on the north bank of the Chickahominy. Jackson was to outflank the Federal right and cut it off from White House. A. P. Hill would cross the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge and move down the stream towards Mechanicsville. His advance, coupled with Jackson's flanking movement, would cause the Federals to abandon Mechanicsville Bridge about one and a half miles below Meadow Bridge, and enable the forces of Longstreet and D. H. Hill to cross. Having crossed, D. H. Hill was directed to move to the support of Jackson, whilst Longstreet was to support A. P. Hill's advance. The four divisions would then advance *en echelon*, Jackson leading on the extreme left.

The immediate object of the movement was to drive Porter's Corps from its position, where it covered New Bridge, and thus open up communications with that part of the Confederate army left on the south bank: and the ultimate object was to force the enemy away from his base and drive him down the Chickahominy. The movement was to commence early on the 26th with Jackson's army, and in order to connect his command with that of A. P. Hill, a brigade under Branch was to cross the Chickahominy by a bridge some five and a half miles above Meadow Bridge, and thus form a link between the two forces. At the same time the rest of the Confederate forces, 27,000 in number, would demonstrate against the Federal lines south of the river and prevent the enemy either advancing upon Richmond or reinforcing Porter. On the north bank over 50,000 Confederates would be concentrated against Porter's solitary Corps, which was barely half that strength. If Jackson's appearance proved, as Lee hoped, a complete surprise to McClellan, and Porter received no supports, then there could hardly be a doubt that the 5th Corps would be annihilated: whatever position it took up was certain to be turned by Jackson.

The crucial question which confronted Lee was, what would McClellan do? He might transfer a large part of his force to the north side of the Chickahominy, and elect to fight a pitched battle



there: or he might march the bulk of his army, the four Corps south of the river, straight upon Richmond: even supposing that he did nothing, but simply watched the destruction of his line of communications, he might still either march across the Peninsula to the James and on its banks find a new base, from which he could operate against Richmond, or he might admit his failure and retreat down the Peninsula to Fortress Monroe. Lee in concentrating two-thirds of his army on the north bank of the Chickahominy was playing a risky game. McClellan might reply by launching more than two-thirds of his army, some 75,000 men, against the Richmond lines, which were held by a force of about the same strength as Porter's Corps. Supposing in both cases the offensive succeeded, the balance would be on the side of the Federals who would have gained possession of the hostile capital, and would have no difficulty in finding a new base on the James owing to their naval superiority: whilst at the best Lee could only hope to sever their communications with the Pamunkey and destroy one Army Corps.

But Lee read McClellan like an open book<sup>1</sup> They had both served as Engineers with Scott in Mexico: and probably there Lee had formed a fair estimate of the other's military character. Even without previous knowledge, McClellan's wait of a month before the lines of Yorktown argued that he was not very likely to assume a vigorous offensive against any fortified line, however weakly held: and Magruder might safely be reckoned upon to make the most of any force entrusted to him. It is hard to imagine a greater antithesis than that between Lee and McClellan: in the latter's case the engineer predominated over the general. He might be relied upon to advance against any fortified position like Richmond by regular approaches and with all the due formalities of a deliberate investment: he would never risk a pitched battle unless he was forced to. Lee, on the other hand, was ever ready to engage in a stand-up fight, which presented a reasonable prospect of success to counterbalance the risk. He was confident that McClellan would make no serious attempt to force the lines defending Richmond: and he did not anticipate that he would boldly accept the gage of battle flung down and move the bulk of his forces across the Chickahominy to fight a pitched battle for the defence of his communications.

Thus far Lee judged his opponent accurately enough. But he made a decided error in assuming that McClellan, if Porter were crushed on the north bank, would retreat down the Peninsula, and not seek a new base on the James. It was because Lee expected McClellan to retreat at once towards Fortress Monroe, that he concentrated two-thirds of his army on the north bank, as in that

<sup>1</sup> 2 Henderson, 4.

case the Federal army on the south bank of the Chickahominy would be compelled to recross the river by the lower bridges in order to effect a retreat. The results of this miscalculation became sufficiently apparent in the later stages of the campaign. It is perhaps hardly too much to say that if Lee had not made the initial mistake of assuming that McClellan would, if Porter were defeated, retreat down the Peninsula, he would probably have annihilated the Federal army.

As McClellan was telegraphing the news of Hooker's advance to the Washington Government, the Valley Army under "Stonewall" Jackson was pitching its camp at Ashland on the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad some fifteen miles north of Richmond. At that hour Jackson's division ought to have been close to the Virginia Central Railway. But his troops had had a long spell of marching, and the road had been greatly obstructed by felled trees and the burning of the bridges. The Virginia Central Railroad was crossed at 9 a.m.<sup>1</sup> on the 26th, but the same obstructions continued to be encountered, and there was constant skirmishing with the Federal cavalry. Sufficient precautions had not been taken by the Headquarters Staff to ensure the necessary combination between the four Confederate divisions, and in consequence Jackson's force took no part in the fight of that day. A. P. Hill, after vainly waiting for some information from Branch, his connecting link with Jackson's army, at 3 p.m., fearing lest any further delay should upset the whole plan of action, advanced against Meadow Bridge. The resistance which he encountered there was very feeble. For Branch, having at last been informed of Jackson's approach, had crossed the river, and was moving on Mechanicsville, though without having given Hill information.

The Federals, finding themselves menaced both in front and in rear, withdrew to the lines which Porter had constructed three miles back at Beaver Dam Creek, and which were now defended by McCall's division. Hill at once attacked without waiting for any co-operative movement or giving time for artillery preparation, and was repulsed with heavy loss. His casualties were nearly 2,000, whilst those of the Federals were only one-sixth of that amount.

McClellan's position on the night of the 26th was not an enviable one. He found himself suddenly forced to act on the defensive. His line of communications was already as good as severed: for it was now known that Jackson was on the extreme right of the Federal position and would certainly turn it next day. He spent some time in consultation with Franklin and Porter, and eventually decided to do nothing. He would not risk an advance on Richmond, though his lieutenants urged him to take that step.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 2 Henderson, 19.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Ropes, 174.

but decided, as soon as he was forced to abandon his base at White House, to establish a fresh one on the James and to move his army thither.

Porter held a very strong position on the north bank of the Chickahominy. It was in the shape of a semicircle with both extremities resting on the river and covering two bridges. The Confederates could only approach it through a broad belt of forest: on emerging from the forest they would have to descend into a valley from 500 to 1,000 yards wide, itself thickly wooded in most places, then cross a swampy creek which covered the Federal front, and finally scale a hill sixty feet high, on the top of which Porter had arranged his batteries.<sup>1</sup> The assaulting columns would have to face a tremendous fire of artillery and musketry, whilst the denseness of the wood would make it very difficult for the Confederate batteries to come into action, or for the different divisions to maintain communication with each other. Early on the morning of the 27th McCall, at Beaver Dam Creek, was ordered to fall back to the main position at Gaines' Mill, which has given its name to the battle.

Lee had however no misgivings. Still arguing that the Federals in case of defeat would retreat down the Peninsula, he calculated that Jackson on the right would threaten their single line of retreat to White House and compel Porter to weaken his centre and left in order to keep this road open.<sup>2</sup> About 2.30 p.m. the attack was commenced by A. P. Hill, who, in spite of his severe repulse on the previous day, sent his troops in with great determination. Longstreet was held in reserve on the right, and it was not intended that he should attack, until Jackson, who now had with him D. H. Hill's division, had commenced operations against the Federal right and forced Porter to weaken his left. No sign however was made by Jackson: there was a distinct lack of co-operation on the part of the Confederates: whilst A. P. Hill was vainly hurling his troops in successive attacks upon the strong Federal position, Jackson with his own and D. H. Hill's commands was quietly waiting, expecting that Longstreet and A. P. Hill would drive the Federals into his arms as they retreated towards White House.

A. P. Hill's division was so roughly handled that Longstreet was ordered up to support him without waiting for Jackson's battle to begin. After the fight had raged for over an hour Jackson judged from the sound and direction of the firing that the Confederate plan had failed, and prepared without further delay himself to strike in. About 4 p.m. D. H. Hill advanced to the attack, but he could make no impression on the Federal right. Ewell, who attacked on Hill's right, was still more unsuccessful, and

<sup>1</sup> 2 Henderson, 32-3.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Henderson, 34.



his troops were quickly thrown into a state of considerable confusion. The other divisions under Lawton, Whiting, and Winder, which were to have extended the right until it got into touch with A. P. Hill's left, were, owing to the mistake of an inexperienced staff officer, held back for a time.<sup>1</sup> But the mistake was rectified and a general advance made by the whole Confederate army.

Porter's troops were exhausted with their hard fighting: his reserves were all used up. Only one division had been sent from the south side of the river to his assistance. The desperate onslaught of Hood's Texan brigade broke his centre, and the Federal army thus cut in half fell back hastily to the bridges. Twenty-two guns were captured and 2,800 prisoners taken. But nightfall and the arrival of two brigades from Sumner's Corps prevented the retreat becoming a rout.

During the night the Federal troops were withdrawn to the south side of the river. Their total loss was 6,837: the Confederates, as the attacking side, lost still more heavily in killed and wounded, which together amounted to about 8,000.<sup>2</sup> The lack of properly trained staff officers to keep up communication between the different divisions appears to have been the principal cause of the miscarriage of Lee's plans.

There can hardly be a doubt that if McClellan had properly reinforced Porter, the latter would have held his own, and the Confederates would have had nothing to show for their heavy losses. Even as it was, they had gained only a partial success: Porter's Corps were very far from being annihilated. The Federals had been driven from the north side of the river, but as they intended to find a new base on the James, this was not a very heavy blow. Instead of definitely ordering certain forces to be sent to Porter, McClellan contented himself with asking the Corps commanders on the south of the river to send him what forces they could spare. In the face of the skilful demonstrations, which Magruder kept up throughout the day, they preferred to retain as many of their troops as possible. Franklin sent Slocum's division to Porter's aid, but the only other reinforcement, Sumner's two brigades, arrived too late to do more than cover the retreat.

On that night, after the battle was over, McClellan informed his Corps commanders of his intention to retreat to the James. It is an extraordinary thing that, knowing as he did that unless he reinforced Porter strongly, his communications with White House must be lost, McClellan did not give orders twenty-four hours earlier for his trains to get under weigh.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 2 Henderson, 41.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Henderson, 52. 2 Ropes, 179, estimates the Confederate loss as at least 6,000.

<sup>3</sup> 2 Ropes, 181.

As events turned out, if the movement had begun on the night of the 26th the Federal army would have reached the James without having any serious fighting at all on the south side of the Chickahominy. It was necessary to keep Porter on the north bank whilst the supplies at White House were being shipped aboard the transports. But the trains might have been set in motion across the White Oak Swamp early on the 27th and much precious time thereby saved. McClellan had had the upper bridges on the Chickahominy destroyed on the 26th and 27th, and on the morning of the 28th the lower bridges down to Bottom's Bridge were burnt. The old bridge across the White Oak Swamp creek was rebuilt the same morning, and by the evening a new one at Brackett's Ford was finished. Keyes with the 4th Corps led the retreat.

From the Federal position on the south bank of the Chickahominy to the James was a distance of fourteen miles, but when once the White Oak Swamp was passed, only six miles lay between the army and its goal.<sup>1</sup> By noon of the 28th the 4th Corps was across the creek, and advancing four miles further, took up a position which observed the roads coming from Richmond and covered the retreat of the trains and reserve artillery. Morell's division of the 5th Corps crossed the creek in the course of the afternoon, and Sykes' division of the same corps was across early on the 29th and was followed closely by McCall's division. The 5th Corps was sent across the swamp in front of the trains to give it as much time as possible to recover from the hard fighting at Gaines' Mill. The reserve artillery was all got across the creek during the night of the 28th. The herd of 2,500 beef cattle<sup>2</sup> were crossed over the creek early on the morning of the 29th and reached the James on the 30th. McClellan showed himself at his best in conducting this retreat. He was above everything else an organiser: and organisation rather than generalship was what was needed just then.

For the Confederates the 28th was a wasted day. Lee held a strong conviction that McClellan would either attempt to recover his original base at White House, or else, accepting the defeat of the 27th as final, would retreat down the Peninsula to Fortress Monroe. Apparently he did not credit his opponent with the courage to execute a flank march across intricate country in the face of a victorious foe; and if, contrary to expectation, he did attempt such a move, Magruder was south of the Chickahominy, and was expected to give his commander-in-chief prompt information.

The morning of the 28th showed no Federal soldiers north of the Chickahominy save as prisoners. But it was possible that

<sup>1</sup> 2 Henderson, 56.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Henderson, 57.

McClellan might recross the river by the lower bridges and in that way attempt to regain his base on the Pamunkey. Accordingly Lee pushed Stuart's cavalry, supported by Ewell's division, down the river to watch the railway and Bottom's bridges. Stuart pressed on to White House and spent the 29th in destroying the large quantities of stores, which the Federals had not had time in their hurried retreat to remove. But this movement to the Pamunkey deprived Lee of the services of his cavalry during the pursuit: for it did not rejoin him again until after the battle of Malvern Hill. As the Federals had destroyed the bridges across the Chickahominy, the bulk of the Confederate forces was confined to the northern bank: and Lee still believed it possible that the Federals would retreat along the Chickahominy and recross yet lower down *en route* for Fortress Monroe. On the south side of the river Magruder could gain no information. The Federal lines in his immediate front were strongly held, and the intricate nature of the country prevented him sending out reconnaissances, except by the regular roads, which were securely guarded. It was not till night had fallen that Lee at length realised that McClellan was retreating to the James, and on the morning of the 29th he issued his orders.

It was essential that a crushing blow should be struck against the Federal line of retreat: if that army reached the James unmolested, it would find there a stronger base than that which it had abandoned on the Pamunkey, the heavy sacrifice of life at Gaines' Mill would be rendered vain, and the pressure on Richmond would be in no degree relieved. Lee, when he attacked Porter, had in contemplation the annihilation of the whole Federal army. McClellan had gained a day upon him, but he yet hoped to strike such a blow as would incapacitate the Army of the Potomac for active service for some time to come. He proposed to assault the enemy simultaneously on the flank and rear. Magruder was directed to move out of his entrenchments and advance down the Williamsburg road. Jackson, with his own and D. H. Hill's troops, was to cross the Chickahominy at the Grapevine Bridge and move on Savage Station. Thus a combined assault would be delivered against the Federal rearguard and in such strength that success seemed certain. Longstreet, with A. P. Hill, was ordered to march up the Chickahominy and cross by the New Bridge, which had been repaired on the 28th, and then to get into the Darbytown road and advance along it till he reached the vicinity of the Charles City crossroads, where he was to be joined by Huger moving down the Charles City road. Thus a second strong force would be concentrated upon the right flank of the Federal army on its march from the White Oak Swamp to Malvern Hill.

Neither of these combined movements was successfully executed.



Jackson took the whole day to repair the bridge, by which he was to cross: and Magruder, deprived of the other's aid, made two disjointed attacks upon the Federal rearguard near Savage Station, which were repulsed without difficulty. If Jackson had been able to get across the river in time, a considerable success might have been achieved, as Heintzelman's whole corps and Slocum's division had prematurely moved off in retreat, leaving Sumner and Franklin, who retained one division, in a very exposed position. None of the other Confederate divisions advanced far enough to strike McClellan's line of retreat.

By the morning of the 30th the Federal commander had got all his artillery and trains across the White Oak Swamp, but to secure their retreat to the James he was obliged to take up a defensive position and wait to be attacked. His preparations for the inevitable battle were carefully made. Franklin with two divisions was to guard the White Oak Swamp Creek, the bridges having already been broken down. Sumner and Heintzelman with five divisions covered the Quaker road by which the trains were retreating, and watched the Charles City, Darbytown, and Newmarket roads. Further south and close to the James was arrayed the 5th Corps, with the 4th Corps in support, to defend Malvern Hill against any attacks by the river roads. The gunboats in the James strengthened the Federal left, as their fire swept the approaches to Malvern Hill.

The 30th was the critical day of the whole campaign. It was Lee's last real chance of crushing the Federal army, and again he had the disappointment of seeing his carefully arranged plan for a combined attack fail. Jackson found himself unable in the face of Franklin's resistance to force a way across White Oak Swamp Creek. The fords were commanded by the Federal artillery, and the dense timber close to the stream swarmed with sharpshooters. Some of the Confederate cavalry and infantry did succeed in getting across the creek, but the fords were impracticable for artillery, and any further advance was barred by the very strong position which the Federal batteries had taken up on a commanding ridge of hills. The Confederate guns, being smoothbores, could not cope successfully with the less numerous but far more powerful rifled guns of the Federal batteries. No orders reached Jackson to move to the head of the swamp into the Charles City road to the support of Longstreet.<sup>1</sup> But when Franklin saw that no infantry attack was intended, he sent reinforcements, which materially contributed to aid the centre in repelling the fierce assault made upon it. On the opposite wing Holmes proved even more ineffective. Advancing down the Newmarket road towards Malvern Hill he was so daunted by the artillery fire, with which

<sup>1</sup> For a defence of Jackson's conduct on the 30th, see 2 Henderson, 60-71.

Porter greeted him in conjunction with that of the gunboats, that he precipitately retreated, leaving two guns behind, though his whole list of casualties only amounted to fifty-one. Nor did he attempt to take any part in the battle of the following day. Magruder, like D'Erlon at Ligny,<sup>1</sup> marched and countermarched between Longstreet in the centre and Holmes on the extreme right without rendering any assistance to either. Huger was the most unsatisfactory of all: though on the very verge of Longstreet's battle he took no part in it, because his road was obstructed by felled trees. Of all Lee's troops only Longstreet's and A. P. Hill's divisions took any active part in the assault on the Federal line. Out of the 75,000 men, with whom Lee proposed to deal McClellan's retreating host a staggering blow, only 20,000 were actively engaged, and even these two divisions did not attack simultaneously but successively, as A. P. Hill was at first held back in order to take part in the pursuit, which it was expected would ensue, when the combined attack all along the Federal line was fully developed.

Longstreet and A. P. Hill conducted their attacks with splendid vigour. The Federal centre was broken: McCall's division gave way, and fourteen guns with some hundreds of prisoners were captured. But on either flank of McCall the Federals stood firm, fresh reinforcements were brought up from other parts of the field where the inactivity of the other Confederate commanders caused no apprehension of an attack, and the Confederates in the centre failed to reach the Quaker road, along which the trains were moving. At the close of this day's fighting, known as the battle of Glendale, Nelson's Farm or Frayser's Farm, the Federal line was re-established, and Lee had lost his second and best chance of striking at McClellan.

It is almost incredible, but none the less true, that McClellan was not present on the battlefield on this the most critical day of the retreat: early in the morning he had ridden to Haxall's Landing to confer with the commander of the naval forces, and still more strangely he had left no substitute in his place. The various Corps commanders displayed admirable harmony and worked excellently together, but if Lee's combination had been carried out and the Federal army had got the worst of the battle, the absence of the Commander-in-Chief from the field might have had the most disastrous consequences.<sup>2</sup>

During the night of the 30th the Federals withdrew to Malvern Hill, which was occupied already by the 4th and 5th Corps and the reserve artillery. The position had been most carefully examined by General Porter, and on the morning of the 1st July the troops took up their respective stations at the points already

<sup>1</sup> 2 Henderson, 72.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Ropes, 198-9.

assigned to them. The Federal position at Malvern Hill was in itself stronger even than that which had been occupied at Gaines' Mill. The hill was higher: the whole Federal army with some 250 pieces of artillery, including the heavy guns of the siege train, was united there, and one flank was protected by the formidable fire of the gunboats. The plateau was crowned with tier on tier of guns, and the slopes leading down to a muddy stream swarmed with riflemen. The Confederates could only approach through a densely wooded and very swampy piece of ground, which would prevent the artillery being of much service in the battle, and would hamper all attempts at communication between the attacking columns. None the less, Lee determined to attack. Twice the enemy had escaped the carefully devised plan for his destruction, and now that a last, even though desperate, chance of annihilating the foe offered, Lee was not the man to put it aside. He was playing for a big stake, nothing less than the destruction of the Federal army: and he was prepared to make big sacrifices.<sup>1</sup>

The attack proved a complete failure. No artillery preparation was practicable: as soon as a Confederate battery showed itself in the open, an overwhelming fire was concentrated on it. If success was to be won, the infantry must do all the work, and that was only possible by a co-operative movement, which would throw an overwhelming force on some one point of the Federal position. But of co-operation there was a singular lack. On the left was Jackson, with D. H. Hill on the right and Whiting on the left of the Quaker road: his other divisions were in reserve. On the right stood Huger's division with Magruder's to its left rear. On the extreme right Holmes ought to have been ready to take part in the assault, but the previous day's experience had frightened him. Longstreet's and A. P. Hill's divisions, which had borne all the fighting of the 30th, were held in reserve behind Magruder.

The Confederate plan of battle presumed that batteries could be established so as to rake the Federal line. Armistead, one of Huger's brigadiers, who was in the best position for judging the effect of the Confederate fire, was ordered to charge, when he thought that the moment for an advance had come, with a yell. This yell was to be the signal for D. H. Hill's and Magruder's divisions to join in the assault. The Confederate plan failed in two ways. The fire of their guns was completely swamped by the

<sup>1</sup> From Longstreet's own account (*From Manassas to Appomattox*, 143) it would seem that he was largely responsible for Lee's determination to attack. Lee, being indisposed, ordered Longstreet to reconnoitre the enemy's left and to report upon the practicability of an attack. Longstreet reported it was possible to place in position 100 guns or more in the open ground beyond the belt of wooded swamp, and to bring to bear on Porter's batteries a cross fire which would prepare the way for the infantry attack. On this report Lee acted.



Federal batteries: and the yell of Armistead's brigade proved a worthless signal. D. H. Hill on the left, wrongly imagining that he heard it, about 5.30 p.m.<sup>1</sup> sent his division to the attack. But it was absolutely unsupported: no movement came from the Confederate centre: 10,500 men were launched in a vain assault upon the whole Federal army very strongly posted. When Jackson, having made his way through the swamp, sent up reinforcements, they arrived too late, as Hill's division had fallen back to the shelter of the woods after receiving very heavy punishment. When Hill's attack was over, first Huger and then Magruder took up the struggle. Their men charged with the same impetuous valour that Hill's division had shown, but the sacrifice was equally in vain. No impression was made on the Federal position: the batteries held their ground: the infantry line was unshaken. The attack of the Confederate centre lacked organisation: the brigades went in piecemeal, and the loss in that part of the field was even heavier than that of Hill's division. In all, the Confederates lost over 5,000 men in the short but fierce engagement: the Federal loss was probably not more than one-third of their opponents.<sup>2</sup>

This Confederate defeat quite altered the situation. The pursuing army had suffered a heavy reverse. Though only three divisions had been engaged, they had been so terribly punished as to be useless for any further fighting for some time. It is quite conceivable that if McClellan had risen to the occasion, and on the 2nd July had assumed the offensive, he might have gained such success as would have more than counterbalanced all his losses during the past seven days. But McClellan himself, and probably the greater part of his army as well, had had enough of fighting. It seems clear that the process of retreating from day to day had had a demoralising effect upon the Federal army.<sup>3</sup> The victory of the 1st July was due almost entirely to the artillery, assisted by the siege train and the gunboats. It afforded no proof that the infantry were capable of assuming a vigorous offensive. And McClellan was far too much engrossed with the care of his own army to realise the severity of the blow which had been dealt the enemy. The same night he gave orders for the retreat to be continued to Harrison's Landing, where the gunboats could render still more effective aid in covering his position.

In this last stage of the retreat the demoralisation of his army was most apparent. "It was like the retreat," General Hooker stated in the evidence which he gave before the Committee of Congress investigating the conduct of the war, "of a whipped army. We retreated like a parcel of sheep."

On the 2nd the Confederates made no attempt to pursue. At a

<sup>1</sup> 2 Henderson, 77.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Repes, 204.

<sup>3</sup> 2 Repes, 205, takes a different view.

conference held between President Davis and General Lee it was decided not to make any movement until further information of the enemy's plans had been brought in by the cavalry. The roads were in a horrible condition, owing to heavy rain, and the troops exhausted with their continuous exertions of the last few days. The delay was most unfortunate for the Confederate cause. So disorganised was the Federal army that no attempt had been made to take possession of the Evelington Heights, a ridge commanding the whole encampment at Harrison's Landing. This position was seized by Stuart with his cavalry early on the morning of the 3rd, and supposing that the infantry were close at hand, he opened fire on the astonished Federal camp with a single howitzer. But the Confederate infantry was far away. Longstreet, who led the advance on the 3rd, lost his way, and was too far distant to render any assistance to Stuart. The Federals, recovering from their astonishment, attacked the hill, and Stuart, after holding on to it until his ammunition began to fail, was forced to abandon his position, which the enemy immediately occupied and fortified. When the bulk of the Confederate army drew near to Harrison's Landing on the 4th, Lee found that the Federal position was practicably impregnable, stronger even than that of Malvern Hill. He made no attempt to attack, and after remaining three days inactive in front of the Federals, he withdrew to Richmond on the 8th, leaving Stuart with the cavalry to watch McClellan's further movements.

The failure of McClellan's campaign is largely to be attributed to the action of his Government in withholding from him for the second time his 1st Corps. If towards the end of May McDowell had been allowed to advance from Fredericksburg, 150,000 men would have been concentrated against Richmond at a time when the covering army did not number 60,000. The result of the united movement could have hardly been doubtful: the Capital of the Confederacy must have fallen.<sup>1</sup> But McDowell was ordered to the Valley, and McClellan, who had taken up a position athwart the Chickahominy with a view to joining hands with him, found himself in serious danger, owing to this distribution of his forces. The Confederate attack on the 31st May ought to have been crowned with success, and the way in which the battle was fought reflected but little credit on Johnston or his chief subordinates. Almost a month later McClellan was preparing his final advance, but he had now to deal with a new and more dangerous opponent. Lee's counterstroke ought to have produced as its legitimate result the destruction of McClellan's army. But throughout "the Seven Days" complete success was never attained, owing to the lack of combination. This was due partly to the intricate nature of the

<sup>1</sup> 2 Ropes, 132.

ground and the lack of reliable maps, especially of that part of the country lying between the Chickahominy and the James. But the chief cause of the repeated failure to carry out a combined movement was the inferior quality of the staff officers in the Confederate army. So great was the need of officers in that Service that almost all of those who had any military experience or training were assigned to regimental duty. Those who served on the Staff were lacking in experience. To mould an inexperienced staff into a capable body of reliable subordinates is a task which can only be accomplished with time, even by a born leader of men: and Lee, who assumed command only on 2nd June, had not the time allowed him to carry out the necessary reform. The failure of Jackson to take any part in the engagement of the 26th, or to do his fair share of the work on the 30th, must be attributed in the main to the inefficiency of the Staff.

In the Seven Days' fighting the Confederate losses amounted to 20,000. The Federals, who were throughout acting on the defensive, only lost 16,000, including 6,000 prisoners.<sup>1</sup> The Confederates also captured 52 guns and 35,000 rifles, thus partially making good the much-felt need of modern weapons.<sup>2</sup>

Apart from all other considerations, the Peninsular campaign was of immense value to the Confederate cause, because it established on a sure basis Lee's reputation as a commander in the field. Before it he had been known as a profound thinker, a master of the theory of war: after it he was regarded as a superb fighter, and a determined leader in the face of the enemy.

<sup>1</sup> 2 Ropes, 208.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Henderson, 89.



## CHAPTER IX

### JACKSON'S VALLEY CAMPAIGN<sup>1</sup>

Importance of the Valley Campaign—Early movements of Jackson—Movement on Romney—Intrigues against Jackson and his temporary resignation—Advance of Banks—Battle of Kernstown—Effect of the attack on the Federals—Banks reinforced advances with caution—Jackson takes a flank position—He pretends to leave the Valley and then falls on Milroy—Jackson returns to attack Banks—Topography of the Valley—Banks does not realise his danger—Jackson's rapid advance—Front Royal—Banks retreats—Jackson's pursuit—Banks defeated at Winchester—Effect of Jackson's campaign on McClellan's plans—Federals reinforced to capture Jackson—Their want of combination—Frémont's pursuit of Jackson—Jackson's plan to fight Shields and Frémont separately—Cross Keys and Port Republic—Federals fall back and Jackson slips away to Richmond.

“STONEWALL” Jackson's campaign in the Shenandoah Valley deserves special mention for two reasons: first, on account of the immense influence it exercised directly and indirectly upon the fate of McClellan's Peninsular campaign; second, as an illustration of the strategical methods of one of the greatest of American soldiers.

Although Jackson was not entirely emancipated from the control of higher authorities, yet as the commander of a detachment far distant from the main army he was allowed a comparatively free hand, and this was especially the case after Lee assumed the command of the Confederate forces.

Early in November, 1861, Jackson,<sup>2</sup> recently promoted a Major-General, was sent to take command in the Shenandoah Valley with his headquarters at Winchester. He was probably glad to leave the main army at Centreville: for he was bitterly disappointed at the refusal of President Davis to allow the victorious army of Bull Run to invade the North. He realised, as the other

<sup>1</sup> See Map V.

<sup>2</sup> Thomas J. Jackson was born at Clarksburg, West Virginia, 1824. He entered West Point in 1842, graduating in 1846, and obtaining a commission in the Artillery. He served in the Mexican War, receiving brevets of Captain and Major for gallant and meritorious conduct at Churubusco and Chapultepec. After the war he did garrison duty at Fort Hamilton on Long Island and at Fort Meade, Tampa. In 1851 he was elected Professor of Natural and Experimental Science in the Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, and resigned his commission (Allan, 10).

generals did, but as the central authorities did not, that the only true form of defence must provide for the possibility of offensive movements.

About the middle of the month, his old brigade, the "Stonewall" brigade of Bull Run fame, was sent him, and by the beginning of December he had under his command about 4,000 men. To the west lay West Virginia, his birthplace: that district was held by the Federal Commander, Rosecrans, with a force of 27,000 men widely scattered. The Confederate attempts to recover West Virginia had been directed from Staunton in the south of the Valley and had all failed. Jackson wished to advance from the north by way of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. But reinforcements could not be spared, and the scheme was abandoned.

Although his headquarters were sixty miles distant from Johnston's at Centreville, he was still subordinate to the latter, and his troops held the extreme left of the Confederate line reaching from Winchester to Fredericksburg. D. H. Hill held Leesburg and formed the connecting-link between the Valley and Manassas. As the President's decision had compelled Johnston to act strictly on the defensive, Jackson was directed to pursue a like policy. His duty was to observe the enemy, keep open the communications with Manassas, and be prepared to join the main army when McClellan commenced his advance.

Facing Jackson on the north bank of the Potomac was General Banks with 18,000 men. His headquarters were at Frederick City, but the district which he commanded extended seventy-five miles further west as far as Cumberland. On the south branch of the Potomac, thirty-five miles north-west of Winchester, near Romney, were 5,000 troops under General Kelly.<sup>1</sup> Jackson determined to attack this isolated detachment, and asked that for that purpose he might be reinforced by Loring's division and Edward Johnson's brigade, which were covering Staunton against any advance from the west. President Davis approved the plan, and whilst withholding Johnson's brigade ordered Loring's division to Winchester for service under Jackson. This division reached Winchester on Christmas Day and raised Jackson's force to 11,000 men. Before its arrival he had found some work for the troops, which he already had under his command, and had done a certain amount of damage to the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal.

On 1st January he moved from Winchester with 9,000 men. His advance was directed against the villages of Bath and Hancock on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad in order to cut the line of communications between Banks and Rosecrans, and prevent the former sending reinforcements to Romney. On 4th January he occupied Bath, but its garrison of three regiments

<sup>1</sup> 1 Henderson, 225.

escaped across the river. On the 5th he opened fire on Hancock, which lay on the opposite bank of the Potomac, and under cover of the bombardment destroyed the railway bridge over the Great Cacapon River and did much damage to the railroad and canal. On the 7th he marched twenty miles southward to Unger's store, where he remained some days for the purpose of rough-shoeing his horses and resting his men.

On the 13th he resumed the advance, and on the following day entered Romney, which had been evacuated by the Federals on the 10th. Kelly's force depended for its line of supplies upon Grafton seventy-five miles west, and it had been Jackson's original intention to push on from Romney, and break up the railway in that direction, so as to destroy Banks' line of communications with the west, in the hope that that general would then abandon the idea of invading the Valley.<sup>1</sup> But his men were worn out. The weather had been most inclement, and the marches through blinding snow along slippery roads had tried them sorely. Discontent and murmuring were rife: Loring's division, which composed more than half the whole force, was unaccustomed to such hard work and rigorous discipline. Its commander, who had "ranked"<sup>2</sup> Jackson in the regular army, proved a jealous subordinate and encouraged the complaints of his men. Even the Stonewall brigade was grumbling. So Jackson abandoned the idea of advancing further. He put Loring's division into winter quarters at Romney and drew back the rest of his forces to Winchester and its neighbourhood. He reached Winchester on 24th January; his entire loss since he marched out on 1st January was only four killed and twenty-eight wounded.<sup>3</sup> He had by his expedition won back three counties to the Confederate cause, secured the exceedingly fertile valley of the south branch of the Potomac as a source of supplies, and placed the enemy, who were prepared to assume the offensive, on the defensive. But his work was quickly undone.

On 30th January Jackson was ordered by the Secretary of War to recall Loring's division from Romney. Mr. Secretary Benjamin had listened to the remonstrances of Loring and his officers. They complained that they had been put to endure all the hardships of the winter in a mountain village, which was nearer to the enemy's outposts than to the rest of the Confederate army at Winchester. They accused Jackson of favouring his own soldiers, and declared that the soldiers of their division were so discontented with their lot that the only chance of keeping them with the colours was to withdraw them at once from a position of such peril and hardship. On 31st January Jackson recalled Loring to

<sup>1</sup> 1 Henderson, 237.

<sup>2</sup> American official verb for "to be senior to."

<sup>3</sup> 1 Henderson, 239.



Winchester, but on the same day sent in his resignation to the Government.

Only with great difficulty was he persuaded to withdraw it. It is possible that Jackson's action in this matter was not one of the least important services which he rendered to the Confederate cause.<sup>1</sup> He gave the Government a much-needed lesson. He taught them not to interfere with a general in the field engaged in carrying out operations already sanctioned by the Cabinet. It is an interesting speculation, what might have been the result if McClellan had adopted a similar line of action towards the Federal Government.

But the mischief was done. Romney was reoccupied by the Federals on 7th February, and Edward Johnson's brigade was forced to retire from its post on the Alleghany Mountain. On 27th February Banks commenced his advance and crossed the Potomac with 38,000 men and 80 guns. This advance was part of the general forward movement of McClellan's great host. He was directed to hold the road from Charlestown to Martinsburg so as to cover the repairing of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. To encounter Banks, Jackson had only 4,600 men, as Loring's division had at his request been ordered to another theatre of war. On 7th March D. H. Hill withdrew from Leesburg, and on the 9th Johnston retired from Centreville behind the Rappahannock.

Jackson was thus left isolated in the valley. He was sixty miles distant from the nearest reinforcements at Culpeper Court House. Johnston had originally intended, when he fell back, to recall Jackson's command to the eastern side of the Blue Ridge; but at the latter's earnest request he left him in the Valley charged with the duty of holding Banks' whole force in check and preventing him from detaching any part of it to McClellan's aid. On 12th March the Federals occupied Winchester, and a week later Strasburg, eighteen miles south. Jackson had fallen back before the overwhelming numbers of Banks to Mount Jackson, twenty-five miles south of Strasburg, hoping to draw the Federals in pursuit up the Valley.

But on 16th March a complete change of plan was made in regard to Banks' Corps, due to the fact that McClellan's plan of an advance upon Richmond by the Yorktown Peninsula had been at last definitely accepted by the Government. One division was to be left in the Valley to cover Harper's Ferry, the railroad, and canal. Banks' other division (the third division of his Corps had already been detached to join McClellan) was to cross the Blue Ridge, hold Manassas, and repair the railway there.

On the 20th Williams' division started for Manassas, and Shields' division fell back towards Winchester. Jackson started in pur-

<sup>1</sup> 1 Henderson, 253.

suit, and on the 22nd Ashby's cavalry came in contact with the Federal piquets a mile or two out of Winchester. Ashby reported that the force, which he had encountered, only consisted of four regiments of infantry with cavalry and artillery. Jackson assumed that he only had in front of him a rearguard, and determined to attack in the hope of recalling the troops marching for Manassas. On the night of the 22nd his division, after a march of twenty-two miles, reached Strasburg. The next day a march of another fourteen miles brought them close to Kernstown, where the Federal force had taken position. Fearing that delay would enable the enemy to escape, he resolved to attack at once. His plan of battle was to turn the Federal right by seizing a wooded ridge, which ran across their line of retreat to Winchester. The battle commenced shortly before 4 p.m., and after three hours' hard fighting the Confederates fell back discomfited, and that night retreated to Newtown three miles south of Kernstown.

Jackson had for once fallen into a trap. Shields, a veteran of the Mexican War, had cleverly concealed the greater part of his forces in the hope of luring Jackson on to attack. The Confederates found themselves confronted by greatly superior numbers. They fought stubbornly, and their total loss was 20 per cent. of the entire force.<sup>1</sup> But though defeated on the field of battle, the Confederate leader had succeeded in achieving the object for which he fought. It was supposed by the Federal authorities that he would never have dared to attack unless he was expecting large reinforcements.<sup>2</sup> At once President Lincoln and his Cabinet were filled with alarm for the safety of Washington. Their chief objection to McClellan's Peninsular campaign had been that it uncovered the Capital. The very event which they had feared seemed on the point of fulfilment. Williams' division was ordered back to the Valley. Blenker's division was detached from McClellan and assigned to Frémont, who had recently been appointed to the command of the Mountain Department, as West Virginia was now styled, but directed to report *en route* to Banks for temporary service in the Valley. Finally, McDowell's Corps was taken from McClellan's army and ordered to remain at Manassas; and both Banks and McDowell with their respective commands were withdrawn from McClellan's control.

On the 25th Banks, having been joined by Williams' division, reoccupied Strasburg. But his advance was marked by extreme caution. For six days he remained at Strasburg, and then on 2nd April moved to Woodstock. Then followed another wait of

<sup>1</sup> The Confederate loss was 718 out of about 3,500 men. Shields' force was at least 7,000 strong, and his total casualties amounted to 590 (1 Henderson, 321).

<sup>2</sup> 1 Henderson, 304-5.

a fortnight, and on the 17th he resumed the advance, occupying Harrisonburg with his cavalry on the 22nd. Two of his brigades arrived there on the 26th, but the other three remained at Newmarket.

Jackson had evacuated Harrisonburg on the 18th, and turning off to the east, moved in the direction of the Blue Ridge and went into camp in Elk Run Valley. There he was in communication with Ewell's division, which was holding the line of the Rapidan, and at the same time lay on the flank of any advance which Banks might make from Harrisonburg to Staunton. Johnson's brigade had been obliged to fall back from the Shenandoah Mountain owing to Jackson's abandonment of the Harrisonburg-Staunton road, and had taken up a position at West View, seven miles west of Staunton. At the same time Frémont was moving slowly forward towards Staunton by way of Romney, Moorefield, and Franklin. He proposed to make a combined movement with Banks on Staunton, and having there secured the Virginia Central Railway to push into East Tennessee and capture Knoxville. In pursuance of this plan Milroy's brigade had occupied McDowell, a village twenty-seven miles north-west of Staunton, and Schenck's brigade was at Franklin, thirty-four miles to the rear.

Jackson was bound to strike a blow before Banks and Frémont could unite and oppose him with overwhelmingly superior numbers. Banks was the nearer, but his troops were the more concentrated. He therefore determined to turn upon the weaker and more scattered force and for that purpose to make use of Johnson's brigade, and then to unite with Ewell and crush Banks. It was necessary first to mislead and mystify Banks, so as to keep him quiet at Harrisonburg whilst the movement against Milroy was being carried out. On the 30th Jackson left the Elk Run Valley and moved along the east bank of the south fork of the Shenandoah to Port Republic. Then he crossed the Blue Ridge at Brown's Gap. This would lead Banks to suppose that he was bound for Richmond. In the meantime Ewell moved his division into the position in Elk Run Valley, which Jackson had just abandoned. On the 3rd May Jackson reached the Virginia Central Railway at Mechum's River Station. On the 4th he was transferring his troops by rail to Staunton. On the 5th he effected his junction with Edward Johnson.

On the 7th the combined force moved out of Staunton, westwards towards McDowell. On that day Milroy learnt that Jackson and Johnson had united their forces and were moving against him. He at once sent to Schenck begging him to come with all speed to his aid. Schenck responded with alacrity, and by 10 a.m. of the 8th his brigade joined Milroy in the camp at the foot of Bull Pasture Mountain. By that time the Confederate



advance had already reached the summit of the mountain. It had been Jackson's original plan not to attack till next day, by which time he would have placed a force marching under cover of the night across the Federal line of retreat. But the Federal generals, seeing that their position would be rendered untenable as soon as the Confederate batteries were established on the heights above them, determined to attack in order to secure their retreat during the night.<sup>1</sup> The fighting commenced about 4.30 p.m. and lasted for four hours. The Federals having been repulsed at every point then withdrew, and during the night retreated towards Franklin. Jackson followed in pursuit the next day, but the Federals had got a good start, and Schenck set fire to the forests, which still further retarded the Confederate pursuit. Jackson finding that it was impossible to prevent the two brigades from joining the main body under Frémont, abandoned the pursuit on the 12th, having advanced to within a few miles of Franklin.

The Federal detachment had been driven back from Staunton, and Frémont's army was so much disorganised that there was a good chance of overwhelming Banks before he could be reinforced. On the 14th Jackson was again at McDowell. The same day Frémont arrived at Franklin, but remained there inactive for ten days refitting after the losses inflicted at McDowell. Jackson turned off from the Staunton road and moved northwards towards Harrisonburg, and on the 17th had an interview with Ewell. The two generals quickly arranged a plan of action against Banks.

That commander was now in a position of great danger. Shields' division had been taken from him and sent to join McDowell's Corps at Fredericksburg, and he had been ordered to fall back to Strasburg. There he was cut off from all hope of receiving reinforcements from Frémont, as the passes, through which help might have come, had been obstructed and rendered impracticable by a squadron of Ashby's cavalry.<sup>2</sup> He was completely isolated, and exposed to the united attack of Jackson, Ewell, and Johnson. His military abilities were of the slightest. Originally a hand in a cotton mill, he had risen to be Speaker of the House of Representatives and Governor of Massachusetts. His had been one of the military appointments so injudiciously made on political grounds by President Lincoln at the outset of the war.<sup>3</sup>

The topography of the Valley was all in favour of the Confederates. The Shenandoah Valley is 140 miles long, with a breadth varying from 12 to 24 miles. Near Front Royal the two forks of

<sup>1</sup> The attack was directed against Sitlington's Hill, an isolated spur on the (Confederate) left of the turnpike, which completely commanded McDowell (1 Henderson, 363). The Confederates lost 498 men out of 6,000 (of whom only 4,500 were engaged); the Federals 256 out of 2,500.

<sup>2</sup> Henderson, 372.

<sup>3</sup> 1 Ropes, 113; 1 Henderson, 277.

the Shenandoah unite: between these two forks runs the Massanutton range for about a distance of fifty miles. The valley of the south fork on the eastern side of the Massanuttons is considerably narrower than on the other side of the range. It is densely wooded, and gives a covered line of advance against the rear of any force stationed above the junction of the two forks of the Shenandoah.

Banks, however, was very far from realising the peril of his position. He believed that he was in no immediate danger of being attacked. His whole force numbered 10,000 men, and was distributed in the following manner. The bulk of the command, over 7,000 men, was at Strasburg; Winchester was held by a garrison of nearly 1,500; two companies of infantry were posted at Buckton, a railway station about midway between Front Royal and Strasburg, and Front Royal was occupied by a force of 1,000 men.<sup>1</sup> Jackson had at his disposal 17,000 men. With his own division, Johnson's brigade, and one of Ewell's brigades, he was moving along the western side of the Massanutton range, whilst Ewell with the rest of his command was on the eastern side advancing through the Luray Valley. On the 20th Jackson reached Newmarket. At this point the one practicable road crossed the Massanuttons; and on the 21st Jackson's army was crossing into the eastern valley, whilst Ashby's cavalry, thrown well beyond Newmarket, effectually screened the movement from Banks at Strasburg. The whole Valley Army was thus united and pushing on towards Front Royal. On the afternoon of the 23rd the storm broke on the devoted garrison of that post. They were entirely taken by surprise, and only a handful succeeded in escaping to Winchester. The two companies at Buckton station were also captured.<sup>2</sup> The Federal flank was turned, and the road lay open to Winchester.

Banks was strangely slow to realise the truth. Believing that Jackson was at Harrisonburg, sixty miles away, his first impression was that the attack on Front Royal was merely a cavalry raid. When informed of the true dimensions of the attacking force, he believed that the numbers had been exaggerated and that it was only Ewell's division, which was at Front Royal, and that Jackson's main force was still in his front. His intention was to stand fast at Strasburg in the expectation that reinforcements would speedily reach him from Washington. Not till after 10 a.m. of the 24th did he really grasp the gravity of the situation. Then he ordered an immediate retreat.

Jackson had sent two regiments of cavalry to strike the Valley turnpike at Newtown ten miles north of Strasburg, and with his main force was marching on Middletown, five miles nearer Strasburg. He failed, however, to cut off Banks' retreat. The Federal

<sup>1</sup> 1 Henderson, 358.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Henderson, 394.

infantry had already passed Newtown when the Confederate cavalry reached that point. The cavalry, which formed the rear of Banks' army, were driven off the road by the foremost brigades of the Valley Army, and the trains of the retreating army ought to have been destroyed, but Ashby's cavalry flung away a great opportunity through want of discipline, as the majority left the ranks to plunder. The Federal rearguard was handled with great ability, and Jackson was unable to press the pursuit beyond Newtown.<sup>1</sup>

On the 25th Banks stood at bay at Winchester. He held a fairly strong position, but was hopelessly outnumbered, having only 6,500 men to oppose at least 15,000. Jackson moved against him on the Valley turnpike, whilst Ewell came in on the Federal left by the road from Front Royal. By 10 a.m. Banks's army was in full flight for the Potomac. But Jackson had at the moment no cavalry with which to follow up the flying foe. Ashby, with the handful of followers who still kept to the colours, had pressed forward to the right, expecting that the enemy would endeavour to retreat through the Blue Ridge,<sup>2</sup> and Stuart, commanding two regiments, refused to obey any orders which did not reach him through his immediate superior, Ewell. Jackson abandoned the pursuit five miles north of Winchester; and by midday of the 26th Banks's army was safely across the Potomac. But by this time it was little better than a disorganised mob, having lost a third of its numbers and a vast quantity of baggage.

Jackson, however, had done something more than drive Banks out of the Valley. He had completely paralysed McClellan's plan of campaign against Richmond. McDowell was to have moved forward on the 26th from Fredericksburg to take part in the advance of the whole Federal army. One hundred and fifty thousand men would have been concentrated against the doomed city. Now, however, owing to Jackson's triumphant march, McDowell was ordered to abandon the movement against Richmond and send at once one-half his corps to the Valley in order to cut off Jackson's retreat. At the same time Frémont was ordered to move into the Valley from the west, and co-operate with McDowell. It was in vain that McDowell protested to the amateur strategists at Washington. McClellan had to postpone his advance, but meantime his army occupied a perilous position, being disposed with a view to McDowell's co-operation, across the Chickahominy, and Johnston commanding the Confederate army at Richmond was not slow, as related in Chapter VIII., to take advantage of the opportunity.

<sup>1</sup> Major-General G. H. Gordon commanded the rearguard. But with the remnant of Ashby's cavalry and the Stonewall brigade, Jackson followed the retreating Federals throughout the night, skirmishing at intervals, until at dawn the old battlefield of Kernstown was reached.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Henderson, 419.



After two days' rest Jackson resumed his advance towards the Potomac, and on the 29th the bulk of his army was at Halltown threatening Harper's Ferry. But by this time he was aware that the Federal forces were closing in on his line of retreat, and he had an immense train of captured stores, which he was loath to sacrifice. On the 30th the greater part of his army fell back to Winchester. One brigade remained at Halltown for the night to hold the garrison of Harper's Ferry in check. But that same day Shields' division, leading McDowell's advance, recaptured Front Royal, and Frémont had advanced to Wardensville. The position of Jackson's force seemed perilous in the extreme. Shields was within twelve miles and Frémont within twenty of Strasburg, from which place Jackson at Winchester was eighteen miles distant, whilst the brigade at Halltown was no less than forty-three miles away.

But it was no easy task to ensure unity of action between two columns converging from different directions on the same point. The two Federal generals had no understanding, and arranged no means of communicating with each other; and each was afraid of finding himself confronted by the dreaded Jackson with superior forces, whilst his colleague was still far away. On the 31st the main body of the Confederate army moved from Winchester to Strasburg, and the Stonewall brigade marching from Halltown passed through Winchester, and went into camp at Newtown, having covered twenty-eight, and in some cases thirty-five, miles that day.<sup>1</sup> On the Federal side Shields remained inactive at Front Royal throughout the 31st, and Frémont only advanced to within six miles of Strasburg. On the 1st June Jackson, having waited for the Stonewall brigade to rejoin, reached Woodstock, and the great peril was escaped. Frémont was easily held in check by Ewell, and Shields, under the mistaken impression that Jackson was retiring north, put his troops in motion for Winchester.<sup>2</sup> The scheme of Lincoln and Stanton for cutting off Jackson had signally failed.

Frémont, having let his prey escape him, now took up the pursuit with vigour. On the 2nd June he occupied Strasburg, and his cavalry pressed hard on Ashby's rearguard; whilst Shields, to whom McDowell had committed the pursuit,<sup>3</sup> was moving up the Luray valley. To prevent his foes combining, Jackson destroyed the bridges over the south fork of the Shenandoah, and thus keeping Shields on the east bank of the river, prevented him from connecting with Frémont through Newmarket Gap. Passing through Harrisonburg he again turned eastwards to Port Republic. There he held the one bridge by which his pursuers

<sup>1</sup> 1 Henderson, 430.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Henderson, 433.

<sup>3</sup> McDowell's 2nd division under Ord was at Front Royal.

could unite, and at the same time menaced Frémont's line of advance if he tried to move upon Staunton. On the 6th a rearguard action was fought two or three miles south of Harrisonburg, in which Frémont's cavalry were repulsed, but Ashby killed.

Jackson now determined to defeat his opponents in detail. If he concentrated against Shields, who was the weaker, on the east side of the river and burnt the bridge, Frémont's guns could still come into action on the high ground on the west bank and command the field of battle, whilst having burnt the bridge, it would be impossible afterwards to assume the offensive against Frémont. Nor was it possible to attack Frémont in such force as to have any chance of gaining a decisive victory, until Shields had been first disposed of. Accordingly Jackson detached Ewell to Cross Keys, half-way between Harrisonburg and Port Republic, to hold Frémont in check, whilst with the rest of his forces he awaited Shields' advance.<sup>1</sup>

On the 8th Frémont attacked Ewell, but the assault was made in half-hearted style, and a vigorous counterstroke against the Federal left caused Frémont to fall back. On the 9th Jackson was preparing to crush his foes in turn. Part of Ewell's division was recalled to join in the attack upon Shields. That general, in the eagerness of his pursuit, had his division strung out over a space of twenty-five miles, and only two brigades, not more than 4,000 strong, faced Jackson.<sup>2</sup> The latter, being in a great hurry to crush Shields' isolated brigades and then recross the river to attack Frémont with his whole army, attacked with but little caution. Ultimately he drove the enemy in full retreat before him, but the precipitancy of his attack, without waiting to develop his superior strength, caused his loss to be considerably heavier than it need have been. Whilst this action was going on, Frémont, advancing cautiously, forced the small force in his front to fall back across the river and burn the bridge. It was therefore impossible for Jackson to turn against Frémont, even if his army had been in a fit condition for a second battle on the same day.

These Confederate successes at Cross Keys and Port Republic cleared the upper end of the Valley of the Federals. The pursuing columns had received a rude shock. Frémont fell back through Harrisonburg to Mount Jackson; and for the third time McDowell's Corps was held back from the long-looked-for advance on Richmond. Shields was ordered to remain at Luray, and the second division of the same Corps was detained at Front Royal. It was not till the 20th that these two divisions were permitted to leave the Valley for Fredericksburg.<sup>3</sup> By that time it was too

<sup>1</sup> 1 Henderson, 451.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Henderson, 467.

<sup>3</sup> 1 Henderson, 475.

late. On the 17th Jackson was already moving his army away from the Valley. On the 19th, following the line of the Virginia Central Railway, it was at Mechum's River Station. On the 21st it was at Frederickshall, within fifty miles of Richmond. The Federals were completely mystified as to its whereabouts, with such secrecy had the evacuation of the Valley been carried out. On the 23rd Jackson arrived in Richmond to arrange with Lee the details of the great counterstroke, which was to drive McClellan out of the Peninsula.

History affords few instances of a small force producing such great results as followed from Jackson's Valley campaign. Both he and Lee had detected the weak spot in the Federal armour—the anxiety of the Cabinet for the safety of their Capital. The Confederate generals played upon the fears of the Washington politicians, and by so doing paralysed the plan of campaign of the Federal commander. It is hardly too much to say that the fate of Richmond was decided not on the banks of the Chickahominy, but by the waters of the Shenandoah.



## CHAPTER X

### THE SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS (OR SECOND BULL RUN)

The formation of the Army of Virginia under Pope—Government mistrust of McClellan—Halleck appointed Commander-in-Chief—Withdrawal from the Peninsula ordered—Pope's task—Pope's unfortunate orders—Jackson sent to delay Pope—Jackson defeats Banks at Cedar Run—Lee joins Jackson—Lee's plan miscarries owing to a captured letter—Second plan foiled by a flood—Stuart's raid—Lee's third plan—Jackson's flank march—Its complete success—Pope's schemes—Pope orders concentration at Gainesville and an attack on Jackson at Manassas; then a concentration at Centreville—Jackson's attacks—Longstreet's movements—Position on the night of 28th August—Pope's plans—Jackson's position—Second battle of Manassas—Fitz-John Porter's movements—Pope's strong delusion; he renews the attack on the 30th—The Confederate position—Porter attacks and is repulsed—Longstreet's counterstroke—Struggle for the Henry House Hill—Pope falls back on Centreville—Battle of Chantilly—Federal armies withdrawn to Washington—Pope relieved of command.

WHEN McClellan took the field at the head of the Army of the Potomac in March, the President relieved him of the post which he held as General-in-Chief of all the land forces, in order that he might concentrate his whole attention on his own campaign.

Shortly afterwards the Government organised all the other forces, which they had in Virginia, into three departments under Frémont, Banks, and McDowell, retaining in their own hands the general control of these armies. The unsuccessful attempt made by Frémont and McDowell in execution of the Government plan to intercept Jackson's retreat up the Valley after his pursuit of Banks must have convinced the Cabinet of the error of needlessly multiplying military departments. On the 26th June these three armies were formed into a single army to be known as the Army of Virginia, and Major-General Pope was called from the West to command it. The new commander was a thorough soldier of the old regular army. He had graduated at West Point in 1842 and had served with distinction in the Mexican War; since the outbreak of the Civil War he had held a subordinate command under Halleck in the West, and had won fresh laurels by the reduction of New Madrid and Island No. 10 in the Mississippi.

On arriving at Washington he was called upon to act temporarily as military adviser to the Government. General Hitchcock had filled that post for some time, but though his reputation for military ability stood high, he suffered under the disadvantage of never having seen active service in time of war.<sup>1</sup> The Government at this time felt itself in a very awkward position: its largest and most efficient army—the Army of the Potomac—was encamped at Harrison's Landing on the James: its commander, McClellan, had largely lost the confidence of the Government even before the campaign commenced, and any lingering belief in him had been dissipated by his retreat to the James. He was now clamouring for reinforcements: the Government were extremely reluctant to send any further troops to a general whose ability and sincerity they distrusted. They had even retained at Fortress Monroe the troops sent by Burnside from the Carolinas instead of placing them directly under McClellan's command. Their natural instinct was to condemn the Peninsular campaign as a complete failure, and to recall the Army of the Potomac for service in a different field and under a different commander. At the same time, the Government, taught by experience, shrank from the sole responsibility of recalling McClellan. It was therefore determined to summon to Washington some general officer who had displayed distinguished ability in the field, and keep him there as the official military adviser of the Government. He was, in fact, to act as Chief of the Staff to the President, who, by the Constitution, was Commander-in-Chief.

To fill this most responsible post it was decided to summon Halleck from the West. Under the circumstances, Halleck was the natural selection. Nearly all the successes which the Federals had as yet gained had been in his department. Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Shiloh, Corinth,<sup>2</sup> had all been placed to his credit, and were in marked contrast to the non-success, which had hitherto attended McClellan's operations. The Government had yet to learn that in the West Halleck had reaped where he had not sown: that the successes gained nominally under his auspices had in reality been won almost in spite of him. They did not know, nor indeed could they be fairly expected to know, that his military ability was of the slenderest kind, and that of military judgment he possessed hardly a particle.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 2 Ropes, 234.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Chap. XIII.

<sup>3</sup> 2 Ropes, 234, 5, 260, 313. Halleck graduated at West Point in 1839 and entered the Engineers. He was not actively engaged in the Mexican War, and retired from the Army in 1854. He became the leading member of a firm of lawyers in San Francisco. He had gained a considerable reputation in military circles as a writer on the art of war. Later on he was the author of one of the best known works on International Law. The high estimate formed of his military abilities is shown by the fact that he was one of the first batch of four major generals in the regular army appointed after the outbreak of the war.

On the 11th July Halleck was appointed to the post of General-in-Chief of the land forces of the United States. His duties in the West prevented him reaching the capital till the 22nd. The most pressing question of the moment was the future destination of the Army of the Potomac: and on the 25th July Halleck went to Harrison's Landing to hold a conference with McClellan. The latter strongly urged that on the banks of the James and nowhere else could the Confederacy be crushed, and expressed his readiness, with a reinforcement of 20,000 men, to undertake the capture of Richmond. McClellan was clearly right in his view. His army was still in a most favourable position for offence. He could cross the James and capture Petersburg, thus cutting off Richmond from its southern line of railway communication.

Such a step, which at the time was quite feasible, would probably have compelled the evacuation of Richmond.<sup>1</sup> But as McClellan persisted in fixing the strength of Lee's army at 200,000 men, and his own only amounted to 90,000, it was difficult to convince Halleck that a reinforcement of 20,000 men would be likely to effect much alteration in the present position. It is likely enough that Halleck knew perfectly well that Lee had not half the force with which McClellan credited him, but used the latter's exaggerated estimate as affording a plausible reason for doing—what the Government had always meant him to do—for recalling the Army of the Potomac. On the 3rd August that order was given, and in spite of McClellan's indignant protest, was repeated and its execution insisted upon. As events proved, it was many weary months before a Northern army was again within a few miles of Richmond.

The arrival of Halleck at Washington enabled Pope to leave the capital and hasten to the front.<sup>2</sup> During the past month, which he had spent at Washington, he had not been idle. He found that the Government expected three things of him—to guard Washington from attack, to secure the Shenandoah Valley, and to create a diversion for the benefit of McClellan's army by threatening the Confederate communications at Gordonsville. His first step was to concentrate the scattered forces which made up his command. He summoned the Corps of Banks and Frémont (the latter now commanded by Sigel) to the east side of the Blue Ridge. They could guard the gaps in that range, and whilst these were held by the Federals, no force could advance down the Valley towards the Potomac without exposing its line of communications to a flank attack. One of McDowell's two divisions, under the command of King, was at Fredericksburg, and Pope was very anxious to bring it into line with the rest of his army, which was concentrating near Warrenton. But Halleck withheld this division for a time from

<sup>1</sup> 2 Ropes, 243.

<sup>2</sup> See Map III.



Pope, because he wished to protect the line of railway running from Falmouth opposite Fredericksburg to Aquia Creek. At the same time Pope ordered his cavalry to keep continually on the move, and directed their commander, Hatch, to advance on and capture Gordonsville. Had not Hatch encumbered his march by taking artillery and a wagon train, he might have gained possession of Gordonsville, before Jackson arrived from the Peninsula just in time to save it from capture.<sup>1</sup>

Whilst Pope was infusing into the troops under his command an energy to which they had long been strangers, he also issued certain General Orders from Washington, which have done much to ruin his reputation. The address which he sent to his new army was remarkable for its bombast and execrable taste. He instituted an invidious comparison between the Armies of the East and West, and announced that he had been brought from the West, where nothing but the backs of their foes had ever been seen, to teach the Eastern armies how to fight and conquer. The Army of Virginia, both officers and men, must have burned with resentment against their new commander. Frémont had already resigned rather than serve under a man junior to himself in the Service.<sup>2</sup> It was a risky experiment calling a Western general to the command of an Eastern army. McDowell was on the spot and was a capable officer, but unfortunately the rout of Bull Run had destroyed the Government's trust in him. Pope's address was not calculated to make the relations between himself and his subordinates any easier. At the same time he issued a variety of General Orders, which provoked the fiercest animosity among the Southerners. The general tendency of the orders was to introduce into the struggle a severity which, though justifiable according to the practice of war, had hitherto been avoided: and one order which compelled the peaceful inhabitants of districts temporarily in possession of the Federal armies to take an oath of allegiance to the United States Government under penalty of being driven from their homesteads, and in case of return of being shot, was nothing short of barbarous.<sup>3</sup>

Lee had withdrawn his army to Richmond on the 8th July, and on the 13th despatched Jackson with two divisions to Gordonsville. The Confederate commander was in a rather difficult position. Although it was now impossible for the enemy to bring to bear upon him that combination with which they had menaced Richmond, when McDowell with his corps of 40,000 men was on the point of advancing from Fredericksburg to join McClellan on the Chickahominy, yet if McClellan and Pope simultaneously assumed the offensive, he would be sorely pressed for want of men. McClellan, however, was not likely to advance again until he had

<sup>1</sup> 2 Ropes, 233

<sup>2</sup> 2 Ropes, 227.

<sup>3</sup> Ropes, *Army under Pope*, 10, 11.

been largely reinforced : and towards the end of the month Lee sent A. P. Hill with his division to the aid of Jackson, who was much in need of reinforcements, as with only 11,000 men he was confronting a force of 40,000 Federals.<sup>1</sup>

Pope had reached the front on the 1st August, and at once prepared for a vigorous forward move. He could not give any help to McClellan directly, unless indeed his army were to be transported by water to the James. But indirectly he might do a good deal to facilitate McClellan's withdrawal to Fortress Monroe, where he was to embark his army for Aquia Creek. Pope was moreover a man of very sanguine views. He had hopes of capturing both Gordonsville and Charlottesville. He very easily forgot that his advance was only a part and not the whole of a general plan of campaign, and apparently regarded himself as undertaking an independent movement. Both Gordonsville and Charlottesville were positions of considerable strategic importance. The former was the junction of the Orange and Alexandria Railway with the Virginia Central, and at the latter place a branch of the Virginia Central ran to Staunton at the upper end of the Valley. Their capture would have been a very serious embarrassment to the Confederate communications.

Jackson had now about 24,000 men collected in the vicinity of Gordonsville. From the outset Lee realised that the safety of the Confederate cause required that a heavy blow should be dealt Pope before he could be reinforced by the bulk of the army of the Potomac, and Jackson now saw a chance of attacking and defeating Pope's army in detail. On the 7th August he commenced his advance towards Culpeper. That point also was of strategical importance, as at it met the three roads by which the different portions of Pope's army were advancing.<sup>2</sup> If he could gain possession of it he would be in a position to deal a series of blows against their scattered divisions. On the 6th Pope had commenced his advance with Banks' Corps, which was moved to Culpeper Court House with Ricketts' division of McDowell's Corps following in support : and Sigel's Corps was also given the order to advance. It seems to have been Pope's intention to take up a position on Robertson's River, a tributary running into the Rapidan from the west. This line was already piqueted by his cavalry and to support them against Jackson's advance Banks was ordered forward from Culpeper. The two forces met on the 9th August at Cedar Run, seven miles beyond Culpeper.

The orders given by Pope to Banks were very confused, and might certainly be interpreted to mean that he was to attack any

<sup>1</sup> 2 Henderson, 97. Pope's army amounted to about 47,000 (2 Ropes, 231), but of this force King's division was detained at Fredericksburg.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Henderson, 104.

force which he encountered advancing.<sup>1</sup> Acting upon this interpretation of his instructions Banks attacked vigorously and for a moment gained considerable success. The Confederate left was broken. Their line from left to centre was rolled up, but at this point Jackson's reserves arrived and quickly settled the issue of the day. The Stonewall brigade checked the rout and held back the advancing Federals, whilst Hill's division delivered a counter-stroke with crushing effect. The Federal centre was forced back, both their flanks were turned, and they were driven from the field after a brave but ineffectual resistance with very heavy loss. Banks lost about a quarter of his whole force, which was 9,000 strong,<sup>2</sup> and the blow was so severe that his troops took little part in the rest of the campaign. Jackson had at least 20,000 men on the field, and his losses amounted to 1,300. The fighting was all over in an hour and a half, and Jackson pressed on that same evening towards Culpeper. That was his goal: his fight with Banks had been but an incident, for which he was only half prepared. But when he had advanced a mile and a half further and night had fallen, he found himself confronting the forces of Sigel and Ricketts, which had been pressed forward to the support of Banks. It was no part of Jackson's plan to attack a force stronger than his own, and he fell back behind Cedar Run. For two days he remained in position waiting to see if Pope would venture to attack him, but on the night of the 11th, learning that King's division was on the point of joining Pope, he withdrew across the Rapidan to his original camp near Gordonsville. He had by no means accomplished all that he hoped: he had aimed at nothing less than the breaking up of Pope's army, but he had dealt a crushing blow to one of its Corps, and he hoped to lure Pope on in pursuit and thus give Lee a chance of concentrating a superior force against him.

On 13th August Lee learnt that McClellan was beginning to embark his troops, and that Burnside's force, which had already left Fortress Monroe, was on its way to join Pope. He determined to assume the offensive with all his might, and at once despatched Longstreet with twelve brigades towards Gordonsville.<sup>3</sup> Jackson, partly in the hope of mystifying the enemy and partly to be ready in position for the flank movement which he and Lee contemplated against Pope, moved away from Gordonsville to his own right to Pisgah Church. On the 15th August Lee and his lieutenants held a Council of War at Pisgah Church, and a movement round the enemy's left flank was determined on. Pope had placed himself in a position which was very open to a flank attack. Having been reinforced by King's division on the night

<sup>1</sup> 2 Ropes, 249-50; 2 Henderson, 114, note.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Henderson, 124.

<sup>3</sup> 2 Ropes, 254.



of the 11th, the next morning he crossed Cedar Run and advanced to the Rapidan. Finding no signs of Jackson and hearing that part of Burnside's command was being sent to him, he was full of sanguine expectations and contemplated crossing the Rapidan and moving on Louisa Court House. Halleck, however, who saw that Pope was altogether mistaking his rôle, which was to stand on the defensive until the Armies of the Potomac and Virginia should be united, insisted on his stopping on the northern bank of the Rapidan. Pope depended for his supplies on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, but at Culpeper that line makes a great bend almost at right angles turning eastwards towards Washington, and it would be perfectly easy for an enemy to move past the Federal left and strike this line of communications at Rappahannock Station, and by destroying the railway bridge there to cut them off from direct communication with Washington.<sup>1</sup> This was precisely the movement which Lee and Jackson were contemplating.

The Confederate army, 55,000<sup>2</sup> strong, was concentrated out of sight of the Federal outposts behind Clarke's Mountain, within six miles of their unconscious foe's extreme left. Jackson and Longstreet were ordered at dawn of the 18th to cross the Rapidan at the Somerville and Raccoon Fords and move on Culpeper, whilst Stuart's cavalry, preceding Longstreet's advance,<sup>3</sup> was to seize Rappahannock Station and destroy the railway bridge, and then form on Longstreet's right to take part in the battle, which was expected to ensue in the neighbourhood of Culpeper.

Had the scheme been carried out as originally planned, it is hard to see how Pope's army could have escaped destruction. It would have been taken completely by surprise, and its line of communications must have been lost. Pope would then have been forced to fight a battle against superior numbers, and the Federal army was not nearly so efficient an instrument of war as the Confederate army had become with its experience in the Valley and Peninsula. Pope's army was, in fact, a mere aggregate of independent units hastily put together, which had not yet had time to acquire organised cohesion.<sup>4</sup> But the Confederate plan miscarried. The cavalry force was not yet forthcoming for the rush upon Rappahannock Station. Judging this to be an essential part of the plan, Lee postponed the movement until the 20th, in order to enable the cavalry to take part in it. On the night of the 17th Stuart's adjutant-general was captured by a Federal patrol, and on him was found a letter from Lee, which disclosed the fact, of which Pope was till then profoundly unconscious, that Jackson had been largely reinforced. Early on the morning of the 18th

<sup>1</sup> 2 Ropes, 255-6.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Henderson, 153; 2 Ropes, 254.

<sup>3</sup> Stuart was to cross further to the east by Morton's Ford. 2 Ropes, 257.

<sup>4</sup> 2 Ropes, 253, 303-4, note.

Pope was informed by a spy that the Confederate army was preparing for an advance against his rear.<sup>1</sup> Immediately orders for a retreat were issued, and by the evening of the 19th the Federals were in position behind the Rappahannock. Their retreat was not discovered until late in the afternoon of the 19th. A thick haze prevented the vedettes on Clarke's Mountain from seeing it sooner. At once a general pursuit was commenced, and by the evening of the 20th the Confederates were encamped on the south bank of the Rappahannock within touch of the Federals.

Lee's first plan for the destruction of Pope's army had failed. But it was still possible to crush Pope, although the position was much less favourable and the time was short. At that season the Rappahannock was so low as not to constitute a serious obstacle. Jackson was directed to move up the river and find a crossing by which he could turn the Federal right. On the 22nd Jackson marched ten miles up the river from Rappahannock Station and crossed Early's brigade over the river at Sulphur Springs. But a second time the Confederates were robbed of success. Such heavy rain came down that the river was soon in flood, and Early's brigade was left isolated on the further bank. He, however, moved northwards, and took up a position behind one of the tributaries of the Rappahannock, which was also in flood, and thus Sigel's Corps, which formed the right of the Federal army, was prevented from attacking. On the 23rd Jackson repaired the ruined bridge at Sulphur Springs, and sent another brigade to the support of Early. On the morning of the 24th, as the enemy were advancing in force, the two brigades were withdrawn across the river.

The same day that Early's brigade crossed to the north bank of the Rappahannock, Stuart, with 1,500 cavalry, also crossed the river still further up at Waterloo Bridge, and sweeping round through Warrenton, struck the Orange and Alexandria Railroad at Catlett's Station, where Pope's supply trains were parked. The conditions were favourable for a surprise. The rain was falling in torrents, and the night was very dark. Some 2,000 troops were guarding the trains, but they were quickly dispersed. A considerable amount of spoil was seized, and the camp set on fire. But owing to the wet it was found impossible to destroy the railway bridge over Cedar Run, which had been the main object of the expedition. Before nightfall of the 23d Stuart was back again on the south side of the Rappahannock, having covered sixty miles in twenty-six hours, and bringing with him some 300 prisoners;<sup>2</sup> but the most important capture was Pope's despatch-book, which gave detailed information of the actual strength and disposition of his forces, and the reinforcements which he was expecting. These two movements across the river of Stuart's cavalry and

<sup>1</sup> 2 Henderson, 142.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Henderson, 150.

Early's infantry, and their subsequent withdrawal, had a further effect, unsuspected at the time, but with far-reaching consequences. Pope was convinced that the attempt to turn his right was definitely abandoned.<sup>1</sup>

Twice had Lee been baffled, and in both cases by sheer bad luck. The time, too, within which Pope's army was to be fought and beaten, was getting desperately short. Pope's captured despatch-book disclosed the fact that part of the Army of the Potomac had landed at Aquia Creek, and was marching to his aid: that a force was also concentrating at Washington, and that within a few days 150,000 men might be in line of battle on the Rappahannock.<sup>2</sup> There were but two alternatives: either immediate retreat—and such a movement seemed all the more necessary, as according to the present dispositions of the opposing armies the Federals were actually the nearer of the two to Richmond—or else some bold stroke which would compel Pope to fight at a disadvantage before he could be reinforced, and give Lee a chance of defeating the overwhelming strength of his enemies in detail. On the night of the 24th Lee and Jackson met in conference at Jefferson, whither the headquarters of the army had been moved that day. Then and there a plan was devised, perhaps the most daring in the history of warfare. Lee determined to divide his army under the very eyes of his enemy, and to send Jackson round by a wide sweep northward through Thoroughfare Gap, in the Bull Run Mountains, against the Federal dépôt of supplies at Manassas Junction. Pope would be forced, when his line of communications was broken, to fall back from the Rappahannock in the direction of Washington; and an opportunity might and must be found of striking him a crushing blow in the process. Jackson, after destroying the dépôt at Manassas Junction and breaking up the railroad, was to manœuvre so as to keep Pope occupied, until Lee, following through Thoroughfare Gap with Longstreet's wing, could get up to combine in an attack upon the Army of Virginia.

The risk run by this division of the Confederate army was enormous. Pope's army would be lying between the two wings of the Confederates: by holding Thoroughfare Gap he could prevent Longstreet coming through to the aid of Jackson, against whom he could still concentrate a greatly superior force; or he might boldly assume the offensive, and crossing the Rappahannock, attack with his whole army Longstreet's isolated Corps. Both Lee and Jackson considered the risk, however great, worth running. They had no great opinion either of Pope's generalship or of the efficiency of his army, and Jackson felt himself quite competent to mystify his opponent during the critical days which must elapse before the Confederate army was concentrated again. The only

<sup>1</sup> 2 Henderson, 150.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Henderson, 151.



alternative was retreat, and Lee had not marched all the way from the James to the Rappahannock only to retire. The contemplated movement would have the effect of forcing Pope away from the reinforcements which were expected from Aquia Creek. At the time when the momentous resolution was arrived at, it was probably not known that part of McClellan's army was being transported not to Aquia Creek, but to Alexandria.<sup>1</sup>

No time was lost in carrying out the plan. Jackson in anticipation of the movement had already withdrawn his command some way back from the river. Long before the dawn on the 25th the Valley army had commenced its famous march. None but the general himself knew its destination. It might be returning by way of Chester Gap to the scene of its former triumphs in the Shenandoah Valley: either Winchester or Harper's Ferry might be its objective. It was midnight when the column halted at Salem, on the Manassas railway, after a march of twenty-six miles. Short was the time allotted to repose. Again before the dawn of the 26th the army was once more on the march for Thoroughfare Gap, and the morning light soon revealed to it the exhilarating truth that it was being led against the communications of Pope himself. At Gainesville the Warrenton-Alexandria pike road was reached, and then Jackson turned south-east towards Bristoe Station.

He was now thirteen miles in rear of Pope's headquarters and right across his line of communications.<sup>2</sup> Bristoe Station was reached a little before sunset, after a march of nearly twenty-five miles. But more work was yet to be done before the whole army sought its well-earned rest. Some seven miles up the railway lay Manassas Junction, with its vast wealth of stores. Jackson had deliberately preferred to march from Gainesville to Bristoe Station rather than to Manassas Junction, in order to prevent Pope sending any reinforcements by the railway to save his depôt. Trimble with two regiments of infantry and Stuart with his cavalry pressed on to Manassas. It was nearly midnight when they reached the Junction: only a feeble resistance was encountered, and with a loss of only fifteen wounded<sup>3</sup> the Confederates found themselves in possession of Pope's supplies. On the next morning Hill's and Taliaferro's divisions marched to join Stuart at the Junction, whilst Ewell's division was left at Bristoe Station to hold in check any force which Pope might send up the railway in pursuit. The troops at Manassas Junction celebrated a very carnival of pillage

<sup>1</sup> 2 Henderson, 153, 240. The original design was to send the whole of the Army of the Potomac except Keyes' Corps to Aquia Creek. Thither Burnside's and Porter's Corps proceeded. Heintzelman's landed at Alexandria, and was followed by Franklin's and Sumner's. Keyes' was left in the Peninsula to garrison Fortress Monroe and its neighbourhood. A detachment from the Kanawha Valley was also sent to Washington.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Henderson, 159.

<sup>3</sup> 2 Henderson, 161

on the 27th.<sup>1</sup> The roads were all watched by Stuart's cavalry: direct approach from Warrenton Junction was barred by Ewell's division strongly posted on Broad Run. After placing a guard over the liquor, Jackson directed that the magazines should be flung open to his wearied and famished soldiers. About 3 p.m. Ewell, who had advanced across Broad Run to destroy a bridge over another stream in his front, found himself confronted by Hooker's division, which had been ordered to move up the railroad from Warrenton Junction. After an hour's hot skirmishing Ewell withdrew his troops across Broad Run. He had been expressly ordered not to bring on a general engagement. Hooker, satisfied that Jackson's whole Corps was close at hand, made no attempt to cross the stream.

Having reached Manassas Junction, Jackson had to consider his next move. To remain at the Junction was simply to court capture by the whole Federal army. He resolved upon a movement which might have the effect of completely mystifying Pope. All the stores of the Junction were given to the flames. As the night fell, the depôt became one mighty blaze which reddened all the sky. Of that vast conflagration Pope was himself a witness from Bristoe Station, where he had just joined Hooker.<sup>2</sup> As he watched the destruction of that gigantic accumulation of stores, he may have remembered in the bitterness of his soul the boastful utterances of his address to the Army of Virginia, in which he had called upon them to take no thought for their own lines of retreat, in order the better to study those of the enemy.

The fire was still raging when Jackson withdrew his divisions from the scene of ruin. Moving shortly after midnight, Taliaferro's division marched north along the Sudley Springs road, and crossing the Warrenton turnpike, encamped on the right bank of Bull Run. Hill marched east, crossed Bull Run at Blackburn's Ford, and moved on Centreville: he left Centreville at 10 a.m. on the 28th, and recrossing Bull Run at the Stone Bridge, took up his position north of the Warrenton turnpike, forming the extreme left of the Confederate line. Ewell's division was the last to start, as it had to be brought from Broad Run, where it was facing Hooker. It did not leave the Junction till dawn, and followed Hill's line of march to Blackburn's Ford: crossing Bull Run at that point, it moved up the left bank of the river, recrossed at the Stone Bridge, and took up a position on Taliaferro's left. Thus by the morning of the 28th Jackson had completed the larger half of

<sup>1</sup> About 7 a.m. on the 27th a Federal brigade belonging to Franklin's Corps was sent by rail to Bull Run. It then advanced towards Manassas Junction, but was easily repulsed. Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry followed in pursuit as far as Burke's Station, within twelve miles of Alexandria.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Henderson, 169. "None, however, of the Federal reports mention seeing the light of this great fire." (2 B. & L. 506, note.)

his task. He had swept right round the Federal flank, broken their line of communications, destroyed their supplies, and now established himself with his whole command on the north side of the Warrenton turnpike, within twelve miles of Thoroughfare Gap, and ready to reach out to his right and join hands with Lee, as soon as he should advance with Longstreet's force through the Gap. All this had been accomplished with the minimum of loss.

But Jackson had not simply made his great march for the purpose of cutting up Pope's communications; if that had been the sole object which Lee had in view, the same result might have been obtained more speedily and with less risk by sending Stuart's cavalry alone around the Federal flank. It was Jackson's further duty to detain Pope until Lee could come into line for a combined attack, and to force the Federals to turn and fight their pursuers on the right bank of Bull Run. If Pope were allowed to array his army behind Bull Run, within easy reach of Washington, Lee's difficulties would be immensely increased.

It is now necessary to return to Pope and see what steps he took to cope with the new problem so suddenly set him by the Confederate leaders. Pope was a general of sanguine views and considerable enterprise, and within certain limits his military judgment was sound. What he chiefly lacked was the capacity for divining, as Wellington phrased it, "what the fellow on the other side of the hill was up to." When Pope reached the Rappahannock, he found his movements considerably hampered by Halleck's instructions. He was directed to hold the line of the Rappahannock at all costs and "fight like the devil." He was also ordered to keep open communications with Falmouth, from which point the divisions of the Army of the Potomac were to be sent to him, as they successively disembarked at Aquia Creek. To maintain this line of communications he was obliged to extend his left down the Rappahannock, and as his numbers were inferior to Lee's he would be unable to prevent a turning movement against his own right. He determined therefore to assume the offensive himself, and, when Jackson was marching up the river to find a crossing at Sulphur Springs, was preparing to cross the river by the lower fords and assail Lee's right flank and rear.<sup>1</sup> But the same heavy rain which kept Early isolated on the north bank of the Rappahannock prevented Pope from carrying out his daring scheme. On the 24th, in consequence of Early's movement across the river on the 22nd, Pope was concentrating his army at Warrenton and upon the roads which led from that place to the bridges over the Rappahannock at Sulphur Springs and Waterloo. As Jackson made no further attempt to cross his troops over the river at either of these two points, Pope came to

<sup>1</sup> *Ropes, Army under Pope*, 39.



the conclusion that the turning movement against his right had been abandoned, and on the morning of the 25th was issuing orders for a disposition of his forces on a line running north and south from Warrenton to Kelly's Ford.<sup>1</sup>

When, however, Jackson's march to some destination as yet unknown was discovered by the Federal look-outs owing to the clouds of dust, Pope decided that he was moving to the Shenandoah Valley, and ordered Sigel and McDowell to force the Rappahannock at Waterloo Bridge and Sulphur Springs, and Reno commanding two divisions of Burnside's Corps<sup>2</sup> to cross below the bridge and make for Culpeper.<sup>3</sup> No attempt was made, however, to carry out this forward movement, except by McDowell, and he did not cross the river. By the night of the 26th it had become plain that Jackson was moving through Thoroughfare Gap, and Pope came to the conclusion that the Confederates designed to assail his right flank and rear at Warrenton. He realised that with Jackson in his rear and threatening his communications he must abandon the line of the Rappahannock, and on that night issued orders directing his army to take a position running east and west from Warrenton to Gainesville with a strong reserve at Greenwich.<sup>4</sup> But the news that the Confederates had struck the railroad at Manassas Junction caused him to change his plans, and on the morning of the 27th to order a concentration on Gainesville. Heintzelman and Porter had just reported to him for duty with the 3rd and 5th Corps of the Army of the Potomac, and Reynolds' Pennsylvania division had also joined him and been assigned to McDowell's Corps.

Thus Pope had now at his disposal a force of between 70,000 and 80,000 men. The position which he had taken up on the morning of the 27th was a very strong one, as it lay across the direct line of communication between Lee and Jackson. If Pope's army remained in that position it would be impossible for Lee to join Jackson by way of Thoroughfare Gap. But the military situation quickly changed.

Hooker's division of Heintzelman's Corps had been ordered to move from Warrenton Junction, and in the afternoon came into contact with Ewell at Broad Run.

It was quite a surprise to Pope to learn that the whole of Jackson's Corps was across his line of communications. He had hitherto supposed that the Confederate force at Manassas was merely cavalry and the movement a repetition of Stuart's raid against Catlett's Station. The prospect of capturing Jackson's entire command disturbed his mental balance, and his subsequent

<sup>1</sup> Ropes, *Army under Pope*, 46.

<sup>2</sup> These two divisions were commanded by Stevens and Reno, who, though temporarily acting as Corps commander, retained direct control over his own division.

<sup>3</sup> 2 Henderson, 170.

<sup>4</sup> Ropes, *Army under Pope*, 52.

manceuvres revealed him as the victim of a strong delusion. It was not given to such a capacity as Pope's to fathom the far-reaching and daring plans of Lee and Jackson. His one guiding principle was that the enemy would adopt the course which he wished them to adopt. He made up his mind that Jackson would remain in the entrenchments at Manassas, and there offer battle to the whole Federal army. Accordingly on the night of the 27th he ordered a concentration of all his force on Manassas Junction. "March at the very earliest blush of dawn," were his orders, "and we shall bag the whole crowd." All thought of the possible movement of the other half of the Confederate army vanished out of his mind. He ordered McDowell, whose troops lay between Gainesville and Thoroughfare Gap, to march with all his forces to Manassas, and thus opened to Lee the road by which he could reunite with Jackson. McDowell, whose military judgment was far superior to that of his commander, on his own responsibility left a division under Ricketts to hold the all-important Gap.

So convinced was Pope that he would find Jackson waiting for him at Manassas, that he sent no scouts to make sure of his intended victim's presence,<sup>1</sup> although Bristoe Station, where he had established his headquarters on the night of the 27th, was only seven miles from Manassas Junction. The truth did not dawn upon him until about noon of the 28th, when with the 3rd Corps and Reno's two divisions he reached the Junction only to find it absolutely deserted and the birds flown without leaving a trace behind them.

After some hours of perplexity, news arrived that the enemy had been seen at Centreville: and at 4.15 p.m. Pope issued an order directing all his troops on Centreville. The march of A. P. Hill's division through that place had had the desired effect of completely mystifying Pope. Thus, for the Federals, the 28th was an entirely wasted day. Over 60,000 men (excluding Banks' Corps, which was guarding the trains at Warrenton Junction), were marching and countermarching within easy reach of 25,000 Confederates, who were hidden in the woods north of the Warrenton turnpike. The two armies actually came into contact in the course of the morning. Sigel and Reynolds marching according to Pope's orders from the neighbourhood of Gainesville to Manassas encountered upon the Warrenton turnpike a brigade of Taliaferro's division, which opened fire upon them. The Confederates finding themselves outnumbered quickly withdrew into the woods, and Sigel and Reynolds continued on their way. They had been told that Jackson was at Manassas Junction, and supposed that this force, which they had just encountered, was a

<sup>1</sup> 2 Ropes, 268.

mere reconnoitring party. Its true significance was not realised, and Pope continued to march eastwards in pursuit of a foe, who had already withdrawn to the west. It was not until near sunset that the real position of Jackson was at length revealed to his bewildered pursuer. About that hour King's division of McDowell's Corps was marching along the turnpike towards Centreville.

As the day wore on Jackson was himself in considerable perplexity as to the movements of his foe. It was no part of the combined plan of action that Pope should be allowed to take up a fresh position behind Bull Run within easy reach of reinforcements coming from Washington.

In the afternoon a Federal courier was captured with McDowell's order to all the troops under his command, practically the left and centre of Pope's army, to march to Manassas Junction.<sup>1</sup> Jackson began to fear that Pope was retreating behind Bull Run, and for greater security was taking the longer route *via* Manassas instead of the direct road along the turnpike over the Stone Bridge.<sup>2</sup> When he saw King's division moving along the road he supposed it to be the flank guard of McDowell's Corps. The moment for which he had been waiting was come. He knew that Longstreet was forcing his way through Thoroughfare Gap.<sup>3</sup> McDowell's captured order and the presence of King with his face set towards Centreville were sufficient proof that whatever force still confronted Longstreet would be easily swept aside. If, as Jackson supposed, King's command was but the flank guard of a larger force, then so much the better. For the larger the force which was attacked, the greater was the probability that Pope would be brought back into Lee's clutches.

It was a strange game of cross purposes: Pope, as he imagined, in pursuit of Jackson, marching away from him to Centreville: Jackson, under the impression that the Federals were retreating, attacking a force which was moving in pursuit of himself. But whether the Federals were pursuing or retreating, it was essential that Pope and the bulk of his army should be brought back from Centreville in the direction of Gainesville. Jackson's attack on King was designed to that end, and proved eminently successful. The fight on the evening of the 28th, which raged for about an hour and a half a little to the west of Groveton, was carried on by two divisions of Jackson's Corps with two brigades of King's division. The Federals were taken by surprise when the batteries opened upon them, but imagining that they had to deal only with Stuart's horse artillery, quickly deployed into line and advanced against the hidden foe. It was not till the Federals were close to the woods north of the high road that the Confederate infantry showed themselves. The struggle which ensued was carried on

<sup>1</sup> 2 Henderson, 177.<sup>2</sup> 2 Henderson, 179.<sup>3</sup> 2 Henderson, 178.



with the utmost determination at close quarters, and on both sides the losses were heavy. No flank movement was executed, and as night fell the Federals, finding themselves outnumbered, drew back to the road. They had lost about 1,100, nearly half the whole number of troops engaged:<sup>1</sup> the Confederate loss was even heavier, and included among the wounded the two divisional commanders, Ewell and Taliaferro.

When Jackson on the night of the 24th withdrew his command from the right bank of the Rappahannock, Longstreet brought his troops up from near the railway bridge and took the vacant position opposite Sulphur Springs and Waterloo, whilst Anderson's division took Longstreet's place at the railway bridge.

On the 25th both Longstreet and Anderson kept up demonstrations against the enemy on the opposite bank. Late in the afternoon of the 26th Longstreet started to follow Jackson's line of march, and Anderson moved up the river to take Longstreet's place. Longstreet's marching was by no means so speedy as that of Jackson. He only covered thirty miles in two days. At 3 p.m. on the 28th<sup>2</sup> he reached Thoroughfare Gap and found Ricketts' division in position at the eastern end. After a long skirmish Longstreet was obliged to send three brigades over the mountain by Hopewell Gap, north of Thoroughfare Gap; and Ricketts, finding himself in danger of being outflanked, fell back in the evening to Gainesville.<sup>3</sup>

The position on the night of the 28th was as follows: Jackson held a line north of the Warrenton turnpike, stretching from near Groveton to Bull Run, commanding the Sudley Springs Ford: he thus covered an alternative line of retreat northward by Aldie Gap, which he could utilise in case Longstreet failed to get through Thoroughfare Gap, to unite with the rest of Lee's army west of the Bull Run Mountains.


Longstreet, twelve miles away, held the Gap, and ought to be in position on Jackson's right the following morning. Anderson was behind Longstreet.

On the Federal side Ricketts was at Gainesville, still separating the two wings of the Confederate army. King's division was on the Warrenton turnpike, confronting Jackson's right and centre, and in connection with Ricketts on its left. On the right of King came Reynolds' division, and on Reynolds' right was Sigel's Corps. Pope's orders and counter-orders had failed to concentrate his army at Centreville, where only Kearny's division of the 3rd Corps and Reno's two divisions had encamped. Hooker's division was

<sup>1</sup> 2 Henderson, 183, who estimates the Federal force engaged at 2,800. The two Federal brigades engaged were Gibbon's and Doubleday's. <sup>2</sup> 2 Ropes, 272.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Ropes, 274.

<sup>3</sup> Besides the three brigades which went through Hopewell Gap, Hood's division climbed over the mountain at Thoroughfare by a trail (2 B. & L., 517).







still south of Bull Run. The 5th Corps was at Bristoe Station, and Banks was east of Warrenton Junction with the trains. A superior force was in front of Jackson, and Ricketts at Gainesville still intervened between him and Longstreet. But before the dawn of the 29th an alteration in the relative position of the two armies had taken place, which seriously prejudiced Pope's chance of success in case he chose to assume the offensive. About 1 a.m. King fell back to Manassas, and Ricketts, finding himself isolated, followed suit and retired to Bristoe Station. The road was now open to Longstreet to bring his Corps into line with Jackson's.

Pope totally misread the situation. He believed that Jackson was retreating towards Thoroughfare Gap, and had been intercepted by McDowell. By some process of reasoning, peculiar to himself, he had arrived at the conclusion that there was nothing to fear from Longstreet's Corps during the 29th.<sup>1</sup> On that day he expected to crush Jackson with overwhelmingly superior numbers, and ordered a general concentration of his army on the Warrenton turnpike. But at this stage of the campaign Pope had lost touch with his different Corps. He did not know that both Ricketts and King had fallen back to the Orange and Alexandria Railway, and that Hooker had not crossed Bull Run. McDowell had spent the night vainly looking for Pope, and during his absence Ricketts and King, acting on their own responsibility, had withdrawn from their positions. The task of holding Jackson fast, until Pope could bring up his right wing from beyond Bull Run, devolved upon Sigel, who, supported by Reynolds, formed the Federal centre.

In anticipation of the coming battle (see Plan) Jackson had withdrawn his right from beyond Groveton towards the left, so as to connect with Hill's division, whose left was necessarily fixed near Bull Run. The line which he held was that of an unfinished railroad running from Sudley Springs to Gainesville.<sup>2</sup> Its high embankments and deep cuttings gave admirable cover to the Confederates, and constituted no inconsiderable obstacle to any assaulting force. Jackson's whole line only covered 3,000 yards, and thus he was enabled to hold back one-half of his force in reserve. His corps now numbered 18,000 infantry, with 40 guns, and 2,500 cavalry disposed upon the flanks.<sup>3</sup> The force which Pope brought to bear against Jackson's position on the 29th consisted of Sigel's Corps and Reynolds' division with the 3rd Corps and Reno's divisions numbering about 35,000 men.<sup>4</sup> But of this force only Sigel and Reynolds were actually in position on the morning of the 29th: Heintzelman's and Reno's troops had to be brought from Centreville, and did not reach the field of battle until noon.

<sup>1</sup> 2 Ropes, 278.

<sup>3</sup> 2 Henderson, 190.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Ropes, 283.

<sup>4</sup> 2 Ropes, 282.

Sigel's first attack was badly managed: the disposition of his divisions was faulty; the assault was made piecemeal,<sup>1</sup> and practically the bulk of the fighting fell upon two brigades which attacked Hill's left and were repulsed without very much difficulty. Before noon he made a second and fiercer attack, mainly directed as before against Hill's division on the Confederate left. Again the attack was repulsed; but Hill was this time obliged to bring up a brigade from his reserve to support his front line.<sup>2</sup> By now the troops from Centreville, at least 17,000 in number, had arrived upon the field, and they were ordered to assault Hill's position under Pope's personal direction. This attack, delivered by Hooker's and one of Reno's divisions, was more fiercely pressed home than either of its predecessors. Hill's two front lines were seriously shaken: twice the railway embankment was lost and won: at last Hill put in Pender's brigade from his reserve, and the Federal column was driven back. But Pender pushed the counterstroke too far,<sup>3</sup> following the retreating enemy into the open ground, and coming under the fire of their batteries. As he fell back within the woods a fresh assault was delivered: Grover's brigade of Hooker's division was ordered forward. Advancing with the utmost gallantry, it struck the disordered Confederates a tremendous blow. Hill's division went reeling back from the railroad, and the men, breaking from their ranks, fled for refuge towards the guns, which were stationed about five hundred yards in rear of the fighting line. But there were no reserves to support Grover's charge; and Jackson hurried into action Forno's brigade, which he had brought from the extreme right, where it had originally been posted to connect with Longstreet's Corps. Grover's brigade was disordered by the fury of its own charge, and when attacked in front by this new brigade and pressed on its left flank by an advance of Taliaferro's line, was driven back after a desperate struggle, lasting only twenty minutes from first to last, across the turnpike with tremendous loss.

The fifth and last assault was made about 4.30 p.m. by Kearney's division and Stevens' of Reno's Corps. Like the others, it was mainly directed against Hill's position. The Confederate left had suffered heavily; all the brigades of Hill's division had been engaged: the men were weary, and the supply of ammunition was running out. When the final assault came, Hill's exhausted troops, still fighting desperately, were pushed back, and the Federals penetrated 300 yards within the Confederate lines.<sup>4</sup> But Jackson, watching the battle from the ridge, where his artillery was posted, was ready with his counterstroke. He still had Early's brigade, brought like Forno's from the extreme right, in reserve, and he

<sup>1</sup> 2 Henderson, 192.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Henderson, 196.

<sup>3</sup> Branch's brigade (2 Henderson, 194).

<sup>4</sup> 2 Henderson, 200.

now sent it forward, supported by two regiments of Ewell's division, to restore the battle on the left at the point of the bayonet. Early accomplished his task brilliantly: once again the Federal ranks, disordered by the hard struggle and the advance through thick woods, were unable to resist the shock of a smaller but more compact force. They were speedily driven back across the turnpike; and with this repulse of Kearny and Reno the battle of the 29th, so far as Jackson's Corps was concerned, ended.

Jackson had confronted, at any rate since noon, a force greatly his superior in numbers; but in none of the five assaults, which were all frontal, had he to deal with a body of men stronger than his own command.

Pope had proved himself a poor tactician. No attempt was made to turn Hill's left, and the successive assaults lacked unity. Pope, however, was not much troubled at first by the repeated failures of his right and centre to carry Jackson's position. He was relying upon his left wing, under McDowell and Porter, to fall upon Jackson's right, which he believed to be exposed to a flank attack.

On the morning of the 29th Porter, with the 5th Corps, had already passed Manassas Junction on his way to Centreville, when he was turned back by a fresh order directing him to take King's division, as well as his own force, and march on Gainesville. He was presently overtaken by McDowell, and yet another order was received from Pope, which proved to be based on a complete misconception of the facts. His own and McDowell's Corps were directed to move towards Gainesville so as to connect with the rest of the Federal army on the Warrenton turnpike. As the point on which Pope specially insisted in this order was that they must be prepared to withdraw behind Bull Run that night for the sake of supplies, it did not seem likely that an attack on Jackson was contemplated, but merely an union of the two Federal wings with a view to retiring behind Bull Run and giving battle to the united forces of Lee and Jackson, which might be expected at Centreville by the evening of the 30th. When within three and a half miles of Gainesville, McDowell and Porter found themselves confronted by a hostile force of uncertain size and strongly posted; at the same time sounds of the fierce struggle on the Warrenton turnpike could be heard. It was plain to both commanders that Pope's order had been issued under an entire misunderstanding of the actual situation. They were already confronted by Longstreet's Corps, which had arrived upon the scene a day earlier than Pope anticipated; and it was equally plain that Jackson was not retreating, but making a firm stand. A despatch was also received from Buford, one of the cavalry generals, to the effect that a strong force of Confederates had



already passed through Gainesville, and the clouds of dust rising in the same direction showed that the movement was still continuing. Under these perplexing circumstances, the two generals after a consultation decided to separate. McDowell marched with King's division to the right towards the field of battle, slowly followed by Ricketts' division from Bristoe Station. This force reached the field too late to take any part in the battle on the north side of the high-road, though King's division was sharply engaged towards evening, but not with Jackson's Corps.

Porter was left with his own Corps, numbering about 9,000 men, confronting a Confederate force of unknown strength, but knowing that Longstreet could easily concentrate an overwhelming force against him. Accordingly he did little more than hold his position during the rest of the day, making an occasional demonstration to prevent reinforcements being sent to Jackson's aid. In this object he was distinctly successful. For Longstreet, with a greatly superior force, allowed himself to be "contained" for the greater part of the day by Porter's single Corps.<sup>1</sup>

Lee had moved Longstreet's troops through Thoroughfare Gap on the morning of the 29th, and pushed forward through Gainesville to support Jackson. On that day it seemed as though the object of Jackson's daring flank march was completely accomplished. The two wings of the Confederate army were practically united; their opponents were disorganised; the various Corps had lost touch with each other, and Pope was hopelessly bewildered. But Longstreet was a difficult man to move; he disliked plunging into an engagement until he had thoroughly realised the position. Three times did Lee urge him to attack.<sup>2</sup> It was not till evening was drawing on that he could be persuaded to make so much as a strong reconnaissance. Hood's division was sent forward on the high-road and quickly came into collision with the division of King, which had at last arrived on the Federal left. The encounter was short but sharp; the Federals were pushed back a mile and a half and abandoned one gun.<sup>3</sup> But after midnight Hood withdrew from his advanced position.

The night of the 29th saw Jackson firmly holding his ground in spite of the assaults of one-half of the Federal army, and Longstreet was in position on his right. A great opportunity had been missed owing to Longstreet's slowness; and Lee did not intend to assume the offensive on the 30th. He knew that D. H. Hill's, McLaws', and Walker's divisions had already crossed the Rappahannock, and were marching to his support. He determined, before making any fresh movement, to wait until these reinforcements should have joined him.<sup>4</sup> Jackson's Corps

<sup>1</sup> On the controversy regarding Porter's movements on the 29th, see 2 Ropes, 277-82.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Henderson, 202. <sup>3</sup> 2 Ropes, 284; 2 Henderson, 202. <sup>4</sup> 2 Henderson, 206-7.

was now at any rate safe, and the most pressing anxiety removed. It was to be left to Pope to settle what the next move should be.

It might naturally have been expected that Pope, who in his Joint Order to McDowell and Porter on the 29th had insisted on the necessity of retiring that night behind Bull Run, would, after his failure to carry Jackson's position, especially as he was now informed that Longstreet was close at hand, withdraw behind Bull Run, where he might reasonably expect to be reinforced by the Corps of Sumner and Franklin. These he knew had landed at Alexandria, and Halleck had promised that they should be pushed forward with all speed to join him. But Pope flung prudence to the winds. He was furious with Porter because that officer had failed to fall upon Jackson's right, erroneously supposed by Pope to be "in the air." The mere fact that it was Porter who, amongst others,<sup>1</sup> reported the close approach of Longstreet's Corps, was quite enough to make Pope disbelieve the information. He had already convinced himself that he was being sacrificed to the jealousy of the officers of the Army of the Potomac.

During the night Hood's division had fallen back on the high-road, and Jackson's troops had also retired from the positions which they had held at the close of the fighting on the 29th to the shelter of the woods. McDowell and Heintzelman, after a personal reconnaissance on the morning of the 30th, reported that Jackson was, in their opinion, retreating.<sup>2</sup> Pope was only too ready to believe this report. He knew that thus far he had been a failure, and that he had lost the confidence of his soldiers, but there was a chance of retrieving his lost reputation by a bold stroke. He gladly imagined that Longstreet had fallen back through Thoroughfare Gap and that Jackson was following him. Accordingly, on the morning of the 30th, he issued an order for a general pursuit of Jackson under the direction of McDowell. For this purpose McDowell had under his orders Porter's Corps and Reynold's division as well as his own Corps. The other Federal wing was to follow a road running from Sudley Springs to Haymarket and about a mile and a half north of the Warrenton turnpike.<sup>3</sup>

Thus had Pope delivered himself into the hands of the enemy. The very opportunity which Lee on the night of the 29th believed to have been lost, was presented again owing to Pope's determination to pursue instead of retiring behind Bull Run. By the morning of the 30th the whole Confederate army was in position. Jackson's line was that which he had held on the morning of the

<sup>1</sup> Reynold's and Buford also informed Pope of Longstreet's position (2 Ropes, 284).

<sup>2</sup> 2 Ropes, 286.

<sup>3</sup> 2 Ropes, 289.

previous day behind the embankment of the unfinished railway. Longstreet's Corps was arrayed south of the Warrenton road. In front of Jackson's right there was an open space half a mile or more wide reaching to the woods where the Federal left wing was forming for attack. Longstreet had stationed eighteen guns between his left and Jackson's right so as to command this space. He had cast aside his hesitation of the previous day and was already preparing to turn the Federal left by the old stage road which runs about a mile south of the turnpike.<sup>1</sup>

It was soon apparent to McDowell that Jackson was not retreating at all; he recalled the troops under his command to their original positions on the turnpike. Reynolds on the extreme Federal left reported that the enemy was in force on his exposed flank. McDowell thereupon ordered Reynolds to fall back and hold Bald Hill, so as to cover the Federal left flank and rear, and directed Sigel and Ricketts to send troops to Bald Hill and the Henry House Hill respectively as a further protection to the Federal line of communications. In spite of the fact that the position quickly revealed itself as very different to what Pope had imagined, the Federal Commander-in-Chief was still resolved that Porter should assault Jackson's right. The movement from the outset was doomed to disastrous failure. Porter had to cross the open space of meadowland swept by the direct fire of Jackson's artillery and infantry and by the enflading fire of Longstreet's batteries posted on Jackson's right; and his supports both on the right and left flank were being withdrawn to protect the Federal rear from the attack threatened by Longstreet's whole corps. Human fatuity could go no further.

Between 3 p.m. and 4 p.m.<sup>2</sup> Porter moved out to the assault. It was of necessity, as prescribed by Pope's commands, a frontal attack. Three times was the assault renewed. So hard pressed was the Confederate left under Hill, which was assailed by King's division (now commanded by Hatch), that Jackson signalled to Longstreet for reinforcements.<sup>3</sup> The latter, who had matured his own plans for a crushing counterstroke, sent two fresh batteries to join the eighteen guns already posted on Jackson's right. So furious a fire swept the open meadowland that Sykes, who formed the reserve for Porter's assault, was unable to get his troops across the exposed space to support the attack. Left without support, the assaulting divisions fell back, having suffered heavy loss. The Federal offensive movement for that day was over. It never ought to have been attempted.

As Porter's troops fell back Lee saw that the time had come for his counterstroke. Longstreet's Corps was already moving to the attack in anticipation of the order. Jackson's Corps was

<sup>1</sup> 2 Ropes, 292.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Ropes, 293.

<sup>3</sup> 2 Henderson, 216.



ordered to advance so as to cover Longstreet's left. The whole Confederate army bore down upon Pope. Its line of battle covered a front of four miles.<sup>1</sup> Every division was in at least two lines, and in the centre of Longstreet's Corps eight brigades were massed one behind the other. Jackson's advance drove back the divisions of Stevens, Ricketts, Kearny, and Hooker from successive positions towards the Stone Bridge. South of the turnpike rose Bald Hill and the Henry House Hill. The former had originally been held by Reynolds' division, but Pope after witnessing the repulse of Porter's Corps withdrew Reynolds from that position, and directed him to cross the turnpike and form a line, behind which Porter's defeated troops might rally. Thus the hill which protected the Federal left was only held by a single brigade.<sup>2</sup> After a desperate struggle it was carried by the Confederates, and the repeated efforts of Sigel's Corps supported by two of Ricketts' brigades failed to retake it.<sup>3</sup> From Bald Hill Longstreet's Corps swept forward to the Henry House Hill. But there they found themselves confronted with a harder task. The safety of the Federal army depended on that hill being held; if it were captured, retreat over the Stone Bridge would be impracticable. Sykes' regulars and Reynolds' Pennsylvanians were in position on the hill, which became the rallying point for the troops south of the turnpike. The divisions of Longstreet made desperate and repeated efforts to capture the all-important position. But the swift advance and the hard fighting on Bald Hill had thrown them into some disorder. Their attacks on the Henry House Hill lacked unity, and the artillery had been left too far in the rear to render efficient aid. An hour more of daylight would have enabled the Confederates to win a tremendous victory. Jackson, on the north of the turnpike, was already in possession of the Matthews Hill within 1,400 yards of the Federal line of retreat over Bull Run.<sup>4</sup> With the Henry House Hill in their possession also the Confederates would have commanded the approach to the Stone Bridge from both sides. Night put an end to the battle. The Federal left wing still held possession of the Henry House Hill, and under cover of the darkness the whole Federal army was withdrawn across Bull Run and made its way to Centreville.<sup>5</sup>

The position which it held there on the morning of the 31st was a strong one. It was behind entrenchments with abundant supplies and reinforced by two fresh Corps of the Army of the Potomac, Sumner's and Franklin's, numbering 20,000 veterans. Lee determined on another turning movement: on the afternoon of the 31st the indefatigable Jackson crossed Bull Run by Sudley

<sup>1</sup> 2 Henderson, 220.

<sup>2</sup> Warren's

<sup>3</sup> 2 Ropes, 295.

<sup>4</sup> 2 Henderson, 224.

<sup>5</sup> Pope's retreat is condemned as unnecessary by 2 Ropes, 299-302.

Ford, and having reached the Little River turnpike which runs into the Warrenton road six miles east of Centreville, advanced along it to Pleasant Valley. There he halted for the night, being within five miles of Centreville. Longstreet followed Jackson late in the afternoon but did not cross Bull Run that evening.

Next day (September 1st) Jackson moved slowly forward, preceded by Stuart's cavalry. Late in the afternoon he came into contact with a Federal force. This proved to be Stevens' division, which Pope had directed to take up a position on the Little River turnpike, so as to cover his flank as he continued his retreat to Fairfax Court House. A fierce engagement ensued between Jackson's two leading divisions and Stevens' command reinforced by Kearny's division to the accompaniment of a severe thunderstorm. Night and the violence of the storm combined to put an end to the combat, which is generally known as the battle of Chantilly. Both sides had suffered severely and the Federals lost both their generals. Jackson's advance was checked, and Pope reached Fairfax Court House without interruption.

By this time the Federal commander had lost all confidence in his troops. He represented them in his reports to Halleck as profoundly demoralised. He himself attributed his failure to the jealousy of the officers of the Army of the Potomac, especially Porter. To his prejudiced eye the arrival of two veteran Corps commanded by generals of acknowledged ability seemed only a source of weakness. Although his army now largely outnumbered that of Lee, he abandoned all idea of taking the offensive and urged that his troops should be withdrawn to the fortifications of Washington. Halleck acceded to his request, and by the morning of the 3rd the whole army was safe within the lines in front of the Capital. McClellan had already been appointed to the command of the troops in and around Washington, and on the 5th Pope, who had been vainly hoping that the army would be reorganised under officers chosen by himself, was relieved of his command. With Pope's retirement the short life of the Army of Virginia came to an end. The name disappeared; and the troops were merged in the Army of the Potomac, which shortly took the field under its old commander, McClellan.

Lee's campaign had been brilliantly successful. He had driven his opponent from his advanced position on the Rapidan across the Rappahannock and Bull Run, and forced him to seek shelter under the guns of Washington. He had captured 30 guns, 20,000 rifles, and 7,000 prisoners, besides inflicting on his foe a loss in killed and wounded of 13,500, at a cost to his own army of only 10,000.<sup>1</sup> This great feat he had accomplished with an army considerably smaller than that which he had so signally defeated.

<sup>1</sup> 2 Henderson, 231.

After reaching the Rappahannock Pope's army, originally the smaller, was reinforced from the Army of the Potomac until it became the larger. During the fighting of the 29th and 30th the Federal force numbered between 70,000 and 75,000; the army which on 2nd September retired within the fortifications of Washington exceeded 80,000. Throughout the campaign Lee never had more than 55,000 men.<sup>1</sup>

Judging by results, the campaign was a masterpiece of offensive strategy. It has been criticised as overbold. To divide an army in the face of superior numbers and reunite it on the battlefield is an achievement of the greatest daring and difficulty. But Lee had thoroughly taken Pope's measure. Probably there was no other Federal general against whom he would have adopted such an audacious plan of campaign. Nor would he have ventured on such a movement unless he had had Jackson to play the principal part in it. The risk that Jackson ran was more apparent than real. Pope's captured despatch-book had revealed the dispositions of his troops. He had failed to take any advantage of Early's and Stuart's presence on his side of the Rappahannock on the 22nd August. The superiority of Stuart's cavalry to that of the Federals, which during the later stages of the campaign was worn out by the heavy work which Pope had required of it throughout, tended to diminish considerably the risks attending Jackson's march: and the critical period was practically over on the morning of the 28th, when Jackson in position north of the Warrenton road had an alternative line of retreat through Aldie Gap, by which he could have rejoined Longstreet west of the Bull Run Mountains.

<sup>1</sup> 2 Henderson, 231. In 2 B. & L., 500, it is estimated that the Federal force engaged on the 29th and 30th numbered 63,000 (this does not include Banks' Corps, which numbered over 8,000); and the Confederate force is reckoned as 54,000.



## CHAPTER XI

### LEE'S FIRST INVASION OF THE NORTH—THE ANTIETAM (OR SHARPSBURG)

Reasons for the invasion of Maryland—Difficulties to be faced—Jackson at Frederick City—Position in the Shenandoah Valley—Lee's plan for the reduction of Harper's Ferry—Jackson's march—Surrender of Harper's Ferry—McClellan's difficult position—Reasons for the slowness of his advance—"The lost despatch"—McClellan fails to rise to the occasion—McClellan forces Turner's Gap—Franklin forces Crampton's Gap—Lee's daring resolve—His reasons for offering battle—Criticism of Lee's judgment—The battlefield of the Antietam—Position of Lee's forces—Lack of co-operation on Franklin's part—McClellan's advance—Jackson rejoins Lee—McClellan hesitates to attack—Advance of Hooker across the Antietam; he is followed by Mansfield—McClellan's plan of battle—Hooker attacks Jackson—Hooker's repulse—Mansfield takes up the attack—Repulse of Mansfield's Corps—Position of Confederate left—Reinforcements sent from the right—Advance of the 2nd Corps—Sedgwick crosses the turnpike—Jackson's counterstroke—Arrival of Franklin—Repulse of the Confederate charge—Withdrawal of Greene's division—The battle of the centre—Advance of French—Advance of Richardson—McClellan's failure to follow up success—Burnside on the Federal left—The 9th Corps crosses the Antietam—Advance on Sharpsburg—Arrival of A. P. Hill—Repulse of the Federal left—Losses—Lee determines to hold on—Contemplated counterstroke by Jackson found impossible—Lee retires across the Potomac—Criticism of Lee's tactics—Criticism of McClellan's tactics.

AFTER Jackson's failure on the 1st September to strike Pope's line of retreat and the latter's prompt withdrawal of his army to the shelter of the Washington fortifications, Lee rested his troops for one day.

Any attempt to attack or invest the lines of Washington was wholly out of the question. It remained for him either to stand on the defensive in Virginia, or to cross the Potomac into Maryland and transfer the scene of operations to Northern soil. On the 3rd the Confederate army was moving in the direction of Leesburg. Lee had determined to carry out the movement which ought to have been made a year ago after the first battle of Bull Run.<sup>1</sup> To remain on the defensive in Virginia was simply to abandon the initiative to the enemy, to allow him at his own time and in his own way to resume the offensive with an army whose *moral* would have been restored and numbers largely increased.

The invasion of Maryland had much to commend it. It would relieve the inhabitants of Virginia of the pressure of the war upon

<sup>1</sup> See Cap. VI.

their fields and would enable the rich crops of the Shenandoah Valley and other fertile districts to be gathered in safely. It might open up a valuable recruiting-ground in Maryland. In any case the fears of the Washington Government would be so excited by the possibility of a rising in Maryland, that they would almost certainly abandon all thought of pressing on to Richmond, and thus valuable time would be secured for strengthening the fortifications of the Southern capital. It would bring home to the Northerner the horrors of war, when he found his own territory invaded: one victory gained by Lee on Northern soil would have a greater effect on Northern sentiment than several victories won in Confederate territory. At the best, Lee hoped that he might deal his foe such a blow as would bring the war to an end.

His original plan was, after crossing the Potomac to move westwards into Pennsylvania and draw the Federal army after him so far from either Washington or Baltimore that, in case of the victory which he anticipated, his enemy would have no chance of escaping the full consequences of his defeat by withdrawing, as he had done after Manassas, to the shelter of some impregnable position. A crushing defeat inflicted upon McClellan's army in Pennsylvania was not unlikely to turn the general feeling of the North in favour of peace, especially if European Powers were to put pressure upon the Federal Government to abandon a struggle which seemed hopeless. A victory won on Northern soil might serve as a pretext for foreign intervention.

Far-reaching as was Lee's plan, he did not blind himself to the weakness of the instrument with which he was to carry it out. Since the battle of the Second Manassas, he had been reinforced by the divisions of D. H. Hill, McLaws, and Walker with Hampton's cavalry. These reinforcements probably did not do much more than make good the losses incurred during the recent arduous campaign. The number of stragglers in the Confederate army had been very great, largely owing to the want of shoes. A considerable part of the army was marching barefoot, and the line of its march could be traced by the bloody marks of unshod feet. The insufficient food and green diet, which had been the lot of too many during the great flank march and subsequent days of hard fighting, had spread dysentery and similar diseases through the ranks. It is doubtful if Lee crossed the Potomac with more than 55,000 men.<sup>1</sup> His transport also was bad, as the animals were greatly weakened by the privations and hardships of the last few weeks; and especially he was afraid lest his supply of ammunition should run short.

<sup>1</sup> 2 Ropes, 337, note; 2 Henderson, 257, note. Palfrey, 68, gives the Confederate strength at a low estimate at 40,000. Colonel Taylor, Lee's Adjutant-General, puts it as low as 35,000.

But in spite of these disadvantages Lee determined to take the risk. At the worst he calculated to be able to lengthen out the campaign in Federal territory so that no fresh movement against Richmond would be possible till the following spring. Having resolved upon the movement, he lost no time in executing it. It was useless to wait for further reinforcements, as President Davis had decided to devote his chief attention to the war in Tennessee and Kentucky, where for the time fortune was smiling upon the Confederates. Between the 4th and 7th of September the Confederates were crossing the Potomac. On the 7th Jackson occupied Frederick City,<sup>1</sup> and was quickly followed by the other Confederate divisions: whilst Stuart's cavalry formed an impenetrable screen, which baffled all the attempts of the Washington Government to gain information as to their enemy's plan of campaign.

The Confederate invasion of Maryland necessitated a change in their line of communications. As long as they remained on the Virginia side of the Potomac they had relied for their supplies upon the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. That line had now to be abandoned, and henceforth they must depend upon the Shenandoah Valley for their communications. The Federals held three fortified posts in the Valley. Some 8,000 men occupied Harper's Ferry, and smaller garrisons held Winchester and Martinsburg. Lee had expected that upon his advance into Maryland these garrisons would be withdrawn. McClellan urged Halleck to recall them and attach them to the Army of the Potomac as a welcome reinforcement for the forthcoming campaign. Halleck, however, decided to retain these garrisons in the Valley, in violation of every principle of sound strategy.<sup>2</sup> When Lee found that, contrary to his expectation, Federal troops still remained in the Valley, he decided that their capture was essential to the safety of his communications. A year later, when for the second time he invaded Maryland, he judged otherwise, and left a Federal garrison in Harper's Ferry undisturbed.<sup>3</sup> But he was probably influenced also by a very natural desire to capture so large a body of Federal troops, which Halleck's defective strategy had left absolutely at his mercy. To effect this object he resolved to divide his army once more, calculating upon McClellan's well-known slowness of movement to be able to reunite his forces west of the mountains before a pitched battle should become imminent.

On the 9th the Confederate leader issued his orders at Frederick City for a movement on the following day. Jackson, with the three divisions of his own command was, after crossing the South Mountain range, to ford the Potomac at a point west of Harper's

<sup>1</sup> See Map IV.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Ropes, 331; Palfrey, 19.

<sup>3</sup> 2 Ropes, 333, note. But see 2 Henderson, 261.



Ferry and advance on Martinsburg. McLaws, with two divisions, when he had crossed the South Mountain, was to take possession of the Maryland Heights, overlooking the Potomac and Harper's Ferry. Walker's division was directed to cross the Potomac east of Harper's Ferry and secure the Loudoun Heights, which command Harper's Ferry from the east bank of the Shenandoah. The garrison in Harper's Ferry would thus be completely surrounded and cut off from all hope of escape, as Jackson, after getting possession of Martinsburg, was to move towards the Ferry, closing the roads westward. Longstreet and D. H. Hill, with the rest of the army, were ordered to cross the mountains and move on Hagerstown, Hill's division forming the rearguard. After the fall of Harper's Ferry the two wings would reunite either at Hagerstown or Boonsborough. Hagerstown is twenty-five miles distant from Frederick City, and the same distance from Harper's Ferry, whilst on the 9th McClellan's advance guard was thirty miles from Harper's Ferry and forty-five from Hagerstown.<sup>1</sup>

Jackson moved with his usual promptitude. Crossing South Mountain at Turner's Gap, he encamped for the night close to Boonsborough, having marched fourteen miles. That night he determined to cross the Potomac at Williamsport, which was further west than the other ford at Shepherdstown, in order that he might prevent the Martinsburg garrison escaping west, and might drive that force into the "blind alley" of Harper's Ferry. On the night of the 11th he encamped four miles west of Martinsburg, and the following morning moved against that post to find it abandoned by its garrison. In the afternoon he recommenced his march, and on the following day, passing through Halltown, came in sight of the Federal force in position on the Bolivar Heights. His troops in the four days had covered over sixty miles.<sup>2</sup> Neither McLaws nor Walker marched with the celerity of Jackson. Lee had hoped that they would be in position on the Maryland and Loudoun Heights respectively by the morning of the 12th. But it was not till the afternoon of the 13th that McLaws carried Maryland Heights, which were very feebly defended, and about the same time Walker occupied Loudoun Heights without encountering any resistance. On the same night Jackson opened communications with his two lieutenants, and on the next day made the necessary arrangements for a combined attack.

Harper's Ferry lies in the angle formed by the Potomac and the Shenandoah: to the south, across the space dividing the two rivers, ran the Bolivar Heights, which were strongly held by the Federals. In the afternoon of the 14th a heavy artillery fire was opened by the Confederate batteries, and Jackson's own force was gradually

<sup>1</sup> 2 Henderson, 262-3.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Henderson, 266, note.

working itself into position for an attack the next day, and by nightfall commanded both flanks of the Bolivar Heights. On the morning of the 15th, after a preliminary cannonade, the assault was about to be delivered, when the garrison capitulated. Seventy-three guns, 13,000 small arms, and 12,500 prisoners (including the garrisons of Winchester and Martinsburg, which had both retired to Harper's Ferry), were the prize of victory.<sup>1</sup>

McClellan's position as commander of the Army of the Potomac in this campaign was a singularly difficult one. When his army was withdrawn from the Peninsula, he found himself a commander without an army. He was never formally relieved of the command of his army, but as the successive Army Corps arrived at Aquia and Alexandria, they were ordered off to join the Army of Virginia under Pope. On the 1st September he was verbally instructed by Halleck to take command of the defences of Washington, but he was expressly told that this command gave him no control over the troops serving under Pope in the field. On the 2nd he received a verbal order from President Lincoln to assume command of the retreating army. Having never been formally relieved of his command, he was never formally reinstated in it.<sup>2</sup> But in taking the field with the Army of the Potomac he was acting entirely on his own responsibility. He fought through the campaign of the Antietam with a rope about his neck. His anomalous position as the commander of an army engaged upon an unauthorised campaign, caused him to display in his second and last duel with Lee even greater caution and deliberation than in the Peninsular campaign. Nor was it only of himself and his probable fate, in case of defeat, that he had to think. His army was the only organised force left in the East. If it were defeated there would be nothing to prevent Lee marching whithersoever he chose. Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, all alike would be at his mercy.<sup>3</sup>

There was yet a third reason which caused McClellan to move very slowly. The great superiority of the Confederate cavalry effectually prevented his getting any information about Lee's intentions. He therefore judged it necessary to move with the greatest caution, covering Washington and Baltimore, and at the same time keeping his troops well in hand in order to be able to concentrate them swiftly for the pursuit of Lee if the Confederate general invaded Pennsylvania, or to return with them for the defence of the capital, in case the invasion of Maryland proved a mere feint, and the bulk of the Confederate forces were directed against Washington.

<sup>1</sup> 2 Henderson, 275.

<sup>2</sup> Palfrey, 4, 5.

<sup>3</sup> 2 Henderson, 286. But Ropes condemns McClellan's view of the situation as exaggerated.

The greater part of the Federal army was at or near Frederick City on the 13th. On that day fortune put in McClellan's way such an opportunity as has rarely been vouchsafed to any general. A Federal private discovered wrapped round a handful of cigars a copy of Lee's orders to D. H. Hill, giving full particulars of the intended movement against Harper's Ferry, and detailing the positions, which the different portions of the Confederate army were to occupy for the next few days. Thus in an instant it was revealed to McClellan that his foe had divided his army, and that it was in his power to concentrate against either half an absolutely overwhelming force. He had moved out from Washington with an army of nearly 85,000 men,<sup>1</sup> composed of the 1st Corps, now commanded by Hooker, the 2nd and 6th under their old commanders Sumner and Franklin, Couch's division of the 4th Corps,<sup>2</sup> the 9th Corps under Burnside, and the 12th under Mansfield.

These Corps were organised by McClellan for this campaign into a right wing consisting of the 1st and 9th Corps, under the command of Burnside, a centre under Sumner consisting of the 2nd and 12th Corps, and a left wing of Franklin's Corps and Couch's division under the former's command. Porter, with the 5th Corps, had also been ordered on the 11th to report to McClellan, and one division of this corps reached Frederick City on the 13th.

Yet this unique opportunity failed to stimulate McClellan to greater activity. Before him lay the South Mountain range, with its two passes, Turner's and Crampton's Gaps, and Lee's lost despatch informed him that no considerable force was holding these passes. A night march would have enabled him to secure possession of both Gaps without fear of encountering serious resistance. But the despatch which he sent to Franklin at 6.20 p.m. merely ordered that general to move on Crampton's Gap next morning at daybreak, and directed him to cut off or destroy McLaws' command and relieve the garrison of Harper's Ferry. The despatch continued, "My general idea is to cut the enemy in two and beat him in detail. I ask of you at this important moment all your intellect and the utmost activity that a general can exercise."

Unfortunately the Commander-in-Chief failed to set his subordinate a good example in the way of showing activity. During that afternoon the sound of McLaws' guns engaged in the fight for Maryland Heights was distinctly heard at Frederick City. Yet, though the roads were good, the weather fine, and the South

<sup>1</sup> Palfrey, 7; 2 Ropes, 336.

<sup>2</sup> Couch's division had been summoned from Fortress Monroe, where its place was taken by 5,000 fresh troops.



Mountain range only twelve miles distant,<sup>1</sup> McClellan postponed all movement until the following morning.

During the night of the 13th news was brought to Lee of the discovery of his lost despatch and of McClellan's intention to take advantage of the opportunity. He at once ordered D. H. Hill's division, which was encamped a mile or two west of Boonsborough, to fall back and hold Turner's Gap, and directed Longstreet, who had reached Hagerstown, thirteen miles beyond Boonsborough, to return and support Hill.<sup>2</sup>

No portion of McClellan's army moved before daylight. The action at Turner's Gap commenced about 7 a.m., and that at Crampton's Gap, six miles south of Turner's Gap, began about noon. The fighting at Turner's Gap lasted throughout the day. The right wing of the Federal army was there engaged by Hill's division and eight brigades of Longstreet's Corps. Until late in the afternoon, however, the fighting was rather a succession of small engagements than one connected battle. About 4 p.m. the Federals commenced their final assault with the 1st and 9th Corps. When night put an end to the combat the Federals had practically gained possession of the Gap, though the Confederates still held on to the western side of the ridge. The Confederate position had been a very strong one, and if their troops had been properly handled the Federal attack might have been repulsed. Longstreet's troops took ten hours to march thirteen miles, and reached the field of battle in a very exhausted condition. Only four out of his eight brigades seem to have been actively engaged.<sup>3</sup> Their commanders, instead of reporting to D. H. Hill and asking for instructions, posted their respective brigades where they thought fit, and owing to their ignorance of the ground took up faulty positions, where they were able to render Hill but little assistance.<sup>4</sup> Hill's division bore the brunt of the fighting, and suffered heavily.

The fighting at Crampton's Gap was by no means so severe. The forces in that engagement were much less equally matched. Franklin in his own Corps and Couch's division had 18,000 men, whilst the Gap was only held by a cavalry brigade reinforced by three brigades which McLaws sent back. Before 5 p.m. Franklin, after some spirited fighting, forced the Gap, and that evening his troops bivouacked in Pleasant Valley. The Confederate losses on the 14th amounted to 3,400, whilst the Federals lost 2,300,<sup>5</sup> including a very able officer in the person of Reno, temporarily commanding the 9th Corps, who was mortally wounded at Turner's Gap.

During the night the Confederate forces at the western end of

<sup>1</sup> 2 Henderson, 269.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Ropes, 343.

<sup>3</sup> B. & L., 579 (D. H. Hill's account of the battle).

<sup>4</sup> Palfrey, 38.

<sup>5</sup> 2 Henderson, 278.

Turner's Gap, finding their position untenable, withdrew. The Federals had gained possession of both passes over the South Mountain range, and could claim a tactical victory. But strategically the Confederates had gained the advantage, for though they had failed to hold the mountain passes, they had achieved their chief purpose of gaining time enough to ensure the fall of Harper's Ferry. At 8 a.m. on the 15th the garrison capitulated. Lee's plan of campaign had thus proved partially successful. He had taken Harper's Ferry, but he was by no means in the position which he had expected, owing to McClellan's comparatively rapid advance. His first thought on the night of the 14th, after the loss of the South Mountain passes, was to fall back across the Potomac and reunite his army in Virginia.<sup>1</sup> But he quickly changed his mind, and determined to give battle to McClellan in Maryland and run the risk of having one half of his army annihilated before the other half could come to its support.

Lee's policy in resolving to stand and fight behind the Antietam was audacious in the extreme. He was deliberately courting disaster, and but for a succession of unforeseen accidents would have almost certainly suffered a crushing reverse. Though his position for defensive purposes was a tolerably strong one, yet in case of defeat it afforded no line of retreat except by the Shepherdstown Ford across the Potomac. In the course of the battle of the 17th two other fords further west were examined and pronounced practicable for infantry.<sup>2</sup> But it is hard to see how, if defeated, he could have saved his guns.

Why, then, did he accept such an enormous risk? The position seemed to be one in which he stood to lose everything and gain nothing. At the best, supposing McClellan deferred his attack until Jackson's half of the army rejoined Lee, the Confederate army could reasonably expect to do no more than hold their own in a defensive battle and after repulsing the enemy to retire into Virginia. But in that case they gained nothing by standing to fight, and were certain to incur heavy losses, which they could ill afford. It seems, however, that Lee hoped to do something more than merely fight and win a defensive battle. He believed that if McClellan gave Jackson time to get up, it would be in his power, after repulsing the Federal attack, to deliver such a counterstroke as would hurl McClellan's army back in rout towards the South Mountain, and, by annihilating the only army the Federals had in the East, would put an end to the war. It was for that object that Lee prepared to run an enormous risk, holding as he did that in a war in which one of the two combatants was so much the weaker in numbers and in material resources great risks must be run on the chance of gaining great successes.

<sup>1</sup> 2 Ropes, 348.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Henderson, 297, note.

But in imagining that he had a reasonable chance of gaining a signal success over McClellan, it is probable that Lee underestimated both the ability of the opposing general and the quality of his troops. The army with which the Confederates had now to deal was far more formidable than that which Pope had commanded. The troops had unbounded confidence in McClellan: two Corps, the 2nd and 6th, had not been engaged at all in the disastrous campaign of the Second Manassas, and the whole army was greatly encouraged by the successes gained on the 14th. The *moral* of the Confederates had been proportionately weakened by their defeat and subsequent retreat. D. H. Hill's division had fought well, but been severely punished, whilst Longstreet's troops had by no means acquitted themselves with credit, and were exhausted by the march and countermarch. During the retreat to the Antietam signs of demoralisation had not been lacking. There had been an unusual amount of straggling during the march.


McClellan also was a general of very different calibre to Pope. His military defects lay in excess of caution and a slowness of deliberation and of movement which lost opportunities. But for that very reason he was the less likely to give opportunities to a foe whose military genius he held in the highest respect. Lee had no right to expect that McClellan would repeat the blunders of Pope and give him a chance of delivering a counterstroke like that which had proved so successful on the 30th August.

Anyhow the die was cast. On the morning of the 15th Lee was arraying the fourteen brigades, which made up Longstreet's and D. H. Hill's commands, along the ridge which separates the Antietam from the Potomac (see Plan). West of the point where the Antietam flows into the Potomac, the latter river makes a variety of bends, so that a line of battle can be formed less than six miles long with both its flanks resting upon the Potomac.<sup>1</sup> This was the position which Lee took up. Along his front flowed the Antietam Creek, a deep, slow stream, about sixty feet broad, with its banks thickly fringed with trees, whilst on either side the slope ascended sharply towards the crest above.<sup>2</sup> Four bridges crossed the stream, one close to its confluence with the Potomac, the next known as the Burnside Bridge, below Sharpsburg: the third bridge was opposite Sharpsburg, and two and a half miles north was the fourth bridge. On the west side of the ridge the village of Sharpsburg was situated: a road ran south-west from the village to the Shepherdstown ford, and another road ran northward to Hagerstown. On this road, a mile north of Sharpsburg, stood the Dunker church on the edge of what is known as the West Wood. On the opposite side of the turnpike, and separated from it by a broad cornfield, is another

<sup>1</sup> Palfrey, 48.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Henderson, 294.







wood, known as the East Wood, stretching in a north-east direction. Beyond both of these is the North Wood, which reaches across the turnpike. Just beyond the West Wood, about a third of a mile north of the Dunker church, is a small stream, and rising above it is a low ridge, which gave room for several batteries, and stretches so near to the Potomac as to cover the left flank.

This ridge was held by Stuart with cavalry and horse artillery: another body of cavalry watched the southernmost bridge: along the ridge reaching from the Burnside Bridge, through Sharpsburg, to the further edge of the East Wood, the Confederate infantry was posted, Longstreet on the right and D. H. Hill on the left. The latter's troops extended about a quarter of a mile east of the Hagerstown turnpike, and occupied the East Wood. The ground on the western side of the road was decidedly more difficult than on the eastern side, mainly consisting of woodland, with large upstanding ledges of limestone, which furnished excellent cover for the riflemen: what open ground there was, was mainly uncultivated. The entire force which Lee had in line on September 15th was less than 20,000 men, with about 125 guns.<sup>1</sup>

On the night of the 14th McClellan sent orders to Franklin to move against and destroy whatever force he might find in Pleasant Valley, and, if possible, withdraw the garrison from Harper's Ferry. But McLaws made so brave a display with his command, the bulk of which he drew up in line of battle across Pleasant Valley, with the flanks resting on South Mountain and Elk Ridge, that Franklin did not venture to attack him, though his force was decidedly the stronger of the two. Franklin possessed apparently the same fault as his Commander-in-Chief of doubling the enemy's strength. When the cessation of artillery fire at Harper's Ferry made it tolerably certain that the garrison had capitulated, he leaped to the conclusion that Jackson would send troops across the river to aid McLaws, and so far from making any attempt to test the strength of McLaws' position, or displaying that "utmost activity" which McClellan had asked of him, began to beg for reinforcements, stating that the enemy in his front outnumbered him two to one. Even when McLaws began to send his trains across the river and withdraw his troops, Franklin made no attempt to interfere with him. He remained where he was, guarding McClellan's left and rear from an imaginary foe.

At Turner's Gap McClellan had the 1st, 2nd, 9th, and 12th Corps well closed up, and one division of the 5th Corps. About 7 a.m. of the 15th the advance of the Federal pickets revealed the fact that the Confederates had withdrawn during the night, and an immediate pursuit was ordered.

<sup>1</sup> Ropes (ii. 349-52) adversely criticises Lee's resolve to stand and fight. On the other side, see 2 Henderson, 281-7.



By 8 a.m. the Federal army was filing out of the western end of Turner's Gap. At that moment McClellan had at his immediate disposal thirty-five infantry brigades. The weather and the roads were alike favourable for marching, and Sharpsburg was not more than eight miles distant. There was really nothing to prevent McClellan getting his army into position in front of Lee that same afternoon, and attacking a foe whom he outnumbered three to one. But McClellan failed to rise to the occasion. He could not rid himself of his constitutional slowness, and he argued from Lee's bold stand that at least 50,000 men were confronting him in line of battle. His march was slow: there was much unnecessary delay, and only two divisions were in position ready to attack on that day.<sup>1</sup> After a rapid examination of the ground he decided to postpone the attack till the 16th.

But the morning of that day brought a welcome reinforcement to Lee's army. Jackson had arrived with two divisions, having made a night march of seventeen miles. After a period of rest the newly arrived divisions were posted on the left of D. H. Hill's division. The Confederate left now reached from the East Wood across the turnpike into the West Wood. Later in the day Walker's division also arrived from Harper's Ferry. This force was posted in reserve on the right. Thus, on the 16th, Lee had been reinforced by between 8,000 and 9,000 men.<sup>2</sup> McClellan's prospects of success were consequently not so good as on the 15th. He still, however, outnumbered the Confederates two to one. But though every hour of delay was reducing the odds, McClellan could not make up his mind to attack on the 16th. He left Franklin throughout that day in Pleasant Valley to watch McLaws' command, which had been withdrawn across the Potomac the previous day. His own explanation of his extraordinary delay is that the enemy had shifted the position of certain of his batteries, and this required a rectification of his own line of battle. Having rearranged that, he found that there was not sufficient time left to do more than make the necessary preliminaries for the decisive battle now postponed till the 17th. For some reason he had, after the South Mountain engagement, changed the organisation of his army. Burnside was transferred from the command of the right wing to that of the left, but the 1st Corps under Hooker was taken from his command and placed on the extreme right next to Sumner, who now commanded the right wing.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Palfrey, 46-8.

<sup>2</sup> 2 R. 125, 355, where 8,000 is given as the strength of the ten brigades which reinforced Lee on the 16th. <sup>3</sup> Henderson, 290-1, estimates the effective strength of Jackson's two divisions, including officers and artillery, at 5,500, and of Walker's division at 3,500.

<sup>4</sup> Sumner had no direct control over Hooker, who received his orders direct from McClellan.

About 2 p.m. of the 16th Hooker was directed to cross the Antietam by the upper bridge and neighbouring ford and try to turn the enemy's left flank. Hooker moved about 4 p.m., crossed the creek without opposition, as the northernmost bridge was out of sight of the Confederate lines, pushed forward to the Hagerstown road, and then changing front to the south moved along the turnpike and on both sides of it, until just before dark he encountered Hood's division, which formed the extreme Confederate left.<sup>1</sup> Some sharp fighting between the skirmishers took place, but the engagement was little more than an affair of advanced guards. Hooker bivouacked for the night at the point where he had first encountered Hood.

During the night the 12th Corps, under Mansfield, also crossed the Antietam, followed Hooker's line of march, and bivouacked about a mile to his rear. McClellan on the evening of the 16th sent a despatch to Franklin, ordering him to send Couch's division to the Maryland Heights, and with his own Corps to join the main army.<sup>2</sup> The second division of Porter's Corps arrived on the 16th, but McClellan had done little all that day except unmistakably advertise to his foe where the storm would first break on the following morning.

His plan of battle was to assault the Confederate left with the 1st and 12th Corps, supported by the 2nd Corps, and if necessary by the 6th; as soon as ever matters seemed to be progressing favourably on that wing, to launch the 9th Corps across the Burnside Bridge against the heights south of Sharpsburg; and if either or both of these attacks proved favourable, to advance his centre across the Antietam with all the forces left at his disposal. The plan in itself was good, and if properly carried out should have ensured victory. But the execution was faulty in the extreme: instead of a single concentrated battle, a succession of disjointed attacks took place, which Lee was able to defeat in detail.

Firing commenced about 5 a.m. Hooker was moving forward against Jackson, who late the previous night had taken Hood's place. Jackson's troops were drawn up right across the road with the flanks resting in the East and West Woods. The Confederate left was perpendicular to the rest of the line, and its right flank was enfiladed by the fire of the Federal batteries on the eastern ridge. After a preliminary artillery duel of about an hour's duration Hooker's troops came to close quarters. A desperate combat ensued which lasted over an hour and raged on both sides of the turnpike. Jackson's two divisions held their ground against

<sup>1</sup> Hood's two brigades were not posted on the right with the rest of Longstreet's Corps, but were on the extreme left extending D. H. Hill's line from the East Wood across the Hagerstown road and connecting on his left with Stuart's command.

<sup>2</sup> Palfrey, 44.

a force nearly twice their own strength.<sup>1</sup> They were practically put out of action for the rest of the day, but Hooker's Corps was fought to a standstill. The commander was himself severely wounded, and by 7.30 a.m. the first assault had been repulsed and Hooker's Corps was falling back to the shelter of its batteries massed on the edge of the North Wood. It had lost 2,500<sup>2</sup> men, but the loss in Jackson's weaker divisions was relatively heavier: for not less than 1,700<sup>3</sup> men had fallen. Ewell's division, under Lawton, which had held the more exposed position on the east side of the turnpike, was withdrawn and its place taken by Hood's two brigades. J. R. Jones' division, reduced to only 600 fighting men, held on to the edge of the West Wood.<sup>4</sup> On the extreme left Stuart's horse artillery, stationed on a commanding ridge, had done good service and inflicted considerable loss upon Hooker's force, whose right flank was exposed to their fire.

But no sooner had Hooker's Corps fallen back than its place was taken by the 12th Corps. This force, numbering about 7,000 men, did not apparently arrive upon the field of battle until the 1st Corps was already in retreat. Thus early did the lack of combination on the Federal side manifest itself. The Corps commander fell mortally wounded as his troops were deploying into line. Their advance was almost entirely on the east side of the turnpike, and the assault was chiefly directed against Hood's division and three brigades of D. H. Hill's division, which were posted on Hood's right facing north-east. Another desperate infantry combat ensued, in which both sides suffered very heavily. Hood's troops at last gave way and fell back across the turnpike to the Dunker church. The withdrawal of this division uncovered the flanks both of D. H. Hill's brigades on the east of the road and of the remnant of Jones' division on the west, and caused them likewise to fall back. Greene's division of the 12th Corps pushed through the cornfield across the turnpike and established itself in the West Wood about a quarter of a mile north of the Dunker church. But owing to lack of support it was unable to advance further.

About 9 a.m. this second attack against the Confederate left came to an end. Like Hooker's Corps, the 12th Corps had been fought out. Its losses amounted to 1,500.<sup>5</sup> As the result of nearly four hours' fighting the Confederates had been forced to abandon the East Wood and cornfield, and to take up a fresh

<sup>1</sup> Henderson reckons the strength of Jackson's forces actually engaged (excluding Early's brigade) at 4,200, and of Hooker's Corps at 12,500. Ropes estimates Hooker's strength at 9,000 or 10,000, and adds to Jackson's two divisions Hood's two brigades and three of D. H. Hill's brigades. The estimate in the text is an attempt to preserve the balance between the two conflicting views.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Henderson, 306.

<sup>3</sup> 2 Henderson, 304.

<sup>4</sup> 2 Henderson, 309.

<sup>5</sup> 2 Henderson, 309. Ropes (ii. 371) states the loss of the 12th Corps at 1,700.



position on the further side of the road under cover of the West Wood. Stuart's artillery had been withdrawn to a new position towards the left rear.

Early's brigade at the beginning of the battle had been supporting Stuart, but that force was now recalled by Jackson to reinforce the main body so hardly pressed by Hooker's and Mansfield's assaults. Jackson's command had lost enormously. One of his divisions had already been withdrawn, the other had been almost annihilated. Hood's division, which was covering his right, had been driven back to the Dunker church and remained out of action for the rest of the day. Jackson by 9 a.m. had only Early's brigade of 1,100 men and some 600 more, the survivors of Jones's division, with which to hold his line reaching from the furthest point of the West Wood to the Dunker church.

But in spite of his awful losses he was still full of confidence. Instead of thinking only how he could hold on with his attenuated command, he was meditating a counterstroke. He had sent to Lee for reinforcements, and the Confederate Commander-in-Chief, finding that no serious attack menaced his right, sent to the left Walker's and McLaws' divisions. The latter, in company with R. H. Anderson's division, had reached the battlefield very early on the morning of the 17th. They had not marched with the same speed as had Jackson's and Walker's troops. But McClellan's dilatory tactics, by postponing the battle till the 17th, gave them time to take their full share of the fighting on that day. With McLaws', Walker's, and Early's troops Jackson had quite 10,000 men at his disposal.<sup>1</sup> He could not hurl them at once against the shattered ranks of the 1st and 12th Corps: for Sumner's 2nd Corps was moving to the attack, and already Sedgwick's division had crossed the turnpike and was advancing through the West Wood.

Sumner had been ordered the previous evening to have his Corps under arms an hour before daybreak in readiness to support the advance of Hooker and Mansfield. Though he had his Corps ready at the hour named, he received no further orders from McClellan till 7.20 a.m.;<sup>2</sup> by which hour Hooker's Corps had fought its battle and was already *hors de combat*. Crossing by the fords below the upper bridge, Sumner, a gallant but too impetuous commander, whose long training as a cavalry officer probably unfitted him for the successful handling of infantry,<sup>3</sup> hurried his leading division under Sedgwick with all speed to the scene of battle. He probably supposed that his second division under French was advancing in echelon on his left, but he took no trouble to make sure that that was the case, and, as a matter of fact, French's division diverged in a southerly direction as soon as the creek was crossed. His third division under Richardson was

<sup>1</sup> <sup>2</sup> Henderson, 308; Palfrey, 89.

<sup>2</sup> Palfrey, 82.

<sup>3</sup> Palfrey, 54.

detained by McClellan on the other side of the Antietam, and did not cross till some time later.

As Sedgwick's troops swept out of the East Wood across the cornfield towards the turnpike, it must have seemed to them as though the fighting was at an end. Hooker's Corps had simply disappeared. Of the 12th Corps one division was retiring, the other was hidden from sight in the West Wood. Early's brigade was also hidden in the same wood. Without encountering any resistance the Federals crossed the turnpike, and entering the West Wood at some distance north of the point held by Greene's division, swept right through it to the further edge. The division was advancing in a column of three deployed brigades, and so close were the successive lines to each other, that it was impossible in case of a flank attack to change front. There were no skirmishers on either wing.

Sumner simply led his troops into a trap. As they reached the further edge of the wood they found themselves confronted by McLaws' and Walker's divisions, which were drawn up partly on their front, partly on their flank. Early's brigade was also on their flank extending towards their rear. The unfortunate Federals were attacked both in front and flank by a force considerably superior in numbers to their own. Such a contest could have but one issue. In a few minutes Sedgwick's division was flying, having lost over 2,000 men in that brief encounter.<sup>1</sup>

Now had come the time for the Confederate counterstroke. Their victorious troops rushed across the turnpike through the cornfield against the East Wood. If they could but secure that the Federal batteries would be forced to withdraw to the ridge beyond the Antietam, if, indeed, they had time to escape: and the Federal right wing, consisting of two Corps and one division, which were already quite fought out, would be annihilated.

But it was not to be. Franklin had moved from Pleasant Valley at 5.30 a.m., and his first division had already reached the battlefield. As McLaws' and Walker's troops rushed upon the East Wood, they were met by two fresh brigades<sup>2</sup> deployed in line of battle. The eagerness of pursuit had disorganised the Confederate ranks, and a fierce charge of a Federal brigade drove them back with heavy loss across the turnpike to seek shelter once more within the West Wood. By 10.30 a.m. fighting on the Confederate left had come to an end. Jackson still held his position to the west of the turnpike stretching from the Dunker church along the edge of the West Wood, with Stuart's force on the extreme left bent back towards the Potomac. But the

<sup>1</sup> The loss was 2,200 out of a force 5,500 strong (2 *Ropes*, 364-5).

<sup>2</sup> Hancock's and Irwin's of Smith's division. It was Irwin's brigade which charged (*Swinton*, 219).

price which he had paid was enormous. Both his own divisions, with the exception of Early's brigade, were virtually annihilated. McLaws' and Walker's divisions had lost heavily when repulsed after their fierce charge upon the East Wood.<sup>1</sup>

It is not quite certain at what hour Greene's division of the 12th Corps was withdrawn from its position on the edge of the West Wood, north of the Dunker church; probably it was driven back by Early's advance at the same time as Sedgwick's division was put to flight.<sup>2</sup>

The first stage of the battle was over. The attempt to crush the Confederate left had failed. The centre became the next scene of fighting. For three hours, from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m., D. H. Hill's and R. H. Anderson's divisions were engaged in deadly combat with Sumner's other two divisions—French's and Richardson's—and possibly two of Franklin's brigades.<sup>3</sup> The Federal leaders displayed no more combination in this part of the field than in the earlier attacks. The two divisions engaged went into action at different hours and different points.

Richardson did not cross the Antietam till an hour after French, and took his division into action at a point two-thirds of a mile south of French's line of advance. Three of D. H. Hill's brigades had already suffered severely in the battle with Mansfield's Corps. The Confederate left centre was somewhat drawn back and held a sunken road, known to fame as the Bloody Lane. In front of this road they had piled up a barricade of fence rails, and their position was thus rendered very strong. French's division failed to make much headway. Its losses amounted to over 1,800, and it had not driven the Confederates from the sunken road.<sup>4</sup>

But further to the Federal left Richardson gained more success. To defend his centre Lee had put in his last reserve, R. H. Anderson's division. This force was posted on D. H. Hill's right, and on these troops fell the full force of Richardson's onslaught. The sunken road<sup>5</sup> was carried, and the Federals, pressing forward, gained possession of the Piper house quite close to the turnpike. Hill's brigades on the left, finding their flank turned, fell back

<sup>1</sup> These two divisions lost 2,131 men (2 Henderson, 314).

<sup>2</sup> 2 Ropes, 367. But Greene claims to have held on till 1.30 p.m. (Palfrey, 96, who however, thinks that Greene probably fell back about the time when Irwin's brigade was withdrawn from the point of its extreme advance).

<sup>3</sup> 2 Henderson, 316. It is by no means clear to which of Franklin's brigades Colonel Henderson refers. Probably Irwin's and Brooks' brigades of Smith's division are meant. Irwin's brigade suffered heavily, losing 349 men (2 B. & L., 599). But its operations were apparently confined to repulsing McLaws' attack and delivering a countercharge. Brooks' brigade was formed on the right of French's division, but was not seriously engaged, as its loss only amounted to 1 killed and 24 wounded. None of the other brigades suffered any real loss on the 17th.

<sup>4</sup> Palfrey, 95.

<sup>5</sup> The "sunken road" ran across "from the Hagerstown pike to the Keedysville pike in a broken line of six parts" (Palfrey, 98).



across the turnpike, and the Confederate centre was in imminent danger of being crushed. Both divisions were used up, and it seems that there was nothing but some batteries hastily brought into position to check the Federal advance. But that advance never took place. Richardson fell mortally wounded, and his troops came to a halt. Both Federal divisions had suffered severely; no supports were at hand, and there was no superior officer on the spot to take control of that part of the field and secure the victory.

McClellan refused to listen to Franklin when that officer begged to be allowed to put in his two divisions, one of which had not been engaged at all, and the other but slightly. The Federal Commander-in-Chief did not show himself at all upon the actual field of battle, but remained throughout the day at his headquarters. He appears to have relied mainly upon Sumner's advice, and Sumner, though one of the bravest of men, had had his nerves so shaken by the sight of Sedgwick's division reeling to the rear, that he dissuaded McClellan from risking such another bloody repulse. It was almost certainly a grave error of judgment. For Lee's centre was broken, and there were no reserves left to draw upon. By 1 p.m. the second phase of the fight was at an end. The Confederates had lost ground, but had prevented the Federals gaining any foothold west of the turnpike.

It had been a part of McClellan's original plan of battle that as soon as his attack on the Confederate left was seen to be progressing favourably, Burnside, with the 9th Corps, should cross the Antietam, and having gained possession of the crest overhanging the stream, should sweep northwards along the ridge rolling up all the enemy's forces south of Sharpsburg. Orders were received by Burnside about 9 a.m.<sup>1</sup> on the 17th directing him to assault the bridge in his immediate front.

Burnside was, however, so chagrined by the alteration made in his command since the engagement at Turner's Gap, which removed him from the right wing to the left, and only gave him a single Corps with which to operate, that he refused to take any part in the actual handling of his troops on that day, and contented himself with transmitting the orders, which he received from McClellan, to Cox, one of his divisional generals, whom he charged with the execution of them. This multiplication of commanders did not tend to produce rapidity of movement, and the fact that Cox was new to the Army of the Potomac was an additional cause of delay.<sup>2</sup> None of the necessary preliminaries for an attack had

<sup>1</sup> McClellan, in his official report, stated that at 8 a.m. he ordered Burnside to attack the bridge. This order is generally supposed to have been received about 9 a.m., but General Cox (2 B. & L., 617, note) contends that the order was not received till 10 a.m.

<sup>2</sup> Cox had but recently arrived from the Kanawha Valley.

been carried out on the preceding day. The fords which crossed the Antietam in the neighbourhood of the bridge had not been located; and such was the extraordinary ignorance of the ground that the leading brigade, advancing to assault the bridge, actually missed its way.<sup>1</sup> Only a small Confederate force of three regiments and two batteries held the opposite bank.<sup>2</sup> The strength of the Confederate position lay in the fact that the road leading to the bridge ran for some 300 yards along the front of their line within easy rifle range.

Though the order to attack was received at 9 a.m., and the opposition was confined to a single weak brigade, yet the Federals did not capture the bridge until 1 p.m., just about the time when the assaults of French's and Richardson's divisions on Lee's centre came to an end. A ford was at last discovered below the bridge, and the Confederates, finding their right turned, withdrew from the river bank and fell back upon the main body holding the ridge south of Sharpsburg. Two more precious hours were wasted, as the division which had taken a prominent part in capturing the bridge had to be withdrawn, and another division brought to the front to take its place. By some extraordinary oversight the movement of these troops was entirely confined to the bridge, and no use was made of the fords.

It was not till 3 p.m. that the Federal left wing was in position fronting north. The only force between them and Sharpsburg consisted of six skeleton brigades, under D. R. Jones.<sup>3</sup> The 9th Corps advanced in two columns, the right direct upon Sharpsburg, whilst the left was intended to be in echelon behind it. The right, encountering little resistance, advanced close up to the suburbs of Sharpsburg and captured a battery. But the left had a harder task before it, and the gap between the two columns steadily increased. It was at this juncture that A. P. Hill's division, which had been left at Harper's Ferry to complete all the details of the capitulation, arrived upon the field, having marched seventeen miles in eight hours.<sup>4</sup> No precautions had been taken by the Federals to guard their left flank against a sudden attack, though they must have known that Hill's division might reach the battlefield at any moment, and that its line of march would bring it full on the exposed flank.

Hill, indeed, was only just in time. Jones' division was giving way. The Federals were on the point of capturing Sharpsburg. Lee's infantry were all used up. To check the further advance of the foe he had only his batteries to rely upon, and these had already been severely handled by the heavier ordnance of the

<sup>1</sup> Palfrey, 111.

<sup>2</sup> Palfrey, 109.

<sup>3</sup> According to D. R. Jones' own statement, his whole command of six brigades only comprised 2,430 men. But Palfrey (66, 67) concludes that Jones' estimate is at least 2,000 too low.

<sup>4</sup> 2 Henderson, 318.

Federals in the artillery duel which had raged throughout a considerable part of the day.<sup>1</sup>

With Sharpsburg in the hands of the Federals, Lee's line of retreat would have been cut. But A. P. Hill's arrival quickly averted the danger. Striking Rodman's division, which formed the left of the 9th Corps, full on the flank, he broke it, and its commander was amongst the killed. The victorious advance of the Federals was sharply checked. A fresh front had to be formed to meet the new foe; and, disheartened by the sudden reverse, the 9th Corps abandoned the ground which it had won and fell back to the bridge.

With the repulse of Burnside's attack, the battle came to an end. The losses on both sides had been enormous. The Federal loss was over 12,000, and the Confederates lost 9,500.<sup>2</sup> Considering the relative strength of the two armies, the Confederate loss was the heavier. All their troops had been engaged, and the whole army was pretty well fought out. On the other hand, only two-thirds of the Federal army had been seriously engaged. Porter's and Franklin's Corps, numbering at least 25,000 men, had suffered hardly any loss at all.

It seemed imperative upon the Confederates to lose no time in crossing to the other side of the Potomac. But Lee took a different view of the situation. In spite of the advice of all his chief officers, including the indomitable Jackson, the Confederate Commander-in-Chief determined to hold his position for another day, and give McClellan another chance of winning a pitched battle. He had not yet abandoned all hope of gaining such a victory as might bring the war to an end.

Early in the afternoon of the 17th, when the succession of Federal assaults on the left and centre of the Confederate line came to an end, he had directed Jackson to make an attempt to crush the Federal right. But Stuart, who was sent to examine the Federal position, pronounced it too strong to be assailed. Again on the 18th, when McClellan declined to renew the contest, Lee was still intent on the same idea of attacking the Federal right. But a careful examination of the position only corroborated Stuart's opinion of the previous day.<sup>3</sup> Their rifled artillery gave the Federals an immense superiority over the Confederate guns, a large part of which were short-range smoothbores.

<sup>1</sup> Henderson (ii. 318) considers that "a sufficient force to sustain the right might have been withdrawn from the left and centre, but Hill's approach was known, and it was considered inadvisable to abandon all hold of the means for a decisive counterstroke on the opposite flank."

<sup>2</sup> The Federal loss was officially stated at 12,410. Various estimates are formed of the Confederate loss. Henderson (ii. 322) gives 9,500. <sup>2</sup> Ropes, 376, quotes Allan to the effect that the Confederate loss "probably amounted to 8,000 or more." <sup>2</sup> B. & L., 603, estimates their loss at over 11,000. <sup>3</sup> <sup>2</sup> Henderson, 320-1, 325-8.



As McClellan was being reinforced and there was clearly no chance of dealing him a heavy blow, Lee was obliged to retreat. On the night of the 18th the movement commenced. The Federals made no attempt to interfere with the withdrawal of the Confederate army. Early on the morning of the 19th the whole of Lee's army was safe on the Virginia side of the Potomac. On the 20th a reconnaissance in force was pushed across the river under the direction of Fitz-John Porter, but was quickly driven back by A. P. Hill's division with some loss. McClellan made no further attempt at pursuit.

Whatever may be thought of the wisdom of Lee's resolve to stand and fight at Sharpsburg, his actual conduct of the battle was beyond question a tactical masterpiece. He utilised every available soldier: throughout the day he controlled the Confederate operations over the whole field: he fearlessly reinforced his left and centre from the right, when he saw that no attack was meditated at that point, and he never let go his central idea of making the battle decisive of the war. Yet with all his skill he came very near to defeat. Twice in the course of that one day did the neglect of the Federal commanders to guard the exposed flank of a division advancing to the attack deprive them of a great chance of victory.<sup>1</sup> If ordinary precautions had been adopted to protect either Burnside's or Sedgwick's advance, the Confederate line would have been rolled up.

McClellan, unlike Lee, exercised no control over the fighting. He carried the "Commander-in-Chief idea" so far that he allowed it to prevent him showing himself on the battlefield.<sup>2</sup> Thus the battle was left to fight itself. The Federal attack struck first Lee's left, then his centre, and finally his right. But these attacks were successive, not simultaneous: and each separate attack might be divided into distinct stages, which were no less lacking in unity. McClellan never carried out that part of his plan which referred to an advance of the centre. Though he outnumbered the 39,000 men who composed the Confederate army on the 17th by two to one, he kept in reserve nearly a third of his whole force, and thus reduced the odds to three to two. Nor did the energy of the subordinate commanders make amends for the inertness of their leader. It was on the Federal side a badly fought battle, a battle of lost opportunities. Yet in spite of all the shortcomings of McClellan and his lieutenants, Lee's great purpose had been baulked. He had invaded Maryland, meaning to fight a decisive battle. He had fought a pitched battle, but had been far from annihilating his foe. He might claim a tactical victory, but strategically the fruits of the campaign remained with McClellan.

<sup>1</sup> Palfrey, 118.

<sup>2</sup> Palfrey, 134.

NOTE ON THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE  
TWO ARMIES

McClellan, in his official report, stated the strength of his army "present for duty" as 87,164. Colonel Taylor, Lee's adjutant-general, following contemporaneous evidence, estimates the Confederate army at 35,255. Colonel Henderson gives 40,000 as the strength of Lee's army. General F. W. Palfrey, in *The Antietam and Fredericksburg*, very justly points out that the returns made by Federal and Confederate commanders were based on totally different principles. The Confederate returns only counted the number of muskets in the line of battle and frequently excluded the officers; whereas the Federal returns of "present for duty" included all the men detailed for service with the Quartermaster and Commissary Departments, the headquarter guards and orderlies, wagoners, company cooks, officers' servants, pioneers, and field-hospital attendants. A deduction of at least 20 per cent. must be made from the Federal estimates of "present for duty" before the effective force of the two sides can be fairly compared.

## CHAPTER XII

### FREDERICKSBURG

McClellan's inactivity—The Emancipation Edict—Stuart makes a raid round the Federal lines—Important results of the raid—McClellan crosses the Potomac—Lee's plan of campaign—McClellan relieved of the command of the Army of the Potomac—Reasons for his removal—Fitz-John Porter shares McClellan's fate—Burnside succeeds McClellan—A new plan of campaign—Reorganisation of the Army of the Potomac—Sumner reaches Falmouth—Lee's preparations—Lee's original selection of a battlefield overruled by President Davis—Burnside's forward movement delayed—Reorganisation of the Army of Northern Virginia—Further delays on Burnside's part—Lee's position—Burnside crosses the Rappahannock—Capture of Fredericksburg—Burnside settles his plan of attack—Franklin's advice—Contradictory nature of the orders given to Franklin—Orders given to Sumner—Jackson concentrates his Corps—Did Burnside fall into a trap?—Jackson's position—Its weak point—Franklin's advance—Franklin's attack—Its partial success—But finally repulsed—Position of Marye's Hill—Sumner's attack—The decisive repulse—Franklin refuses further co-operation—Losses—Reasons why Lee attempted no counterstroke—Burnside anxious to renew the attack—But dissuaded by his officers—Further movements of Burnside—Burnside relieved of the command of the Army of the Potomac.

**A**FTER the battle of the Antietam, McClellan made no immediate attempt to resume the offensive. In his own opinion, he had saved the Union by driving Lee out of Maryland. He was quite content to rest upon his laurels until such time as he had completely reorganised his army. It is quite possible that from a purely military point of view McClellan was right.<sup>1</sup> A large part of the army with which he had carried out the recent campaign had been badly beaten at the Second Manassas: reconstruction was necessary, especially as the army had been recruited by a number of entirely fresh and untrained regiments; but hitherto it had been impossible to do much towards reorganising the army whilst an offensive movement was in operation. The cavalry especially were in a very poor condition, and remounts were urgently needed, whilst throughout the whole army there was a general lack of needful supplies.<sup>2</sup> It is far from impossible that the distrust felt towards McClellan in Government circles extended to the supply depôts in Washington, and caused the delay of which McClellan repeatedly complained.

But from a political point of view the President and his Cabinet

<sup>1</sup> 2 Henderson, 355.

<sup>2</sup> 2 B. & L., 102-3.



were most anxious that the battle of the Antietam should be followed up by some decisive movement. Five days after that battle, on the 22nd September, Abraham Lincoln issued his famous Edict of Emancipation, by which he declared that in all States which after the 1st January, 1863, should be still in a state of insurrection the slaves would be recognised as free by the Federal Government. This proclamation was certainly a wise political move. Enthusiasm for the war was beginning to flag after the recent failures. Many held that the Union was not worth fighting for at all if slavery were still to be retained. Lincoln now appealed to a loftier sentiment and a wider audience. He exalted the war to the level of a crusade.<sup>1</sup> He secured to the Federal cause increased support at home and general sympathy abroad. He won the whole-hearted enthusiasm of the Abolitionist party, which, principally recruited from the West, supplied the Northern armies with their best soldiers. But for the moment the wisdom of the President's action seemed doubtful. Emancipation was not popular with the army generally. The Democratic party was entirely opposed to it, and the political enemies of the President charged him with a violation of the Constitution. Lincoln considered that the best way of gaining support for his declaration would be a signal victory over Lee's army, and accordingly he urgently pressed McClellan to push across the Potomac and lose no time in forcing Lee to another battle.

Nothing, however, could induce McClellan to move until he felt himself ready. He had indeed sent two Corps to hold Harper's Ferry and to fortify the heights overlooking that post. But in spite of his partial success at the Antietam, he still completely misread the military situation. He underestimated the severity of the blow which he had dealt Lee: he exaggerated his enemy's numbers. His misapprehension of the position is most clearly shown by the extraordinary expression that he believed that the two Corps at Harper's Ferry would be able to hold out until reinforced.<sup>2</sup>

On the 6th October the President sent him orders through General Halleck to cross the Potomac forthwith and march against Lee; but McClellan serenely disregarded the order. On the 10th October Lee despatched Stuart with 1,800 cavalry to make a raid round the Federal position; and for the second time in the same year Stuart rode right round the Army of the Potomac. For fifty-six hours he was within the enemy's lines, and covered in all 126 miles. His losses were insignificant, whilst he destroyed a considerable amount of Government property at Chambersburg (Map IV.); and he brought back the valuable information that troops were not being withdrawn from the Army of the Potomac, but on the contrary reinforcements were being sent to that army.

<sup>1</sup> 2 Henderson, 412-13.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Ropes, 435.

Lee was thereby freed from any apprehension of a movement by water against Richmond for that year, and was able to devote his whole attention to the army immediately in his front. Stuart's raid had a second and still more important result. The Federal cavalry, which had not yet recovered from the hard work imposed on them by Pope, were completely worn out in their futile attempts to capture the Confederate detachment. It became impossible for McClellan to make any forward movement until he had got remounts for his cavalry.<sup>1</sup>

Not until the 26th October, more than five weeks after the battle of the Antietam, did he begin to move his army across the Potomac. His troops crossed on the east side of the Blue Ridge. McClellan was as slow in crossing his army over the river as in all his other movements. It was the 2nd November before all his forces were on the south bank of the Potomac.<sup>2</sup> The bulk were concentrated at and near Warrenton (see Map III.).

Lee, on the 2nd November, having thoroughly satisfied himself that the Federal advance was to be on the east side of the Blue Ridge, ordered Longstreet's Corps across the Ridge to Culpeper Court House. With his usual daring Lee did not hesitate in the face of a much superior foe to divide his army so that its two wings were sixty miles apart.<sup>3</sup> His reason for retaining Jackson in the Valley was, that the presence of that enterprising commander would constitute a standing menace to McClellan's lines of communication, and keep before the eyes of the Washington Government the spectre of another invasion of Maryland. If McClellan, despite this threat, pushed on from Warrenton towards Culpeper, it was Lee's intention to summon Jackson up the Valley and reunite his two wings near Gordonsville.

McClellan was contemplating an advance on Culpeper in the hope of crushing Longstreet's Corps before it could be reinforced by Jackson,<sup>4</sup> when on the night of the 7th November he was relieved of the command of the Army of the Potomac, and Burnside appointed to take his place. Unquestionably McClellan deserved better treatment at the hands of his Government. At a moment of great national peril he had come forward, and by his Maryland campaign saved the Union, if not from absolute destruction, at any rate from a position of extreme danger. As a commander he was steadily improving; experience was teaching him many lessons; it was impossible for an intelligent soldier, as McClellan was, to fight many battles with Lee and Jackson without learning much from them. His Maryland campaign, apart from his faulty handling of his troops on the actual battlefield, was

<sup>1</sup> For Stuart's raid and its importance, see 2 Henderson, 357-60.

<sup>2</sup> Palfrey, 131.

<sup>3</sup> 2 Henderson, 362.

<sup>4</sup> For a criticism of McClellan's intended plan of campaign, see 2 Ropes, 446-7.

better conceived and executed than any of his movements in the Peninsula. With all his faults and limitations as a general, it remains probably true, that McClellan was without any exception the best commander that the Army of the Potomac ever had.<sup>1</sup> Certainly no other general ever possessed to a like extent the confidence and devotion of the soldiers of that army.

But McClellan was sacrificed to political exigencies. He had always been opposed to the emancipation of the slaves, and was likely to be the Democratic candidate at the next Presidential election. If he were to enter upon that contest with the laurels of victory on his brow, the Republican party would have but little chance of success. He was moreover distrusted and disliked by Halleck, who was conscious of his own inferiority, and by Stanton, whom he had not hesitated to charge with having done his best to ruin the Army of the Potomac in the Peninsula.

Along with McClellan, Fitz-John Porter, the commander of the 5th Corps, was also recalled. He had shown his worth in the Peninsula at the battles of Gaines' Mill and Malvern Hill: he was perhaps the ablest officer in the Army of the Potomac. He was to be made the scapegoat of Pope's failure in the Second Manassas campaign. He was tried by court-martial on the charge of disobeying orders, was cashiered and dismissed the service. Many years later he obtained a rehearing of his case, was triumphantly acquitted, and restored to his old rank in the army.<sup>2</sup> It is a strange commentary on the methods of Lincoln's administration, that with such grave charges hanging over his head Porter was allowed to retain the command of an Army Corps during the Maryland campaign. The inference would seem to be that after Pope's disastrous failure the Government realised that McClellan, and McClellan only, could save them, and that he must be left to work out their salvation in his own way: but when once that was accomplished, he and his most trusted lieutenant were discarded by their ungrateful employers.

It was a grave mistake to remove McClellan: it was a criminal blunder to replace him by Burnside.<sup>3</sup> Of all the general officers serving at that time with the Army of the Potomac, Burnside was probably the most incompetent: in the eyes of that army he lay under the grave suspicion of having prevented a decisive victory being won at the Antietam by his inaction and mismanagement of the left wing. When the Civil War broke out he had been more than seven years out of the service. But he had gained a considerable reputation for his successful campaign in North Carolina:<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Palfrey, 135.

<sup>2</sup> In 1886 by the Cleveland Administration.

<sup>3</sup> 2 Henderson, 368; Palfrey, 54-5.

<sup>4</sup> The fact that Burnside was a personal friend of McClellan probably aided to secure his appointment, as it was hoped that he might therefore be acceptable to the Army of the Potomac. Burnside was also next in rank to McClellan. Cf. 2 Ropes, 442-3.



he was a man of charming manners and of great personal fascination: and it is probable that the Government at Washington was not aware of the low opinion, which those who knew his military capacity better, held of him.

Burnside was conscious of his own incapacity to fill so important a post: only with the greatest reluctance did he take over the command.<sup>1</sup> He determined to adopt quite a new plan of campaign. Instead of pressing on towards Culpeper Court House, in the hope of being able to deal with Longstreet and Jackson in detail, or at any rate of forcing the united Confederate army to fight for its line of communications with Richmond, he resolved to move his army along the north bank of the Rappahannock, to cross that river at Fredericksburg, and from that point to press on with all speed towards Richmond. It is quite probable that this course commended itself chiefly to him, because he would escape from the danger of having his line of communications threatened by Jackson in the Valley.<sup>2</sup> This plan of campaign did not find favour with Halleck, but the President, when appealed to, gave his consent to it, adding that he thought it would be successful only if carried out with great rapidity.<sup>3</sup> The President's sanction was received on the 14th November.

Burnside had already divided his army into three Grand Divisions, a continuation of McClellan's arrangement during the Maryland campaign. The Right Grand Division, consisting of the 2nd and 9th Corps, was under the command of Sumner: the Centre Grand Division of the 3rd and 5th Corps was commanded by Hooker, and Franklin was in charge of the Left Grand Division, which contained the 1st and 6th Corps. The 12th Corps was at Harper's Ferry and the 11th was held in reserve.

Sumner commenced his march on the 15th, and arrived at Falmouth opposite Fredericksburg on the 17th: he was closely followed by the other two Grand Divisions and the cavalry. Fredericksburg was found to be very feebly garrisoned, and Sumner was anxious immediately on his arrival to send a body of troops across the river and capture the town. Burnside forbade the movement because, as the bridges had been destroyed, he feared lest a sudden rise of the river, which at that season was very likely to occur, would leave part of his army isolated on the southern bank. Had Sumner's advice been followed, in all probability the awful carnage and terrible humiliation of the 13th December would have been avoided.

<sup>1</sup> Colonel Irwin, the historian of the 19th Army Corps, states (2 B. & L., 104) that there is good reason for believing that Burnside had twice already refused the command, in August and again early in September.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Henderson, 370.

<sup>3</sup> According to Halleck, "The President's assent was given to the plan of crossing the Rappahannock at the upper fords, above the Rapidan" (2 Ropes, 449, note 3).

Lee had already anticipated that the change of commander might be followed by a change in the plan of campaign : and with a view to the possible advance of the Federals by way of Fredericksburg he had sent orders on the 12th November for the destruction of the railway from Fredericksburg to Aquia Creek.<sup>1</sup> On the 18th he started Longstreet's Corps on the march to Fredericksburg, and the following day wrote to Jackson urging him to ascend the Valley and come to Orange Court House.<sup>2</sup>

It had not been Lee's original intention to fight on the line of the Rappahannock, but to fall back to the North Anna, thirty-six miles further south, and on its banks give battle to Burnside's army. By adopting the North Anna as his line of defence, he would have secured a position not perhaps so strong defensively as that which he afterwards occupied on the Rappahannock, but possessing the great advantage of enabling him to deliver a decisive counterstroke, which he could not do at Fredericksburg ; in the probable event of Burnside's defeat, the additional thirty-six miles, which he would have advanced from the Rappahannock, would afford an excellent opportunity to the Confederate leaders to assail his flank, cut his line of retreat, and destroy his communications, by which means the Federal army would very probably be either annihilated or forced to capitulate. But Lee's sound military judgment was overruled by President Davis.<sup>3</sup> The latter was reluctant to relinquish unnecessarily any Confederate territory from which supplies could be drawn. He had never grasped the great military principle, that the surest means of self-defence is to retain the power of assuming the offensive. He was quite content to maintain a strictly defensive attitude at Fredericksburg, though a Confederate victory won there could not lead, owing to the nature of the position, to a decisive success. He looked for ultimate success, not to the genius of his generals or the valour of his soldiers, but to the intervention of foreign Powers. He therefore aimed solely at protracting the struggle so as to give time for that intervention to take place.

Besides the superior advantages which the North Anna position possessed, there was another reason why Lee had not at first intended to fight on the Rappahannock. He had expected that Burnside's advance would be made with such speed that it would be impossible for the Confederate army to concentrate in time to oppose him at that early stage of the campaign.<sup>4</sup> But though President Lincoln in accepting Burnside's plan of campaign had insisted on the necessity of speed, if it were to prove successful, by some strange oversight the pontoon train, which was to convey the Federal army across the river, was not sent up from Washington

<sup>1</sup> 2 *Ropes*, 451.

<sup>3</sup> 2 *Henderson*, 375.

<sup>2</sup> 2 *Henderson*, 370.

<sup>4</sup> 2 *Henderson*, 370.

till the 25th November. By that date Lee had got Longstreet's Corps concentrated on the heights above Fredericksburg, and he determined to subordinate his judgment to the President's and offer battle there with his whole army.

There was this further reason for fighting at Fredericksburg that, considering the lateness of the year, Burnside might not try to push his advance further, but resolve to wait for the spring before resuming the offensive. Accordingly Lee summoned Jackson from Orange Court House to Fredericksburg.

The Confederate army had been remodelled since the battle of the Antietam, and was now divided into two Corps. The first, containing five divisions, was under the command of Longstreet;<sup>1</sup> and the second, under Jackson, now consisted of four divisions, commanded respectively by Early, Taliaferro, A. P. Hill, and D. H. Hill. The 2nd Corps was stationed on the lower waters of the Rappahannock, Early's division twelve miles below Fredericksburg at Skinker's Neck, D. H. Hill's division at Port Royal six miles further down the river; the other divisions were held in reserve ready to support Longstreet or the right of their own Corps, as occasion might require.

After concentrating his army at Falmouth, Burnside's movements became much more deliberate. First there was the delay caused by the late arrival of the pontoon train; then he was unwilling to move forward until the railroad to his rear, which formed his line of communications, was repaired: finally, when he found Lee prepared to dispute his further advance, he had to fix upon some plan of attack. It seems strange that he made no attempt to cross the Rappahannock by the upper fords, which was the route followed by Hooker in the following spring, and thus turn the Confederate left. His first idea was to try and turn their right by crossing at Skinker's Neck, but when he found that Early's division was there in position ready to dispute his passage, and that the Federal gunboats were unable to force their way up the river past D. H. Hill at Port Royal, he abandoned that plan. At length he resolved to cross the river at Fredericksburg, and make a frontal attack on Lee's position. Probably he was driven to adopt this desperate course by the impatience of his Government, which had not superseded McClellan in order that his successor might adopt the same dilatory tactics.<sup>2</sup>

The position, which Lee held, was so strong that it seems wonderful that Burnside ventured to assault it. On the southern bank of the Rappahannock there ran a long, low ridge parallel to the river and at a distance from it varying from 1,500 to 3,000 yards.<sup>3</sup> This ridge started about two miles above Fredericksburg quite

<sup>1</sup> Longstreet's divisions were commanded by McLaws, R. H. Anderson, Pickett, Hood, and Ransom.

<sup>2</sup> Palfrey, 142.

<sup>3</sup> 2 Henderson, 374.



close to the river above the Falmouth ford and extended for six miles to the Massaponax River. Broken by ravines and streams it possessed great natural strength as a defensive position; and Lee had utilised the time so liberally given him by Burnside to strengthen it by artificial means. Probably he had learnt a lesson from the Antietam, where he had made no attempt to strengthen his position by any kind of entrenchments. His army had been busily occupied at Fredericksburg with axe and spade; and a fortnight's labour had made the position almost impregnable.

Burnside gave orders that the crossing should commence on the 11th December. Along the north bank of the Rappahannock runs a higher ridge known as the Stafford Heights, which completely commanded the river and plain below. Along these heights 147 guns were in position.<sup>1</sup> Fredericksburg was held by a small Confederate brigade. Burnside intended to cross the right wing of his army over the river exactly opposite Fredericksburg and the left wing by another set of bridges two miles further down.<sup>2</sup> It was a foggy morning and the work of laying the pontoons proceeded but slowly. Below the town no opposition was encountered, and one brigade of Franklin's command crossed that day. The building of the upper bridges was, however, considerably obstructed by Barksdale's riflemen in Fredericksburg. When about noon the fog cleared away, all the guns, which could be brought to bear upon the town, opened fire; but the garrison was well sheltered and suffered little loss. Eventually a force was taken across the river in boats.

Fredericksburg was captured after some sharp fighting, and the bridges were speedily completed. On that day one division and one brigade of the right wing crossed the river.<sup>3</sup> During the following day the whole of Sumner's and Franklin's divisions were moved across the river. There was a dense fog, and no opposition was attempted by the Confederates.

On the afternoon of the 12th Burnside settled his plan of attack for the next day. It is almost incredible but none the less true that Burnside, when he crossed the river, had no distinct plan in his head. With cruel justice it has been said that he hoped to do something, he did not quite know what, with his left, and if he succeeded, to do something with his right.<sup>4</sup> At 5 p.m. he came over to Franklin's headquarters and had a lengthy conference with him and his two Corps commanders, Reynolds and Smith.

Franklin strongly urged that the main attack should be made upon the Confederate right with a column of at least 30,000 men to be sent in at dawn. In order to carry out such an attack he requested that two of Hooker's divisions should be brought across

<sup>1</sup> Palfrey, 146.

<sup>3</sup> Palfrey, 147.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Ropes, 456.

<sup>4</sup> Palfrey, 151.

the river to his support during the night.<sup>1</sup> Certainly if any chance of success was still left to Burnside's army, that chance lay in a heavy attack upon the Confederate right. That was the least strong point in the whole of their line. Jackson's line might have been broken possibly by an attacking force of 30,000 men, and the Federals would then have secured a position to the right and rear of Lee's line. But even supposing they were so far successful, it is not easy to see how they could have gained any permanent success, as the rest of the Confederate position was so strong that reinforcements could have been fearlessly sent to the support of Jackson. Anyhow, an attack in force on the extreme right of the Confederate line was the only plan which presented even the smallest prospect of success.

Burnside in his conference with Franklin did not come to any definite conclusion, but promised to let Franklin have his orders before midnight at the latest. Those orders did not arrive till 7.30 a.m., and gave directions for a plan of battle very different to that which Franklin had recommended. He was now ordered to hold the whole of his command in readiness for a rapid movement down the old Richmond road, and to attack Jackson's position with a single division at least, taking care to keep it well supported and its line of retreat open. It is at once plain that the two parts of this order were contradictory: if Franklin was to support properly the division told off to try and gain a position within the Confederate lines, it was impossible for him to keep his whole command in readiness for a rapid movement elsewhere.<sup>2</sup>

Sumner was also directed to make a similar tentative movement against the Confederate left. He was to advance one division at least along the Telegraph and Plank roads and endeavour to seize the heights on either side of those roads. Burnside's plan was apparently to seize with Franklin's division a point on the military road, which the Confederates had cut through the woods at the back of the ridge in order the better to connect the two wings. The seizure of this point would enable the rest of Franklin's command to move down the old Richmond road and get in rear of the crest held by Lee. Thus far the plan agreed with that which Franklin had submitted to him the previous evening. Only, how Burnside expected that a single division could secure the required position, passes understanding. He also apparently expected that if the two positions on the right and left were secured by Franklin's and Sumner's attacks with a single division each, the Confederates would be forced to evacuate the whole of the ridge between the two points. In reality the success of his preliminary movements would have only had the result of con-

<sup>1</sup> Palfrey, 150.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Ropes, 463.

centrating more closely a powerful enemy between his two widely separated wings.

When it became clear on the 12th December, that the bulk of the Federal army was crossing the river, A. P. Hill's and Taliaferro's divisions were ordered to come into line on the right of Longstreet's Corps, and at noon of the same day orders were sent to the other two divisions of the 2nd Corps to come up from the lower reaches of the river and take their position for the battle, which was now imminent. Again Lee succeeded in uniting his two wings on the field of battle just at the right moment.

It is an open question whether Burnside realised that he was going to attack the whole of the Confederate army, or believed that he had only to deal with Longstreet's Corps.<sup>1</sup> The latter supposition would do something to explain away the foolhardiness of his frontal attack. But on the other hand it seems almost impossible to suppose that, if Burnside hoped to steal a march on Lee, he would have advertised the intended attack on the 11th and yet delayed delivering it till the 13th, when the most distant of Jackson's divisions was only eighteen miles away.

Jackson's position was a strong one. His line was about 2,600 yards long. On the left it rested on Deep Run, beyond which Hood's division of Longstreet's Corps was in position. Its right was at Prospect Hill, a spur jutting down from the wooded ridge and overlooking the Massaponax valley. His skirmish line was posted along the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad, which runs parallel to the course of the river and about a mile to the west of it, till having passed the ridge it takes a turn southward. The fighting line was drawn up 150 yards above the railroad embankment along the crest of the ridge under cover of the forest. A. P. Hill's division supplied the first two lines: Early's and Taliaferro's troops formed the third line, and D. H. Hill's division was held in reserve. On both right and left batteries had been massed in commanding positions. The one weak point in the line was, that at the right centre a coppice projected beyond the edge of the forest and ran down the slope for more than a quarter of a mile beyond the embankment. Triangular in shape, its base faced the Federals and was 500 yards long. Although it was impossible to find any position from which either the approach to or exit from this coppice could be commanded, it had not been cleared, as the soil was so swampy and the undergrowth so thick, that it was believed that the Federals would be unable to penetrate it. There was in consequence a considerable space, a quarter of the length of the whole line, along the Confederate front left undefended by direct artillery fire.<sup>2</sup> On the extreme right of Jackson's position, between the ridge and the Massaponax, Stuart's

<sup>1</sup> 2 Ropes, 468.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Henderson, 379-82.



cavalry and horse artillery, the latter under the "incomparable Pelham,"<sup>1</sup> were posted.

Franklin had placed the 6th Corps on his right holding the Richmond road and Deep Run, and the 1st Corps on his left. With this latter Corps he intended to make his attack. Meade's division in the centre was to lead the assault, supported by Gibbon's division on the right, whilst the left flank was to be protected by Doubleday's division. Meade's division, having moved down the river until it was opposite the Confederate right, was formed in column of attack, and advanced to the assault between 9 a.m. and 10 a.m. But no sooner was it across the Richmond road than Pelham's two guns opened on its left flank. For more than half an hour Meade's advance was arrested by their fire. When Pelham at length withdrew by Stuart's order, Franklin opened fire with several batteries, supported by the heavy guns on the Stafford Heights, against the Confederate position. The thick timber protected Jackson's line against any serious loss, and his own guns made no reply, reserving their fire for the infantry attack. Shortly after 11 a.m. Meade's advance was again resumed, but when it was within half a mile of Jackson's line, the Confederate guns at length broke silence, and came into action with such effect that Meade's division retreated behind the Richmond road. For an hour and a half a furious artillery duel lasted, and at 1 p.m. Meade, with Gibbon in line on his right, again moved forward to the attack. Franklin had established two heavy batteries on the Richmond road to the right and left of the attacking force, which curbed the fire of the Confederate artillery from the ridge.

On the left Doubleday's division was engaged with Stuart's command, and two divisions of the 3rd Corps had been brought across the river, and were in reserve. Franklin had found it impossible to carry out Burnside's commands to the letter. Only one Corps was ready for the rapid move down the Richmond road. His other Corps was committed to the assault of Jackson's position, and the two divisions of the 3rd Corps were held in reserve so as to keep open its line of retreat. Already the task of capturing a point on the Confederate right was assuming proportions which it seems that Burnside had never anticipated.

The attack was delivered with great determination. Meade's division forced its way through the coppice, and broke A. P. Hill's line. The two right brigades<sup>2</sup> of the first line were thrown into confusion, and a third brigade<sup>3</sup> brought up from the second line

<sup>1</sup> Major John Pelham was Stuart's chief of horse artillery. He was very young to hold so important a post, having graduated at West Point in 1861. But he had greatly distinguished himself at Sharpsburg and added to his fame at Fredericksburg. He was killed in a cavalry encounter on the Rappahannock in the spring of 1863.

<sup>2</sup> Archer's and Lane's brigades.

<sup>3</sup> Gregg's brigade.

fared no better. But Jackson had plenty of troops in reserve, whilst Meade's victorious brigades had no supports. Early's and Taliaferro's divisions were ordered up from the third line, and delivered a vigorous countercharge at the point of the bayonet. Meade's troops, having lost their organisation whilst fighting in the dense wood, were in no condition to resist the attack, and with the loss of more than half their numbers were driven back. Gibbon's division was also fiercely assailed: his flank was exposed by the retreat of Meade's division, and soon both Federal divisions were flying back for shelter to the Richmond road. Contrary to Jackson's orders that the pursuit should not go beyond the railroad, two brigades<sup>1</sup> continued to follow the flying foe to the Richmond road. It was only the presence of the two divisions of the 3rd Corps<sup>2</sup> which saved the Federal artillery on the left from capture, and prevented the repulse of the 1st Corps from becoming a terrible disaster. The two adventurous brigades were driven back to the cover of the woods with very heavy loss. But the Federal left had lost 5,000 men, and Franklin was in no condition to resume the attack for some time.<sup>3</sup>

Burnside's attack with Sumner's Grand Division on the Confederate left centre was even more disastrous. He had originally intended that Franklin's attack should precede Sumner's; but shortly after 11 a.m., growing impatient, he directed Sumner to advance. The position which he was ordered to assault was one of enormous strength. His troops moving out along the Telegraph and Plank roads had to storm Marye's Hill. The front of this hill was protected by a stone wall which, strengthened by earth piled up against its outer face, gave admirable cover for the troops behind who were drawn up in the broad road, whilst the hill rising above the wall was covered with sharpshooters in rifle-pits and guns in entrenchments. Such a position with a front not more than 600 yards long was almost impregnable when held by four brigades.<sup>4</sup> Yet for nearly three hours the devoted troops of the Federal right wing were launched in successive assaults against it. History records fortunately but few instances of brave men sent to destruction by the incompetence of their general in a more hopeless undertaking.

The three divisions of the 2nd Corps were first sent into the assault. French's and Hancock's divisions led the way. They had to march 1,700 yards under a murderous fire before they could reach the enemy's front. When Couch, the commander of the 2nd Corps, saw the effect produced upon the troops by the heavy

<sup>1</sup> Hoke's and Atkinson's brigades of Early's division.

<sup>2</sup> Birney's and Sickles' divisions. Stoneman was in command of the 3rd Corps. Sickles' division was but slightly engaged.

<sup>3</sup> For Franklin's attack and repulse, see 2 Henderson, 386-93.

<sup>4</sup> Cobb's, Kershaw's, Cook's, and Ransom's brigades. The two first belonged to McLaws' division, the other two constituted Ransom's.

fire as they deployed into line, he sent in Howard's division in support of Hancock.

But numbers only served to swell the slaughter. The main line did not get within 100 yards of the stone wall, though some bodies were afterwards found within twenty-five yards of it. Hancock, the fiercest fighter in the Army of the Potomac, lost 2,000 men in his division and French 1,200; Howard, whose division came into action later than the other two, lost nearly 900. When the 2nd Corps was fought out, the 9th took its place. Sturgis' division lost over 1,000 men in a vain attempt to carry the wall. One brigade of the 3rd Corps<sup>1</sup> was put in to support Sturgis and was repulsed with loss; and a similar fate awaited Griffin's division of the 5th Corps, which lost over 800. Perhaps the hardest and best fighting was done by Humphreys' division of the 5th Corps. His division consisted of two rather raw brigades. Their commander saw that the only chance of carrying the wall lay in ordering his men not to fire, but to trust solely to the bayonet. Though heroically led, they could make no impression on the Confederate position, and were obliged to fall back in good order, but with a loss of over 1,000 men. With the repulse of Humphreys' division the fighting on the Federal right came to an end.<sup>2</sup>

As attack after attack of Sumner's wing was repulsed, Burnside sent urgent orders to Franklin to resume the offensive in his front and thus try to lessen the pressure upon Sumner. But Franklin had lost confidence alike in his commander and his men.<sup>3</sup> He considered that a fresh assault would only lead to another bloody repulse, and might seriously endanger the safety of his already somewhat demoralised wing. He may have argued, too, that Burnside's ignorance of the real strength of the Confederate right justified him in not attempting to carry out his commands. Whatever may be the verdict upon Franklin's conduct—and it is a reasonable view to hold that an army which had the misfortune to be commanded by a Burnside was lucky to have so cautious an officer as Franklin in command of one of its wings<sup>4</sup>—the 13th of December was fatal to his military reputation. He was relieved of his command in the following January and never employed again with the Army of the Potomac.<sup>5</sup> It is a lamentable thought that the Federal Government did not hesitate to sacrifice such able officers as Porter and Franklin to hide the shortcomings of Pope and Burnside. The Federal losses amounted to 12,647. Of these 7,800 fell in the right attack. The Confederates lost 5,300, of which more than two-thirds belonged to Jackson's Corps.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Carroll's brigade of Whipple's division.

<sup>2</sup> For the attack of Sumner's and Hooker's Corps, see Palfrey, 161-73.

<sup>3</sup> 2 Henderson, 393.

<sup>4</sup> Palfrey, 181.

<sup>5</sup> Franklin commanded an Army Corps under Banks in the Department of the Gulf for a time.

<sup>6</sup> 2 Henderson, 404-5.



No attempt was made by Lee to deliver a counterstroke.<sup>1</sup> In the first place his position at Fredericksburg was not favourable for an offensive movement. The river with its six bridges secured the retreat of the enemy, and the batteries massed on Stafford Heights, as well as those which had been brought across the river, would have inflicted terrible loss on any force advancing across the open plain. In the second place Lee, seeing with what ease the Federal attack had been repulsed, did not realise what fearful loss had been suffered by his opponent, nor could he guess how great was the distrust felt for Burnside by officers and men alike. He expected that the Federals would renew the assault next day and was quite prepared to receive it.

Had Burnside been left to himself, the disastrous tactics of the 13th would have been repeated the following day. The sight of the awful slaughter of his troops seems to have quite upset his mental balance. He was with difficulty dissuaded from attacking Marye's Hill with the 9th Corps, which he proposed to lead in person.<sup>2</sup> Throughout the 14th and the 15th the two armies lay in position facing each other. On the night of the 15th, under cover of a fierce storm, the Federal army was withdrawn to the north bank of the Rappahannock.

Burnside, in spite of the disastrous failure of his first attempt was still determined to get to close quarters with Lee's army, and reverted to his original idea of turning the Confederate right by crossing the Rappahannock some miles below Fredericksburg. But on the 30th December he received a telegram from the President ordering him not to undertake any fresh movement without first giving him information of it. On receipt of this telegram Burnside repaired to Washington only to find himself unable to persuade either Lincoln or Halleck to authorise a forward movement of any kind. Returning to the army, he determined to act on his own responsibility.<sup>3</sup> Late in January he attempted to turn Lee's left flank by the upper fords of the Rappahannock; but the inclemency of the weather compelled him to abandon the operation known as the "Mud March." On the 26th of the same month<sup>4</sup> he was relieved of the command of the Army of the Potomac, and Hooker appointed in his place.

<sup>1</sup> Jackson was in favour of making a night attack but was overruled by Lee (2 Henderson, 399).

<sup>2</sup> The 9th Corps was composed of the troops which had served under Burnside in North Carolina and in the Antietam campaign.

<sup>3</sup> 2 *Ropes*, 470.

<sup>4</sup> 2 Henderson, 415.

## CHAPTER XIII

### GRANT IN THE WEST—FORT DONELSON AND SHILOH <sup>1</sup>

The Western theatre of war—The Confederate position—Halleck's sudden resolve—Advance on Fort Henry—Fall of Fort Henry—Result produced—Johnston's plan of campaign—Advance on Fort Donelson—Failure of the fleet—The Confederates try to cut their way out—Partial success of the Confederate attack—Arrival of Grant—Smith's successful attack—The Federals recover the lost ground—Surrender of Fort Donelson—Results of the surrender—Criticism of Halleck's methods—Reasons for Buell's failure to co-operate—Buell occupies Nashville—Evacuation of Columbus—The strategical position—Difference between Buell's and Halleck's views—Halleck appointed to the supreme command in the West—Lincoln's error of judgment—Halleck's plan of campaign—Johnston reorganises the Confederate army—Position of Grant's army—Johnston's advance—Position of Buell's army—Battle of Shiloh—Federal right driven back—Attack on Federal centre—Death of Johnston—Federal centre broken—Arrival of Buell—Beauregard calls off his troops—Criticism of soldiers and generals—Fighting renewed on the 7th—The Federals recover their lost camps—Pope's success at Island No. 10—Halleck advances on Corinth—Beauregard evacuates Corinth—Evacuation of Fort Pillow—Naval battle of Memphis—End of the campaign.

**W**EST of the Alleghanies the campaign of 1862 opened in the beginning of February. The Confederates under Albert S. Johnston held a line running from Columbus on the Mississippi to Bowling Green, and by holding this advanced position retained possession of a considerable part of Kentucky. Facing them were General Buell, commanding the Department of the Ohio, who had concentrated the bulk of his forces at Nolin in order to confront Johnston's main force at Bowling Green, and General Halleck commanding the Department of the Missouri. The latter had been too much occupied with restoring order out of the confusion which Frémont had left behind him, to be able to pay much attention to affairs east of the Mississippi. But one of his lieutenants, Grant, was in command at Cairo. It was he who, in September of the preceding year, had forestalled the Confederate general Polk by seizing Paducah, and in November had moved down the Mississippi with a small force, and fought an indecisive battle with some of Polk's troops at Belmont opposite Columbus: and he fully appreciated the importance of the issue which was about to be fought out in Kentucky and Tennessee.

<sup>1</sup> See Map VI.

The Confederate position was one of considerable danger. Although they held the interior lines, and at that time of year the wretched condition of the roads and the swollen streams presented almost insuperable obstacles to any large force operating by land, yet the rivers Cumberland and Tennessee afforded an easy advance by water into the very heart of the Confederate power in the West. The Confederates were painfully aware of their inferiority on water. The superior mechanical skill of the Northerners gave them an immense advantage in any combat which might be fought out on the Mississippi and its tributaries. In the West the Confederates had aimed not so much at building gunboats which might resist the advance of the Federal vessels as at securing strongly fortified positions on the rivers, which would prevent the ships of their foe from moving up and down at pleasure on their waters. On the Mississippi, above Memphis, they held strong positions at Fort Pillow, New Madrid and Island No. 10, and Columbus. On the Cumberland and the Tennessee they had constructed Forts Donelson and Henry to protect the waterway to Nashville and the Memphis and Charleston Railway.

Buell, with a full appreciation of the military situation, had been throughout the winter urging upon McClellan the advisability of a combined movement by land and water upon Nashville. But Halleck had been too much occupied with his own difficulties in Missouri, and McClellan, partly on political grounds, favoured an advance into East Tennessee. Suddenly Halleck flung aside his old objections, and on the 30th January sent word to McClellan that he was ordering Grant to move up the Tennessee and capture Fort Henry. It is not clear why Halleck so suddenly changed his mind. In all probability he had been convinced by the representations of Grant and Commodore Foote, who was in command of the naval force, that a movement against Forts Henry and Donelson might lead to great results. He was a man of considerable ambition and anxious to rival the success of Buell, one of whose lieutenants, G. H. Thomas, had recently gained a victory at Mill Springs:<sup>1</sup> and he hoped by despatching Grant on this expedition to force the hand of the Government and compel McClellan to abandon his cherished scheme against East Tennessee and give him all the assistance that he could towards effecting the reduction of the Confederate forts.

These two fortified posts had been constructed in the summer of 1861 by direction of the authorities of Tennessee.<sup>2</sup> Fort Henry lay on the east bank of the Tennessee, and twelve miles away was Fort Donelson on the west bank of the Cumberland. The sites, especially in the case of Fort Henry, were not too well chosen, and

<sup>1</sup> See Cap. VI. p. 47.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Ropes, 13.



in both cases the fortifications were too large for defence by a small garrison, and rather resembled entrenched camps<sup>1</sup> The two posts, which were under the command of General Tilghman, who had placed a garrison of 3,000 men in Fort Henry and of 2,000 in Fort Donelson, guarded the bridges, by which the railroad from Bowling Green to Columbus, connecting the two flanks of the Confederate position, crossed the rivers, and their importance was fully realised by the Southern commanders.

Grant received his orders on the 1st February; and on the 3rd the expedition started from Paducah, forty miles below Fort Henry. Grant was in command of 15,000 men organised into two divisions under McClernand and C. F. Smith, and was supported by a fleet of seven gunboats under Foote, of which four were ironclads.<sup>2</sup> By the 5th the whole force had arrived, and Smith's division was landed on the left bank, where it occupied a high bluff overlooking Fort Henry.

Not only was the Confederate position commanded from the opposite side of the river, but even on its own bank there were heights, which once secured by the Federals would have rendered the position of the garrison untenable.<sup>3</sup> Under the circumstances Tilghman decided to send all the infantry to Fort Donelson and to retain in the fort only a company of artillery. His sole object was to gain time for the rest of the garrison to escape. On the 6th the fleet advanced to the attack and made short work of the Confederate defences. The fort was built so low that the guns were close to the level of the water. Various accidents befell some of the guns, and after an hour and a half's bombardment<sup>4</sup> Tilghman surrendered. The infantry made good their retreat to Fort Donelson.

The news of the capture of Fort Henry produced a great effect both in the North and South. It was the first great success won by the Federals, and it had been gained with startling suddenness. It was hastily assumed, that in its ironclad gunboats the North had an instrument of warfare with which the Confederate fortified works were powerless to cope. Albert S. Johnston on the following day gave orders for the abandonment of Bowling Green. He determined with 14,000 men to fall back to Nashville; at the same time he sent 12,000 men to reinforce the garrison of Fort Donelson.<sup>5</sup>

This latter step was a very strange one. It would probably have been Johnston's wisest course to concentrate as large a force as possible at Fort Donelson and fight Grant before he could be reinforced. A victory won over Grant would have been the surest means of protecting Nashville. For if once the Federals

<sup>1</sup> 2 Ropes, 14, 15.

<sup>3</sup> 2 Ropes, 14.

<sup>2</sup> For naval operations, see Cap. XXVI.

<sup>4</sup> 2 Ropes, 16, 17.

<sup>5</sup> 2 Ropes, 19, 20, 27.

got possession of Fort Donelson, Nashville itself would speedily be at the mercy of their gunboats. But Johnston, when he sent nearly one half of his army to Fort Donelson, was not contemplating active operations in the field. He proposed to lock the whole force up within the fortifications, and he relied upon the ability of his subordinates to extricate their troops, when further resistance seemed useless. It is hardly surprising that General Floyd, whom he placed in command of the garrison, protested, though vainly, against the whole proceeding.

Grant had hoped to capture Fort Donelson on the 8th. But the forecast was too sanguine. The fleet had to descend the Tennessee and ascend the Cumberland. It had also suffered some injuries from the guns of Fort Henry and needed to refit. As the rapid success at Fort Henry had been gained by the naval force, Grant did not feel himself justified in advancing upon Fort Donelson until it was able to co-operate in the movement. Not till the 12th did he move his infantry, now reinforced by a third division under General Lewis Wallace. The same night they arrived before Fort Donelson. The next day witnessed a good deal of skirmishing and desultory fighting, as the Federals were taking up their positions, trying to gain some knowledge of the ground and feeling the strength of the enemy.

On the 14th the fleet attacked, but the result was very different to that anticipated. The batteries, unlike those at Fort Henry, were placed high above the water and were virtually unassailable. A bend in the river just below the fort enabled all the guns to be brought to bear upon anything which came within range.<sup>1</sup> After a sharp action, the fleet was forced to retire. Two of the ironclads had their steering apparatus so damaged that they drifted helplessly out of action, and the other two also received severe injuries. No impression whatever was made upon the fort. On the 15th Grant left his camp to have a conference with Commodore Foote, who had been wounded, and it was decided that after the repulse of the gunboats it would be necessary to reduce the fort by regular siege operations.<sup>2</sup> But on his return to his army Grant found that the situation had entirely altered.

The Confederate garrison in Fort Donelson numbered 18,000 men. But its commanders, Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner, overestimated the strength of Grant's force, and believed that they were largely outnumbered, though they actually at the moment had a slight superiority in numbers over their assailants.<sup>3</sup> Floyd had all along been opposed to an attempt to hold the fort; and he had

<sup>1</sup> Force, 34.

<sup>2</sup> Force, 54.

<sup>3</sup> 2 *Ropes*, 19, gives the Confederate force as rather over 18,000 men. Force raises it to 20,000 (p. 37). Grant's force at first only numbered 15,000, but it was gradually increased till at the close it amounted to 27,000 (1 *B. & L.*, 406, note).

special reasons for not wishing to become a prisoner of war, as he was liable to be tried for high treason for his conduct as Secretary of War in President Buchanan's Administration, and was actually under indictment at Washington for embezzlement of public funds.<sup>1</sup> On the 14th the three generals decided to try and cut their way out through the Federal lines and reach Nashville. The repulse of the fleet that day failed to give them any increase of confidence.

The attack was to be made on the morning of the 15th by Pillow's division, which was to break through McClernand's lines on the Federal right, and open the road to Nashville. Pillow was to be supported by Buckner, and the latter's division was to form the rearguard and cover the retreat. But no definite arrangements were made concerning the details of the retreat. It was not even settled whether it was to commence as soon as ever the road to Nashville should be opened, or whether the movement should be postponed till the night. No attempt was made to organise a train or provide a supply of food for the army.

The attack proved successful. McClernand's division was rolled up and thrown back upon the centre, where Wallace's division was posted, and the road to Nashville stood open. But just at this point Pillow ordered his victorious troops to return to their own entrenchments. His idea apparently was that when the road had been opened, the retreat would not take place till after nightfall.

Grant on his arrival promptly took in the situation. Though his right was beaten, he judged (wrongly, as a matter of fact) that the enemy must be a good deal demoralised by the fact that they had retired.<sup>2</sup> He immediately ordered Smith, who commanded on the left, to assault the enemy's lines to "save appearances," and sent an earnest message to Foote, begging that the gunboats would at least make a demonstration against the fort. Evidently he realised the gravity of the situation, but his admirable composure encouraged his subordinates. Smith advanced with great gallantry, leading the charge himself. The first line of Confederate entrenchments was carried, being but feebly defended, as the greater part of Buckner's division had been withdrawn to take part in the attack upon McClernand. The Federals found that they had gained an elevation which was the key to the whole Confederate position. Buckner returning with his troops from the scene of the earlier fighting made strenuous efforts to regain this all-important point, but without success.

At the same time as Smith advanced to the assault Grant directed McClernand and Wallace to retake the ground which they had lost in the morning. At nightfall the Confederate position had changed considerably for the worse. The line of their retreat was again closed to them, and Smith's successful assault had rendered

<sup>1</sup> B. & L., 401.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Ropes, 30.



their position in Fort Donelson untenable. The troops were demoralised and disgusted at having been recalled after their successful fight; and Grant was receiving reinforcements. A Council of War was held that night. Buckner declared himself unable to hold his position, if the attack were renewed the following morning upon his second line of entrenchments. The boldest and, under the circumstances, the wisest course would have been to have made during the night all the preparations possible for a retreat, and in the morning to have made a second attack upon the enemy's right.<sup>1</sup> Though the Federals had reoccupied their old position, yet the troops on the right were still McClelland's, which had been so severely handled already. It is probable that a considerable part of the garrison would have succeeded in cutting its way out. But the Confederate leaders were in a despairing mood: they had no confidence in themselves or in their soldiers. Floyd turned over the command to Pillow so as to secure his own escape. Pillow followed his superior's example.

But Buckner was of sterner mould, and determined to stand by his troops. Having accepted the command, he at once sent to Grant to offer to capitulate on conditions. Grant replied with a demand for unconditional surrender. Buckner had no alternative but to comply, and on the morning of the 16th Fort Donelson surrendered. Floyd and Pillow left by steamer before the capitulation was concluded, and with them a certain number of infantry escaped also. Forrest, the cavalry commander, with the greater part of his command, escaped by road. A considerable number of stragglers also got away, but the number of prisoners of war amounted to nearly 12,000.<sup>2</sup>

The fall of Fort Donelson following that of Fort Henry within ten days filled the South with consternation. The disaster was all the more sudden, because the last news received had been a despatch announcing a great Confederate victory. A cry went up for vengeance upon the unsuccessful generals, especially Johnston, the Commander-in-Chief. But President Davis staunchly refused to dismiss a general whom he regarded with justice as one of the ablest officers in the Confederacy.

The results of the surrender of Fort Donelson, both material and moral, were enormous. It secured Kentucky to the Federal cause: it laid Tennessee open to invasion: it necessitated the evacuation of Nashville and Columbus. The whole of the first line of Confederate defence in the West was swept away at a

<sup>1</sup> This course was advocated by Pillow, but Floyd and Buckner decided that it was impracticable.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Ropes, 33. Badeau (*Military History of Grant*) says that 14,623 rations were issued to the prisoners. Buckner, in his official report, stated that less than 9,000 remained after the departure of Floyd's brigade, but at the time he told Grant that the force surrendering was from 12,000 to 15,000 men.

single blow. The South, with its feeble resources, could ill afford to lose the services of the thousands who had become prisoners of war. At the North the victory led to the expectation that the days of the Confederacy were numbered, and intensified the disappointment which was felt, when these earlier successes were not followed up.

The double success, achieved with a rapidity which was in marked contrast to the methods of other Federal generals, laid the solid foundation of Grant's military reputation. It gained for him the trust and support of President Lincoln, which stood him in good stead afterwards. Yet for the moment it was Halleck, the commander of the Department, who gained the chief credit for the success won by his lieutenant. It secured him shortly afterwards the supreme command in the West.

But brilliant as had been the results of the expedition, it was open to severe criticism. When Halleck suddenly made up his mind to let Grant carry out the scheme, which he persistently advocated, he did not take the trouble to secure either the approval of McClellan, then Commander-in-Chief of all the Federal forces in the field, or the co-operation of Buell. As he expected, he forced the hand of the Government. McClellan was obliged to abandon his cherished scheme of an invasion of East Tennessee. But he had no troops which he could send to Halleck. Buell, who had been led to believe that Halleck would not make any movement up the Tennessee, had scattered his troops so much that it was no easy task to collect a considerable force, which might be sent to Grant's aid. Halleck himself imagined that he could spare no troops for the purpose from Missouri. Consequently, after the fall of Fort Henry, Grant found himself placed, by the ill-judged precipitancy of his superior officer, in a position of considerable peril. It would have been quite feasible for Johnston to concentrate a superior force against him. Had Beauregard (who had come from the East to command the troops on the Mississippi under Johnston, with headquarters at Columbus) been commanding the Confederate forces in the place of Johnston, that would have been the course adopted<sup>1</sup>: and a decisive victory would have undone all the effects of the capture of Fort Henry. Halleck's inconsiderate haste had forced his subordinate to run a great and unnecessary risk.

Further, it caused a great deal to be left undone which ought to have been done. Grant had a large enough force under his command at Fort Donelson to have pushed up the Cumberland in pursuit of Johnston. But no attempt was made to follow up the Confederate retreat. For ten days after the fall of Fort Donelson Halleck remained without any plan at all. He had totally failed

<sup>1</sup> 1 B. & L., 571-2. But this is denied by Colonel Johnston (1 B. & L., 548).

to grasp the full significance of Grant's success. So far from pressing on into the heart of Tennessee, and thereby turning the Confederate positions on the Mississippi, he was afraid that Beauregard would assume the offensive against Cairo, Paducah, and Fort Henry. He ordered Grant not to advance, but to send back the gunboats. But Commodore Foote, acting on his own responsibility, pushed up the river for thirty miles to Clarksville, which he occupied without resistance, and Grant sent C. F. Smith's division to take possession of that town.<sup>1</sup>

Buell had taken a long time to make up his mind as to the proper course for him to pursue with reference to Halleck's demands for help. He was by no means disposed to break up his army and send a considerable part of it to serve under Halleck's command. A rigid disciplinarian, he had brought the Army of the Ohio to a high state of efficiency, and was particularly anxious that its *esprit de corps*, so great an essential in a volunteer army, should not be impaired by the withdrawal from it of divisions to serve in other armies under other leaders.<sup>2</sup> When he heard that Bowling Green had been evacuated he determined to send one division by water to Grant, and with the rest of his army to march direct upon Nashville. There can be but little doubt that Buell resented Halleck's action in sending an expedition against Fort Henry, and then suddenly calling upon him to send reinforcements to take part in the movement, which Halleck himself had led him to suppose abandoned. He had a general's natural desire to keep his fine army intact. At the moment of Grant's advance he was preparing for an advance into East Tennessee, to follow up Thomas' victory at Mill Springs, and it took him some time to concentrate his troops again for an advance on quite a different line.

On the 24th February two of his divisions were in possession of Nashville, which Johnston evacuated after the fall of Fort Donelson. The conditions of the roads and streams convinced the Federal generals that it was impracticable to follow Johnston, who had retreated to Murfreesborough, although their united forces would have brought 90,000 men against the Confederate army of less than 20,000.<sup>3</sup>

On the 2nd March Columbus was evacuated by Beauregard's orders, and almost all the guns and a considerable part of the garrison were removed down the river to New Madrid and Island No. 10, in order to prevent the further advance of the Federal fleet. General Pope was sent by Halleck to attack this new position of the Confederates.

As the pursuit of Johnston had been abandoned it was necessary

<sup>1</sup> For an extensive criticism of Halleck's strategy, see 2 Ropes, 42-9.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Ropes, 41.

<sup>3</sup> 2 Ropes, 52.



for the Federal generals to devise some fresh plan of action. The right strategical course to adopt was to take such a position that Johnston would be forced either to fight a battle to save his line of communications, or, if he refused to do that, to abandon the Confederate cause in the West as hopeless. Above all, it was important to prevent Johnston at Murfreesborough from uniting with Beauregard, who was concentrating a force at Memphis and Corinth from the garrisons of the abandoned positions on the Mississippi.

The Memphis and Charleston Railroad offered just such a position as the Federals required. If Johnston refused to fight for its defence, it would be possible to sever the West from the East and compel the Confederate forces in the West to fall back upon the Gulf States. At the same time the possession of the railway would enable the Federals to prevent the junction of Beauregard and Johnston. Both Memphis and the posts on the Mississippi above that city still retained by the Confederates would have to be evacuated when once Halleck and Buell were firmly established on the line, which connected the Mississippi with the Eastern States in the Confederacy. The Tennessee provided the Federals with a safe line of advance against the railroad. A movement up that river would bring them into close proximity to Corinth, a railway junction of extreme importance. At that point the Mobile and Ohio Railroad connecting the upper waters of the Mississippi with the Gulf States intersected the direct line of communication between East and West. A short distance west of Corinth, a second, the Mississippi Central Railroad, intersected the Memphis and Charleston line. The two lines from the south, joining at Jackson, ran northward through Humboldt and formed the overland line of communication, on which the Confederate forces in Island No. 10 and New Madrid depended for their supplies. At Humboldt a third line came in—the Memphis and Ohio Railway—which was already broken by the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson. Corinth, Jackson, and Humboldt were three points of strategical importance, but the first was by far the most important, as its capture would compel the evacuation of the other two positions. To the east of Corinth a tributary of the Tennessee was crossed by the Memphis and Charleston line near Eastport, and the destruction of the railway bridge at that point would seriously embarrass the Confederate movements.

Buell formed a correct view of the strategical situation. He wished to unite his army and that of Halleck as far up the Tennessee as possible on the east bank, to cross the river and strike a blow in force at the railroad. Halleck, on the contrary, proposed to send his army up the Tennessee, but to confine its operations to making raids on the west bank against the Confederate lines of communication, with the exception of one division, which he intended to send against the railway bridge near Eastport. But

the point on which he specially insisted was that under no circumstances was a general battle to be brought on; to avoid that, the different expeditions were, if necessary, to retreat. He entirely failed to see that the true objective of all his movements ought to have been the Confederate army in the West, and that its destruction was the one matter of vital importance.<sup>1</sup>

The consequence of these divided counsels was that after the occupation of Nashville the Federals made a very poor use of their opportunities. Buell's army remained at Nashville whilst Halleck made attempts against the Confederate lines of communication, which the condition of the roads and the inclemency of the weather rendered wholly unsuccessful.

In the beginning of March, McClellan had been relieved of the command of all the armies of the United States in the field, in order that he might concentrate his attention upon the Army of the Potomac. On the 11th of the same month President Lincoln yielded to the urgent entreaties of Halleck, who, ever since the fall of Fort Donelson, had been clamouring for the sole command in the West, and appointed him the commander of a new Department extending from Knoxville on the east to and beyond the west bank of the Mississippi to be known as the Department of the Mississippi.

This appointment placed Buell under Halleck's orders. Lincoln was unquestionably right to put an end to the system of dual control established by McClellan. A single commander-in-chief in the West ensured a much-needed unity of movement in the Federal operations. But as certainly Lincoln made a grave mistake in selecting for the command of the new Department Halleck in place of Buell.

Still, for the time, Halleck had achieved his object, and was now Commander-in-Chief of the Federal forces in the West. Missouri, which had absorbed so much of his attention during the earlier stages of the war, had been permanently secured to the Federal cause by the victory of General Curtis at Pea Ridge over the Confederate general, Van Dorn, on the 7th and 8th March.<sup>2</sup> Curtis

<sup>1</sup> For the difference between the two generals' views, see 2 Ropes, 54-5.

<sup>2</sup> The battle of Pea Ridge, or Elkhorn Tavern (Maps IX. and X.), was one of the most important fought during the war on the west of the Mississippi. Van Dorn had just arrived in the Trans-Mississippi from the East. His original plan was to concentrate all his available forces for an advance on St. Louis, in the hope of capturing that city and carrying the war into Illinois. But he found that the Federal general, Curtis, had anticipated him in taking the offensive, and was threatening to invade Arkansas.

The Confederate force was about 16,000; the Federal, 10,500. Curtis, finding himself inferior in numbers, took up a defensive position. But Van Dorn, by a wide turning movement, threw one wing of his army across the Federal line of retreat and, attacking on March 7th, gained a considerable advantage.

But in the meantime the other Confederate wing was heavily defeated, and the next day Curtis, renewing the battle with Van Dorn's victorious wing, gained a complete victory.

After his defeat at Pea Ridge, Van Dorn moved the bulk of his army across the

followed up his success by marching through Arkansas without encountering any serious opposition, and came out on the bank of the Mississippi in the following July. Halleck, in taking over his new command, had nothing to fear on the west side of the Mississippi. As his attempt to destroy the Confederate lines of communication on the west of the Tennessee had failed, he determined to carry out the plan of campaign which from the first had been urged upon him by Buell, now his subordinate. He directed the Army of the Ohio to move to Savannah on the east bank of the Tennessee with a view to uniting with Grant's army, which was concentrating at Pittsburg Landing, nine miles above Savannah on the opposite bank. The combined armies were then to move on Corinth, which was twenty miles distant from Pittsburg Landing. The position for the Federal camp had been selected by C. F. Smith, who had been temporarily in command of the advance up the Tennessee, owing to a misunderstanding between Halleck and Grant. It was a strong position, as the flanks were protected by the Tennessee and its tributaries, and could have been rendered impregnable by a single night's work at entrenching. But the use of entrenchments had not as yet been recognised by either combatant. There was, however, one cardinal defect about the position. It had no line of retreat. If the Confederates should concentrate a superior force against Grant before he was reinforced by Buell, the Federal army if beaten in battle would have no alternative except to capitulate.<sup>1</sup>

Johnston and Beauregard were quick to seize the opportunity. They saw a chance of defeating the largely superior forces at Halleck's disposal in detail. About the 18th March Johnston reached Corinth with 20,000 men, having marched from Murfreesborough by way of Decatur.<sup>2</sup> He found there General Bragg, who brought

Mississippi. Hindman, who succeeded him in command of the Trans-Mississippi district, exerted himself to such good purpose that in July he had collected an army of some 20,000 men, with which he barred Curtis's advance on Little Rock (Map X.), the State capital. Curtis then marched to Helena, brushing aside a force sent to intercept him.

At the end of July Holmes was appointed to the command of the Trans-Mississippi Department, and by his orders Hindman prepared a force for the invasion of Missouri, but in November was ordered to suspend this movement in consequence of the appeals for reinforcements which were reaching Holmes from Vicksburg. Nevertheless, Hindman determined, before executing this order, to advance against and drive back a somewhat smaller Federal force, which had been concentrated by General Blunt in North-west Arkansas. Blunt called up to his aid two divisions from Missouri under Herron. Hindman had an excellent chance of defeating the two Federal forces in detail, but after getting into close contact with Blunt's force, took up a defensive position and allowed himself to be overwhelmed by the united forces of Blunt and Herron in the battle of Prairie Grove, December 7th, 1862 (3 B. & L., 441-50).

<sup>1</sup> 2 Ropes, 59. But it is perhaps permissible to argue with Fiske, 72, that as long as the gunboats commanded the river, Grant might reckon on having sufficient water transport to withdraw his army in case of defeat.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Ropes, 61. The head of Johnston's column arrived about the 18th, but his whole force was not assembled till the 25th (1 B. & L., 549), or even perhaps the 27th (1 B. & L., 579).



a force of 10,000 men from Pensacola. Beauregard ordered his troops to assemble at the same point. On the 29th March Johnston formally assumed command of the Army of the Mississippi, as it was now styled, numbering about 40,000 men with 100 pieces of artillery.<sup>1</sup> Apparently Johnston had lost confidence in himself after his repeated failures to check the Federal advance, and urged Beauregard, the victor of Bull Run, to assume the chief command. But the latter refused to supersede his superior officer. The Confederate army was organised into three Corps under Polk, Hardee, and Bragg,<sup>2</sup> all West Point graduates and soldiers of decided ability, with a reserve of infantry under Breckinridge, who had been Vice-President of the United States, when Buchanan was President.

By the 1st April Grant had concentrated at and near Pittsburg Landing about 45,000 men.<sup>3</sup> His army was divided into six divisions commanded by W. T. Sherman, Prentiss, McClelland, Lewis Wallace, Hurlbut, and W. H. L. Wallace—the last named was commanding in place of C. F. Smith, who had injured his leg so seriously that he was obliged to leave his command, and before the end of April he died of the effects of his accident. Grant laid himself open to severe criticism by continuing to keep his army at Pittsburg Landing, after the operations against the enemy's lines of communication had been found to be impracticable. The Landing had been selected as the temporary base for the operations, but it was the height of imprudence to turn it into a permanent camp within twenty miles of the enemy, unless it was strongly entrenched. But throughout this part of the campaign Grant displayed a sense of security which was strangely out of place. His easy successes had made him careless and unduly contemptuous of the enemy. He knew that they were collecting in force at Corinth. He ought to have realised that his exposed position gave them an opportunity which such able officers as Johnston and Beauregard were hardly likely to let slip. Yet he had made up his mind that the Confederates would not venture to assume the offensive. His own headquarters were at Savannah, nine miles away from his army and on the opposite bank of the river. No plan of battle had been arranged. The divisional commanders had been allowed to fix their camps, not with a view to mutual support, but as it suited the convenience of each commander. No systematic cavalry reconnaissances had been carried out along the roads leading to Corinth. There was no regular outpost line in front of the camp. Not a single precaution had been taken to guard against a surprise.

It must be said that Halleck shared to the full the light-hearted-

<sup>1</sup> 2 *Ropes*, 61-2 (1 B. & L., 539).

<sup>2</sup> Polk had, however, entered the church and was Bishop of Louisiana at the outbreak of the war.

<sup>3</sup> 2 *Ropes*, 57; 1 B. & L., 538.

ness of his lieutenant. He suffered him to remain in his insecure position: he gave Buell no hint that the safety of Grant's army depended upon the prompt arrival of his forces. He proposed to come at his leisure to Pittsburg Landing to assume the command of the two armies concentrated there, and then to commence the advance on Corinth. He gave the Confederate generals no credit for enterprise or even common sense; he believed them to be committed to a purely defensive policy.

Johnston was anxious to concentrate as large a force as possible against Grant, in order that he might inflict a crushing blow. Van Dorn, after his defeat at Pea Ridge, had been ordered to bring to Corinth all the troops that he could raise from Missouri and Arkansas. Johnston waited for his arrival as long as he thought safe; but on the night of the 2nd April, hearing that Buell was moving rapidly towards Savannah, he ordered an advance the following day.<sup>1</sup> It was his intention to fall upon the Federal camp in the early hours of the 5th, but the wretched condition of the roads and the inexperience of officers and men prevented the troops being in position at the appointed time. Forrest's cavalry had encountered a certain amount of opposition, whilst leading the advance. Beauregard, when it became clear that the attack must be postponed, was in favour of abandoning the whole enterprise and of returning to Corinth, believing that the Federals must know of their advance and were decoying them into a trap. Johnston, however, resolved to go on. His army had come to fight and not to retreat: another movement to the rear would destroy the confidence of the soldiers in their general and fatally impair the *moral* of his army. The attack was fixed for the morning of the 6th.

Meanwhile Buell's army of five divisions, numbering about 37,000 men, was drawing near.<sup>2</sup> It had been marching steadily but without undue haste, and had been delayed for twelve days at Duck River where a bridge had to be built. How completely Halleck had failed to impress upon Buell the need for promptly joining Grant is shown by the fact that Buell asked for and actually received permission to take his army not to Savannah, but to a landing-place opposite Hamburg, a town ten miles above Pittsburg Landing. It was by a mere accident that the orders to that effect miscarried. About noon of the 5th (Saturday) the leading division under Nelson reached Savannah. Grant, however, declined to send

<sup>1</sup> Beauregard (1 B. & L., 579) has a different version. He states that he urged the advance in consequence of the arrival of a despatch late on the night of the 2nd from General Cheatham, posted some twenty miles north of Corinth, to the effect that he was being menaced by a Federal division. Beauregard, assuming that the Federals had divided their forces in order to attack the Mobile and Ohio Railway, urged Johnston to move upon Pittsburg Landing.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Ropes, 65. The division commanders were Thomas, McCook, Nelson, Crittenden, and Wood.

it across the river immediately, because he thought there would be no fighting; some day early in next week would be time enough.<sup>1</sup>

About two miles out from Pittsburg Landing (see Plan), upon the Corinth road stood Shiloh Church. There Sherman had his headquarters, and his division formed the right of the Federal army: in rear of him McClelland had pitched his camp. The centre of the position was held by Prentiss' division, half a mile from Sherman's left, across a second road leading to Corinth, and behind it lay Hurlbut's division, whilst more than half a mile beyond Prentiss, and resting upon the river, was Stuart's brigade, detached from Sherman's division. W. H. L. Wallace's division was still further to the rear, and Lewis Wallace's was at Crump's Landing, some five miles further down the river. Two gunboats in the river served to strengthen the left flank.<sup>2</sup>

About 6 a.m. on the 6th the battle of Shiloh commenced. At 3 a.m. on that Sunday morning Prentiss had sent out a brigade to reconnoitre. This force suddenly encountered the Confederate advance under Hardee, and was quickly driven in. So swift was the onslaught that the Federals were quite taken by surprise. The fighting, which lasted throughout the day, was at first a succession of independent battles waged by the different divisions. The Federal front line, held by Sherman's and Prentiss' divisions, was promptly driven back upon the divisions in their rear. The ground was thickly wooded, broken by swamps and ravines, and naturally favourable to the defensive. The Confederates, being raw soldiers and led by inexperienced officers, did not keep their formation very accurately. A good many seem at once to have left their ranks in order to plunder the captured camps. The Federals consequently found time to form a second line of defence. But the lack of organisation now made itself felt. Their line was divided into three distinct sections at some distance from each other, so that the flanks of the respective divisions were open to a turning movement. On the right Sherman's and McClelland's divisions stubbornly resisted the onslaught of Hardee's and Polk's Corps. Their right was covered by Owl Creek, but their left flank was completely exposed. As the attacking line extended, the Federals were forced to fall back from one position to another to escape being driven into the Creek, on which their right rested. Eventually they took up a position on Snake Creek, into which Owl Creek runs, covering the bridge, by which Lewis Wallace's division was expected to arrive from Crump's Landing, and this they held to the close of the day's fighting. In McClelland's report it was stated that this was the eighth position which his troops had occupied since the fighting began.

<sup>1</sup> 2 Ropes, 66-7.

<sup>2</sup> For the position of the Federal army, see 2 Ropes, 70.







In the centre the divisions of Prentiss, Hurlbut, and W. H. L. Wallace held a very strong position known as the "Hornets' Nest." Up the wooded slope the Confederate right, composed of Bragg's and Breckinridge's commands, was hurled again and again in unavailing charges. Johnston had left Beauregard in general charge of the whole field to take under his own personal direction the movements of the right wing. He directed a succession of frontal attacks against the Hornets' Nest, which was practically impregnable to any but a flank movement. About 2.30 p.m. he was killed, and Bragg succeeded to the command of the right wing. He initiated a flanking movement, which was rendered the easier by the withdrawal of Stuart's brigade, forming the left of the Federal line, about 3 p.m. Hurlbut, whose division formed the left centre, finding himself outflanked, fell back to the Landing. By his withdrawal Prentiss' left flank became exposed, and that general was forced to change front. He and Wallace, however, continued to hold their position with great resolution until about 5 p.m. Polk moved his corps over from the left to Bragg's assistance. Wallace himself was killed, but nearly all his division made good their retreat. The remnant of Prentiss' division, however, was surrounded and forced to surrender.

But this obstinate resistance had given time for the sorely needed reinforcements to come up. Nelson's division had been hurried up from Savannah to a point opposite Pittsburg Landing, and there was ferried across. By 5.30 p.m. the leading brigade was in position behind a deep ravine covering the Landing. Grant had got together some twenty guns to hold this last position, and such of his infantry as he had been able to rally. But the bluff overlooking the river was crowded with an ever-increasing stream of fugitives, whose numbers have been estimated as high even as 15,000.

Against this last line of the defence Bragg was advancing to complete the defeat of the Federal army. But the sun was already sinking, and Beauregard, who after Johnston's death had succeeded to the command, determined to draw his troops off. In his judgment it was too late in the day to hope to gain any further success, and he wished to give his soldiers a good night's rest in view of the hard fighting which lay before them next day. His orders reached one of Bragg's divisions in time to prevent its further advance. But the other division, moving before Beauregard's order arrived, went in to the assault with the utmost gallantry.<sup>1</sup> But it had no supports: the ammunition supply ran short, and all its efforts were powerless to carry it across the ravine in the face of the heavy artillery fire and Buell's troops,

<sup>1</sup> Of this second—Withers'—division only two brigades took part in the attack, and one of these brigades had not refilled its cartridge pouches.



now engaged for the first time during the day. The gallant but useless struggle was continued until nightfall, when the Confederate division withdrew.

The battle of Shiloh, like the First Bull Run, is typical of encounters between volunteer armies. It was the first pitched battle fought on a large scale in the West. On both sides the lack of discipline and the unrestrained instinct of the individual to think for himself and to take such steps as seem most likely to secure his own safety were to be seen in the large number of stragglers, and of men who, not from cowardice but simply from lack of military habit, left their ranks and moved to the rear when the case seemed hopeless. This was especially noticeable in the case of the Federals. The stream of fugitives increased with each successive movement of the sorely pressed divisions to the rear. It has been estimated that at the close of the day's fighting Grant had not more than 12,000 men under arms (including Lewis Wallace's division from Crump's Landing, which took no part in the fighting of the 6th).

This feature was not so noticeable on the actual day of battle in the Confederate ranks, as they were acting on the offensive and buoyed up by the hope of winning a signal victory. And, indeed, the vigour with which the Confederates attacked at Shiloh contrasts favourably with the methods of the Federals, when they were the attacking force at Bull Run. But after the fighting was over and it was recognised that the attempt to annihilate Grant's army, before it could be reinforced, had failed, there was a steady stream of fugitives anticipating on their own responsibility the order for a general retreat on Corinth, which reduced Beauregard's force for the next day's fighting to 20,000 men.

Nor was the conduct of the commanding officers on either side above criticism. Grant exercised but little personal control over the course of the battle. He showed himself at the different parts of the field, and did his utmost to encourage and rally his beaten troops. But throughout the day on the Federal side the absence of a single controlling mind was noticeable.

Johnston also failed to display any marked tactical ability in the handling of his troops. The original plan had been that the Federal left should be turned, and the whole army thus forced away from the river, on which their hope of reinforcements depended. But Johnston, by committing himself to a succession of frontal attacks against the almost impregnable position of the Federal centre, abandoned the original plan, and caused his troops to suffer very heavy loss without obtaining any counterbalancing advantage.<sup>1</sup>

During the night of the 6th Lewis Wallace's division arrived

<sup>1</sup> For a general review of the battle of the 6th, see 2 Ropes, 68-86.

from Crump's Landing. Its late arrival was due to a misunderstanding.<sup>1</sup> Three divisions of Buell's army were also brought across the river, and by the morning of the 7th Grant had under his command 25,000 fresh troops, who had not borne the burden and toil of the previous day's fighting. He ordered an advance against Beauregard's sorely tried troops as soon as it was light, and by 5 a.m. the battle was renewed. Beauregard on this day displayed tactical ability of a high order. He never allowed his army to become involved in a pitched battle, and yet whilst steadily falling back lost no opportunity of striking a counterblow at any Federal force which pressed too closely in pursuit. His retreat never degenerated into a rout.

The fiercest fighting of the day was on the Corinth road between the Purdy road and Shiloh Church. For nearly six hours Bragg held his position there with splendid tenacity, and prevented the Federals from cutting the line of retreat to Corinth.<sup>2</sup> Between 3 p.m. and 4 p.m. Grant, having regained the positions which his first line had held at the commencement of the previous day's fighting, desisted from any further attempt to crush the Confederate army. There was no apparent reason why he should not have pressed the pursuit till nightfall. But on neither of these two eventful days did Grant rise to the height of the occasion.

The losses on both sides were very heavy; in killed and wounded they were nearly equal, the Federal loss being slightly over 10,000, whilst that of the Confederates was a few hundreds short of that number. But the Federal loss in prisoners and missing was much heavier than that of their opponents.<sup>3</sup> In Prentiss' division alone 2,200 were taken prisoners.

Having abandoned the pursuit on the afternoon of the 7th, Grant made no attempt to resume it, but waited at Pittsburg Landing for Halleck's arrival. The Commander-in-Chief joined his armies on the 11th April. He displayed no eagerness to advance, but preferred to wait until Pope's army should join him. Pope, with 21,000 men, had been sent to operate against the Confederate position at Island No. 10 and New Madrid, and after some very arduous work, including the cutting of a canal twelve miles long,<sup>4</sup> forced the surrender of 7,000 Confederates on the 8th April.

<sup>1</sup> Wallace, having some of his brigades thrown out some distance upon the Purdy road, started upon receiving Grant's orders to march, by a road parallel to that which Grant intended him to follow, and which would have brought him to Snake Creek, two miles higher up. Being overtaken by two of Grant's staff officers, he learnt that it would be dangerous to follow this road, and was obliged to retrace his steps some three miles and take a cross road (Fiske, 80).

<sup>2</sup> Fiske, 96.

<sup>3</sup> 1 B. & L., 538-9.

<sup>4</sup> The length of the whole canal was twelve miles. Part of it had to be excavated to gain sufficient depth, and for six miles a channel had to be cut through a thick forest of large trees (Force, 82).

The only position on the Mississippi still held by the Confederates above Memphis was Fort Pillow, eighty miles below New Madrid. Pope had been originally ordered to continue his movement down the river and attack this post. But before he had actually commenced operations against it he was recalled to join Halleck, which he did on the 21st April.<sup>1</sup> In spite of this reinforcement, which raised his army to 100,000 men, Halleck allowed another week to pass by before he commenced a very cautious advance on Corinth. On the 1st May Beauregard was reinforced by 15,000 men brought from the opposite bank of the Mississippi by Van Dorn. The army under his command now numbered over 50,000, but he did not venture to give battle to a force double his own strength. Halleck's forward movement was a succession of slow approaches. He carefully entrenched each position, and impressed upon his lieutenants that under no circumstances were they to allow themselves to be drawn into a pitched battle. For over a month the operations against Corinth dragged slowly on until, on the 29th May, Beauregard, finding himself in danger of being hemmed in, evacuated the town in the night. The movement was quite unexpected by Halleck, and Beauregard withdrew the whole of his army in safety to Tupelo, some fifty miles to the south on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. There he had the advantage of an excellent water supply and a salubrious climate; and his army, which had suffered considerably from sickness in its entrenchments at Corinth, rapidly recovered its health.

The evacuation of Corinth necessitated the abandonment of Fort Pillow. The garrison was withdrawn on the 3rd June. The Federal fleet pushed on to Memphis, where, on the 6th, a Confederate fleet of gunboats and rams was encountered and destroyed, and the same day Memphis, from which the garrison had already been withdrawn, was occupied by the Federals.

With the occupation of Corinth and Memphis, the spring campaign in the West came to an end. Much had been accomplished. The Federal army was firmly established across the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. The Mississippi had been opened to Vicksburg. Kentucky and West Tennessee were in the hands of the Federals. But there had been also much left undone. The opportunities for destroying the Confederate army had been signally missed. Before long that army was as strong as ever, and it was the Confederates who next assumed the offensive in the West.

<sup>1</sup> 2 *Ropes*, 94.



## NOTE ON SHILOH

A keener controversy has raged over the battle of Shiloh than perhaps over any other battle of the Civil War. In the Federal ranks the long-standing jealousy between the Armies of the Tennessee and the Ohio finds free expression in the divergent accounts of the battle, which come from the partisans of one or other, and there has been no more damaging criticism of Grant's methods than that penned by Buell, commander of the Army of the Ohio. Similarly on the Confederate side, the admirers of Johnston and the enemies of Beauregard have sought to saddle the latter with the responsibility of the defeat, and have claimed that Johnston had won a victory, which Beauregard threw away after the commanding general's death.

The first point at issue is the alleged surprise of the Federal army. Though Grant and Sherman have both denied that any surprise of their troops took place, yet it is impossible to ignore the overwhelming evidence to the contrary. It is probable enough that Bragg somewhat exaggerated, when he spoke (1 B. & L., 558) of many of the enemy being surprised and captured in their tents, but the undeniable fact remains that the Federal leaders were not expecting an attack, that they had made no preparations for such a contingency, and that the scouting on the Federal side was so slovenly that a great army was allowed to assemble within two miles of Sherman's headquarters without its presence as an army being detected. The surprise of the 11th Corps at Chancellorsville was hardly more complete than that of the Army of the Tennessee at Shiloh, though from a variety of causes the subsequent course of the fighting on the two fields followed different lines. Halleck, Grant, and Sherman were all three convinced that the enemy was definitely committed to a defensive policy, and that there would be no serious fighting until Corinth was reached.

The initial advantage in the fight lay then with the Confederates, and was retained by them till almost the close of the day. The absence of the commanding general during the early stages of the battle, which commenced before 6 a.m., whilst Grant did not reach Pittsburg Landing till after 8 a.m. at the earliest, combined with the total lack of preparation for a possible battle, as is evidenced by the fact that one of Sherman's brigades was encamped on the extreme left two miles from the division to which it belonged, prevented the Federals from forming an organised line of battle and enabled the attacking force to defeat their opponents in detail. Grant, indeed, says (1 B. & L., 473) that "with the single exception of a few minutes after the capture of Prentiss, a continuous and unbroken line was maintained all day from Snake Creek or its tributaries on the right to Lick Creek or the Tennessee on the left above Pittsburg."

The following brief summary of events, taken from Buell's *Shiloh Reviewed* (1 B. & L., 487-536), presents a different, and, it is believed, a more accurate

account of the day's fighting. Skirmishing began with Prentiss' troops. Prentiss drew up his main line about a quarter of a mile in front of his camp, and held that position till the enemy passed him on the right to attack Sherman, whose left regiment immediately broke. Prentiss retired, renewed resistance in his camp, and then fell back in still greater confusion to the line, which Hurlbut and Wallace were forming half a mile to his rear. McClernand, owing to Sherman's left wing giving away, was unable to form his line until he had fallen back some 300 yards with the loss of six guns. Of Sherman's division Hildebrand's brigade on the left very soon disappeared. Buckland's brigade of the same division made a stout resistance of about two hours at Oak Creek, but with McDowell's on the right was ordered back to form a line on the Purdy road 400 yards to the rear in connection with McClernand's right. This effort was defeated; five guns were lost, and Sherman's division as an organised body disappeared. McDowell's brigade was the last to go, about 1 p.m. McClernand afraid, as all connection with the left was gone, of being cut off from the river, retired in the direction of the Landing, and about 3 p.m. took up a fresh position along the River road north of Hurlbut's original headquarters. In the meantime Stuart's brigade on the extreme Federal left had fallen back to a position in prolongation of and on the left of Hurlbut's, Wallace's and Prentiss' line in the Hornets' Nest, but without having any connection with it. The Federal centre held their position in the Hornets' Nest from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. By 3 p.m. the right wing, consisting of Sherman's and McClernand's divisions and one brigade, sent to its aid by Hurlbut, had given way, and Stuart's brigade on the left had also fallen back. At 4 p.m. Hurlbut, owing to the pressure on his left in consequence of Stuart's withdrawal, fell back, and the Confederates, massing on both flanks as well as in the front of the Hornets' Nest, compelled the surrender of Prentiss and 2,200 men shortly after 5 p.m. When the last Confederate attack was made by Chalmers' and part of Jackson's brigades, Hurlbut was in line behind a battery of siege-guns posted half a mile from the river, but there was no organised resistance for a distance of 500 yards from the Landing. A rifled battery had been placed in position there, but the gunners were leaving their posts when Ammen's brigade of Buell's army arrived and repulsed the Confederate attack. The rifled battery could effect nothing against the attacking force, which was sheltered in the ravine, and the fire of the gunboats was equally harmless.

Grant (1 B. & L., 475) states that "before any of Buell's troops had reached the west bank of the Tennessee firing had almost entirely ceased; anything like an attempt on the part of the enemy to advance had absolutely ceased." In proof of this view he cites the fact that Buell's loss on the 6th consisted of two killed and one wounded, all the casualties being in the same regiment. Buell's contention, however, is that it was the presence of Ammen's brigade which prevented the final charge made by the two Confederate brigades from cutting off the Army of the Tennessee from the Landing.

The nature of the battlefield, largely covered with wood and intersected by ravines, favoured the defensive and prevented the Confederates from utilising their cavalry for purposes of pursuit. This circumstance enabled

the Federals to hold on till reinforcements arrived, but those reinforcements came not from Lew Wallace's division at Crump's Landing, but from Buell's Army of the Ohio.

Grant also asserts (1 B. & L., 476) that victory was assured when Lew Wallace arrived, even if there had been no other support. Apart from the contention that Wallace's division would have been too late to save Grant's army, had it not been for the intervention of Ammen, the record of the next day's fighting seems to show, that with only Wallace's division to reinforce his beaten army, Grant would have been hard put to it, even to hold his ground against Beauregard. On the 7th the fighting on the left was entirely done by the Army of the Ohio, whilst on the right the honours were borne off by McCook's division of the same army.

In an elaborate argument Buell maintains that the official map misrepresents the position of Grant's army on the night of the 6th. He says that this map extends Grant's line full half a mile too far to the west, placing Hurlbut's division on the front actually occupied by McClelland, McClelland's division on and 400 yards beyond Sherman's ground, and Sherman within the lines occupied by the enemy. He goes on to say that the revision of the map made nineteen years later by Sherman is still more misleading, giving Grant a battle front of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles instead of one mile at the most, not only extending Grant's line too far to the west but at least half a mile too far to the south. He considers that Sherman's line was not more than three-quarters of a mile from the river and more than a mile distant from the bridge over Snake Creek, by which Lew Wallace's division was expected, and which it could in no practical sense be said to cover.

Amidst such conflicting testimony it seems impossible to arrive at any definite conclusion without avowing oneself a partisan of one side or the other. Ropes (ii. 79, 80) expresses himself very cautiously to this effect: "that this attack [of the two Confederate brigades] might have succeeded if it had been made before the troops from Buell's army arrived, is by no means improbable." One may perhaps go so far as to say, that without Buell's reinforcements Grant would not have won the battle of the 7th, whilst his position on the 6th might have been one of the gravest peril.

On the Confederate side the rival claims of Beauregard and Johnston have been urged with a personal animosity happily lacking in the Federal controversy. Not only facts but also motives are called in question, and no important statement made by the one side is left uncontradicted by the other. The first point at issue is, to which of the two generals belongs the credit of conceiving the offensive movement against the Federal army at Pittsburg Landing. Colonel Johnston, A. S. Johnston's son, who was not himself at Shiloh and in his account of the battle seems to place much reliance upon a monograph furnished him by General Bragg, written, as it would seem, with the express purpose of discrediting Beauregard, states that it was his father who fixed upon Corinth as the point of concentration and determined upon the offensive movement against Grant, whilst Beauregard, so he asserts, had all along favoured a defensive policy and wished to limit the movement upon Pittsburg Landing to a reconnaissance in force. On the other hand, Beauregard main-



tains that from his arrival in the western theatre of war he advocated an offensive policy, but that Johnston was steadily opposed to it, and that only with great difficulty did he persuade Johnston to join him at Corinth instead of continuing his intended retreat on Stevenson.

There is no doubt that the Confederates were a day late in making their attack, and if it had been made on the 5th, as originally designed, their chances of success would have been greater. For this delay Colonel Johnston holds Beauregard to blame. He states that the orders for the march issued from Beauregard's headquarters were not the same as those which Johnston had originally approved, and that the change was the cause of the delay. Beauregard maintains, and his contention is supported by the evidence of two of his staff, General Jordan, Adjutant-General of the army, and Colonel Chisolm, that the orders issued on the morning of the 3rd were those approved by Johnston on the previous night, and that the delay was due to the misconduct of the Corps commanders.

Beauregard claims that as soon as fighting commenced on the 6th Johnston gave him general control of the field and confined his whole attention to the extreme right. On Beauregard's theory Johnston's death did not cause any appreciable lull in the combat; perhaps there was an interval of fifteen minutes whilst Bragg was organising a movement to out-flank the Hornets' Nest. Colonel Johnston holds that his father exercised a general control over the whole field of battle up to his death, and speaks of him as being on different parts of the field at different times. He considers that Johnston's death caused a lull of over one hour in the battle, and that after that melancholy event there was no longer any sign to be found in the Confederate ranks of that unity of purpose and combination of movement which the presence of Johnston on the field had thus far ensured.

After the capture of Prentiss and his troops Colonel Johnston states that "all the Corps commanders were at the front and in communication: a line of battle was formed, and all was ready for the last fell swoop." According to Bragg, that final assault was never made, as Beauregard "at Shiloh, two miles in the rear," sent orders for the withdrawal of the troops. According to this view it was not Grant's reserve artillery or Ammen's infantry brigade which saved the Federal army, but Beauregard's fatal order issued under a misconception of the state of affairs at the front.

Beauregard, however, contends that after Prentiss' surrender "no serious effort was made by the Corps commanders to press the victory. The troops had got out of the hands either of Corps, divisional, or brigade commanders, and for the most part at the front were out of ammunition. Before the order (for withdrawal) was received, many of the regiments had been withdrawn out of action, and really the attack had practically ceased at every point." Colonel Chisolm states that he was on the extreme left with Hardee till almost dark, up to which time no orders had arrived to cease fighting. There seems, however, some doubt as to the reason which led Beauregard at 6 p.m. to call off his troops. According to his own account he knew that Buell's advance-guard had crossed the river, and he therefore withdrew his troops to make preparations for the defensive battle which he knew would take place next day. But according to General

Jordan's version, a telegraphic despatch had been received at the Confederate headquarters to the effect that Buell was marching towards Decatur, and Beauregard called off his troops because he felt sure of being able to annihilate Grant next day at his leisure.

Of these two utterly contradictory versions of the battle of the 6th, the evidence seems on the whole to favour Beauregard's. The animus in Colonel Johnston's narrative is very marked. General Johnston at the opening of the war was regarded as the ablest soldier of the South. His failure to hold Kentucky and Tennessee caused dismay and astonishment, and his friends and admirers were anxious to represent their hero as stricken down in the moment of gaining a victory, which would have retrieved all his previous disasters. For that purpose it was necessary to cast the blame of throwing away the victory, which was as good as won, upon Beauregard.

## CHAPTER XIV

### BRAGG IN THE WEST—MURFREESBOROUGH<sup>1</sup>

Position in the West after the fall of Corinth—Halleck's false strategy—Grant's enforced inactivity—Buell advances towards Chattanooga—Forrest's raid on Murfreesborough—Bragg prepares to assume the offensive—Buell recommences his advance—Morgan's raid on Gallatin—Kirby Smith invades Kentucky—Bragg invades Middle Tennessee—Buell follows in pursuit—Bragg misses his opportunity—Consternation at the North—Buell resumes the offensive—Mistakes of Bragg and Kirby Smith—Battle of Perryville—Confederates evacuate Kentucky—Buell relieved of the command—Rosecrans succeeds to the command—Rosecrans and Halleck—Raids of Confederate cavalry—Rosecrans advances—Battle of Murfreesborough—Rosecrans' plan of battle—Bragg's plan of battle—Rosecrans abandons his movement against the Confederate right—The Federals form a new line of battle—The Confederate attack repulsed—Rosecrans refuses to retreat—Fighting on the east bank of the river—Bragg abandons Murfreesborough—Results of the campaign.

IF Halleck had vigorously pressed the pursuit of the Confederate army after the evacuation of Corinth, he would have either forced it to fight a battle, in which the advantage of numbers and *moral* would have been on the side of the Federals, or compelled it to take shelter in Vicksburg, where the same fate would have befallen Beauregard which a year later overtook Pemberton.<sup>2</sup> But Halleck was quite content to fix his headquarters at Corinth and devote his energies to repairing the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. He had under his command three armies—the Army of the Tennessee commanded by Grant,<sup>3</sup> the Army of the Mississippi under Pope, who, being appointed shortly after to the command of the Army of Virginia, was succeeded by one of his division-generals, Rosecrans, and the Army of the Ohio under its original leader Buell.

The conditions were now favourable for carrying out the project, so dear to the heart of President Lincoln, of sending relief to the

<sup>1</sup> See Map. VI.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Ropes, 384.

<sup>3</sup> Halleck on reaching Pittsburg Landing reorganised his army into a right wing under Thomas, a centre under Buell, a left wing under Pope, and a reserve under McClelland. Grant was virtually shelved with the honorary title of second-in-command. Four divisions of the Army of the Tennessee with Thomas' own division of the Army of the Ohio formed the right wing, whilst the other two divisions of the Army of the Tennessee constituted the reserve. In course of time, however, the Armies of the Tennessee and the Ohio were restored to their original dimensions, and the Army of the Mississippi was united with that of the Tennessee under the command of Grant.



Unionists of East Tennessee. An advance through Chattanooga on Knoxville was now practicable, and promised great results ; and the capture of Chattanooga would effectually sunder the line of communications between the west and east of the Confederacy. Halleck, urged by the President to undertake the movement, charged Buell and the Army of the Ohio with the task ; that is to say, he detailed about one-third of his entire force for the purpose, but neglected to make any use of the rest of his army in order to prevent the Confederates concentrating in superior numbers against Buell.

It was quite possible for the commander of the main Confederate army in Mississippi, if left to himself, to send such large reinforcements to Kirby Smith commanding the Department of East Tennessee as would make Buell's task one of exceptional difficulty. Not only did Halleck make no attempt to interfere with Beauregard's army at Tupelo, but he hampered Buell by ordering him to repair the Memphis and Charleston Railway, as he advanced, and use it as his line of supply.

As this line ran between the territory recently conquered by the Federals and that still held by the Confederates, it was liable to be broken up at any moment by a raid of the Confederate cavalry ;<sup>1</sup> and in the West the Confederates possessed in Forrest and Morgan two cavalry commanders of quite exceptional ability for that sort of work. To attempt an invasion of East Tennessee with the Memphis and Charleston Railroad as the main line of supply was to take away at the outset most of the chances of success. Buell vainly petitioned to be allowed to take as his line of supply one of the railways running to his rear, and to make Nashville his base. He was condemned by Halleck's decision to waste nearly the whole of June. By the end of that month Halleck realised that he had made a mistake, and directed Buell to take Nashville in place of Corinth as his base.

In July Halleck was called to Washington to act as General-in-Chief of all the armies in the field. Buell thereby gained an increased freedom of action : and Grant assumed the command of the Armies of the Tennessee and the Mississippi. But he was directed by Halleck to hold two divisions in readiness to go to the assistance of Buell, if required, and consequently found himself not in a position to assume the offensive. Throughout the summer he was condemned to a policy of inactivity ; and even after the bulk of Beauregard's army left for East Tennessee could do no more than act on the defensive against the forces of Van Dorn and Price, which then took up their position at Tupelo.<sup>2</sup>

By the end of June Buell had concentrated three divisions at Athens, in Alabama, about a hundred miles west of Chattanooga.

<sup>1</sup> 2 Ropes, 385.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Ropes, 387.

A fourth division under Mitchel was occupied in repairing the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, and had advanced so far east as to threaten Chattanooga.

On the 27th June Beauregard, owing to ill-health, was relieved of the command of the Army of the Mississippi and Bragg was appointed his successor. The latter immediately sent one division to Chattanooga to protect it against Mitchel's advance. But the rest of the Confederate army remained in its encampment at Tupelo until the latter part of July. About the beginning of that month Buell moved two divisions to Battle Creek, a stream running into the Tennessee to the north of Bridgeport, and by the 12th the Nashville-Chattanooga Railway was open as far as Decherd, and one division was at work repairing it to Stevenson.<sup>1</sup> He was on the point of advancing against Chattanooga when a cavalry raid upon his line of communications forced him to postpone that movement for a time.

On the 13th July Forrest, with about 1,400 cavalry, suddenly appeared before Murfreesborough, on the Nashville and Chattanooga Railway, forced the surrender of the garrison, numbering 1,700 men,<sup>2</sup> and besides carrying away or destroying a great amount of Government stores, broke up the railroad so effectually that it was not repaired till the 28th July.

Time was thus secured for Bragg to concert an offensive movement with Kirby Smith. Not only was it of great importance to the Confederate cause to retain possession of East Tennessee, and that object could be best attained by assuming the offensive and invading Kentucky and Middle Tennessee, but also substantial advantages might be expected to follow from an attempt to reconquer the territory recently won by the Federals. Both Middle and West Tennessee were openly Confederate in their sympathies, and it was believed that many recruits to the Southern cause might be found in Kentucky. It was arranged that while Kirby Smith invaded Kentucky, Bragg should advance into Middle Tennessee. In the first week in August Bragg's infantry, which had been sent by rail *via* Mobile, began to reach Chattanooga: some of his troops were despatched to Kirby Smith, who was confronted by a Federal force holding Cumberland Gap.

In the meantime, Buell had got the railroad repaired and was preparing to resume the movement on Chattanooga. He had already sent to Grant for the two divisions, which had been promised him, when, on the 12th August, Morgan made a cavalry raid on the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, captured Gallatin and destroyed the railway bridge and the tunnel. As Louisville was Buell's primary base, Nashville being but a secondary one, the Federal commander found himself obliged by this fresh raid upon

<sup>1</sup> 2 Ropes, 390.

<sup>2</sup> Cist, 45.

his communications to abandon all hope of taking the offensive, and prepared to meet the movement which Bragg was plainly on the point of making.

About the middle of August Kirby Smith, whose army, with the reinforcements sent by Bragg, largely outnumbered the Federal force confronting him in Cumberland Gap, made his way through the Cumberland Mountains by other roads, and securing the Federal line of supplies forced them ultimately to abandon their position and retreat to the Ohio. Pressing forward into Kentucky he encountered, on the 30th August, a hastily raised force at Richmond, which he defeated with heavy loss. On the 2nd September he reached Lexington and established his headquarters there, sending out detachments to threaten Louisville and Cincinnati.

Bragg had a more difficult task to face. In order to invade Middle Tennessee from Chattanooga he had to cross two rivers and two mountain ranges,<sup>1</sup> and all his supplies had to be carried by wagons over country roads which were in very poor order. In spite of these difficulties, on the 5th September he established his headquarters at Sparta. Till then the mountains had served to screen his movements, and Buell had not ventured to move out any distance to meet him for fear of uncovering Nashville. At Sparta, Bragg had the choice of two routes. He might move either west on Nashville, or north in the direction of Louisville.

On the same day as Bragg reached Sparta, Buell concentrated his forces at Murfreesborough on the road to Nashville. On hearing the news of Kirby Smith's invasion of Kentucky he expected that Bragg would move northward to join him, and made preparations to leave an adequate garrison to hold Nashville and then to push north with the bulk of his army in order to cover Louisville. It became a race between the two generals, which should reach Louisville first. On the 14th September Buell had reached Bowling Green, but on the previous day Bragg had already reached Glasgow, thirty miles to the east, and on the 14th attacked Munfordsville, whose garrison of 4,000 men surrendered on the 17th. Thus Bragg intervened between Buell and his destination. Kirby Smith was within 100 miles, at Lexington, and could have sent him reinforcements and supplies.

Now, if ever, was the time for Bragg to fight a decisive battle, and by a crowning victory to win back Kentucky and Tennessee to the Confederate cause. But at this juncture Bragg, strangely enough, cast military considerations to the winds. A great opportunity was sacrificed to an imaginary political need. It seemed both to Bragg and Kirby Smith to be most important to

<sup>1</sup> The Tennessee and Sequatchie Rivers, and Walden's Ridge and the Cumberland Mountains.



inaugurate formally at Frankfort, the State capital, a Secessionist governor. On the 21st Bragg withdrew his troops from the Nashville-Louisville line and marched off to join Kirby Smith, and on the 25th Buell, without encountering any opposition, entered Louisville.<sup>1</sup>

The consternation excited in the North by the Confederate invasion had been very great. Special apprehension was felt for the safety of Cincinnati. On the 19th August a new department had been created, to be called the Department of the Ohio, including Kentucky and the States north of it, and General Wright had been assigned to the command.

Very unjustly Buell was condemned by the Washington authorities for not having prevented the Confederate invasion. It was determined to relieve him and put Thomas in his place. But the orders for this change of command did not arrive until Buell was on the point of moving out from Louisville to assume the offensive in his turn against Bragg; and the generous remonstrances of Thomas caused the order to be rescinded.

On the 1st October Buell advanced from Louisville. His army had been largely reinforced, and numbered 58,000 men. But the fresh troops were mostly raw recruits not to be compared with Bragg's veterans. On the same day Bragg left his army at Bardstown under the command of Polk, and hurried off to Lexington that he might take part in the inauguration of a Confederate governor at Frankfort, which was fixed to take place on the 4th. Buell sent two divisions in the direction of Frankfort to hold Kirby Smith in check, and with the rest of his army pushed on to Bardstown. Both Bragg and Kirby Smith were under the impression that the two divisions moving towards Frankfort were the main body of Buell's army, and accordingly orders were sent to Polk to move northward and fall upon their flank, whilst Kirby Smith was to attack in front. But Polk, having more accurate information, decided to disobey the order, and knowing the numerical inferiority of his own force, to fall back to a strong position fifty miles south-east. Bragg, however, ordered him to move to Harrodsburg with a view to joining Kirby Smith, who, on the 5th, was at Versailles, twenty miles north of that place.<sup>2</sup>

Kirby Smith's troops had left Frankfort as soon as the inaugura-

<sup>1</sup> Bragg was hampered by the fact that he was not the sole commander in that theatre of war. Therefore he did not summon to his aid Kirby Smith, who held an independent command, and he did not consider himself strong enough alone to attack Buell in a position where defeat might have meant destruction. <sup>2</sup> *Ropes*, 402-3, and *Fiske*, 152. General Wheeler (3 *B. & L.*, 10) states that Bragg was eager to fight, till the arrival of Thomas' division from Nashville, on September 20th, caused him to fear that he was not strong enough to risk a battle. But Colonel Urquhart, of Bragg's staff, states (3 *B. & L.*, 601) that the general was always opposed to fighting and said to him emphatically, "This campaign must be won by marching, not by fighting."

<sup>2</sup> *Ropes*, 406-7.

tion was completed, and almost immediately after the State capital was occupied by the Federals. On the 7th Bragg ordered Polk to move from Harrodsburg on to Versailles, but learning that his left wing, under Hardee, was being pressed at Perryville by the Federal advance, directed Polk to send one division back to Hardee's support.

On the following day a fierce encounter took place at Perryville. The Confederate force numbered about 17,000 men. The Federal commander signally failed to make use of his greatly superior numbers. The different divisions of his army were scattered over a considerable extent of country owing to the scarcity of water, and formed an irregular line six miles long. The Confederate attack, ably directed by Hardee, fell with great force upon the Federal left wing about 2 p.m. The left of McCook's Corps was turned, and he was forced to fall back with heavy loss, including that of fifteen guns. But the Confederates failed to gain any further success and retired during the night to Harrodsburg. The losses on both sides were heavy considering the number of troops actually engaged. The Federals lost 4,200, and the Confederate loss was over 3,000.<sup>1</sup> Three out of the four divisions of Bragg's army were engaged, and not more than half Buell's forces. The independence of McCook, who did not report that he was engaged until fighting had been in progress for two hours, prevented Buell concentrating his divisions for a decisive counterstroke.

It was no part of Bragg's plan to fight a pitched battle. Hardee's attack on the 8th was intended to check the Federal advance, and give Bragg time to gather his supplies and men together and evacuate the State. He had had high hopes of gaining a large number of recruits in Kentucky, and had taken with him arms sufficient to equip 20,000 fresh troops<sup>2</sup>; but he found himself griev-

<sup>1</sup> For an account of this battle, see 2 Ropes, 408-9. The battle of Perryville, though accidental in origin and indecisive in result, is entitled by the severity of its losses to rank among the major engagements of the war. Buell was not expecting a general engagement on the 8th, and early that day his centre Corps was considerably in advance of the wings. In the morning a Confederate force from Perryville attempted to recover possession of a small creek, on which the Federal Corps depended for its water supply, but was sharply repulsed mainly by Sheridan's division. No second attack was expected by Buell, and McCook's Corps, which had come into line on the left, was being pushed forward to Chaplin River, when it was suddenly attacked by Hardee. The left brigade, composed of raw troops, gave way, and one of the division-commanders was killed. On the right Sheridan's division, supported by another brigade of the same Corps, drove back the enemy, and finally pursued them into and through Perryville. This success relieved the pressure on the Federal left, which had been forced back nearly a mile, and the Confederates, finding their left flank in danger, eventually abandoned the battlefield. Three-fourths of the whole Federal loss was incurred by McCook's Corps, and only Sheridan's division and one other brigade in the centre Corps were heavily engaged. The right wing was practically not engaged at all. Buell seems to deny the loss of Federal artillery. He says that "the enemy captured some artillery which he did not carry off, though he exchanged some of his pieces for better ones" (3 B. & L., 48). Bragg severely censured Polk for not attacking the centre Corps with all his forces.—Cist, 69.

<sup>2</sup> Cist, 70.

ously disappointed, and decided that Kentucky was not worth fighting for.

Ever since the beginning of October the situation had steadily altered in favour of the Federals. Having recovered his base at Louisville, Buell was able to draw for men and supplies upon the boundless resources of the north-west, whilst his opponent had to depend for his supplies upon the country which his troops occupied, and his retreat, if he were defeated, would have to be made by country roads, which, with the approach of winter, would quickly become impassable.<sup>1</sup>

Bragg had missed his chance when he allowed Buell to reach Louisville without a battle. Having thrown away the opportunity, it was probably not worth his while to risk a battle in which he had little to gain and much to lose. In view of Buell's superior numbers, it was essential that the Confederate forces should be concentrated, and on the 10th Kirby Smith joined Bragg at Harrodsburg.

The Confederates remained there a few days on the chance that Buell might be tempted to attack them in position, but as the latter made no movement, withdrew into East Tennessee. Buell had not expected Bragg to evacuate Kentucky without a battle: believing that a hard struggle was in store for him with the whole Confederate force, he had waited for the two divisions to return from Frankfort before resuming his advance. Having been joined by one of these divisions, he moved out from Perryville on the 11th only to find the enemy retreating before him. Though their retreat was steadily pressed, they could not be brought to bay, and at London Buell abandoned the pursuit owing to the difficulty of moving large bodies of men over the rough country roads. He then transferred his army to the line of the Nashville and Louisville Railway in the neighbourhood of Bowling Green, intending later on to take up a position to the east of Nashville on the Nashville and Chattanooga line with a view to resuming his advance upon the latter place in the spring.<sup>2</sup>

But on the 30th October he was relieved of his command and Rosecrans summoned from the Army of the Mississippi to take his place at the head of what was henceforth to be known as the Army of the Cumberland. Buell's recall was nominally due to his refusal to carry out Halleck's plan for a winter invasion of East Tennessee. But for a month the sentence had been hanging over his head. It can hardly be doubted that Buell was unjustly treated by his Government. As an organiser and disciplinarian he was not inferior to McClellan, and in strategic ability was distinctly superior to the equally ill-fated commander of the Army of the Potomac. It was his plan of campaign that Halleck had usurped: and had

<sup>1</sup> 2 Ropes, 411-12.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Ropes, 412.



Buell and not Halleck been placed in supreme command in the West, it is most unlikely that the movement, which opened so successfully at Fort Donelson, would have come to a premature ending at Corinth.<sup>1</sup> It might perhaps be alleged against him that his long training in a military bureau unfitted him for handling large bodies of troops in the field.<sup>2</sup> Yet against that charge must be set his record on the second day of the battle of Shiloh.

Rosecrans owed his appointment, for which Thomas had originally been designed, to the successes which he had gained over the troops of Van Dorn and Price in the battles of Iuka, fought the 19th September, and Corinth on the 3rd and 4th October. This latter battle resulted in a brilliant victory for the Federals, and established Rosecrans' reputation as a hard fighter and competent leader.<sup>3</sup>

On the 30th October Rosecrans assumed command at Louisville. He announced his intention in a letter of the 1st November to Halleck of going on to Bowling Green and then to Nashville as soon as the railway had been completely repaired, and expressed the opinion that Bragg was concentrating at Murfreesborough for an advance on Nashville. If Halleck looked to find in Rosecrans a more amenable subordinate than his predecessor had been, he must have been grievously disappointed. Rosecrans declared emphatically against the possibility of successfully invading East Tennessee during the winter. The new commander had carefully thought out his plans for himself, and did not intend to allow any interference with them. He rightly judged that Bragg did not mean to abandon Tennessee without a struggle, and that, if he intended to keep a hold upon it, he must regain Nashville. Therefore, if the Federal army moved against him at Murfreesborough, he would be forced to accept battle or else admit the powerlessness of the Confederacy to retain possession of a State which had seceded from the Union.

But Rosecrans was determined not to advance until he had accumulated two million rations at Nashville. Then he would, at any rate, for a time be independent of the railways, and could march against Bragg without any fear of being obliged to abandon the offensive in consequence of a successful cavalry raid upon his line of communications. But before the required amount of rations could be collected at Nashville, it was necessary to repair the railway from Nashville to Louisville. That work was completed by the 26th November, and by the 24th December the reserve supplies

<sup>1</sup> For an appreciation of General Buell, see 1 Ropes, 199, 200, and 2 Ropes, 414. Buell had had the misfortune to make two powerful enemies in Morton, Governor of Indiana, and Andrew Johnson, recently appointed military governor of Tennessee. A further reason for Buell's removal may perhaps be found in the fact that he was regarded as one of McClellan's supporters (Schouler, 254).

<sup>2</sup> Cist, 76.

<sup>3</sup> See Cap. XVII.

had been brought up, and Rosecrans felt himself in a position to commence his advance. Ever since he had assumed command he had been importuned by Halleck to display more energy and activity, and to do something brilliant. The unforgivable sin in the eyes of the Federal Government was slowness. He was distinctly warned that if he did not move quickly he would be superseded. To these remonstrances, based upon an insufficient knowledge of the nature of the work to be done, and couched in language which was almost insulting when addressed to the commander of an army, Rosecrans turned a deaf ear. Threats were powerless to move him before he was ready to advance. As he said in his dignified reply, he needed no other stimulus to do his duty than the knowledge of what that duty was: to threats of removal he was insensible.<sup>1</sup>

In the meanwhile Bragg was concentrating his army at Murfreesborough, where he rejoined the force which he had left under Breckinridge to keep up a blockade of Nashville, when he moved north into Kentucky. Buell had left two divisions<sup>2</sup> to garrison Nashville when he hurried after Bragg, and the garrison had proved itself quite capable of holding Breckinridge in check. Bragg presumed that Rosecrans would go into winter quarters, and accordingly distributed his own troops in encampments in the vicinity of Murfreesborough.<sup>3</sup> He sent a considerable part of his cavalry on raiding expeditions against the Federal lines of communication. Morgan's command broke up the Nashville and Louisville line at Nolin, and completely destroyed the great trestle works some distance nearer Louisville. But the raid had not the desired effect of forcing the evacuation of Nashville, or of even seriously embarrassing Rosecrans, owing to the accumulation of supplies already made at Nashville.

Another body of Confederate cavalry under Forrest made a raid into West Tennessee and broke up the railway between Corinth and Columbus, on which Grant depended for his supplies.

Bragg, however, retained three brigades of cavalry, which proved of great service in delaying the Federal advance until he had had time to bring up his troops from their encampments and prepare a line of battle.

On the 26th December Rosecrans advanced from Nashville. Two miles beyond the Federal piquet line patrols of Confederate cavalry were encountered. The advancing columns were opposed by the three brigades of Bragg's cavalry supported by three infantry brigades with artillery. The Confederate troops were well handled, and progress was slow. On the 30th the two armies

<sup>1</sup> 2 *Ropes*, 419-24.

<sup>2</sup> Originally three, but Thomas' division subsequently rejoined Buell's main force.

<sup>3</sup> *Cist*, 81.

were facing each other at Murfreesborough. The town lies on the railroad to Chattanooga thirty miles south-east from Nashville. It is situated on the east bank of the west branch of Stone's River. Both the railroad and the turnpike cross the river close to the town and run towards Nashville along the west bank. The greater part of Bragg's army was on the west bank, south both of the railroad and turnpike. Breckinridge's division alone was on the east bank.

Rosecrans proposed to send his left wing, under Crittenden across the river, thus bringing two divisions into action against Breckinridge's one. Thomas was to press the Confederate centre vigorously.<sup>1</sup> In this way Rosecrans hoped to roll up the Confederate right upon Murfreesborough, to capture that town and secure the railroad, and so drive the whole Confederate army away from their line of supplies. If he succeeded he would have an excellent chance of annihilating Bragg's army. But to achieve success it was necessary that McCook, commanding the Federal right, should be able to hold the opposite wing in check, until Rosecrans had rolled up the Confederate right. The task imposed upon McCook was a difficult one. For his right faced the Confederate centre, and their left wing, under Hardee, was overlapping his extreme right. There was every likelihood that Bragg would attempt to carry out exactly the same manœuvre as Rosecrans contemplated and turn his opponent's right. McCook's line was badly arranged: all of it, except one brigade on the extreme right, was facing east. Rosecrans expressed the opinion that it ought to be facing more south, or else it would be in imminent danger of being outflanked. But he left McCook full discretion to do as he thought best, as being better acquainted with the nature of the ground. McCook, with the same cheerful optimism which he had displayed at Perryville, where for over two hours he fought an independent battle without communicating the fact to the commanding general, decided that the present formation would do very well, and declared himself capable of holding his ground for three hours, the length of time that Rosecrans thought that he should require for crushing the Confederate right and capturing Murfreesborough.

Bragg saw how the disposition of McCook's Corps invited a flanking movement, and proposed to turn the Federal right with Hardee's Corps, roll it up and force it back upon the Nashville turnpike: with Polk pressing the Federal centre he hoped to drive the whole of Rosecrans' army across the turnpike and sever it from Nashville. He might then reasonably hope to recapture the capital of Tennessee. The Federal army numbered 47,000 of all

<sup>1</sup> If Crittenden was successful against Breckinridge, he would gain a commanding ridge, from which artillery could enfilade the Confederate line on the opposite bank.



arms, whilst Bragg's strength has been variously estimated from<sup>1</sup> 38,000 to 46,000. The smaller estimate is probably nearer the truth.

Soon after 6 a.m. on the 31st Hardee advanced with his two divisions formed in a single line against Johnson's division, which formed the right of McCook's Corps. The disposition of this division was very faulty. Although Johnson knew that an attack was impending, he had fixed his headquarters more than a mile to the rear, and had posted his reserve brigade near his headquarters. At the moment of the attack one of the other brigadiers was absent at the divisional headquarters, and was taken prisoner as he was hurrying to the front. The other brigadier was mortally wounded at the outset of the action. The troops were left without any commander, and being attacked simultaneously in front and flank soon gave way. The onslaught next fell upon Davis' division. The Confederate forces were swinging round, pivoting upon the right of Polk's Corps. Both Polk's divisions were put in against Davis' left and Sheridan's right, whilst Davis' right was attacked by Hardee's victorious divisions. The resistance in this part of the field was far more obstinate, as the Federal commanders had had more time to prepare a line of defence; but the impetuosity of the Confederate attack, backed by superior numbers, ultimately prevailed, and the whole of the Federal right and right centre was forced back upon the Nashville turnpike, where it took up a fresh position.

It was in rallying the flying soldiers and reforming them into line of battle that Thomas, commanding the Federal centre, first displayed that intrepid courage in an emergency which became afterwards the distinguishing feature of his generalship.

At 8 a.m. Rosecrans had set Crittenden's Corps in motion. One division quickly crossed the river without encountering any opposition. Though he had been already informed that McCook was hard pressed on the right, Rosecrans had paid little attention to the news. It was exactly what he had expected, but he relied upon McCook keeping his promise to hold out for three hours, and merely sent him directions to hold his ground. But the fact that the right wing was being driven in, and was in danger of being utterly routed, could not long be ignored. Just as Rosecrans was sending the second division across the river, and congratulating himself that his turning movement was about to be crowned with complete success, he found himself obliged suddenly to abandon the offensive and save his army from what threatened to be an appalling disaster.

<sup>1</sup> 2 Ropes, 424-5. Cist gives the Federal force at 43,400 and the Confederate at 46,600. Rosecrans reported his force actually engaged at 43,400, whilst Bragg stated his as 37,712 (3 B. & L., 613).

In such a crisis Rosecrans proved his worth. However much he may be open to censure on December 30th for declining to take the responsibility of giving McCook a direct order to rearrange his line and take up a stronger defensive position, there can be nothing but praise for the skill and boldness with which he staved off disaster, and converted what seemed certain defeat into ultimate victory. He ordered the movement across the river to be suspended, and the troops which had already crossed were recalled. One brigade was left to watch the crossing. The rest of Crittenden's Corps was hurried to the support of the new line which Thomas had formed on the Nashville turnpike. Fearlessly exposing himself as he rode to and fro along the line rallying his troops, Rosecrans' presence and the gallantry of his bearing did much to encourage his men.<sup>1</sup> Ably seconded by Thomas and Sheridan, he succeeded in forming a line which all the efforts of the Confederates failed to break.

Elated by their success over McCook's Corps, and believing that a decisive victory was within their grasp, Bragg's soldiers rushed again and again to the assault with all the impetuosity and dauntless valour of the Southerner. Four brigades of Breckinridge's command were brought across the river and put in against the left of the Federal line, where Palmer's division was holding the "Round Forest," regarded as the key of the whole position.<sup>2</sup> Here the fighting was as fierce as in any part of the field. There were few battles in the war in which greater bravery was displayed by the soldiers on both sides. But the gallantry of the assault was met by a resistance of inflexible stubbornness; and when darkness descended upon the field the Federals still held the Nashville turnpike.

The troops of both armies bivouacked where they had fought. Some of the Federal officers urged an immediate retreat upon Nashville. But Rosecrans refused to make any retrograde movement. He determined to hold his ground and accept battle if Bragg renewed the attack on the following day: and if the Confederates did not give battle, he intended himself to assume the offensive.

But Bragg was in no condition to attack on the 1st January. His losses the previous day had been too heavy. He held his ground close to the Federal line in the hope that Rosecrans would order a retreat. But he knew if Rosecrans refused to retire, he himself was powerless to drive him from his position. The Confederate army had shot its bolt on the 31st December.

A division of Crittenden's Corps was moved across the river

<sup>1</sup> Cist, 128.

<sup>2</sup> The object of the Confederate leaders was now to break through the Federal left and take Rosecrans' new line in flank.

during the afternoon of the 1st. The next day Breckinridge assaulted this division with great fury and drove it back across the river, but only in his turn to be driven back by another Federal division, which crossed the river and held its position for the rest of the day. This position on the east bank of the river enabled the Federal artillery to enfilade Polk's lines on the opposite bank.

Accordingly on the night of the 3rd Bragg withdrew his disheartened and worn-out soldiers from the battlefield, and retreated through Murfreesborough to Tullahoma on the railroad, where he went into winter quarters covering Chattanooga. Rosecrans occupied Murfreesborough, but made no attempt to pursue; his heavy losses, the exhaustion of his troops, and the wretched condition of the roads rendered it imperative to cease active hostilities till the winter was over.

The Federals lost over 9,000 in killed and wounded, as well as 3,700 prisoners and twenty-eight pieces of artillery. Bragg's losses in killed, wounded, and missing amounted to over 10,000.<sup>1</sup> But the substantial fruits of victory remained with Rosecrans. The Confederates had little to show for their heavy losses. The Federal hold on Tennessee had not been shaken, and Nashville was still theirs.

#### NOTE ON MURFREESBOROUGH

Both generals had conceived precisely the same plan of attack. But Bragg gained the initial advantage by being the first to attack. As at Shiloh, the Federal right was surprised. When Johnson's division had been driven from the field to be followed presently by Davis', Rosecrans was obliged to abandon his own offensive and devote himself to forming a second line of battle, on which he might stand on the defensive. It was mainly owing to Sheridan, commanding McCook's left division, that the necessary time was gained for taking up a defensive position. After repulsing in conjunction with part of Davis' division two fierce assaults, Sheridan was obliged by Davis' withdrawal to fall back and form a fresh line in a dense cedar thicket on the right of Negley's division of Thomas' Corps. Here some of the most desperate fighting of the day took place. Three times did four Confederate divisions attack this position, until Rousseau's division was sent up by Thomas, who had been holding it in reserve, to take Sheridan's place, and the latter having been fiercely engaged for more than four hours, and having lost over a third of his division, withdrew to the new position which Rosecrans had taken. Sheridan's retreat compelled Negley's division to fall back, and shortly after Rousseau's division, finding itself assailed on both flanks, also retired. But by noon Rosecrans had established his second line of battle, and the

<sup>1</sup> 2 Ropes, 433. In 3 B. & L., 611-12, the Federal loss is given at 13,249, and the Confederate at 10,266.



Confederates, failing to gain fresh ground on their left and centre, devoted their chief energies to a desperate assault on the Federal left, held by Palmer's division and two of Wood's brigades—all of Crittenden's Corps. Van Cleve's division and Wood's third brigade had been placed on the right of Rousseau, and the extreme right of the new line was held by McCook's Corps, which had been reformed. Bragg had been calling upon Breckinridge for reinforcements since an early hour. But Breckinridge was very slow in complying with this order, and the four brigades which he eventually sent across the river came up in two detachments about two hours apart, and were hurled by Polk in two separate attacks upon Palmer's position. The first of these attacks was made about 2 p.m.; with the failure of the second the Confederate offensive came to an end. Bragg laid the blame for his failure to achieve complete success upon Breckinridge. Nevertheless he believed that the victory was his and that the Federals would be obliged to retreat.

## CHAPTER XV

### CHANCELLORSVILLE

Hooker's appointment to the Army of the Potomac—Lee standing on the defensive—Hooker's plan of campaign—The Federal movement begins—The Rappahannock crossed—The Rapidan crossed—Concentration of Federal right wing at Chancellorsville—Movement of the Federal left wing—Movements of the Federal cavalry—Lee waiting for information—Stuart rejoins Lee—Lee moves to meet Hooker—Position of the two armies on May 1st—Jackson advances towards Chancellorsville—Hooker advances towards Fredericksburg—Hooker recoils before Jackson—Sedgwick's inaction on the 1st—Hooker still confident of success—Federal council of war—Position of Federal right wing—Lee and Jackson in council—Jackson commences his flank march—Jackson's march detected—Sickles' advance—Line of Jackson's march—Fitzhugh Lee's reconnaissance—Jackson strikes—Unpreparedness of the 11th Corps—Hooker partly to blame—Rout of the 11th Corps—Jackson's success—Jackson's intended plan of action—Jackson's fall—Stuart takes command of the 2nd Corps—Sickles' movements—The Federals strengthen their position during the night—Position on May 3rd—Hooker's fatal mistake—Stuart occupies Hazel Grove—The Confederates renew the attack—The Chancellorsville position carried—Hooker wounded—Hooker's lost opportunity—New position of the Federal right wing—Sedgwick defeats Early—Sedgwick moves towards Chancellorsville—Encounters McLaws—Sedgwick repulsed—Lee concentrates against Sedgwick—Sedgwick retreats across the Rappahannock—Lee prepares to concentrate against Hooker—Hooker retreats across the Rappahannock—Review of the campaign—Losses—Jackson's death.

THE spring of 1863 found the Armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia still confronting each other on opposite banks of the Rappahannock. The Federal army was no longer led by Burnside. On the 26th January he had been relieved of the command and Hooker put in his place. It was plainly not without misgivings that President Lincoln appointed Hooker to command the Army of the Potomac. He had gained for himself a well-deserved reputation as a hard fighter. His record as commander of the 1st Corps in the battle of the Antietam was still fresh in men's memories. He had the confidence of the soldiers and had, or at least seemed to have, unbounded confidence in himself. But he had been the leader of the cabal which did so much to render Burnside's position at the head of the army impossible: and it was a dangerous precedent to reward intrigue and insubordination with the chief command. It was, however, rightly judged unwise to bring a general from the West to command the army of the East. Pope's campaign had been a lesson not easily

forgotten. Within the ranks of the Army of the Potomac no one possessed a higher reputation or seemingly greater qualifications for supreme command than "Fighting Joe" Hooker.<sup>1</sup> The administration at Washington sorely needed a victory. Their emancipation policy was not popular among the soldiers; the number of enlistments was falling off, and Lincoln feared that an attempt to carry out the enforced draft which was required to recruit the ranks, would be met with open resistance, unless the Government had behind it the prestige of a victory.

Hooker on taking command found that his first task was to reorganise the army. The Army of the Potomac under Burnside's command after the bloody reverse at Fredericksburg and the farcical failure of the "Mud March" was degenerating into a mere disorganised rabble. This, it is true, was largely due to the spirit of discontent which Hooker himself had been instrumental in fostering. Desertion was rife. Nearly 3,000 officers and over 80,000 of the rank and file were found to be absent, and the greater part of these were absent from reasons unknown.<sup>2</sup> Hooker proved himself an able organiser. Desertion was stopped by a judicious system of granting furloughs. The confidence of the soldiers in themselves and their general was quickly restored, and by the beginning of April Hooker found himself at the head of an army which he boastfully proclaimed to be the finest on the planet. One of his most important reforms was the consolidation of the cavalry into a separate Corps, although the inefficiency of the officer selected to command it deprived the experiment of the success which had been reasonably anticipated.<sup>3</sup> Burnside's cumbersome system of Grand Divisions was also abandoned, and a return made to the old Corps organisation.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The appointment of Burnside's successor caused the Government very great anxiety. It was not judged expedient to go outside the Army of the Potomac in search of a commander. Otherwise Halleck and Stanton would have favoured the appointment of Rosecrans. To restore McClellan for the second time to the command of the army which he had created, would have been equivalent to setting up a military dictatorship. Sumner was disqualified for supreme command by reason of old age and physical feebleness. Franklin was under a cloud, having been made the scapegoat for the defeat of Fredericksburg. The choice lay between Hooker, the senior major-general in the army after Sumner and Franklin, Meade and Reynolds. Halleck sounded Reynolds as to his willingness to accept the command if offered him. But Reynolds asked for a greater freedom of action than the military authorities were prepared to concede. Halleck preferred Meade to Hooker. Stanton was utterly opposed to Hooker, and thought that under no circumstances ought he to be appointed. But at this juncture Hooker's friends formed an alliance with the political faction, which was supporting Mr. Chase as Lincoln's successor, and the President yielding to political pressure, gave Hooker the command (3 B. & L., 239-40).

<sup>2</sup> Henderson, 506.

<sup>3</sup> Hooker in his official report censured his cavalry commander Stoneman. Cf. Lee's

<sup>4</sup> Lee, 255.

The 9th Corps had been withdrawn from the Army of the Potomac, but the 11th and 12th Corps were now incorporated with that army. The 1st and 2nd Corps were still commanded by Reynolds and Couch. Sickles was placed in command of the 3rd, Meade of the 5th, Sedgwick of the 6th, and Howard of the 11th. Slocum was in command of the 12th Corps.



On the south side of the Rappahannock the Army of Northern Virginia was still led by its old commander, and the 2nd Corps was under the command of Jackson. But Longstreet and three divisions of the 1st Corps had been taken from it. The continued pressure of the war rendered Wilmington and Charleston (Map I.) as the ports for the blockade runners of vital importance to the Confederacy. They and the railroads connecting them with Richmond were threatened by the presence of a Federal force at Newberne, in North Carolina. President Davis had once again resumed the supreme control of the operations of the Confederate armies, and at the War Office General Randolph had been succeeded by Mr. Seddon.<sup>1</sup> Both these statesmen favoured a policy of standing on the strict defensive, and of dispersing the troops at their disposal instead of concentrating for an offensive movement.

Shortly after the victory at Fredericksburg, D. H. Hill had been detached to take command of the forces which protected the railroad communication between Richmond and its two ports. In January Ransom's division followed, and in February Longstreet was sent with Hood's and Pickett's divisions to cover Richmond against an advance on the south bank of the James. Strict injunctions were given by Lee to his subordinate so to dispose his forces that he could at a moment's notice bring them back to the Rappahannock. But in April Lee had been obliged to yield an unwilling consent to the movement of Longstreet and his two divisions against a Federal force at Suffolk, 120 miles away from Fredericksburg. He was still further weakened by the absence of two cavalry brigades. Consequently he found himself not strong enough to take the offensive until Longstreet's command should rejoin. Had he had his full force concentrated at Fredericksburg, he had intended to carry out the movement with which he afterwards commenced the Gettysburg campaign, and by entering the Shenandoah Valley to force Hooker's army to the north bank of the Potomac.<sup>2</sup> But, situated as he was, he could only wait for Hooker to develop his plan of campaign, and, instead of controlling, let himself be guided by events.

Hooker had a sufficiently difficult task before him.<sup>3</sup> To attempt to cross the Rappahannock in the face of Lee's army would be to court a second and greater reverse than that which Burnside had suffered. From Banks' Ford to Port Royal the Confederate army

<sup>1</sup> Lee, on assuming command of the Army of Northern Virginia, had insisted upon being relieved of the general control of the Confederate armies. Mr. Seddon's appointment marked a return to that civilian control of military operations, which, in the hands of Mr. Benjamin, had already been proved a mistake. Randolph had been Secretary of War from March 17th to November 17th, 1862.

<sup>2</sup> See his letter of April 16th to Mr. Davis (2 Henderson, 509).

<sup>3</sup> See Map III.

occupied a strongly fortified line, which the engineer's art had rendered far more formidable than when Burnside crossed the river in December. Lee's lines of communication were the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railway directly in his rear, and the roads leading through Orange Court House to the depôts on the Virginia Central Railway. The problem before Hooker was how to strike those communications. The nature of the ground and the increasing width of the Rappahannock rendered any attempt at a flanking movement on the Federal left impracticable.

It remained, therefore, to turn Lee's left by crossing the upper fords of the Rappahannock. As Banks' Ford and the United States Ford were held by the Confederates, it was necessary, in order to turn Lee's left, to cross not only the Rappahannock, but also the Rapidan. Hooker's plan for carrying out his great flank movement unquestionably displayed strategical ability, such as hardly had been looked for in the commander of the 1st Army Corps. He proposed to move three Corps twenty-seven miles up the river to Kelly's Ford, to push them across the Rapidan by the Germanna and Ely's Fords, at the same time uncovering the United States Ford, by which another Corps was to cross, and then to concentrate his right wing of four Corps at Chancellorsville.

In the meantime Sedgwick was to cross below Fredericksburg with two Corps, and hold the Confederate army fast in its entrenched position. A third Corps was to remain in reserve below Falmouth, ready to reinforce either wing of the army, as might be required. The cavalry Corps under Stoneman, 10,000 strong, was also to cross by the upper fords and fall upon Lee's lines of communication. Their principal object was to be the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railway, and when Lee, finding his communications cut, fell back, as Hooker anticipated he would do, towards Richmond, the cavalry was to concentrate behind the Pamunkey and cut off his retreat. Stoneman had been ordered to cross the Rappahannock on the 13th April. But a sudden rise in the river prevented the movement: and eventually the cavalry crossed with the rest of the right wing.

On the 27th the march commenced. The 5th Corps under Meade, the 11th under Howard, and the 12th under Slocum on that day started up the river. Slocum was placed in charge of the movement. On the night of the 28th and morning of the 29th the Rappahannock was crossed at Kelly's Ford. The 11th and 12th Corps pushed on towards the Germanna Ford, and the 5th marched on a parallel road towards Ely's Ford.

Both columns were across the Rapidan early in the morning of the 30th. The advance of the 5th Corps uncovered the United States Ford. Two Confederate brigades, which had been guarding it, finding their position turned by Meade's advance, fell back

to Chancellorsville, and the road was now open for two divisions of the 2nd Corps to cross by this ford and join the rest of the Federal right wing. Early in the afternoon of the 30th Slocum had concentrated his three Corps at Chancellorsville, and the divisions of the 2nd Corps were crossing the Rapidan six miles off. Hooker had left it to his lieutenant's discretion either to push straight on and get clear of the Wilderness, or, in case he anticipated serious resistance on his forward march, to wait at Chancellorsville until further reinforcements reached him. It was of great importance that Banks' Ford should also be uncovered, as that would bring the two wings of the Federal army several miles nearer to each other. But Slocum was content with having effected the concentration at Chancellorsville, and Hooker, assuming command in person at Chancellorsville on the evening of the same day, was quite satisfied with the success of the movement. That night he issued a general Order, stating that "the operations of the last three days have determined that our enemy must ingloriously fly or come out from behind his defences and give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him. The operations of the 5th, 11th, and 12th Corps have been a succession of splendid achievements."

The left wing of the Federal army had been placed under the command of Sedgwick. With his own Corps, the 6th, and the 1st under Reynolds, he commenced on the 29th to cross the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg, at the point where Franklin had crossed in December. By the 30th both these Corps were concentrated on the south bank. On that night the 3rd Corps under Sickles was detached from the left wing and sent to join Hooker at Chancellorsville, as Jackson's Corps facing Sedgwick showed no signs of taking the offensive.

The cavalry Corps had crossed at Kelly's Ford on the 28th. One division of 4,000 sabres under Averell was detached to hold in check W. H. F. Lee's two regiments, whilst Stoneman, with the main body, pressed on to Louisa Court House, which was reached early on the 2nd May, and the work of destruction was at once commenced on the Virginia Central Railway.

Meanwhile Lee had been unable to do anything but wait for Hooker to make plain his plan of campaign. It was impossible to reply to it with a counterstroke against the Federal lines of communication, for they were guarded by the Rappahannock, and Hooker's superiority in numbers was so overwhelming that he could leave a sufficient force to hold the river and prevent any attempt on Lee's part to cross it, whilst further downstream the Federal gunboats barred all possibility of passage. Lee fully expected that Hooker would attempt to cross the upper fords of the Rappahannock and turn his left. Stuart's cavalry stretched



across country from the United States Ford to Culpeper with posts at all the fords. But his total command only amounted to 2,400 sabres, an altogether inadequate force to contend with Stoneman's Corps. On the night of the 28th Stuart reported that a strong force of infantry, cavalry, and artillery was moving towards Kelly's Ford.

Early on the morning of the 29th the sound of firing downstream warned Lee that Sedgwick was advancing, and about the same time he received news that on his other flank a strong force had crossed at Kelly's Ford. It would certainly seem as if Stuart at any rate expected that Hooker's flank march was directed against Gordonsville. With view to such a move he had posted his main force at Brandy Station. This perhaps accounts for the fact that his reports were so long in coming. It was not till 6.30 p.m. on the 29th that Lee was informed that the Federals had crossed the Rapidan in force both at Germanna and Ely's Fords. Anderson was at once despatched with one brigade to Chancellorsville. There he was joined by the two brigades of his division which had been on guard at the United States Ford. Finding that the Federals were advancing in overwhelming strength, he fell back and took up a strong position near the Tabernacle Church covering Banks' Ford, where the other brigades of his division were stationed, and set to work to entrench his line.<sup>1</sup>

On the 30th, Stuart finding that the turning column was moving eastward, left W. H. F. Lee with two regiments to hold Stoneman in check, and with Fitzhugh Lee's brigade attacked Slocum's right flank and fought his way across the Federal front until he regained touch with Lee, bringing with him information of the greatest value as to the strength of the Federal advance.<sup>2</sup>

When Sedgwick's two Corps were arrayed on the south bank of the Rappahannock, Jackson had proposed to fall upon them with all the forces available. Hooker had divided his forces in the sight of the enemy, and it was now possible to deal with him in detail. Sedgwick's force was the smaller and the nearer; and it might reasonably seem the right course to overwhelm it, before the rest of Hooker's army had disentangled itself from the Wilderness. But Lee judged otherwise: the same reasons which had caused him not to attack Franklin's Grand Division when occupying a similar position now led him to decide to leave a containing force to watch Sedgwick, and with the bulk of his army to turn against the Federal right wing. It can hardly be doubted that Lee was right. The success of an attack against Sedgwick could

<sup>1</sup> R. H. Anderson's division of five brigades was watching the upper fords of the Rappahannock. Two brigades had been posted at the United States Ford: two were watching Banks' Ford: with the fifth, Anderson himself marched to Chancellorsville.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Henderson, 515.

only have been bought at such a cost as would have left the Confederate army in no fit condition to encounter the larger wing under Hooker's immediate command. Sedgwick's movements convinced Lee that only a feint was intended on that flank, and the report brought in by Stuart confirmed that belief. That night McLaws' division was ordered to march to Anderson's support, and Jackson's Corps was directed to follow. Only Early's division of the 2nd Corps and Barksdale's brigade of McLaws' division were left to occupy the Fredericksburg Heights and hold Sedgwick in check. McLaws reached Anderson's position in the early hours of the 1st May, and Jackson's Corps arrived at 8 a.m.


On May 1st the position was as follows. The Federal right wing under Hooker himself was at Chancellorsville. 70,000 men, including Sickles' Corps, whose leading brigade reported to Hooker at 9 a.m., were concentrated almost within sight of their goal. The left wing, 40,000 strong, was encamped on the south bank of the river below Fredericksburg, eleven miles from the other wing. One division held Falmouth. Facing Sedgwick were 10,000 Confederates under Early on the Fredericksburg Heights, and between 45,000 and 50,000, with Lee and Jackson at their head, were in position holding Anderson's lines by the Tabernacle church. It has been asserted, and with some show of reason, that the rapidity of Hooker's movement had taken Lee by surprise, and that if Slocum on the afternoon of the 30th, or Hooker himself on the same night had boldly pushed on, Anderson's force would have been swept out of the way, Banks' Ford uncovered, the Wilderness left behind, and the Federal army enabled the following day to deliver battle in such a position as would allow their superior numbers to be used to the greatest advantage. It is true that the turning columns marched with a speed hitherto unknown in the history of the Army of the Potomac.<sup>1</sup> But it is very doubtful whether any advance of the Federal right wing on the 30th would have broken Anderson's lines, especially as he could have been reinforced by McLaws' division in case of need.<sup>2</sup>

Jackson, on reaching the Tabernacle church, immediately ordered the work of entrenching to cease and an advance made towards Chancellorsville. Shortly before 11 a.m. the Confederate army was in motion. On the turnpike McLaws' division marched with three of Anderson's brigades: Jackson's Corps followed the Plank road with Anderson's other two brigades leading.<sup>3</sup> After advancing for about a mile the Federal cavalry were encountered, and it

<sup>1</sup> 2 Henderson, 513.

<sup>2</sup> If the view is held that Lee was not taken by surprise by Hooker's turning movement (3 B. & L., 233), it seems to follow that Hooker's chance of breaking through Anderson's lines on the 30th was but a small one.

<sup>3</sup> McLaws' column was led by one of Anderson's brigades (2 Henderson, 518).







quickly became plain that Hooker was advancing in force. The Federal Commander-in-Chief had been in no hurry to advance. He had waited not only for Couch's two divisions, but also for Sickles' Corps to join him. He did not anticipate encountering any serious resistance, and had sent word to Sedgwick that he hoped "to be on the heights west of Fredericksburg at noon, or shortly after, or if opposed strongly, at night."

At 11 a.m. on the 1st, Hooker commenced his advance (see Plan). Two Corps moved along the Plank road: two divisions were on the turnpike, and two more on the river road leading to Banks' Ford, whilst one division was ordered to turn off to the right and advance towards Todd's Tavern.<sup>1</sup> The 3rd Corps was held in reserve at Chancellorsville. Thus far Hooker's plans had worked admirably, but his subsequent movements were about to be hampered by his want of information and the weakness of his cavalry force. He had only retained with the main army one small brigade under Pleasanton. This was not strong enough to guard his flanks as well as his front. For his information he was, in the absence of an adequate cavalry force, dependent upon signal stations, observatories, and three balloons.<sup>2</sup> But during the early hours of May 1st so dense a fog rose from the river, that balloon and signal stations were alike rendered useless. When, accordingly, whilst still entangled in the Wilderness, Hooker encountered the advancing columns of the Confederates, he was afraid that the whole of Lee's army was before him.

Jackson handled his troops with his usual vigour, and threatened to outflank the Federal columns on both the turnpike and Plank road. Hooker lost his nerve; the responsibility of supreme command paralysed the fighting spirit, for which as a subordinate he had been famous. Fearing to risk a battle against unknown numbers in the intricate depths of the Wilderness, he ordered all his columns to fall back to Chancellorsville, where with prudent foresight he had caused his camps to be strongly entrenched. The Confederates followed up the retreating columns of the enemy, but progress through the forest undergrowth was slow. The afternoon was far advanced when they arrived within sight of Hooker's strongly fortified position at Chancellorsville.

Throughout the 1st May Sedgwick's two Corps remained inactive below Fredericksburg. Although it was plain, as soon as the sun dissipated the mist, that a considerable part of the Confederate army was moving in the direction of Chancellorsville, and the sounds of battle were shortly after heard, Sedgwick, over-estimating the strength of the force immediately in his front, made no movement. Early with his small force made so brave a show that Sedgwick failed to detect any signs of diminished strength in the

<sup>1</sup> Doubleday, 11.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Henderson, 515.

lines confronting him. Deserters, as they styled themselves, reported that the divisions of Hood and Pickett had arrived from Richmond.<sup>1</sup> No definite orders reached him from Hooker, and, thus isolated, he feared to take the responsibility of acting on his own initiative. Reynolds, commanding the 1st Corps, fully coincided with Sedgwick's view.

In order to secure rapid communication between the two wings a line of field telegraph had been laid between Falmouth and the United States Ford, and General Butterfield, Hooker's chief of the Staff, had been stationed at Falmouth to keep up the connection between Hooker and his lieutenant. But the telegraph broke down, and an order despatched by Hooker at 11.30 a.m., directing Sedgwick to make a brisk demonstration, did not reach its destination till six hours later, when it was too late to attempt a diversion.<sup>2</sup>

Hooker, who had so blithely started out in the morning expecting to encounter little or no resistance, found the tables turned upon him. It was he who was now standing on the defensive; it was for Lee to take the next step. But at the same time Hooker had no serious misgivings: only for the moment had he resigned the initiative to Lee, and it did not seem as if that general would be able to make much use of it.

To secure himself against attack, and at the same time to strengthen himself for a resumption later on of his offensive movement, Hooker sent orders that night that Reynolds' Corps should be despatched to Chancellorsville. On that night a Council of War was held at Chancellorsville. Some of the general officers were in favour of attacking the Confederate forces and fighting their way out of the Wilderness towards Sedgwick. But Hooker decided to cling to his camp, and let Lee assume the offensive if he would. At this council he expressed the opinion that on the right the lines should be more contracted, but did not press the point when assured by the officers commanding on that wing that they were perfectly confident of repulsing any attack that might be made upon them.

Hooker's army was strongly posted. On the left was the 5th Corps, resting on the Rappahannock and covering the River and Mine roads. The 2nd Corps held the turnpike. The 12th Corps formed the centre of the line and covered Chancellorsville. The 3rd Corps held Hazel Grove, a bare plateau to the south: one of its divisions under Berry acting as a general reserve. To the right the line was extended by the 11th Corps, whose breastworks covered the Orange Plank road.<sup>3</sup>

Though Hooker's advance had been sharply checked, the position on the night of the 1st was full of peril to the Confederates. Neither Lee nor Jackson had any thought but to attack Hooker, but the question was at what point were his lines vulnerable.

<sup>1</sup> 2 Henderson, 523.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Henderson, 527.

<sup>3</sup> 2 Henderson, 526.



Reconnaissances showed that the Federal centre and left were impregnable. But presently Stuart brought the news that the Federal right could be turned. Its entrenchments had been constructed solely with a view to an attack from the south. If a turning column could reach a position on its right flank the whole line of Federal defences could be taken in reverse. McLaws was ordered to entrench a position facing the Federal centre and left, and endeavours were made to find some route by which Jackson could make a flank march. In the early hours of the morning of the 2nd one of Jackson's Staff<sup>1</sup> brought the welcome information that a private road had been opened through the woods in the required direction for the purpose of hauling wood and ore to the Catherine Furnace. Lee and Jackson were seated in council at 3.30 a.m., when the Staff officer joined them with a map, on which he had traced this road. Jackson at once proposed to lead his whole Corps along it, and Lee, after a moment of reflection, assented.

By 4 a.m. Jackson's Corps was on the march. With 26,000 men he started to make a fourteen-mile march through an intricate country round the enemy's right flank, whilst Lee, with Anderson's and McLaws' divisions, some 17,000 men in all, undertook to find employment for Hooker during the progress of Jackson's movement.<sup>2</sup>

Such a division of the Confederate forces was a desperate expedient: but considering the disparity of force Lee was only running one of those risks which the weaker side must be willing to accept, if it hopes to achieve final success. Nor was the danger so great as it seemed. The Wilderness with its trees in full leaf and its dense undergrowth formed an excellent screen for Jackson's movement, and the operations of the previous day had shown Lee, that neither Hooker nor Sedgwick was likely to assume a vigorous offensive. Once again, as in the Second Manassas campaign, the Confederate leader read accurately the military character of the generals facing him and dared to take risks which he would not have ventured with a more circumspect opponent. The all-important point was, that Jackson's destination should be kept a secret from the Federals: as otherwise it would be a simple process for Howard to entrench his right flank so as to hold Jackson at bay, whilst Hooker with the bulk of his army fell upon the two divisions, which alone Lee retained. Jackson's march exposed the left flank of the force left behind, and a vigorous offensive on Hooker's part would have compelled it to fall back along the Fredericksburg

<sup>1</sup> Major Hotchkiss. See 2 Henderson, 531, 532, where a letter of Major Hotchkiss is quoted.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Henderson, 508. This estimate of Jackson's strength only includes the infantry. Stuart brought with him four cavalry regiments and four batteries of horse artillery, and some part, at any rate, of the corps artillery accompanied the march.

roads, where each step in retreat would take it further away from Jackson's isolated column. Jackson's Corps moved in a single column with Rodes' division leading, followed by Colston's and A. P. Hill's bringing up the rear. In advance of the front division Fitzhugh Lee led the way with a single cavalry regiment, whilst squadrons from the other regiments covered the right flank and aided to screen it from the observation of the Federal skirmishers. The column was ten miles long, and as it was crossing a clearing on some rising ground to the west of the Furnace came into full view of the Federal troops posted on Hazel Grove.<sup>1</sup> It seems strange that, considering the supreme importance of secrecy, Jackson should have followed a route which revealed to the enemy the fact that a movement of some sort was in progress. But it is possible that he was not aware that the road that he was following would expose his column to view, or that he hoped that the discovery of his movement would mystify the enemy and lead them to suppose that he was retreating. Moreover, he was anxious to cover as long as possible the left flank of the force left with Lee.

At 8 a.m. Sickles' outposts on Hazel Grove detected Jackson's march and watched the long column defiling southwards.<sup>2</sup> The movement must be either a flank march with Howard's right flank as its objective, or else a retreat towards Gordonsville. In view of the former contingency Hooker, at 9.30 a.m., sent an order to the generals commanding on the right to be prepared for a flanking attack. They were warned to throw out piquets, to keep a sharp look-out, and generally to strengthen their position, which Hooker now pronounced not so strong as he could wish. At an early hour the Federal Commander-in-Chief had ridden round his lines and expressed his complete approval of the strength of the entrenchments. But at that hour he was not expecting a turning movement and imagined that any attack against his right would come from the south. Now the news from Sickles caused him to fear an attack against his unguarded flank, and accordingly he sent orders to Howard and Slocum to rectify their lines and to take the necessary precautions.<sup>3</sup>

About 11 a.m. Sickles' batteries opened fire on the Confederate column and the trains were withdrawn to another road further south, which was sheltered by the woods. An hour later Sickles advanced with two divisions to clear up the situation.<sup>4</sup> As he approached the Furnace he encountered a regiment guarding the cross roads, and at the same time Anderson's division from the Plank road assailed his left. Two brigades of A. P. Hill's division and an artillery battalion were sent back to guard the passage of

<sup>1</sup> Hamlin (p. 13) says: "For several hours the procession moved in sight of and within reach of the guns of the Federal army, seemingly in contempt of their foes."

<sup>2</sup> 2 Henderson, 534.

<sup>3</sup> Hamlin, 20.

<sup>4</sup> 2 Henderson, 534.

the trains: and though the single regiment guarding the cross roads was very severely handled, Sickles, finding himself threatened in front and on the left flank, sent back for reinforcements. Hill's two brigades, when once the trains of the column were in safety, pushed on after the main body, leaving Anderson to deal with Sickles.

Jackson's column, after passing the Furnace, very soon entered the private road, which ran in a westerly direction parallel to, but south of the Brock road for some distance. It then entered the Brock road, which latter road running in a northerly direction crossed first the Plank road and then the turnpike leading to Chancellorsville. At 2 p.m.<sup>1</sup> Archer's and Thomas' brigades were resuming their march after the rest of Hill's division. Jackson himself at the head of the column had reached the Plank road.

It was his intention to march down that road against Howard's flank. But he was now met by Fitzhugh Lee, who had been scouting further along the Brock road and brought the news that it was perfectly possible to advance the Corps to the turnpike and attack on that road, by which means Howard's position would be taken in reverse. Fitzhugh Lee guided Jackson to a hill, from which he could look down upon the 11th Corps spread out beneath in complete ignorance of the impending blow. Jackson immediately ordered Rodes to push on from the Plank road to the turnpike, whilst the cavalry supported by the Stonewall brigade was moved down the Plank road to screen the movement of the rest of the Corps.<sup>2</sup> Rodes having reached the turnpike, moved about a mile down it and then formed in line of battle.

At 6 p.m. Jackson gave the order to attack. His line of battle reached across the turnpike for about a mile on either side. Four hundred yards in front of Rodes' line of battle were the skirmishers, 200 yards behind Colston's division formed the second line, and Hill's division was held in reserve, part in line of battle and part still in column. Six guns of the horse artillery accompanied the attacking force.<sup>3</sup> The 11th Corps lay absolutely at their mercy. Both Howard, the Corps commander, and Devens, commanding the first division on the extreme right, were obstinately convinced that the enemy were in full retreat. Though the pickets sent in from time to time reports that a strong force was massing in the woods on the right flank, the warning fell upon deaf ears. No precaution was ordered to be taken by the Corps commander against a possible attack from the west. Barlow's brigade, the sole reserve of the Corps, was allowed to be taken without a word of remonstrance from Howard, and sent to the support of Sickles, who was hunting an imaginary foe in the forest beyond the Furnace: and so little was Howard concerned for the safety of his own

<sup>1</sup> 2 Henderson, 536.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Henderson, 538.

<sup>3</sup> Hamlin, 18.



position, that he actually accompanied the brigade on its march, to see how Sickles was getting on.

Hooker must divide with his lieutenant the responsibility for the complete surprise of the right wing. He shared Howard's belief that Jackson was in full retreat. For at 4.10 p.m. he sent a telegram to Sedgwick to the effect that the enemy was retreating, hotly pursued by Sickles. Moreover, Hooker was solely responsible for the fact that there was no supporting Corps ready at hand to help Howard. It is difficult to conjecture what were the precise plans of the Federal commander on May 2nd. He had summoned to his aid Reynolds' Corps and Averell's cavalry division; and it would seem that he was quite content to sit still until these reinforcements reached him.

As soon as Jackson's movement commenced, Lee began a series of demonstrations against different points in the Federal line in order to draw Hooker's attention away from his right wing. But Sickles' discovery of Jackson's march must have enlightened Hooker as to the real strength of the force immediately in his front. Apparently he waited for Jackson's movement to develop itself: and as the hours wore on and no attack was made against his right, he decided that the column must have been retreating. When Sickles advancing in the direction of the Furnace sent back for reinforcements, Hooker felt so confident that there was no danger of an attack upon his right that he sent his only cavalry brigade and the reserve brigade of the 11th Corps to reinforce Sickles. He hoped by this movement to cut the Confederate army in two. But that process had already been voluntarily performed by the Confederate leaders themselves. Sickles advancing southward through the forest fondly imagined that he was pushing Jackson back, when that commander was several miles away on the point of annihilating Howard's Corps.

Jackson's assault at 6 p.m.<sup>1</sup> fell like a thunderbolt upon the 11th Corps. It was approaching supper-time: the Federal soldiers regarded the day's work as done: the men were smoking, playing cards, preparing the evening meal:<sup>2</sup> ambulances, wagons, beef cattle were scattered about close to the front line.<sup>3</sup> About 1,000 yards east of Jackson's position rose a hill on which stood Talley's Farm. Jackson had ordered that this hill must be carried at all costs, as it was supposed that it commanded the ridge running north from Dowdall's Tavern, where the 11th Corps was expected to make its last stand.

<sup>1</sup> 2 Henderson, 544. Hamlin, 64, gives 5.15 p.m. as the moment when the signal for attack was given.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Henderson, 537. But Hamlin, 15, questions the statement that the Federals were playing cards.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Warren's evidence before the Congressional Committee. Swinton, 286, note. But Hamlin, 163-4, charges Warren with lack of candour and malevolence.

The Confederate advance swept away the piquet line, and in ten minutes the first Federal brigade was in full flight. The second brigade of Devens' division held the important hill. But the Federals were too much taken by surprise to be able to offer a protracted resistance. Nearly all the regiments were facing south, and before they had time to get fairly into position the wave of triumphant Confederates swept over them. In another quarter of an hour the hill had been carried, and then through the forest<sup>1</sup> past the Wilderness Church towards Dowdall's Tavern the Federals streamed in flight with their foes upon their heels. Schurz's division was thrown into disorder by the retreat of their comrades and was quickly involved in the general flight.

The ridge at Dowdall's Tavern was held by one brigade of Steinwehr's division: the other brigade at this critical moment was miles away with Sickles looking for Jackson beyond the Furnace. On the ridge a shallow line of rifle-pits had been dug and a brief stand was made. But Colston's division rushed forward from the second line, and side by side the men of the two divisions carried the breastwork, and the last remnant of the 11th Corps was driven in full flight towards Chancellorsville.

It was now 7 p.m.; in an hour the 11th Corps had been driven off the field: and thanks to Hooker's faulty dispositions Jackson was in a position to reap the full harvest of success. Within a mile and a half lay Chancellorsville and Hooker's headquarters; within half a mile was the White House road leading to the United States Ford, Hooker's sole line of retreat. Between Jackson and his goal next to nothing in the way of an organised force intervened. Sickles, who should have supported Howard, had been isolated by his advance southwards and was in danger of being cut off entirely from the main body. Two brigades of the 12th Corps held Fairview Cemetery and constituted the only force protecting Chancellorsville. Berry's division of the 3rd Corps, which had been held in reserve, was north-east of Chancellorsville, and both the 2nd and 5th Corps and the remainder of the 12th Corps had their hands full; for on the sound of Jackson's battle McLaws had by Lee's orders renewed his demonstrations against Hooker's left centre with increased vigour. A mile south of Chancellorsville Hazel Grove was only held by a few batteries and a handful of infantry. Hooker despatched messengers to bring back Sickles with all speed, and ordered Berry to advance his division to Fairview Cemetery and supported him on the right with a brigade from the 2nd Corps.

After carrying the ridge at Dowdall's Tavern the Confederate advance was much slower. Rodes' and Colston's divisions were

<sup>1</sup> Between the hill on which stood Talley's Farm and the open fields round the Wilderness Church there intervened a patch of forest (2 Henderson, 541).

inextricably mixed up together, and the advance through the dense forest in the fast failing light intensified the confusion. At the point where the road to the United States Ford joined the turnpike the two front divisions were halted. But Jackson had no intention of ceasing his advance until his work was completely finished. He ordered the front divisions to fall back and reform their ranks, and directed Hill's division to take their place and push straight forward. His plan was to drive the enemy still further back and entirely cut him off from the United States Ford. Across the road leading to that ford he intended to take up a strong position and compel Hooker to attack him there in order to recover his line of retreat. Having given his orders to Hill, he rode to the front till he nearly reached his own skirmish line, to see for himself what forces were in his front. More than once this habit of making his reconnaissances in person had brought Jackson into danger; and on this occasion it was destined to prove his destruction. As he was riding back a company of the 18th North Carolina infantry, mistaking his small party for a body of Federal cavalry, fired into it, and Jackson fell pierced by three bullets.

With his fall the Confederate advance came to an end. Hill, after seeing his chief taken to the rear, was hastening to the front to take the command, when he too was wounded. No one knew what Jackson's plans were: the Staff officer who had been deputed to show Hill the road to the White House, by which the Federal retreat was to be cut off, had been killed by the same volley as laid Jackson low. It was determined to send for Stuart to take command of the Corps; but the cavalry commander was at Ely's Ford observing the division of Averell, which was moving to Hooker's support, when the disaster befell Jackson; and it was not till 10.30 p.m. that the summons reached him.<sup>1</sup> He at once hurried to the scene of action and took over the command; but on sending back to the hospital to learn Jackson's plans, he found that the Corps commander was so seriously injured as to be incapable of concentrated thought. He was accordingly left to do the best he could for himself. For the time being the initiative passed to the Federals.<sup>2</sup>

Sickles, on receiving the order of recall, had moved back towards Hazel Grove. Anderson's division was too weak to prevent him from retiring from his position near the Furnace. Orders were then sent by Hooker to Sickles to assail the Confederate right flank and recover the lines where Howard's Corps had made their last stand. About midnight Sickles advanced Birney's

<sup>1</sup> Lee's *Lee*, 252.

<sup>2</sup> The account given in the text of Jackson's flank march, attack, and fall is based almost entirely upon Colonel Henderson's narrative. For further details, see the note at the end of the chapter.



division to the attack, but the Confederates were fully prepared and an ill-directed assault was easily repulsed by Lane's brigade. The Plank road remained in the hands of the Confederates. The chief result of Sickles' attack was to cause Stuart to anticipate that it might be repeated, and therefore to abandon all idea of making a night attack himself.<sup>1</sup>

The Federals made good use of the hours of darkness. The 1st Corps, which had bivouacked on the south bank of the river at the United States Ford and reached the battlefield late at night, was posted on the extreme right, where it secured their line of retreat: and the position on Fairview Heights was considerably strengthened. Hooker sent a telegram to Sedgwick, directing him at once to fight his way through the Confederate forces holding the Fredericksburg Heights, and by dawn to fall upon Lee's rear by the Plank road.

On the morning of the 3rd May the position was by no means unfavourable to the Federals. Jackson's flank march had routed one Corps, but Hooker held a strong position, and the arrival of Reynolds' Corps made him stronger in numbers than on the preceding day. The two wings of the Confederate army were still separated, and there seemed a fair chance of crushing Lee's army in detail. But Jackson's attack had done more than rout Howard's Corps: it had beaten the Federal Commander-in-Chief, and knocked all the fighting out of him. Though the orders which he had sent to Sedgwick imposed upon that general a very dangerous task, and required that for the success of his movement he should receive the fullest co-operation from the main army, Hooker had abandoned all idea of taking the offensive.

His one thought was to contract his lines so as to make the defence stronger. With that object in view he directed Sickles early on the morning of the 3rd to evacuate Hazel Grove and fall back to the lines constructed in front of Fairview. He also instructed his engineer officers to lay out a second line of defence to the north of Chancellorsville, covering the United States Ford. The control of the battle had passed from Hooker's nerveless hands to Lee and Stuart. The latter was quick to see the mistake committed by Hooker in evacuating Hazel Grove. That eminence was, in fact, the key to the whole position. Not only did it separate the two Confederate wings, but artillery on its crest would take in flank any advance of the Confederates along the main road against Fairview.

Stuart crowned the summit with thirty pieces of artillery, and the enfilading fire that these guns brought to bear upon the Federal lines at Fairview virtually rendered that position untenable. The Federal forces covering Chancellorsville were drawn

<sup>1</sup> 2 Henderson, 562.

up in the shape of a V. The western face was held by the 3rd Corps, with one division of the 2nd Corps in support on the right and one division of the 12th Corps on the left. On the eastern face Hancock's division of the 2nd Corps and Geary's division of the 12th were in position.

Stuart had spent the night in bringing up batteries, posting his troops for an attack, and opening up shorter lines of communication with Lee. At sunrise on the 3rd the Confederates rushed from west, south, and east on the Federal entrenchments in front of Chancellorsville. With wild shouts of "Remember Jackson," the indomitable veterans of the 2nd Corps assailed Sickles' position, whilst McLaws and Anderson pressed hard on the Federal left. The fiercest fighting was done by Stuart's Corps; again and again the lines were carried, only to be retaken by the Federals, who fought with dauntless courage.

But the repeated assaults of the Confederates and the deadly fire of Stuart's guns on Hazel Grove combined to break down the dogged resistance of their opponents. After five hours of the fiercest fighting<sup>1</sup> Stuart's men carried the last of the Federal positions in front of Chancellorsville. By this time the Federal army was without a leader. A solid shot from one of the guns on Hazel Grove struck a pillar close to the spot where Hooker was standing, and part of the pillar was flung with great force against him.<sup>2</sup> He fell stunned, and although on recovering consciousness he made an attempt to carry on the command, the pain which he was suffering was so excruciating that he was obliged to send for Couch to relieve him. Couch, however, was afraid to assume the responsibility of deviating from his superior's plan of battle, and the temporary change of commander brought no advantage to the Federals.

There were actually three Corps—the 1st, 5th, and 11th—holding the second line of defence nearer the river within easy reach of the scene of battle. But Hooker refused to call up any part of them to succour his hard-pressed troops in front of Chancellorsville: 37,000 men were standing in their ranks waiting eagerly for the order to advance, which never came.<sup>3</sup> Had Hooker put in either the 1st or 5th Corps on Stuart's left flank the result of the battle would probably have been different. But he was possessed of one idea only, and that was to secure his retreat. All thought of striking a bold blow and retrieving the position had been abandoned by him when he ordered the evacuation of Hazel Grove.

The capture of Chancellorsville brought the two wings of Lee's army, so long separated, together again. The three Federal Corps

<sup>1</sup> 2 Henderson, 567.

<sup>2</sup> Lee's *Lee*, 253. According to another account Hooker was leaning against the pillar when it was struck (3 B. & L., 167).

<sup>3</sup> Doubleday, 53.

which had taken part in the desperate struggle made good their retreat to their new position, which was in the shape of a semi-ellipse with the flanks resting upon the Rapidan and Rappahannock and its centre at Bullock's House about three-quarters of a mile north of Chancellorsville.<sup>1</sup>

Strong as was this position, and great as had been the exertions of the Confederates, Lee was preparing to assault it when news reached him that Sedgwick had carried the Fredericksburg Heights,<sup>2</sup> and was moving along the Plank road towards his rear. He at once abandoned the idea of attacking Hooker again that day and despatched McLaws to hold Sedgwick in check, whilst with the 2nd Corps and the bulk of Anderson's division he took up a position in front of Hooker and commenced to entrench.<sup>3</sup>

Hooker's order, which reached Sedgwick about 11 p.m. on the 2nd, directed him to be in position for an attack on Lee's rear by daylight. Hooker, however, imagined that the greater part of the 6th Corps was on the north side of the river, whereas the whole of it was on the south bank, three miles below Fredericksburg. Shortly after midnight Sedgwick advanced in the direction of the town, which after some skirmishing was occupied by the Federals about 3 a.m.<sup>4</sup> In order to reach Lee's rear it was necessary that the Confederates should be driven from the heights which commanded the road to Chancellorsville. Near the river the atmosphere was thick and misty; in consequence, the attack was postponed till sunrise. Sedgwick, finding it was impossible to carry out Hooker's order to the letter, made the necessary preparations in somewhat leisurely style; and it was not till after 11 a.m. that the Fredericksburg Heights were carried and the road opened to Chancellorsville.<sup>5</sup>

The Confederate force which held Marye's Hill and the adjoining ridge apparently only consisted of Barksdale's brigade. For Early, owing to a mistake of one of Lee's Staff who misinterpreted an order, had marched in the direction of Chancellorsville, and though as soon as the sound of the Federal attack was heard he counter-marched, he was not in time to prevent Sedgwick from driving Barksdale's small force from its position. He fell back along the Telegraph road, prepared either to check Sedgwick's advance if he moved on the direct road to Richmond, or to recover the Fredericksburg Heights if Sedgwick marched towards Chancellorsville.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Doubleday, 52.

<sup>2</sup> See Map III.

<sup>3</sup> 2 Henderson, 569.

<sup>4</sup> Doubleday, 56.

<sup>5</sup> 3 B. & L., 228.

<sup>6</sup> This statement as to Early's movements is taken from White's *Lee*, 274. Some such explanation seems necessary to account for the ease with which Sedgwick succeeded where Burnside had so lamentably failed. It seems quite clear that Marye's Hill was only defended by Barksdale's brigade. Early had also detached one of his four brigades to support Barksdale, but it was diverted to another purpose and took no part in the defence of the hill (Doubleday, 59). The fact that Early assumed the offensive on the following day tends to show that his division was not seriously engaged on the 3rd.



The Federals had suffered severely in the struggle with Barksdale, and Sedgwick judged it expedient to bring up Brooks' division from below Fredericksburg, and to reorganise his command. It was not till 3 p.m. that the movement towards Lee's rear was commenced.<sup>1</sup> Wilcox's brigade, which had been hurried up from Banks' Ford to support Barksdale, fell slowly back before Sedgwick's columns, and considerably delayed the Federal advance.

By 2 p.m. McLaws had taken up a position along a wooded ridge close to Salem Church. Entrenchments were hastily thrown up, and Sedgwick found himself obliged for the second time in the day to assault a force holding a strong position. The attack was gallantly made by Brooks' division, and had it been supported by the other divisions, McLaws' line would have been broken. The Confederate centre was driven in, and for the moment the church and schoolhouse, which formed the key to the position, fell into the hands of the Federals. But a vigorous counterstroke drove them back. The other divisions were not within supporting distance, and after Brooks' repulse no attempt was made to renew the attack.<sup>2</sup>

Sedgwick found that he was opposed by a force stronger than he had anticipated, and like Hooker resigned the offensive, and that night took up a defensive position, covering his line of retreat to Banks' Ford. The next morning found him in a position of great danger. Early had reoccupied the Fredericksburg Heights, and was moving along the Plank road to attack his left flank; McLaws' division was in his front, and Lee himself arrived with the three<sup>3</sup> other brigades of Anderson's division, determined to drive Sedgwick into the river. Hooker, less than seven miles away from Banks' Ford, had nearly 70,000 men, including two Corps—the 1st and 5th—which had practically taken no part in the fighting of the last three days, in his fortified lines protecting the United States Ford. But he had made no attempt on the previous day to advance to his lieutenant's support; and Lee therefore on the 4th left only Stuart's Corps to hold the lines which confronted Hooker, and marched with Anderson's division to crush Sedgwick.

The latter's position with either flank resting upon the river was six miles long and only weakly defended by a force which now did not number more than 20,000, whilst Lee had concentrated at least 25,000 against it.<sup>4</sup> The Confederate attack, however, on this day lacked vigour. Much time was spent in reconnoitring the enemy's line and in getting the troops in position for the attack, and it was

<sup>1</sup> Doubleday, 59.

<sup>2</sup> Doubleday, 60, 61.

<sup>3</sup> One of Anderson's brigades had accompanied McLaws on the 3rd, and another had been watching Banks' Ford.

<sup>4</sup> Doubleday, 65.

6 p.m. before the assault was actually delivered. Sedgwick found himself assailed simultaneously from three sides; but the attacking columns had not the fire and dash which the 2nd Corps had displayed on the 2nd and 3rd May, only on Sedgwick's left was the assault really pressed home. There Early drove Howe's division back to a second line of defence, though he failed to turn the Federal left or cut it off from the river.<sup>1</sup>

At nightfall Sedgwick withdrew his whole force to a second position nearer the river, and as it seemed hopeless to depend upon Hooker for any support and his Corps had lost heavily, under cover of the night he withdrew his troops across the river. When the crossing was already in progress an order arrived from Hooker calling upon Sedgwick to hold his ground, but it was then too late. Hooker afterwards blamed Sedgwick for the precipitancy of his retreat, declaring that it was his intention to cross to the north side of the river with his own force and recrossing at Banks' Ford to unite his two wings on the south side of the river, and thus attain the object of his original movement.

Sedgwick, however, having been called by his commander to a position of great danger and then finding himself entirely left in the lurch, can hardly be censured for resolving to secure at any rate the safety of his own corps.

When on the morning of the 5th Lee found that Sedgwick had made good his retreat, he countermarched with the greater part of his forces to Chancellorsville, intending to make another attack upon Hooker's main army. Heavy rain fell that day and prevented the attack being made, and that night Hooker withdrew his army across the river.

The movement which had commenced with such high hopes on April 27th was ended by the morning of May 6th. The two armies were again confronting each other on either side of the river, and Hooker's great scheme for Lee's destruction had ignominiously failed.

There are not many campaigns so rich in dramatic incident as the nine days' marching and fighting which made up the campaign of Chancellorsville. First, there was Hooker's flank movement, skilfully planned and admirably executed, which on the evening of April 30th seemed on the point of being crowned with complete success. Then came the unexpected check on May 1st, and Hooker, belying his reputation as a fighting general, fell back to Chancellorsville.

On the 2nd Lee risked the desperate expedient of dividing his forces in the presence of the enemy. Success justified the venture.

<sup>1</sup> The brunt of the fighting was borne by Anderson's and Early's divisions. McLaws was prevented by the gathering darkness from perceiving the success of their attack. *Lee's Lee*, 255; Doubleday, 64-6.

However the blame is to be apportioned between Hooker and Howard, the Federal right wing was completely taken by surprise and rolled up by Jackson's onslaught. At 9 p.m. on that night it seemed as if nothing could save Hooker's army from an appalling reverse, but Jackson's fall prevented the Confederates from following up their success. The advance was checked, and May 3rd found the Confederate army in a critical position with its two wings still separated.

It was within Hooker's power at any period either on the 3rd or the 4th to assume the offensive with good hopes of gaining a great victory. But whether he had lost his nerve<sup>1</sup> or had not recovered from the effects of his injury, he made no attempt to direct the subsequent course of the battle. He evacuated Hazel Grove, the key of the position. He allowed three of his Corps to be driven from their lines at Fairview without making the slightest effort to assist them, though he had at his disposal three more Corps eager to join in the fray.

On the 4th the extraordinary spectacle was presented of an army twice the strength of its opponent clinging to two entrenched positions within seven miles of each other, whilst the enemy in spite of his inferior numbers was endeavouring to destroy these two bodies of troops in detail. On the afternoon of the 3rd Hooker, with between 60,000 and 70,000 men, had allowed himself to be held in check by a force less than half the size of his own, and on the 4th, though confronted by a force barely a third of his own numbers,<sup>2</sup> he still made no attempt to force the fighting. When he had regained the northern bank of the Rappahannock he issued a characteristic order to his army, informing it that "in withdrawing from the south bank of the Rappahannock before delivering a general battle to our adversaries, the army has given renewed evidence of its confidence in itself." It is precisely this failure to deliver a general battle which justifies the severest strictures upon Hooker, who with an army double the size of his opponent's allowed himself to be beaten in detail and driven across the river.

On both sides the losses were very heavy; the Federals lost 17,000 and the Confederates 13,000. On the Federal side these losses were very unevenly distributed. The 1st and 5th Corps together lost less than 1,000. Sedgwick's Corps suffered most severely, losing nearly 5,000, and Sickles' Corps, which bore the brunt of the fighting on the 3rd, lost over 4,000. In the Confederate ranks the losses were more evenly distributed, though the heaviest punishment was suffered by the three divisions which

<sup>1</sup> The calumnious statement that Hooker was drunk during the battle of Chancellorsville is refuted by the evidence. He exercised a rigorous self-control during the campaign, and it is possible that this unwonted restraint reacted unfavourably upon his nervous system.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Henderson, 571.



accompanied Jackson on his flank march.<sup>1</sup> Stoneman's cavalry raid against Lee's lines of communication, on which Hooker had based great hopes, proved quite ineffective, and had no influence at all upon the fortunes of the campaign.

In a way the battle of Chancellorsville proved the turning-point of the war, in as much as it was won at the cost of Stonewall Jackson's life. Lee's great lieutenant breathed his last on May 10th. His loss was simply irreparable to the Confederate cause. Lee, writing to Jackson after his wound, thus expressed himself: "Could I have directed events, I should have chosen for the good of the country to be disabled in your stead."

There is no need to go into the question whether Lee or Jackson would have served the Confederacy better in its struggle against overwhelming odds. The two great captains, as long as they fought side by side, were invincible, two thunderbolts of war. The great flank marches in the Second Manassas and Chancellorsville campaigns are the lasting monuments of their united genius and daring. Either had implicit faith in the other. Lee said of Jackson, "Such an executive officer the sun never shone on. No need for me to send or watch him. Straight as the needle to the pole, he advances to the execution of my purpose," and Jackson said of Lee, "I would follow General Lee blindfold." But Jackson was more than an "executive officer." His Valley campaign proved that he could plan as well as carry out far-reaching designs. Had he had a wider field on which to show his strategic ability, it is impossible to say what successes he might not have attained. His fall converted the hard-won victory at Chancellorsville into a barren triumph. Never again after his death did Lee venture on those great flanking movements which decided two campaigns. Jackson was but thirty-nine when he died. In two short years of warfare he won for himself an abiding place among the great soldiers of all time. By his death the South suffered a loss which she never recovered.

#### NOTE ON THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE

An account of the battle of Chancellorsville must include some reference to Lieutenant-Colonel Hamlin's monograph on the operations of May 2nd. His narrative may be regarded as the official version of the 11th Army Corps. A careful perusal of his work will probably upset many of the reader's previous notions about the battle. It has been the usual custom in the North to lay the blame of the defeat upon the 11th Army Corps. This Corps, which was generally regarded as a foreign

<sup>1</sup> 2 Henderson, 576, where the Confederate loss is estimated at 12,277. But the official estimate of the Confederate loss is probably a good deal less than the actual loss.

organisation, was on that account made a scapegoat. The West Pointers of native American origin looked with contempt upon its German officers and united in a crusade to blacken its fame. "Probably three-fifths" of the Corps were, however, Americans by birth, and many other members of it were naturalised citizens. The Corps had served with distinction in the Second Manassas campaign, when it was known as the 1st Corps of Pope's Army of Virginia. It joined the Army of the Potomac after the battle of Fredericksburg, and was then under the command of its popular and trusted leader Sigel; but in April that officer resigned his command and was succeeded by Howard. Other changes took place. Devens was appointed commander of the 1st division and Barlow assigned to the command of a brigade in the 2nd.

These changes were resented by the Corps as unnecessary, and were not calculated to increase its confidence or improve its fighting capacity. Hamlin contends that those officers of the Corps who had fought against Jackson in the Valley and at the Second Manassas expected that Jackson was marching round their flank, but neither Howard nor Devens would listen to the repeated representations made to them. Schurz, commanding the 3rd division, had proposed on the receipt of Hooker's 9.30 a.m. order to withdraw the 1st division and part of his own and form a new line facing west on the eastern bank of Hunting Run, but the Corps commander would not listen to him, and contented himself with causing a shallow line of rifle-pits to be dug on the Dowdall Farm. "There is abundant proof of a picket line well established and on the alert," and numerous urgent reports were sent in from the exposed flank, but Howard and Devens had so completely adopted Hooker's view that Lee was retreating, that they received the officers, who made the reports, with incredulity and even taunts.

Their historian claims for the 11th Corps that it made as good a fight against overwhelming odds as any troops could have done under like circumstances. For an hour and a half (he makes the attack commence as early as 5.15 p.m. and puts the capture of the Dowdall Farm at 7 p.m. or thereabouts) the unequal struggle was maintained against a greatly superior force, which attacked them in detail, in rear and flank, with a loss to the Federal Corps of 1,500 killed and wounded and 1,000 prisoners. The last stand was made in the line of rifle-pits on the Dowdall Farm, and when that was carried Buschbeck's brigade retreated in perfect order and unpursued to Fairview, whilst Schurz with five regiments and the fragments of some others took position in the woods north of the Plank road covering the Bullock road.

The one thing, in Hamlin's opinion, which robbed Jackson's attack of complete success, was the blunder of Colquitt. That officer was in command of the right brigade of Rodes' division. As he was advancing through the woods between the Plank and the Pike roads he encountered a strong piquet line; at the same time seeing some cavalry on his right front (these were apparently some of Stuart's men dressed in Federal uniforms) he imagined that Sickles was returning from the Furnace to fall upon his flank, and halting his brigade, changed front to the south. He made Ramseur, who was following him, do the same with his brigade.

Stuart's cavalry and the Stonewall brigade, which were on the Plank road, were also obliged to halt, until Colquitt, who had the right of way, resumed his march. By this blunder seventeen infantry regiments were kept out of action for from forty to sixty minutes, and took no part in the battle until they came in on the left flank of the Federal force making its last stand on the Buschbeck line. "There is certainly reason to believe that if Colquitt had followed his orders with the same alacrity which the rest of his associates did, Devens' division would have been captured almost to a man, and that Schurz's division would have been rolled up before it could be fairly formed, and that Jackson would have been in the field in the rear of Chancellor's House before Sickles knew of his attack."

The scene of Jackson's death is placed on the Mountain road. "The Mountain road is an old road which comes out of the Plank road about half a mile from Chancellor's and runs parallel with and north of it from sixty to eighty yards distant, and again comes into it together with the Bullock road opposite to the road from Hazel Grove." Jackson's objective was not Fairview, but the White House, and, therefore, he was not riding along the Plank road, as usually represented.

The extraordinary inventions of General Pleasonton about what occurred late in the evening at Hazel Grove are forcibly exposed. The famous charge made by Major Peter Keenan with the 8th Pennsylvania cavalry is reduced to its true proportions. The regiment was commanded not by Major Keenan, but by Colonel Huey. It was not ordered by Pleasonton to charge in order to give him time to get his artillery into position, but had been sent to report to Howard at the Dowdall Tavern, and had started on its way before Pleasonton returned to Hazel Grove. Marching in total unconsciousness of its danger, it had almost reached the Plank road, when it suddenly encountered the victorious Confederates. Huey ordered a dash to be made for the road, intending to turn to the right and cut his way through to Chancellorsville. But finding the road to the right blocked by the enemy, he turned to the left and rode down the road. When he had gone about 100 yards a volley was poured in by some troops concealed in the woods, which killed Keenan and some thirty others. Keenan, instead of being "impaled on the bayonets of the enemy," was killed by a musket-shot about a mile away from the spot where the famous charge is represented as taking place.

Pleasanton's claim that with twenty-two guns he checked Jackson's victorious advance and saved the Federal army is also condemned as a fabrication. Hamlin points out that Pleasanton's guns were more than 1,600 yards distant from the Plank road, on or near which nearly all Jackson's Corps was halted by the Dowdall Farm and the Wilderness Church. The only Confederate troops which approached Hazel Grove were two small parties of foragers belonging to the 4th and 21st Georgia regiments, and they made haste to retreat as soon as the artillery fire ceased.

The wild rout, which swept across Hazel Grove past the Chancellor House, where it encountered Hooker and his Staff, was not composed of the 11th Corps, but consisted of the reserve ammunition train of the 3rd Corps with other *impedimenta* belonging to the force which had advanced under Sickles to the Furnace. Few, if any, of the 11th Corps took part



in this rout, as the retreat of the Corps was already over and the greater part of it was again in line of battle either on the Bullock road or at Fairview.

Sickles' midnight charge is also exposed as a great exaggeration. The attack was easily repulsed by two regiments of Lane's brigade without the Federals reaching the Plank road or getting within a mile of Howard's entrenchments, whilst Sickles' right column came into collision with Williams' division of the 12th Corps, and the Federals suffered considerable loss from their own fire. Hamlin also shows that Berry's division of the 3rd Corps, which generally shares with Pleasonton's artillery and Keenan's cavalry the honour of checking Jackson, did nothing of the sort. A space of at least 700 yards, densely wooded, intervened between Berry's line and that of Pender's brigade, which faced it, and no attack was made by the Confederates during that night on Berry's division.

Colonel Hamlin holds that the disaster of May 2nd was due to Hooker abandoning his original policy of a strict defensive and allowing Sickles to make his reconnoissance, which stripped the 11th Corps of its supports.

## CHAPTER XVI

### GETTYSBURG

A temporary lull—Reasons why Lee assumed the offensive—Reorganisation of the Army of Northern Virginia—Lee commences his advance—Lee's object in invading the North—Ewell drives the Federals out of the Shenandoah Valley—Hooker withdraws from the Rappahannock—The Confederates cross the Potomac—Cavalry encounters between the two armies—Lee committed to an invasion of Pennsylvania with his whole army—Invasion of Pennsylvania—Hooker relieved of the command of the Army of the Potomac—Succeeded by Meade—Lee orders a concentration at Cash-town—Stuart's raid—Disastrous results of the raid—Disposition of the two armies—Federal cavalry occupy Gettysburg—Confederates march on Gettysburg—Battle of July 1st—Arrival of Howard—Arrival of Ewell—The Federals defeated—The Confederates fail to follow up their advantage—Lee committed to an offensive battle—Confederate delay on the 2nd—The Federal position—Faulty formation of Sickles' Corps—Longstreet attacks the Federal left—The Confederates fail to capture the Round Tops—The Federal centre temporarily broken—The Confederate left wing on the 2nd—Johnson secures a footing on Culp's Hill—Early's attack on Cemetery Hill repulsed—Results of the day's fighting—Lee determines to renew the attack on the 3rd—Federal Council of War—Lee's plan of attack—Johnson driven from Culp's Hill—Longstreet's delay—A great artillery duel—Pickett's charge—Longstreet fails to support Pickett—Meade's failure to deliver a counterstroke—Cavalry engagement—Lee stands at bay on the 4th—The Confederate army retreats—Lee recrosses the Potomac—Criticism of the campaign.

FOR just a month the two armies remained facing each other on opposite sides of the Rappahannock. Hooker, after his costly failure at Chancellorsville, was not disposed to resume the offensive. The next move must come from Lee. It has been said that Lee's hesitation to make that move was owing to the heavy losses which he had suffered at Chancellorsville.<sup>1</sup> But heavy as those losses had been, they had been made good by the arrival of Hood's and Pickett's divisions of the 1st Corps. His real reason for not moving sooner was the reluctance of his Government to abandon its defensive policy. After Chancellorsville high hopes were entertained in the Government circles at Richmond that peace would quickly ensue.<sup>2</sup> It was expected that the peace party at the North, or Copperheads, as they were termed by their political opponents, would soon be strong enough to force President Lincoln into recognising the independence of the South, and it was believed, too, that foreign intervention might shortly be looked for. Holding

<sup>1</sup> Doubleday, 76.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Henderson, 577.

these views, President Davis and his Cabinet were not disposed to make any attempt to improve the victory just gained. A second reason which detained Lee on the south side of the Rappahannock was his weakness in cavalry. He was not willing to undertake an offensive campaign until he had gathered together a sufficient force of that arm.

From a military point of view there was every reason why Lee should take the initiative. A purely defensive war, if fought out to the bitter end and converted simply into a struggle of endurance, must result disastrously to the weaker side. Only by taking great risks and winning great victories was there any chance of forcing the North into conceding peace. An invasion of the North would, as in the previous year, do much to lighten the strain upon the Confederate commissariat, and would bring home to the Northerner in visible shape the horrors of war. There was another reason, which perhaps weighed even more with the Confederate Government than with Lee. The fate of Vicksburg was trembling in the balance: an invasion of the North might possibly have the effect of recalling Grant's army from the Mississippi, and if its fall was inevitable, then it was highly desirable that some brilliant success should be gained in the East as a set-off to so heavy a blow in the West.<sup>1</sup>

By the end of May Lee's army numbered over 68,000 men ready for duty.<sup>2</sup> More than 9,000 cavalry were under Stuart's command. The artillery of the army had been carefully reorganised, and after attaching to each Corps its appointed number of batteries, the whole of the reserve artillery was placed under the command of General Pendleton. The Army of Northern Virginia was now divided into three, in place of the old arrangement of two Corps. Longstreet continued in command of the 1st Corps, and Ewell and A. P. Hill were appointed to command the 2nd and 3rd.

Ewell was the senior major-general in the army; he had been Jackson's second in command during the Valley campaign, and had but just rejoined the army after losing a leg at the Second Manassas. He was universally popular as a good soldier, though eccentric, and a hard fighter. But over the appointment of A. P. Hill there was a certain amount of sectional jealousy. He was a young man, having graduated at West Point in 1847, and in the Army of Northern Virginia both D. H. Hill and McLaws ranked him. Lee has been accused of recommending him for promotion because he was a Virginian. But some months earlier, after the

<sup>1</sup> It may, however, be fairly argued that the best way of relieving Vicksburg would have been to send some portion of the Army of Northern Virginia to the West, as was actually done later in the year, when Bragg had been manœuvred out of Chattanooga. (See Johnston's *Narrative*, 225-6; 3 B. & L., 245, 639, note.)

<sup>2</sup> Lee's *Lee*, 260. This estimate does not, however, include ten artillery batteries or 6,116 officers "present for duty." (3 B. & L., 440.)



Maryland campaign Lee, when writing to President Davis upon the subject of organising the army into Corps, had spoken of A. P. Hill as the best officer of his grade in the army.<sup>1</sup>

On June 3rd the Confederate movement commenced. It could only be round Hooker's right. On that day the divisions of McLaws and Hood started for Culpeper (see Map III.). Ewell's Corps followed the next day. Hooker, finding that some movement was going on in the opposite lines, had bridges laid at the old crossing place below Fredericksburg, and on the 5th one division of the 6th Corps crossed the river to find out what was left in its front. On the 7th General Pleasonton, who had superseded Stoneman in command of the cavalry, was sent to make a reconnaissance in force in the direction of Culpeper. As soon as Lee saw that the Federal movement was a mere feint, he directed Longstreet and Ewell to resume their march, which for the moment had been interrupted, and the two infantry Corps were concentrated at Culpeper on June 8th.

Pleasanton on the 9th moved his three cavalry divisions, supported by two infantry brigades, across the Rappahannock under the impression that Stuart was concentrating his cavalry force at Culpeper. His information was, however, defective. Stuart had already concentrated his whole force at Brandy Station and, defeating two of his divisions in detail, forced him to recross the river. He claimed, however, to have inflicted such damage upon the Confederate cavalry that Lee was obliged to abandon his original scheme of invading the North on the east side of the Blue Ridge, as Stuart's Corps would no longer form a sufficient screen for his movements in the open country.<sup>2</sup>

But there is very good reason for holding that Lee had never meditated crossing the Potomac on the east side of the Blue Ridge. Even before Chancellorsville, as is shown by his letter to President Davis on April 16th, he had been thinking of entering the Valley and driving the Federal force holding Winchester beyond the Potomac.<sup>3</sup> Pennsylvania, not Maryland, was the destined theatre of operations. He hoped to strike terror into the population of the North by capturing some of their great commercial cities. Harrisburg was to be the first victim, and if his plans worked smoothly, Philadelphia itself might be expected to fall next. At the same time, he desired, as in his previous invasion, to draw Hooker so far from Washington or Baltimore that a victory won in Pennsylvania might be followed by the annihilation of the Army of the Potomac and peace be wrested from the Federal Government by a crushing blow inflicted upon their one army in the East. The further north he could draw Hooker the better would be his chance of achieving that object :

<sup>1</sup> 3 B. & L., 355.

<sup>2</sup> Doubleday, 84.

<sup>3</sup> 2 Henderson, 509.

and for that purpose the Cumberland Valley presented more advantages to an invading army than if the line of the Monocacy were followed (Map IV.).

On the 10th Ewell's Corps, now leading the advance, resumed the march to the Valley by the Front Royal road. The Federal force holding the northern part of the Valley was concentrated at Winchester under Milroy, and numbered about 10,000 men; one detachment was posted at Berryville (Map V.). On the 13th Ewell, with Early's and Johnson's divisions, was moving direct on Winchester, and Rodes' division was advancing on Berryville. The detachment at the latter place made good its retreat to Winchester, though hotly pursued by the Confederate cavalry. Rodes kept on to Martinsburg.

To have fallen back immediately from Winchester would have compelled Milroy to sacrifice the Berryville detachment, which was exhausted with its thirty-mile march. There was some sharp fighting round Winchester on the 14th, and on that night Milroy found himself in a position of great peril. Ewell had skilfully disposed his Corps so as to intercept the Federal retreat.

Milroy spiked all his guns, destroyed his ammunition, left his sick and wounded in Winchester, and in the early hours of the 15th started to cut his way through the forces which blocked his line of retreat. The attempt to force the main road proving unsuccessful, the Federals lost their cohesion and made for the Potomac in isolated bodies. Milroy claimed to have brought off 5,000 of his command,<sup>1</sup> and the Confederates claimed 4,000 prisoners.<sup>2</sup>

The Federals were completely expelled from the Valley, and the garrison of Harper's Ferry was drawn across the river to the Maryland Heights. Milroy's resistance, as some compensation for his heavy loss, had gained time for the Federal Government to make preparations to meet the threatened invasion.<sup>3</sup> The President called upon the Governors of West Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New York for 120,000 men for temporary service. Two new military departments had been created in Pennsylvania: that of the Monongahela, under the command of General Brooks, with its headquarters at Pittsburg (Map I.), and that of the Susquehanna, under General Couch, with headquarters at Carlisle. Couch was succeeded in the command of the 2nd Corps of the Army of the Potomac by Hancock.

On the 13th Hooker at last abandoned his position at Falmouth, and moved off towards Washington. As Lee had foreseen, his advance into the Valley was certain to draw the Army of the Potomac northwards. Hooker would have preferred to let Lee's movement develop itself and then to cross the Rappahannock, and either by weight of superior numbers crush Hill's isolated corps, or

<sup>1</sup> Doubleday, 94.

<sup>2</sup> 3 B. & L., 265.

<sup>3</sup> Doubleday, 95.

by a turning movement march straight on Richmond. But neither Lincoln nor Halleck would hear of Hooker crossing to the south side of the Rappahannock when Lee was threatening to reach the north bank of the Potomac. The old fear of the Federal Government for the safety of the capital demanded that Hooker's army should be brought back to cover Washington.

As soon as the Federal army left its lines at Falmouth, Hill marched away towards Culpeper (Map V.), and on the 15th Longstreet's Corps, whose place was now taken by Hill's, moved to occupy Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps in the Blue Ridge. On that same day Ewell's vanguard crossed the Potomac, and Jenkins' cavalry brigade on the same evening entered Chambersburg (Map IV.). Pressing forward, Jenkins succeeded in occupying Carlisle before Couch could reach it.

Lee's movements were made with great caution. He was anxious about his communications, on which he depended for his supply of ammunition. For though, after crossing the Potomac, he might be able to find subsistence for his army in Northern territory, yet for ammunition he was dependent upon his line of communications being preserved intact. It seems probable that his object in moving Longstreet's Corps from Culpeper towards Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps was to induce Hooker to leave the strong position which he held about Centreville and Manassas in order to attack Longstreet.<sup>1</sup> But Hooker refused to be drawn from his post in front of Washington.

On the 16th Stuart's cavalry left the Rappahannock, where it had been watching the fords, and moved along the eastern base of the Blue Ridge to protect Longstreet's right flank. On the next three days a succession of encounters took place between Stuart and Pleasonton. It was the former's object to secure and hold the Gaps in the Bull Run Mountains in order to screen completely the advance of the Confederate army and to leave Hooker in doubt as to its ultimate destination.

But the cavalry engagements resulted in favour of the Federals, and Stuart was forced back to Ashby's Gap, where he took shelter behind Longstreet's Corps. Pleasonton's success enabled Hooker to move further west, whilst still covering the capital, and to take up a strong position at Leesburg and the Gaps of the Bull Run Mountains, and left Lee no choice, even had he desired otherwise, save to cross the whole of his army over the Potomac on the west side of the Blue Ridge. As Hooker still refused to be drawn from his defensive position, Longstreet's Corps was withdrawn to the west bank of the Shenandoah, and Stuart's cavalry was left to hold the Blue Ridge Gaps.

Lee had now finally made up his mind to invade Pennsylvania

<sup>1</sup> Doubleday, 99.



with his whole army. Ewell's operations had made it plain that there would be no difficulty in getting supplies, and it seemed as though nothing short of a direct invasion of the North would draw Hooker across the Potomac. At the same time he was fully conscious of the risk which he was running, and earnestly begged President Davis to allow a second army, "even in effigy," to be organised under Beauregard at Culpeper, in order that part of the Federal army might be detained south of Washington, and to that extent the pressure upon his own forces lightened. But the President was in no mood to send reinforcements to Lee. He was at the moment greatly concerned for the safety of Richmond, which was being threatened by demonstrations from Fortress Monroe, where General Dix was in command of a considerable force. He refused to allow Beauregard or any of the troops which were garrisoning the Atlantic coast defences to be sent north.

On the 23rd, Rodes' and Johnson's divisions reached Chambersburg: Early's division was marching in the direction of York, hoping to capture the railway bridge over the Susquehanna at Wrightsville.

On the 24th, Longstreet's and Hill's Corps were crossing the Potomac at Williamsport and Shepherdstown. The next day these two Corps reunited at Hagerstown and moved forward to Chambersburg, which they occupied on the 27th. On the same day Ewell with two divisions entered Carlisle, and Jenkins' cavalry reached Kingston within thirteen miles of Harrisburg, and on the same night Early took possession of York.<sup>1</sup> Pushing on to Wrightsville, Early hoped to capture the railway bridge over the Susquehanna. If successful in that object, he intended to cross the river, destroy all railway and telegraphic communication between Philadelphia and the West, and then to march up the north bank of the river, capture Harrisburg, and rejoin Ewell at Carlisle. He was not, however, in time to prevent a force of militia setting fire to and destroying the bridge, and after this fell back to York and waited for further orders.

On the 25th Hooker, seeing that Lee was fully committed to the invasion of Pennsylvania by the Cumberland Valley, determined himself to cross the Potomac and march along the eastern base of the South Mountain range parallel to Lee's line of advance, and at the first favourable opportunity attack his line of communications. On the following day his headquarters were at Frederick City, where three Corps were concentrated. Three other Corps, forming the left wing under the command of Reynolds, were further west at Boonsborough and Middletown. The 12th Corps was sent to Harper's Ferry to co-operate with the garrison of that post in attacking Lee's line of communications.

<sup>1</sup> Doubleday, 112.

Hooker's general idea was to advance with his Corps spread out in the shape of a fan towards the Susquehanna with the left wing covering his flank in case Longstreet's and Hill's Corps turned east, whilst Slocum with the 12th Corps and the Harper's Ferry garrison threatened Lee's rear.<sup>1</sup> But Hooker no longer retained the confidence of the Washington authorities, either military or political. By his failure at Chancellorsville he had forfeited Halleck's support. Rightly enough he had demanded that all forces within the actual theatre of operations should be placed under his control. He had no sympathy with the excessive solicitude which kept a large force within the fortifications of Washington,<sup>2</sup> when the Army of the Potomac was already safeguarding the capital: and Halleck's refusal to allow him to dispose of the garrison of Harper's Ferry caused him to send in his resignation. It was promptly accepted by the Government, who appointed General Meade, one of the Corps commanders of the Army of the Potomac, to the chief command on June 28th: and Meade with some reluctance, knowing that the army was looking to Reynolds as Hooker's successor, accepted the appointment.<sup>3</sup>

George G. Meade, the fifth commander that the Army of the Potomac had had within the last ten months,<sup>4</sup> was in his forty-eighth year. He had graduated at West Point in 1835 as an engineer, and served in Mexico on General Patterson's staff. He had not very long been a Corps commander, having been appointed to the command of the 5th Corps when Hooker was reorganising the army. During the campaign of Chancellorsville his Corps had taken very little part in the fighting. As a division commander he had seen some hard fighting both at the Antietam and Fredericksburg. He must be reckoned a meritorious rather than a brilliant commander.<sup>5</sup> On assuming command he had no choice but to carry out in the main Hooker's plans. He abandoned the idea of threatening Lee's line of communications and recalled Slocum's Corps to the main army. His general idea was to intervene between Lee and Philadelphia, in case the Confederates continued to march north, between Lee and Baltimore or Washington, if they turned back.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Doubleday, 114.

<sup>2</sup> Heintzelman commanded the Department of Washington with a force of about 36,000 men (Swinton, 321).

<sup>3</sup> Lincoln, Stanton, and Halleck had all agreed after Chancellorsville that under no circumstances must Hooker be allowed to command in another battle. But the political influence of Hooker's friends was so great that the Government, instead of directly relieving Hooker of the command, adopted the tortuous method of forcing him to resign (3 B. & L., 241).

<sup>4</sup> Of these five commanders Pope is reckoned as the first. Though he was not technically in command of the Army of the Potomac, yet a considerable part of that army came under his command during the Second Manassas campaign.

<sup>5</sup> Palfrey, 55.

<sup>6</sup> Doubleday, 115.

It was not till the evening of the 28th that Lee was informed that the Army of the Potomac, which he had supposed to be still south of the Potomac, was concentrated in the neighbourhood of Frederick City. He at once scented danger for his communications and determined to prevent any movement against them by threatening Baltimore.<sup>1</sup> Orders were immediately sent to his Corps commanders to fall back and concentrate at Cashtown, near the eastern foot of the South Mountain range. His intention was to fight a defensive battle near that range, so that in case of defeat he might be able to withdraw his army and trains through the Gaps without fear of an effective pursuit.

Meade for his part also wished to fight a defensive battle, and had fixed upon the line of Pipe Creek, about twelve miles south-east of Gettysburg, as the position which he would hold. It may be doubted, however, whether Lee would have attacked him in that position, or whether the Federal army standing on the defensive on that line could have prevented the Confederates from plundering Pennsylvania at pleasure, and capturing Harrisburg, and even Philadelphia.<sup>2</sup>

Lee was seriously handicapped by his want of information. Hooker had crossed the Potomac on the 25th, but Lee was not informed of that fact till three days later. This lack of information was due to Stuart's absence. With three brigades he had made a movement round Hooker's rear, crossed the Potomac on the 27th between Hooker and Washington, on the 28th captured a supply train at Rockville within a few miles of Washington, and on the 29th broken up, as well as the limited time at his disposal allowed, the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. He then made for York, where he expected to find Early. But threatened by the superior numbers of the Federal cavalry, and hampered by keeping with him the captured train, he did not reach the neighbourhood of York until Early had already evacuated that town under orders recalling him to Cashtown. On the night of the 30th, whilst pushing on for York, he passed within seven miles of Early's division, marching towards Gettysburg, but neither force was aware of the presence of the other.<sup>3</sup> Hearing that Early had left York, Stuart pushed on to Carlisle only to find that place also occupied by Federal forces. It was not till the afternoon of the 2nd July that he reached Gettysburg and by that time the men and horses of his command were completely exhausted.

Stuart has sometimes been blamed for making this raid, and an attempt has been made to put the whole responsibility for the defeat of Gettysburg upon his shoulders. But the responsibility must be shared with Lee and Longstreet. It was left to the cavalry commander's discretion by Lee either to cross the Potomac

<sup>1</sup> Doubleday, 116.

<sup>2</sup> Doubleday, 120.

<sup>3</sup> Doubleday, 121.







at Shepherdstown, or to make a sweep round Hooker's rear and cross the river to the east of the Federal army; and Longstreet was opposed to crossing at Shepherdstown on the ground that it would too clearly indicate the Confederate plans to their opponents.<sup>1</sup>

Two of the Southern cavalry brigades had been left to guard Gaps in the Blue Ridge. Jenkins' brigade was far in advance of the main army, and skirmishing within four miles of Harrisburg,<sup>2</sup> when Ewell received his orders of recall; and Imboden's brigade had been sent westward to break up the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and prevent any attack from that direction being made upon the Confederate communications.

Consequently Lee found himself, partly by his own fault, stripped of his cavalry. The eyes of the army were absent. The Confederates stumbled blindly upon their opponents, and the result was that Lee, in place of fighting a defensive battle at Cashtown, where his line of retreat would have been secure, was forced into fighting an offensive battle at Gettysburg about eight miles further east. As Lee was moving south-east in order to cover his communications, and Meade was advancing north-west to get touch of the enemy, a collision was inevitable.

On the night of June 30th the disposition of the two armies was as follows. The 1st Federal Corps was at Marsh Creek between Emmetsburg and Gettysburg, the 11th Corps was at Emmetsburg. Two other Corps, the 3rd and the 12th, were within supporting distance on the west side of Pipe Creek, the other three were spread out in a fan shape behind Pipe Creek. On the Confederate side Rodes' and Early's divisions, marching respectively from Carlisle and York, were near Heidlersburg. Johnson's division had taken a more circuitous route with the trains and was west of the mountains. Hill had two divisions at Cashtown, but Anderson's division was in the rear at the mountain pass on the Chambersburg road. The whole of Longstreet's Corps was west of the mountains, and Pickett's division was at Chambersburg guarding the trains.

On the 30th Buford's cavalry division had by Pleasonton's orders occupied Gettysburg, and on the same day Pettigrew's brigade of Hill's Corps, pushing forward towards Gettysburg, in the hope of replenishing the Confederate stock of shoes, had come in contact with Buford's outposts and fallen back to Cashtown. Early on July 1st Hill sent Heth's division, supported by Pender's, to Gettysburg to find out what was in his front (see Plan). At the same time Reynolds was advancing the 1st Corps to Gettysburg, and had ordered the 11th to follow. At 9 a.m. Heth came into contact with Buford's skirmishers.<sup>3</sup> After about an hour's fighting Reynolds, with Wadsworth's division of the 1st Corps, reached the scene of battle. The chief fighting took place on

<sup>1</sup> 3 B. & L., 251-2.

<sup>2</sup> Doubleday, 118.

<sup>3</sup> Doubleday, 126.



the banks of Willoughby Run, and on a ridge to the east of that stream and about a mile from Gettysburg.<sup>1</sup> Early in the action Reynolds was killed, but Archer's brigade, which formed the right of Heth's line, was driven back across the Run with heavy loss, and Archer himself was taken prisoner. When Pender came up to the support of Heth the 1st Corps, now under the command of Doubleday, found itself outnumbered.

At 11.30 a.m. Howard arrived on the field, and by right of seniority assumed the command of the left wing. He ordered the 1st Corps to hold its ground, sent back for the 11th Corps to advance with all speed, and also sent to the commanders of the 3rd and 12th Corps asking for assistance. The 11th Corps came up about 1 p.m. Two divisions were hurried forward to take their position on the right of the Federal line, whilst the third division was held in reserve on Cemetery Hill.

By this time, however, Ewell with his two divisions was nearing Gettysburg, and Howard directed his two leading divisions to change front so as to face Ewell's advance. Consequently there was a considerable gap left between the right of the 1st and the left of the 11th Corps. About 2.30 p.m. Rodes' division was engaging Howard, and at 3.30 p.m. Early's division struck the 11th Corps on the right flank.

His arrival decided the day in favour of the Confederates. The 11th Corps, finding its right enveloped, was obliged to abandon its position across Seminary Ridge, and retreat through the town. The retreat of the 11th Corps uncovered the right of the 1st, and the pressure upon it by Hill's two divisions and several brigades of Rodes' division grew too heavy to be resisted.<sup>2</sup> Howard refused either to withdraw the 1st Corps or to send it reinforcements.<sup>3</sup> Pender's division overlapped the left of the 1st Corps by a quarter of a mile, and great difficulty was experienced in extricating that Corps from its perilous position. A sturdy resistance was offered on Seminary Ridge, but an advance of Confederate troops on the right threatening to cut off the line of retreat to Cemetery Hill at length compelled Doubleday to withdraw his exhausted men through Gettysburg to the new line of defence.

At 3 p.m. Hancock reached the field,<sup>4</sup> having been sent by Meade to supersede Howard in the command. He promptly realised the importance of holding Cemetery Hill, and sent a division of

<sup>1</sup> McPherson's Ridge.

<sup>2</sup> Four out of Rodes' five brigades seem to have been engaged with the 1st Corps at one time or another on that afternoon.

<sup>3</sup> Doubleday, 146. Howard in his Official Report says that he sent orders to the 1st Corps to retreat, but the order was not sent till Doubleday's left had been turned, and the 1st Corps was already retreating, and it is very doubtful if Doubleday ever received it.

<sup>3</sup> B. & L., 288; Doubleday, 149.

<sup>4</sup> Hancock's Official Report. 3 B. & L., 287.

the 1st Corps to the right of the 11th to hold Culp's Hill. The Federal force holding the hills was very weak. The 1st Corps had been very much cut up, and the 11th Corps was much demoralised. Had the Confederates at once followed up their success, they might have carried the position. Probably not more than 6,000 Federals were holding it,<sup>1</sup> and four strong Confederate divisions were in the field.

Lee, on reaching Seminary Ridge and seeing the state of affairs, sent to Ewell to press the attack, and, if possible, capture Cemetery Hill. At the same time, however, he warned him not to bring on a general battle. For none of Longstreet's Corps had yet arrived, and both the 2nd and 3rd Corps were minus a division.

A false report, that a Federal force was threatening his left flank, caused Ewell to postpone the attack until Johnson's division should have arrived. It marched on to the battlefield about 6 p.m., but by that hour the 12th Corps and part of the 3rd had reinforced the Federal lines. Ewell was unwilling to attack so strong a position unless Hill could co-operate in the assault. But both of Hill's divisions had lost heavily in the earlier fighting, and that commander would make no movement until the arrival of Anderson's division. It came up at sunset, but by that time it was too late to make the attack. So ended the first day of the battle of Gettysburg. Nearly 50,000 men had been engaged,<sup>2</sup> and thus far the Confederates had gained a decided success.

Lee now found himself, as a result of Hill's reconnaissance in force, committed to an offensive battle. Being ten miles east of the South Mountain range he was reluctant to retreat for fear of endangering his trains: and the impossibility of collecting supplies prevented him remaining on Seminary Ridge, and standing on the defensive. It would have been possible for him to manœuvre, and by making a flank movement to the right to get between the Federal army and Washington, and so force Meade to deliver an offensive battle. This was indeed the course advised by Longstreet, and various able military writers have maintained that this is what should have been done.<sup>3</sup> But on the night of July 1st Lee was in great hopes of destroying his foe in detail. The Cemetery Hill was held by the 1st and 11th Corps, which had both been severely defeated, and by the 12th Corps. The 3rd Corps was within supporting distance, but Meade's other three Corps were some distance off. The 2nd Corps went into camp on the night of the 1st, four miles from the battlefield: the 5th Corps was nine

<sup>1</sup> White's *Lee*, 294. But General Hunt (3 B. & L., 284) considers that a Confederate assault was not practicable before 5.30 p.m., and that by that time the Federal position was perfectly secure.

<sup>2</sup> Lee's *Lee*, 271, note.

<sup>3</sup> Hamley's *Operations of War*, 420. But Hunt (3 B. & L., 293) denies that this move would have produced the desired effect.

miles off, and the 6th Corps, which was the largest in the army, was twenty-five miles away, having already marched nine from Manchester.<sup>1</sup> Had the Federal lines been attacked at dawn on the 2nd, it is hard to see how the four Corps in position could have escaped destruction. For the 3rd Corps would on advancing have found itself involved in the rout of the other three, and all four could have been cut off from the rest of the Federal army.

Meade was just as unwilling to fight at Gettysburg as Lee had been.<sup>2</sup> But his hand also had been forced, first by Reynolds' advance to Gettysburg and then by Hancock selecting the Cemetery Hill and Ridge as the position to be finally held by the whole army.

As to the cause of the delay of the Confederate attack on the following day, a bitter controversy rages. The general opinion lays the blame upon Longstreet. He was with Lee on the Seminary Ridge at 5 p.m. on July 1st. After sunset Lee rode through Gettysburg, and met in conference Ewell, Early, and Rodes. His original wish was that the Federal right should be attacked next morning. But the commander of the 2nd Corps and his two senior divisional commanders dissuaded the Confederate leader. They pointed out that the weak point in the Federal line was its left, where a gentle slope led from the one ridge to the other, whilst its strongest point was the right.

Lee's next suggestion was that if he attacked with the right wing, Ewell should move his Corps round on to the Seminary Ridge, as the Confederate line was long and thin, and Lee feared lest the Federals should make an attempt to break it at some point. But the three officers of the 2nd Corps were not only sure that they could hold their ground against any attack, but were confident that they could carry Culp's Hill, and by crowning that height with artillery enfilade the Federal right centre. The conference broke up with the understanding that Longstreet would be ordered to attack Meade's left as early as possible on the following morning, and that as soon as the sound of his guns was heard the 2nd Corps would assault the Federal right, whilst Hill's Corps would demonstrate against the centre.<sup>3</sup>

Lee had another interview with Longstreet after returning from Gettysburg, and it was then, according to General Pendleton, Lee's Chief of Artillery, that Longstreet was ordered to attack at sunrise next morning.<sup>4</sup> As his two divisions were encamped within four miles of the battlefield, there was no reason why they should not

<sup>1</sup> This distribution of Meade's forces is taken from W. S. Reyall's "Battle of Gettysburg," *United Services Magazine*, vol. xv. Two brigades of the 3rd Corps encamped at Emmetsburg, and did not reach the field till 9 a.m. on the 2nd (3 B. & L., 294).

<sup>2</sup> See note at end of chapter.

<sup>3</sup> For this conference between Lee and the chief officers of the 2nd Corps, cf. White's *Lee*, 290-7.

<sup>4</sup> *Lee's Lee*, 276.



have been ready to engage at that hour. Longstreet, however, denies that any such order was given him. He was vehemently opposed to attacking the Federal lines, and wished instead to manœuvre Meade's army out of its position. He seems to have been under the extraordinary impression that Lee was distinctly pledged to him, his subordinate, only to fight a defensive battle. His view of the relation which should exist between a commander-in-chief and his lieutenant was a violation of all military discipline. It would almost seem as though he thought that Jackson's death had in some way altered the position in which he stood to Lee.

There is some doubt as to the hour at which the two divisions of the 1st Corps reached the Seminary Ridge on the 2nd. Hood speaks of being on the ground soon after daybreak, and says that his division shortly followed him. But it seems more probable that the two divisions did not arrive before 8 a.m.<sup>1</sup> Longstreet had been with Lee since daybreak arguing in favour of a movement round Meade's left. As Lee watched the steady stream of Federal reinforcements pouring in, he knew that no time must be lost, if a victory was to be won. He overruled Longstreet's objections, and as he now had both of his divisions on the ground, gave him orders to attack as soon as possible with that portion of his command which was then up. But Longstreet, on his own responsibility, preferred to wait until Law's brigade of Hood's division reached him. It was a great misfortune that during this battle Lee issued no written orders.<sup>2</sup> It is probable that Longstreet would not have disregarded a direct order in writing. But an order issued by mere word of mouth he seems to have regarded as little more than a suggestion, which it was within his discretion to act upon or not.

It was not till noon that Law's brigade, having marched twenty-four miles that morning, arrived upon the scene.<sup>3</sup> In the meanwhile Lee, having given what he regarded as sufficiently definite orders to Longstreet, directed Hill to join in the attack in concert with Longstreet's left, and then rode on to Gettysburg to confer with Ewell. He found the 2nd Corps anxiously awaiting the signal, which was to be given by Longstreet's guns. He again expressed his anxiety lest Meade should attack his left wing, and clearly favoured a contraction of his lines by withdrawing Ewell's Corps from its exposed position to the Seminary Ridge, where it could connect with Hill's Corps. But he did not press the point, when he saw how confident Ewell and Early were of being able to carry the Federal lines in their immediate front. Growing impatient at Longstreet's delay, he rode again to the right wing to seek a reason for the failure to carry out his orders. On arrival he found Long-

<sup>1</sup> White's *Lee*, 301, note.

<sup>2</sup> "It was never Lee's practice to issue definite orders to his corps commanders."

<sup>3</sup> White's *Lee*, 303.

street getting his column into motion. It was already 1 p.m.; more time was spent in marching and countermarching in an endeavour to conceal from the Federals the intended point of attack. It was 4 p.m. before Longstreet's two divisions were at length in line of battle waiting for the order to charge.

The Federal position was a strong one; it was in the shape of a fishhook. The ridge along which their lines were drawn up, at its northern extremity, makes a bend around to the south-east to Culp's Hill. The southern end of the ridge terminates in a rugged hill called Round Top, and just north of this peak is another of less elevation known as Little Round Top. Apart from the hills at either extremity the ridge was of no great height, separated by an undulating valley from the Seminary Ridge a mile distant. On the rising ground between the two ridges the Emmetsburg road runs. The 12th Corps held the extreme right of this line, occupying Culp's Hill and the ground to its south, so as to cover the Federal right rear. One division of the 1st Corps held the northern side of Culp's Hill. Then stretching from right to left came the 11th Corps and two divisions of the 1st holding the Cemetery Hill, with the 2nd Corps extending the line along the ridge. The 3rd and 5th Corps formed the extreme left, with the 6th Corps held back as a general reserve in rear of Round Top.<sup>1</sup>

The last division of the 5th Corps had reached the battlefield about noon, and the 6th Corps came up about 4 p.m.<sup>2</sup> Sickles had, on his own responsibility, deployed the 3rd Corps in advance of the rest of the line. His centre at the Peach Orchard touched the Emmetsburg road, along which his right was extended. His left was bent round and refused so as to cover Little Round Top. Thus a salient angle at the Peach Orchard was presented to the enemy's attack. The formation was a very disadvantageous one, as the troops holding the angle could be enfiladed by batteries on either flank, and when once the centre was broken both the right and left would be outflanked.<sup>3</sup> Except for Sickles' faulty formation Meade's position was well adapted for an army standing on the defensive. Its convex shape gave the Federals the great advantage of being able to operate on interior lines, and thus enabled them to bring up reinforcements to any threatened point in considerably less time than it took their opponents to concentrate troops on their more extensive line.

<sup>1</sup> Doubleday, 162.

<sup>2</sup> 3 B. & L., 294. But Doubleday, 159, makes the 6th Corps arrive an hour, and Swinton, 313, two hours, earlier. Sykes, commanding the 5th Corps, reached the field with two divisions at 7 a.m.

<sup>3</sup> General Hunt (3 B. & L., 392) says of Sickles' position: "It was, in my judgment, tactically the better line of the two, provided it were strongly occupied, for it was the only one on the field from which we could have passed from the defensive to the offensive with a prospect of decisive results. But General Meade had not, until the arrival of the 6th Corps, a sufficient number of troops to risk such an extension of his lines."

Nevertheless, Meade was by no means satisfied with the Cemetery Ridge as a defensive position. He had reached the battlefield very early on the morning of the 2nd, and his first idea after inspecting the ground was to attack Lee's left. Exposed though Ewell's Corps was, it would have been very risky to attack it until the 5th and 6th Corps were up and ready to take part in the battle. The 5th Corps was at first posted on the right in reserve on the Baltimore road, partly to rest itself, partly with reference to Meade's proposed plan of attack. When dissuaded from assaulting the Confederate left, Meade next considered the advisability of attacking their right.<sup>1</sup> So strong was his objection to Gettysburg as a defensive position that, in his opinion, the choice lay between attacking Lee and falling back to the line which he had previously selected behind Pipe Creek. A Council of War was sitting at 4 p.m., when Lee settled the question by assailing the Federal left with Longstreet's Corps.

When once Longstreet got into battle he was a hard fighter, and on July 2nd his Corps fought with splendid valour. Hood's division was on the right and McLaws' on the left. Lee was apparently deceived by the formation adopted by Sickles, and imagined that the Federal left rested upon the Emmetsburg road, whereas the 3rd Corps was nearly a mile in front of the rest of the Federal line, and the 5th Corps, which had been moved from its original position on the right, lay behind Sickles and held the true line of defence.<sup>2</sup> Longstreet's two divisions were formed, by Lee's special direction, perpendicular to the road, and were expected to turn the Federal left, and, driving it northward along the Cemetery Ridge, to force it back upon the centre, and thus roll up the whole of Meade's line.

The faultiness of Sickles' formation was soon made apparent. The angle at the Peach Orchard was carried after a succession of assaults upon its two sides by Barksdale's and Kershaw's brigades. Hood's division outflanked Sickles' left and pushed on to gain the Round Tops. Two Alabama regiments reached the summit of Big Round Top, which had not yet been occupied by the Federals, and rushed down the other side to assail Little Round Top. Had some experienced Staff officer been on the spot artillery might have been brought up to the crest of the hill and the Federal position on Little Round Top rendered untenable.<sup>3</sup>

Hood had fallen wounded in the first twenty minutes, and Law succeeded to the command of the division. He directed his assault upon Little Round Top. No provision had been made by the

<sup>1</sup> "Warren and Slocum having reported an attack against Lee's left as inadvisable, Meade began to post troops on our left with a view to attack the enemy's right" (Doubleday, 157). But see note at end of chapter.

<sup>2</sup> Doubleday, 167.

<sup>3</sup> Lee's *Lee*, 282.



Federal leaders for holding this hill, the key to their whole position. It was only when Sickles' Corps was already giving way that General Warren, Meade's chief engineer, seeing the importance of the position, took the responsibility of detaching one brigade from the 5th Corps to hold it. This brigade only just reached the summit in time to forestall the Confederates. Law's troops made desperate efforts to gain possession of it. The Federal brigade was outnumbered, and must shortly have given way, when another brigade of the 5th Corps dashed up to the rescue, and the Confederates were driven with heavy loss down the side of the hill.<sup>1</sup>

In the centre Birney's division was steadily pushed back by McLaws. Two divisions of the 5th Corps and one of the 2nd in succession were thrown into the battle in the attempt to check McLaws' advance. But though these counter-attacks were made with great bravery, and one Federal brigade charged right up to the Confederate batteries, all their efforts were in vain, as the Confederates, having once pierced the salient angle of Sickles' formation, were able to take in flank any force advancing to meet them. McLaws' brigades had now reached the main Federal line: they had driven their opponents out of a large wheat field and were close to the base of Little Round Top. But a brigade of Crawford's Pennsylvania Reserves of the 5th Corps charged McLaws' force and drove it back out of the wheat field. Darkness was fast coming on: two brigades of Sedgwick's 6th Corps had taken up a position to the right of and below Little Round Top, and Longstreet, who, after Hood's fall, had come forward to lead his troops in person, decided that any further attempt to storm the Top would be vain.<sup>2</sup> Fighting ceased after Crawford's successful charge.

Meanwhile Sickles' right had been equally hard pressed. When the salient angle was carried, Humphreys' division was attacked on one flank by Barksdale's brigade, while Anderson's division of Hill's Corps assailed its front. Struck in front and flank at the same moment that he was trying to change front in order to connect with Birney's division, he was forced back to the ridge. Hancock, who had general control of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Corps, hurried up what reinforcements he could. But Wright's brigade pierced the Federal centre, and for a moment established itself on the ridge and turned one of the abandoned guns on the Federals. But a vigorous charge by Webb's brigade, of the 2nd Corps, recovered the guns, and Wright, finding himself isolated, fell back. Wilcox's brigade also charged home and almost reached the crest

<sup>1</sup> A third brigade—Fisher's—of the 5th Corps reinforced the other two on Little Round Top, but did not arrive till after the repulse of the Confederate attack. Throughout the struggle one Federal battery was engaged, having been dragged up to the summit by almost superhuman exertions (3 B. & L., 309).

<sup>2</sup> Doubleday, 174.

of the ridge, but finding troops concentrated against it from all sides, retired, suffering severely in the process. Wright and Wilcox claimed that by their charge they gained temporary possession of twenty-eight guns. Had their attack been better supported, the Federal line would have been cut in two. Two other brigades of Anderson's division and the whole of Pender's should have been within supporting distance.<sup>1</sup> But Hill handled his Corps feebly throughout the day, and the opportunity was lost.

Though Ewell's Corps had been in position since sunrise, ready to attack the northern end of the Federal line, its battle did not commence until Longstreet's attack was almost over. Johnson's division, which formed the left, was to assault Culp's Hill, whilst Early was to storm the northern face of Cemetery Hill, supported on his right by Rodes issuing from Gettysburg. Earlier in the day Meade had withdrawn the 12th Corps from its position on the right to reinforce his left. He yielded so far to Slocum's entreaties as to leave one brigade of the Corps on Culp's Hill. Johnson's attacks against Wadsworth's division of the 1st Corps and Greene's brigade of the 12th were easily repulsed. His batteries were unable to lend him any efficient support, but his left entered the works which Slocum had abandoned, and having no opposition to face, established itself there about 9 p.m. The darkness compelled Johnson to postpone any further advance till the following day.

Early attacked about sunset. His signal was the opening of Johnson's batteries. But in this attack the want of concert was very marked. Two of his brigades, Hays' and Hoke's, fought their way up the side of Cemetery Hill. Hays' brigade on the right reached the crest of the hill and got in among the batteries of the 11th Corps. But no support came to its aid. Gordon's brigade, which should have supported the other two brigades, failed to reach the position, which Hays had won. Hancock, owing to the inactivity of Rodes and Pender, who ought to have kept him fully employed, was able to send reinforcements to Howard's aid; and Hays' brigade, after a gallant resistance, was forced to retire by the pressure of overwhelming numbers with heavy loss. Rodes was unable to co-operate in Early's attack, whose right flank he should have covered, because he had to move his division out of Gettysburg by the flank, then change front and still march twice as far as Early. Before he was in position to attack, Early's assault had

<sup>1</sup> Doubleday, 175, 176. Perry's brigade of Anderson's division took part in the attack on Humphreys, but was driven back by the Federal fire. As his brigade was between Wright's and Wilcox's, his retreat uncovered their flanks. Pender was in a position in which he might have supported either Anderson's attack on his right or Ewell's on his left. Apparently he had been ordered to cover Ewell's right flank. Hill must then be blamed for not having modified his orders so as to make Pender's division available, if necessary, as a support to Anderson.

been repulsed.<sup>1</sup> Pender, on Hill's left, waited for Rodes to advance, and as he made no movement, himself remained inactive.

Though the results of the day's fighting were very far from being what Lee had a right to expect when he surveyed the Federal lines at dawn, yet he was not discouraged. Both on the right and left the Confederates had gained ground. On the right Longstreet held the Emmetsburg road, where the batteries could find an advantageous position for opening fire on the Federal line. Beyond the road his troops occupied Devil's Den, a rocky depression 500 yards west of Little Round Top, and were close to the bases of both Tops. On the left Johnson had effected a lodgment within the enemy's lines, and menaced their line of retreat by the Baltimore Pike. Both Wright and Early had broken the Federal line and reached the crest of the ridge, but had been prevented by want of support from establishing themselves permanently in the positions which they had gained. Pickett's division, the flower of the Army of Northern Virginia, had reached the field, and Stuart with his cavalry had also rejoined. Lee therefore determined to renew the attack the following day. As he put it in his official report, "The result of this day's operations induced the belief that with proper concert of action, and with the increased support that the positions gained on the right would enable the artillery to render the assaulting columns, we should ultimately succeed, and it was accordingly determined to continue the attack."

There was nothing like the same confidence to be found among the Federal generals. On the night of the 2nd a Council of War was convened at Meade's headquarters. The general opinion of the generals was in favour of continuing to hold their position, as they had the advantage of superior numbers, and on the whole had successfully repulsed the Confederate attacks. But Meade himself could not get over his antipathy to the Gettysburg position; and though the majority of voices was against retreat, there is good reason for believing that he had decided to set aside the opinion of the Council of War, and had even perhaps issued the order for retreat, when the arrival of Captain Dahlgren with a captured despatch of the utmost importance induced him to change his mind.<sup>2</sup>

A veil of the deepest mystery envelops the story of Dahlgren and the despatch, which he is alleged to have captured. It is stated, and apparently with strong evidence to bear out the statement, that the despatch was a letter written by President Davis to Lee, in which he declared that it was impossible to assemble an army under Beauregard at Culpeper as a menace to Washington.

<sup>1</sup> Lee's *Lee*, 284.

<sup>2</sup> See Reyall's article on Gettysburg in the *United Services Magazine*, already referred to. White's *Lee*, 310, note, and Doubleday, 179.



It is easy to understand how after reading this letter, Meade would be encouraged to stand fast, because he now knew that no Confederate force threatened Washington except that immediately in his front, and that even if Lee were successful in carrying Cemetery Ridge, his army would be too worn out by hard fighting to constitute a serious menace to the safety of the Capital. Anyhow, Meade finally decided to hold on to his position at Gettysburg. He still had two Corps, the 6th and 12th, practically intact. The 2nd Corps had been only partially engaged, though one division of it had suffered severely in trying to recover the position which Sickles had lost.<sup>1</sup> The other four Corps had all suffered heavy loss on one day or the other.

Lee's original intention was to continue the tactics of the previous day and make a simultaneous attack upon the two extremities of the Federal line.<sup>2</sup> But after examining the ground on his right he decided that it was impracticable to resume the assault upon the Round Tops, which were strongly held by the 5th Corps with the 6th in support. He therefore decided to assault the Federal centre. This attack was to be simultaneous with Ewell's against the extreme right of Meade's line. Lee had at first meant Longstreet to attack with the whole of his Corps. But upon Longstreet's remonstrance he allowed him to hold back the divisions of Hood and McLaws, in order to protect the right of the line from an attack coming from the direction of the Round Tops, and ordered him to form an attacking column with Pickett's and Heth's divisions (the latter now under Pettigrew's command), placed Anderson's division of Hill's Corps at his disposal, and gave Hill general orders to support the attack with further reinforcements, if required. On the extreme left Johnson's division had been reinforced by two brigades from Rodes' division and one (Smith's), from Early's. But Lee's plan for a simultaneous attack upon the Federal extreme right and left centre was thwarted by the Federals themselves assuming the offensive against Johnson.

The position which Johnson had gained on the night of July 2nd on Culp's Hill not only threatened the Federal line of retreat, but would have enabled a strong column to break in upon Meade's right rear and capture the reserve artillery. It was necessary, if the safety of the Federal army was to be secured, that Johnson should as soon as possible be driven from his position within their lines. Preparations had been made during the night for attacking him at daybreak. Batteries had been placed in position, and Geary's division of the 12th Corps had been brought back from the left. As soon as there was sufficient light to distinguish

<sup>1</sup> The rest of the 2nd Corps had been employed on the 2nd in "patching" the line on Cemetery Ridge against Anderson's attack. One brigade had taken part in the repulse of Early.

<sup>2</sup> White's *Lee*, 310-11.

objects, the Federal batteries opened fire. Johnson, owing to the difficult nature of the ground, had been unable to bring up any artillery, and seeing that it was impossible to remain where he was under the heavy fire to which he was exposed, charged uphill in the hope of gaining better ground and driving off the Federal batteries. The attack was gallantly made and obstinately resisted. For four hours a desperate engagement raged on the slopes of Culp's Hill. But the inactivity of the rest of the Confederate army enabled Meade to concentrate an overwhelmingly superior force against Johnson. The other division of the 12th Corps was brought up and assailed his left flank, and a brigade (Shaler's) even was brought up from the 6th Corps on the left. Johnson, unable to hold his own against such odds, was driven out of the lines which he had occupied on the previous night, and forced to withdraw to his original position. By 11 a.m. the struggle for the possession of Culp's Hill was at an end and the battle of Ewell's Corps was over.<sup>1</sup>

All chance of combined attack had vanished, but Lee still determined to persevere in his attempts to break the Federal centre, though the chances of success were greatly reduced by Johnson's repulse. Longstreet's attack was to be made by two divisions, Pickett's on the right and Pettigrew's (late Heth's) on the left. Wilcox's brigade was to cover Pickett's right flank. Two brigades of Pender's division formed a supporting line behind Pettigrew. The charge was to be preceded by a tremendous artillery preparation. Nearly 140 guns were in position along the Confederate front.<sup>2</sup> It was hoped that their concentrated fire would shake the Federal infantry and silence the batteries, which General Hunt, Meade's Chief of Artillery, had ranged along the Cemetery Ridge. The comparative shortness of the Federal line prevented more than seventy-seven guns being put in position to answer the fire of the Confederate artillery.<sup>3</sup>

By 9 a.m. the infantry divisions, which were to form the attacking column, were in position under cover in the woods behind the ridge.<sup>4</sup> But Longstreet displayed the same reluctance to attack as on the preceding day. He had received his instructions soon after sunrise. The sound of the battle raging on Culp's Hill called him to immediate action. The artillery were ready to open fire by 10 a.m.<sup>5</sup> But for three hours Longstreet made no move. He believed that Pickett's charge was certain to end in failure and was

<sup>1</sup> Doubleday, 187. Lee in his Report says that Johnson retired to his original position about 1 p.m. Lee's *Lee*, 286.

<sup>2</sup> The Confederate artillery was massed in two great batteries, one of seventy-five guns on the Emmetsburg road under Colonel Alexander of the 1st Corps, and the other of sixty-three guns on the Seminary Ridge under the command of Colonel Walker of the 3rd Corps (3 B. & L., 362).

<sup>3</sup> 3 B. & L., 371.

<sup>4</sup> White's *Lee*, 313.

<sup>5</sup> 3 B. & L., 362.

reluctant to give the signal which should send so many gallant men to their death.

At 1 p.m. the long line of Confederate batteries opened fire.<sup>1</sup> A tremendous artillery duel ensued. Over 200 guns were hurling their projectiles across the narrow valley. Grand though the scene was, the damage done on either side was but slight. The infantry were too well sheltered to suffer much loss. The chief result was that the Confederate batteries exhausted their ammunition before the infantry attack was made.

Longstreet had entrusted to Colonel Alexander, who that day had been placed in command of the seventy-five guns massed on the Confederate right, the great responsibility of giving Pickett the order to charge, when he thought that the Confederate fire had produced sufficient effect. As Alexander could not see the Federal infantry, who were hidden from sight, the only way in which he could judge of the effect of the fire of his batteries was by watching to see if the Federal fire slackened. General Hunt, anticipating that the serious work of the day was yet to come, after thirty minutes' cannonade ordered his batteries to cease fire in order that the guns might have time to cool and that he might husband his ammunition.<sup>2</sup> By this time Alexander had exhausted almost all his ammunition. The Federal batteries were ceasing fire, whatever the cause. He sent to Pickett saying, "If you are coming at all, you must come at once." Pickett turned to Longstreet and asked if he should advance. But Longstreet was too overcome with emotion to speak. He could only bow his assent, and Pickett ordered his men forward to the charge.

The Confederate infantry swept over the crest of the ridge and advanced across the 1,400 yards of undulating ground which separated them from the Federal lines on Cemetery Ridge.<sup>3</sup> Pettigrew's division on the left had further to go, and though really continuing Pickett's line appeared to the naked eye to be moving in echelon to it. Half the distance had been covered before the fire of the Federal artillery became serious.<sup>4</sup> A battery stationed on Little Round Top raked the flank of Pickett's advance.<sup>5</sup>

It was just at this crisis in the struggle that the Confederate artillery failed to perform its part. Lee had intended that the

<sup>1</sup> 3 B. & L., 363. But one account gives 1.30 p.m. as the moment at which Longstreet's order to open fire was received (3 B. & L., 362, note).

<sup>2</sup> 3 B. & L., 364. There is a distinct difference of opinion as to the length of time devoted to the cannonade. Colonel Alexander states that the signal was given at 1 p.m., and that Pickett's advance commenced before 1.40 p.m. Other accounts represent the artillery duel as lasting for two hours. Doubleday, 189, says that the firing began at 1 p.m. and lasted till 3 p.m. The mistake may have arisen in the following way. Hill's batteries opened fire soon after 11 a.m. "Over a hundred guns were engaged and a tremendous roar was kept up for quite a time" (3 B. & L., 362). But Alexander's evidence is decisive as to the length of Longstreet's cannonade.

<sup>3</sup> White's *Lee*, 315.

<sup>4</sup> White's *Lee*, 315.

<sup>5</sup> Doubleday, 193.



infantry charge should be supported by the artillery. In his official report, he says, "The batteries were directed to be pushed forward as the infantry progressed, protect their flanks and support their attacks closely." The ground was not unfavourable for the movement of artillery, being nearly level though slightly undulating with a gentle slope to the crests of the ridges. The strength of the Federal position lay in the stone walls, behind which their first and second lines of infantry were arrayed. Alexander had kept nine howitzers in reserve, which he intended to take in advance of Pickett's force up almost to within musket range. But when he wanted them he could not find them. There were fifteen or eighteen guns which still possessed ammunition, and these Alexander advanced behind Pickett's division.<sup>1</sup> But practically the Confederate batteries during the great infantry charge were silent.

It was indeed a magnificent charge. Under a tremendous fire from both artillery and infantry the Confederates, without pausing, pressed dauntlessly on. A Federal brigade moving forward poured a destructive fire into the right flank of Kemper's brigade on Pickett's right. Unable to change front and powerless to defend itself against the deadly flank fire, the brigade crowded in on Garnett's brigade, which formed the left of Pickett's front line. For a moment the advance faltered. Then Armistead, who had been in the second line, rushed his brigade to the front, and with one final effort Pickett's division swept forward to the stone wall, where the first line of the Federal centre was posted, and carried it. Meade's line was broken in two. Pickett had won the crest, but when he looked round for supports, none were at hand.

Beyond the first stone wall was a second with a second Federal line behind it, and between the two walls were some Federal guns. Armistead, waving his hat on the point of his sword, led a handful of determined followers on to seize the guns. For an instant the batteries were captured. But the heavy fire from behind cover of part of Webb's brigade checked Armistead's advance, and a desperate charge of two regiments, led by Colonel Hall, one of Hancock's brigadiers, drove the Confederates back behind the first stone wall.<sup>2</sup> Pickett was obliged to order a retreat. The fury of the charge had spent itself. Pettigrew, on his left, had already fallen back. His division had had a greater distance to go, and had suffered very severely from the artillery fire.<sup>3</sup> Wilcox's brigade on Pickett's right failed to render efficient aid. It would seem that Pickett in his advance, when within 500 yards of the Federal line,

<sup>1</sup> 3 B. & L., 365.

<sup>2</sup> Doubleday, 195.

<sup>3</sup> It is, however, claimed for Pettigrew's division that two of its regiments "made the first breach in the Federal works on Cemetery Hill, and were the only organised regiments that entered into and beyond the enemy's walls" (3 B. & L., 354).

changed direction obliquely about forty-five degrees towards his left. This change of direction was not noticed by Wilcox, who kept straight on, and thus a broad gap was made between Pickett's right brigade and Wilcox.<sup>1</sup> It was this gap which caused Kemper's brigade to be exposed to an attack on its right flank. Wilcox's flank was exposed also to a similar attack. He had not been ordered to advance till Pickett's division had already gone some distance: and finding himself exposed to a heavy cross-fire and being unable to see what had become of Pickett, he fell back.

Wright's brigade was sent forward to cover the retreat, but it was only the disorganised fragments of the force, which had gone so bravely to the attack, that returned to the Confederate lines. In Pickett's division out of 4,500 men, 3,393 men were killed, wounded, or prisoners: of the fifteen regimental commanders, ten were killed and five wounded.<sup>2</sup> Of the three brigadiers, Garnett and Armistead were killed and Kemper wounded. Pettigrew's division suffered nearly as severely, and the Federals claimed 2,000 prisoners from it alone.<sup>3</sup>

It had been expected by Lee that Longstreet would use Hood's and McLaws' divisions to make a vigorous demonstration against the Federal left and thus create a diversion, whilst Pickett was breaking in the Federal centre. But these two divisions took no part in the attack, being held in check by Kilpatrick's cavalry division, which, making a vigorous charge against Longstreet's right flank and rear, threatened the safety of his ammunition train.<sup>4</sup> Longstreet had also Anderson's division of Hill's Corps placed at his disposal for the purpose of attack. But only two brigades—Wilcox's and Wright's—took any part in the fighting: and only two brigades of Pender's division of the same corps were engaged.<sup>5</sup> It seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that Pickett's charge was robbed of whatever chance of success it had from want of proper support: and for that failure Longstreet, as having been in general charge of the attack, must bear the blame.

When the fragments of Pettigrew's and Pickett's divisions struggled back to the Confederate lines, Lee set himself to work as far as possible to repair the disaster. He showed himself indefatigable in his efforts to form a new line, anticipating that Meade would follow up his success by a counter-attack. Fortunately, for

<sup>1</sup> Doubleday, 192.

<sup>2</sup> 3,393 is the figure given by Reyall. In 3 B. & L., 437-8, the loss of Pickett's division is given as 2,888, of which 1,499 were "missing." Reyall states Pickett's strength at 4,500; other accounts make it 4,900 (3 B. & L., 345-54).

<sup>3</sup> Doubleday, 197. Swinton, 361, speaks of 4,500 prisoners taken in all.

<sup>4</sup> Doubleday, 198. The Federal cavalry were in position by noon, but the actual attack was not made till after 5 p.m. (3 B. & L., 393).

<sup>5</sup> Perry's brigade of Anderson's division was also slightly engaged, having moved forward in support of Wilcox. White's *Lee*, 318. The two brigades of Pender's division (commanded by Trimble) were Lane's and Scales'.

the safety of the Army of Northern Virginia, Meade took no such step.

Though it must have been plain on the 3rd that Lee was going to make a great effort to drive in the Federal centre, Meade made no attempt to organise a reserve force, which might in case of need be sent to the support of the menaced portion of his line. There seems no sufficient reason why Meade should not have brought up the 6th Corps and part of the 12th, after the repulse of Johnson from Culp's Hill to form a general reserve in case the centre were broken. Such a force would have delivered a crushing counterstroke after Pickett's repulse. To stand on the defensive without making preparations for dealing an effective counterstroke is to rob an army of any chance of gaining a decisive victory. It can hardly be doubted that an advance of the 6th Corps would have split the Confederate line in two. The ammunition of Lee's batteries had run very short, and there were barely sufficient troops left to hold the centre against a vigorous assault. But Meade had not risen above the conception of acting on the strict defensive. The repulse of Pickett's charge found him without any plan for a counterstroke: and it was too late, after that charge was over, to attempt to organise a counter-attack. The greatest opportunity that any Federal commander ever had of destroying the Army of Northern Virginia was lost.<sup>1</sup>

Though there was no active fighting on the main line after Pickett's repulse, a fierce cavalry encounter was being fought out to the right rear of the Federal position. When Johnson was driven from Culp's Hill and it was made plain that Ewell could not co-operate with Pickett's long-deferred attack, Lee, in the hope of still creating a diversion on the Federal right, sent Stuart with his cavalry to attack the right rear of Meade's army.<sup>2</sup> Stuart had reached the scene of battle the previous day and almost immediately after his arrival had been fiercely engaged with Kilpatrick's cavalry division, which had started to make its way round the Confederate left to strike its left rear. The timely arrival of Stuart obliged Kilpatrick, after a sharp engagement, to fall back and abandon his design. Now on the 3rd Gregg's division was on the watch to prevent Stuart in his turn assuming the offensive. Charge succeeded charge as fresh brigades were thrown in on either side. Neither could claim a victory, and the two opponents exhausted by the desperate fighting fell back to their original positions. But before the combatants parted, Pickett's charge had been defeated and Stuart had been thwarted in the object with which he had made the attack.

<sup>1</sup> Doubleday, 202-3. But see note at end of chapter.

<sup>2</sup> If Pickett's charge proved successful, Stuart would be in position to cut the Federal line of retreat by the Baltimore road.



The Federal loss in the three days' fighting at Gettysburg exceeded 23,000. The Confederate loss is estimated by Southern writers as over 20,000. Federal writers put it as high as 30,000.<sup>1</sup>

On the 4th the two armies were still confronting each other on the opposite ridges. Meade, however, had no intention of attacking Seminary Ridge. The great opportunity had been missed the previous afternoon, and he rightly judged that there was nothing to be done but wait until Lee retreated. On that morning the Confederate trains were started in retreat under the escort of Imboden's cavalry brigade. Progress was necessarily slow, as the trains when on the march covered fifteen miles, and a large number of prisoners as well as Confederate wounded had to be removed. The weather also was very bad, and the rain rendered the roads unfit for the passage of large bodies of troops along them. Meade at first imagined that the retreat now commencing was a device on Lee's part to lure him from his strong position and gave pressing instructions to the officers whom he sent out in charge of reconnoitring parties, on no account to bring on a battle.

On the 5th, as there was no longer any possibility of doubt that the whole Confederate army was retiring, Sedgwick was ordered to follow in pursuit. After an eight-mile march he came up with Early, whose division formed the Confederate rearguard, but made no attempt to press him. On the 6th Lee's army reached Hagerstown (Map IV.), and his trains were at Williamsport. But the recent rain had swollen the river. A detachment sent from Harper's Ferry had destroyed the bridge at Falling Waters, and Lee was forced to wait till the river subsided. He took up a strong position, covering the river from Williamsport to Falling Waters, and skilfully entrenched himself. Meade, who had taken a different route, about twice as long as that followed by Lee through Frederick City and Middletown, did not arrive on Lee's front till the 12th. Lee had made the most of the six days' respite, and Meade was in no hurry to attack his formidable-looking lines.

Urged on by Lincoln and Halleck to fight Lee before he could recross the Potomac, Meade devoted the 13th to a careful inspection of his adversary's position, having made up his mind to attack on the 14th. But during the night of the 13th Lee

<sup>1</sup> The total loss of the Federal army was 20,003 (3 B. & L., 437). That of the Confederates is given as 20,451 (3 B. & L., 439). Phisterer's Statistical Record gives the Federal loss at 23,186, the Confederates at 31,621. The Confederate accounts seem to have greatly underestimated their loss in prisoners. As for the actual strength of the two armies engaged at Gettysburg, Colonel Henderson (ii. 616) gives the Federal force at 93,000 and the Confederate at 70,000, an estimate in close agreement with that given in 3 B. & L., 440. The Comte de Paris gives Federals 82,000, Confederates 73,500 (Doubleday, 123). Colonel Walter Taylor, Lee's adjutant-general, increases the Federal strength to 105,000 and reduces the Confederates to 62,000.

succeeded in crossing the whole of his army, trains and all, over the river, and Meade found on the 14th that again his opportunity was gone.

Lee's second invasion of the North had been even less successful than his first. There were several points of resemblance between the two attempts. In the first the garrison of Harper's Ferry was captured: in the second a large part of Milroy's command at Winchester was taken prisoner. In both campaigns Lee was forced to fight a battle for which he was not fully prepared. In that of 1862 the "lost despatch" to D. H. Hill found at Frederick City compelled Lee to stand on the defensive when a considerable part of his army was still far from the scene of battle. In 1863 the lack of information due to the absence of his cavalry obliged him to fight an offensive battle, which he would have gladly avoided. Because the Gettysburg campaign was a year later, the failure to win a decisive success was the more heavily felt at the South. The pressure of the Federal superiority in material resources and in numbers was slowly yet surely telling upon the Confederacy. On the same day that Lee was preparing to retreat from the Seminary Ridge, Vicksburg, the Gibraltar of the West, surrendered to Grant. Once more the Mississippi "ran unvexed to the sea," and the Confederacy was split in half.

The loss of Vicksburg, combined with Lee's failure at Gettysburg, must have convinced President Davis and his Cabinet that the sands of their Government were running out. Had Lee won a great victory in the North, the loss of Vicksburg might have been counterbalanced. But when he was forced to recross the Potomac, it was plain that the tide had turned and the highwater mark of Southern success had been reached. Lee had hoped, when he invaded Pennsylvania, to win a great victory which would compel the North to grant peace. It is because he failed to win that crowning victory that the battle of Gettysburg has come to be regarded as the turning-point of the war. And because it is so regarded a bitter controversy has raged as to the person at whose door the responsibility for the defeat must be laid. The general consensus of opinion at the South seems to lay the blame on Longstreet.

It is true that his political conduct, after the war was over, alienated his former brothers-in-arms, and that they were only too ready to cast the stone at one whom they regarded as having proved himself false to the traditions of the South. Yet it must be admitted that there seems very good reason for making Longstreet the culprit. Lee was not in any way bound to conduct the campaign in Pennsylvania on defensive lines.<sup>1</sup> He was going to fight a battle and win a great victory by whatever methods seemed

<sup>1</sup> As Longstreet seems to have thought (3 B. & L., 246).

at the moment to be best adapted to that end. On July 1st a severe defeat had been inflicted upon two Corps of the Army of the Potomac. General Hancock bears witness that when he reached the scene of battle that afternoon there was very little in the shape of organised resistance to be found on the Cemetery Ridge. He speaks of some 1,000 or 1,200 men as drawn up in position. These constituted part of the division which Howard had placed in reserve. Apparently the 1st Corps and the other two divisions of the 11th had been too severely handled to be reckoned of much service in defending the ridge. The four divisions of Ewell's and Hill's Corps must have numbered 17,000 men.<sup>1</sup> Had Ewell pressed on with his victorious troops, the remnants of the 1st and 11th Corps must have been driven from the ridge, and Meade would the next day have been forming his five remaining Army Corps behind Pipe Creek.

There is no question that Ewell missed a great opportunity on the afternoon of the 1st. Yet it must be said on his behalf that Lee had left the question of pressing the attack to his discretion, and had charged him not to bring on a general engagement before the whole Confederate army was concentrated for the battle.

The charges brought against Longstreet for his conduct on the two following days are of an altogether different kind. Admitting that the order to attack at sunrise on the 2nd was never directly given him, the fact remains that though the position was one in which (to use an expression of his own), "time was mightier than cannon balls," he postponed his attack until 4 p.m. The charge against him is not that he actually disobeyed orders—it was not Lee's habit to issue written orders to his chief subordinates—but that when he found that his commander had resolved upon a course of action of which he did not personally approve, he failed to render a whole-hearted and ungrudging support to his chief in carrying out the plan which had been finally adopted. Instead of getting his troops into position to attack at the earliest possible hour, which was a step he surely ought to have taken even without orders to that effect, he was arguing with his commanding officer at sunrise and trying to persuade him to change his plan.

There is doubtless much to be said in favour of Longstreet's contention that it was better to manœuvre than fight. But in estimating the charges brought against him, any argument on that point is quite beside the question. He had suggested an alternative, which after due consideration had been rejected; and it was his duty loyally to carry out the plan on which his commanding

<sup>1</sup> Lee's *Lee*, 273. Fitzhugh Lee states that besides the troops of the 11th Corps alluded to by Hancock, "2,450 men, the shattered remains of the 1st Corps, were there too, and Buford's cavalry were drawn up on the plain, making a total of 6,000 troops." The 1,000 or 1,200 men of the 11th Corps were apparently one of Steinwehr's two brigades, the other having been pushed out to cover the retreat (3 B. & L., 288).



officer had decided. There is no need to produce arguments that Longstreet did the exact opposite of what he ought to have done. Directed to attack with all the forces he then had up, he took it upon himself to postpone the attack for several hours until Law's brigade had joined him. An attack made before 7 a.m. (and it must be remembered that Longstreet's two divisions encamped on the night of the 1st only four miles from the field, and that sunrise in the beginning of July is about 4.30 a.m.) would have found less than 27,000 Federals on Cemetery Ridge.<sup>1</sup> No attempt would have been made at all to hold Little Round Top, which was the key to the whole position. But Longstreet let hour after hour slip by, whilst the 5th and 6th Corps were marching on to the battlefield as well as two brigades of the 3rd Corps and the reserve artillery.<sup>2</sup> And those precious hours were wasted because Longstreet was waiting for a single brigade to join him. One cannot but re-echo Lee's words, "If I had had Jackson at Gettysburg I should have won the battle, and a complete victory there would have resulted in the establishment of Southern independence." The judgment is not exaggerated. Had Stonewall Jackson been in command on the right wing, four Federal Corps would have been annihilated in the early hours of the 2nd, and Meade, with the remaining three would have had no alternative but to fall back and cover Washington.

Gettysburg was for the Confederates essentially a battle of lost opportunities.<sup>3</sup> The engagement on the 1st was brought on by accident, but so far as it went was a victory for the Confederates. Had Ewell made the most of his chance there would have been no battle of Gettysburg at all; but Lee, with his army concentrated, would have encountered Meade on the line of Pipe Creek. Yet Ewell's hesitation proved of the utmost service to Lee, for it gave him a grand chance of destroying Meade's army in detail. But Longstreet's obstinacy and procrastination robbed him of that chance.

On both the 2nd and the 3rd Lee's plan of battle was to hurl converging columns on a central force. To achieve success concerted action was absolutely necessary, but on neither day was any sign of it visible. On the 2nd Longstreet's refusal to attack till Law came up disarranged the whole plan of battle. The right and left wings fought quite separate engagements, and so fatal had been the effect of the long hours of delay, that on the left wing there was no concerted action between the divisions of Ewell's Corps. Johnson and Early fought independently, and Rodes did not fight at all.

<sup>1</sup> White's *Lee*, 298.

<sup>2</sup> Two divisions of the 5th Corps arrived with the Corps-Commander Sykes as early as 7 a.m., but the third division was not up till noon (3 B. & L., 294).

<sup>3</sup> 2 Henderson, 600.

On the 3rd the chances of a combined attack on the Federal position were destroyed by the Federals themselves attacking Johnson on Culp's Hill. But on that day Longstreet proved as hard to move as on the previous day. He allowed eight hours to elapse between the time when he received his orders and his attempt to execute them.<sup>1</sup> And his method of execution calls for the gravest censure. Because he disapproved of Lee's policy and despaired of its success, he virtually washed his hands of the whole business. He resigned all responsibility to Pickett and Alexander, and made no attempt whatever to support the former's charge, thereby dooming it to inevitable failure. He preferred to prove himself a true prophet rather than a loyal lieutenant. Gettysburg was lost because "someone had blundered," and the blunderer was Longstreet.

### NOTE ON BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG

The importance of the battle of Gettysburg justifies a brief examination into the causes of the Confederate defeat. Lee invaded the North in 1863 with the purpose of ending the war by a decisive victory. He hoped by threatening the principal cities of Pennsylvania, Harrisburg the State capital and Philadelphia the second city in the United States, to force the Army of the Potomac to give him battle. He naturally would have preferred to fight a defensive battle on ground of his own choosing, as he had a sufficient force to enable him to deliver a telling counterstroke. But if an opportunity presented itself of striking an offensive blow, it was within his discretion to make the most of it.

There was no reason to apprehend any difficulty about subsisting his army in Pennsylvania, but the need of maintaining a sufficient supply of ammunition caused him to keep an anxious eye upon his ever-lengthening line of communications stretching all the way back to Staunton in the Upper Valley.

A chance collision fixed Gettysburg as the battlefield. The position was not one which Lee would have deliberately chosen. It was too far away from the South Mountain, in case he should be obliged to retreat, and it was decidedly favourable to that army, which stood upon the defensive.

Lee on July 1st had a choice of three alternatives: he could either attack, retreat, or manœuvre. To retreat without a battle would involve a sad loss of prestige to the army fresh from the victories of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, and would have been an open confession of the weakness of the Confederacy. To manœuvre was the course urged by Longstreet. But there were two grave objections to such a course. First, the absence of his cavalry rendered it extremely perilous to advance further into a hostile country in the presence of an army numerically superior to his own; secondly, to manœuvre round Meade's left flank and place himself between

<sup>1</sup> Longstreet received his orders soon after sunrise.

the Federal army and Washington or Baltimore would not necessarily compel Meade to fight an offensive battle; whilst Meade's army lay unbeaten in his rear, it was impossible for Lee to attack either city, and such a movement, as Longstreet advocated, would expose his line of communications, on which he depended for his ammunition.

The necessity of keeping open his line of retreat similarly prevented him from standing on the defensive along the line of Seminary Ridge. In a "waiting game" the advantage must lie with the Federals. Accordingly Lee determined to attack.

At the outset Fortune declared herself on his side. Ewell's failure to capture Culp's Hill on the 1st was really a stroke of good luck for Lee. It gave him an unique opportunity of crushing his foe in detail. Had Longstreet attacked at daybreak he would have found in his front only Geary's division of the 12th Corps, and by 5 a.m. that force had been withdrawn to the right and the Federal line from the left of the 1st Corps was entirely undefended (the 2nd Corps did not get into position till about 7 a.m.). But when once the Federal forces on Cemetery Ridge reached numerical equality, the disadvantage of Lee's position became apparent. His plan of attack was based upon hurling converging columns against a central position, and his own line was so drawn out that it was extremely difficult to ensure unity of movement. Probably Lee would have done better to contract his lines and to insist upon his left wing moving round into closer contact with his centre. As it was, Heth's and Pender's divisions of Hill's Corps, Rodes' division and Gordon's brigade of Ewell's Corps took no part in the fighting of the 2nd.

On the 3rd, with Meade's whole army in position, the difficulties of Lee's task were immensely increased. To manœuvre, as Longstreet still advised, was impossible after the armies had been in such close contact. To retreat was almost as perilous as to attack. Supposing that Lee carried Cemetery Ridge, he could no longer hope to gain such a victory as had been possible on the previous day. His army was certain to be so fought out as to render an advance on Baltimore or Washington out of the question. But the bare fact of winning a victory on Northern soil might have a far-reaching effect. The spectacle of the Army of the Potomac driven from its position would strengthen the hand of the Peace party in the North, and might afford a convenient occasion for the intervention of European Powers. Lee had never disguised from himself the necessity of the weaker side taking great risks. In a mere struggle for existence the superior resources of the North must ultimately prevail. So he determined to continue the policy of assaulting with converging columns with this difference, that the main attack was now directed not against the extreme left, but against the left centre of the Federal host. But Meade by driving Johnson's division from the position, which it had gained the previous evening on Culp's Hill, broke up the plan of a combined attack and threw the whole burden of the fight on the central column.

It seems quite clear that the attack, as ultimately made under Longstreet's supervision, was not carried out as Lee had intended. The "proper concert of action" on which he relied for success was conspicuous by its absence. A smaller force was engaged in the attack on the afternoon



of the 3rd than on either of the two preceding days. Hood's and McLaws' divisions took no part in it, though it is plain that Lee expected from them, if not actual co-operation, at least a vigorous demonstration against the Round Tops. Hill's Corps had been placed at Longstreet's disposal. But four of its brigades were not utilised.

In a second point, too, Lee's anticipations were in all probability grievously disappointed. It is not likely that he intended the great attack to be made by infantry alone. The slope between the two ridges was not unfavourable for the advance of artillery, and it is reasonable to suppose that Lee expected a large number of the guns in position on the Seminary Ridge to accompany the infantry column. He was not informed that there was a lack of ammunition on the fighting line, and at the critical moment when the advance commenced the Confederate guns stood silent. Had they been properly provided with ammunition (and for this failure Longstreet, who was in general charge of the attack, must be held ultimately responsible) they could have been advanced into close action, and even had the horses been shot down they might still have been run forward by hand.

Lee has sometimes been blamed for not putting some other officer than Longstreet in charge of the attack on the 3rd. But on the 2nd Longstreet had committed no open act of insubordination. Lee by listening to his arguments had condoned his delay. When once he got into action, Longstreet on that day, as on many another occasion, proved himself a hard and staunch fighter. Pickett's division was bound to form part of the attacking column on the 3rd, and to have placed it under any other Corps commander than its own would have been most invidious and almost certainly would have led to sectional jealousies.

On the other hand, the general feeling at the North seems to be that Lee attempted the impossible, or as Ropes (ii. 352) puts it, "Lee seems to have been unable to discriminate between successes obtained against poor troops, and successes obtained against good troops—poorly led."

But such a view seems to ignore the fact that Lee, after the battle of the 2nd, was committed to a renewal of the attack next day, if only to cover his retreat, and can only find ground for condemning Lee's decision to attack on the 2nd (the crucial point of the controversy) by accepting as satisfactory Longstreet's explanation of his own conduct on that day.

Meade's conduct of the Gettysburg campaign has also been exposed to severe criticism. The main charge against him is, that he never reconciled himself to the adoption of Gettysburg as a battlefield, and on the 2nd was in favour of retreating even after the repulse of Lee's attack. Meade himself emphatically denied that he ever entertained such an intention. The evidence adduced in support of this charge rests chiefly upon the testimony of Generals Butterfield (Chief of the Staff), Pleasonton (Chief of the Cavalry), and Slocum (commanding the 12th Corps). It is sufficient here to say, that the evidence of Butterfield and Pleasonton, even if absolutely accurate, merely shows that Meade was only taking justifiable precautions in case military contingencies, as yet unforeseen, should necessitate the withdrawal of the army, and Slocum's statement as to Meade's dissatisfaction with the Gettysburg position at the Council of War held on

the night of the 2nd was not made till 1883, nearly twenty years after the battle.

On the other hand, Southern writers have claimed that there is good evidence to show that the chief officials at Washington at any rate believed that Meade was only induced at the last moment to change his mind and hold on to his position on Cemetery Ridge in consequence of the capture of an important despatch by Captain Dahlgren.

The second charge against Meade lies at the root of the Meade-Sickles controversy (3 B. & L., 413-19). Sickles, commanding the 3rd Corps, accuses Meade of having been so absorbed with his right wing, that he paid no attention to his left, and consequently in his ignorance of the real situation issued orders to Sickles impossible of fulfilment, and claims that it was his own action in placing his Corps on his own responsibility in advance of the rest of the Federal line, which alone prevented Little Round Top, the key to the Cemetery Ridge position, from falling into the hands of Longstreet. Meade blames Sickles for disregarding his orders and taking up a position, which exposed Little Round Top, the very point which, according to Meade, Sickles had been expressly ordered to occupy with his left.

Finally, Meade is blamed for failing to organise on the afternoon of the 3rd a counterstroke after the repulse of Pickett's charge. His critics point out that the losses of the 6th Corps, numerically the strongest in his army, only amounted in all to 242. In the light of that fact, Halleck's eulogy of Meade for having brought all his forces into action at the right time and place as no previous commander of the same army had done, seems somewhat misplaced. Southern critics, with the notable exception of Longstreet, argue that, had Meade pursued the broken divisions of Pickett and Pettigrew with the 6th Corps and other available troops, he would have found a gap of at least a mile in the Confederate line, might have cut Lee's army in half and captured the artillery, which had exhausted most of its ammunition. But so sound a military critic as General Hunt, Meade's Chief of Artillery, maintains that "to have made such a change to the offensive on the assumption that Lee had made no provision against a reverse, would have been rash in the extreme" (3 B. & L., 376). Whilst on the one hand it may be argued that the Seminary Ridge was no Marye's Hill to be held by infantry alone, on the other it must be conceded that Meade had sufficiently effected his object by repulsing Lee's attack, and that the defeat of an attempted counterstroke might have endangered the success already won.

Doubleday throughout his narrative is distinctly hostile to Meade. This may, perhaps, be explained by the fact that on July 1st Meade relieved Doubleday of the command of the 1st Corps, to which he had temporarily succeeded on Reynolds' death, in favour of Newton. There was also a decidedly cold feeling between Meade and Butterfield, who had been Hooker's Chief of the Staff. Meade took the first opportunity of getting rid of him.

## CHAPTER XVII

### THE CONQUEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI—VICKSBURG<sup>1</sup>

Confederate fortifications on the Mississippi in 1861—The Mississippi opened from Columbus to Vicksburg—Fall of New Orleans—Farragut before Vicksburg—The Confederates fortify Port Hudson—Halleck suffers the initiative to pass to the Confederates—Grant obliged to stand on the defensive—Battle of Iuka—Battle of Corinth—Van Dorn relieved by Pemberton—Grant assumes the offensive—The first movement to the rear of Vicksburg—Choice of alternatives—Sherman starts down the river—The Confederate cavalry destroy Grant's line of supplies—Grant retires to Grand Junction—Sherman defeated at Chickasaw Bluffs—Sherman superseded by McClernand—Capture of Arkansas Post—McClernand recalled to the Mississippi—Organisation of Grant's army—Unsuccessful attempts to get in rear of Vicksburg—The canal plan—The Lake Providence plan—The Yazoo Pass plan—The Big Sunflower plan—Grant prepares a movement on Grand Gulf—Porter's fleet runs past the Vicksburg batteries—Federal concentration at Hard Times—Pemberton's disposition of his forces—Attack on Grand Gulf—McClernand crosses the Mississippi—Fighting on May 1st—Federals occupy Port Gibson—Grant determines to "cut loose" from his base—Grant advances—Federals occupy Raymond—Federals capture Jackson—Grant proposes to defeat the Confederates in detail—Anomalous position of J. E. Johnston—Pemberton disregards Johnston's orders—Battle of Champion's Hill—Federals capture the Big Black bridge—Pemberton withdraws his forces into Vicksburg—Pemberton again disobeys Johnston's orders—Grant's first unsuccessful assault—Grant's second unsuccessful assault—Grant commences siege operations—Johnston's feeble attempts to relieve Vicksburg—Fall of Vicksburg—Pursuit of Johnston—Fall of Port Hudson—Unsuccessful attempts to relieve Vicksburg from the West—The turning-point in Grant's career.

**I**N order to appreciate the full importance of Grant's campaign against Vicksburg, which ended in the surrender of that fortress on July 4th, 1863, it is necessary to summarise briefly the operations which had taken place along the Mississippi since the beginning of the war.

It was the general policy of the Confederate Government to stand on the defensive, not to aim at the conquest of the North, but to prove to the Washington Cabinet that it was unable to crush the South. Both combatants fully realised the importance of the Mississippi, and busied themselves during the winter of 1861 with providing a fleet which might operate upon its waters. But the Confederates, seeing that their inferiority in mechanical resources and material appliances would prevent any naval force which they might be able to organise from coping on equal terms

<sup>1</sup> See Maps VI. and X.



with that of their opponents, proceeded to strengthen their position on the river by fortifying a succession of strong posts, which were intended to close the river to the Federal vessels. Their most northern post was Columbus, which in violation of Kentucky's neutrality had been seized by Polk early in September, 1861. Further down the river fortifications had been raised at Island No. 10 and New Madrid and at Fort Pillow. Below Fort Pillow no favourable ground for fortification could be found until Vicksburg was reached. New Orleans, at the mouth of the river, was defended by Forts Jackson and St. Philip: between these forts and Vicksburg no strong posts had been established on the river during the early part of 1862.<sup>1</sup>

General Albert S. Johnston, commanding all the Confederate forces in the West, at the beginning of 1862 held a line running east and west from Columbus on the Mississippi to Bowling Green, thus covering the capital of Tennessee, Nashville. But the victory of Thomas at Mill Springs in January turned his right flank, and Grant's advance up the Tennessee and capture of Fort Henry broke through his centre.

Johnston was obliged to abandon this line, and the capture of Fort Donelson on the Cumberland rendering it impossible to hold Nashville, he adopted as his second line of defence the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. Fort Pillow, some eighty miles above Memphis, which was unsuitable for fortification, formed an advanced post on the extreme left of the line. The abandonment of the first line of defence led to the evacuation of Columbus and the capture by Pope of the Confederate forces in Island No. 10 and New Madrid. An attempt to assume the offensive and crush Halleck's armies in detail resulted in a Confederate defeat at Shiloh and the death of Johnston. Beauregard, who succeeded Johnston in command, evacuated Corinth on May 30th. The abandonment of this second line of defence necessitated the evacuation of Forts Pillow and Randolph, and in a fierce battle fought just above Memphis the Confederate fleet was annihilated. The Mississippi was now open to the Federals as far south as Vicksburg.

David G. Farragut, commanding a Federal fleet in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 24th ran past the batteries of Forts St. Philip and Jackson, and on the following day appeared off New Orleans, which was formally taken possession of for the Federal Government by General Butler on May 1st.

Pushing up the river without encountering any opposition, the advanced division of Farragut's fleet appeared off Vicksburg on May 18th. Farragut himself soon followed, bringing with him

<sup>1</sup> Twelve miles below Fort Pillow was a smaller work, Fort Randolph. No attempt was made to fortify Vicksburg till April, 1862 (Greene, 20).

some 1,500 troops under General Williams. As Williams pronounced his own force too small to be able to render any effective co-operation, it was decided not to attempt to reduce the place, and Farragut with part of his fleet returned to New Orleans and Williams with his troops to Baton Rouge at the end of the month. The fortifications of Vicksburg were at the time far from completed. They had not even been begun till the latter end of April, and were not finished till the middle of June, and it was not till the end of that month that the place was adequately garrisoned.<sup>1</sup>

On June 25th Farragut again appeared before Vicksburg, having this time with him the whole of Williams' brigade, numbering about 3,000 men. Williams landed his troops on the west bank and commenced digging a canal across the peninsula opposite the town, and on the 28th Farragut with seven of his ten vessels ran past the batteries and joined Davis' fleet, which had come down from Memphis. It was quite plain that the navy could do no real damage to the batteries, and Farragut declared himself satisfied that it was impossible to reduce Vicksburg without a land force of at least 12,000 men.<sup>2</sup> On the night of July 15th Farragut ran back past the batteries in a vain endeavour to destroy a big Confederate ram, which had taken refuge under their guns, and returned to New Orleans on July 29th.

Encouraged by the failure of the Federal navy before Vicksburg, Van Dorn, who had assumed the chief command there, detached a force to attack Baton Rouge, whither Williams had returned. The Confederates were beaten off with considerable loss,<sup>3</sup> and then proceeded to establish batteries at Port Hudson, thirty miles above Baton Rouge, by which they effected their purpose of closing the Red River to the Federals. The possession of this river was of vital importance to the Confederacy, as by it supplies were brought from Western Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas to the eastern shore of the Mississippi. The Confederates were left in possession of the Mississippi from Helena to Baton Rouge, which was evacuated by the Federals shortly after Van Dorn's attack. Batteries had been established commanding the river at Port Hudson, Natchez, Grand Gulf, and Vicksburg, and a fort built some miles up the Arkansas River, from which gunboats could dash out into the Mississippi.<sup>4</sup>

On June 1st Halleck was at Corinth with 100,000 men, but he made no attempt to follow up the advantage which he had already gained. Instead of initiating a vigorous campaign, which should have had for its object the destruction of Beauregard's army and the reduction of either Vicksburg or Chattanooga, he consumed five weeks in doing little more than slowly repair the railways.

<sup>1</sup> Greene, 21.<sup>2</sup> Greene, 23.<sup>3</sup> August 5th.<sup>4</sup> Greene, 28.

When he left for Washington to take up the post of General-in-Chief, the only offensive movement for which he had given directions was an advance by Buell's army upon Chattanooga, and that movement was seriously hampered by the order that Buell should repair the Memphis and Charleston Railroad as he advanced along it. Halleck's policy of inaction suffered the initiative to pass out of his hands into those of Bragg, who had relieved Beauregard of the command of the Confederate army. Bragg seized his opportunity, and dividing his forces, with one portion of them assumed the offensive, and drew Buell after him in a stern chase to Louisville and the Ohio, whilst the other portion, consisting of Van Dorn's and Price's commands, was left to operate against Grant. Van Dorn had been charged with the protection of the Mississippi whilst Price was guarding the Mobile and Ohio Railroad.

Under Halleck's instructions Grant had no alternative except to stand strictly on the defensive and prepare as best he could to meet the blow, which he saw to be imminent. Price received directions from Bragg to keep Grant occupied and prevent him from detaching any forces to the aid of Buell. Price accordingly proposed to Van Dorn a joint attack upon Corinth, where Grant's largest detachment under Rosecrans was stationed. As Van Dorn's forces were so scattered that he could not at once take part in the proposed movement, Price determined to operate on his own account against Rosecrans, and on September 14th seized Iuka, to the east of Corinth.<sup>1</sup> Grant saw an opportunity of crushing Price before he could be reinforced by Van Dorn, and directed a concerted attack to be made upon him by Ord advancing along the railway from Corinth, and by Rosecrans, who was to secure the roads by which Price could retreat west or south. Grant thus hoped to drive Price up against the river Tennessee and destroy him. But the co-operative movement failed: there was some sharp fighting on the 19th on the Jacinto road between one division of Rosecrans' force and one of Price's divisions, and during the night Price withdrew his whole force by the Fulton road, which Rosecrans had failed to reach. Grant's attempt to deal with his enemy in detail had failed, and he was obliged to resume the defensive and wait for the next attack, which would now be delivered by the combined forces of the two Confederate leaders.

On October 1st 22,000 Confederates were concentrated twenty miles north-west of Corinth.<sup>2</sup> Van Dorn's object was to attack Rosecrans from the west and north-west and drive him back to

<sup>1</sup> According to Colonel Sneed, Price's Chief of the Staff, that general, under pressing orders from Bragg, was preparing to march to Nashville to join Bragg, when he was informed on the night of the 18th that he had been placed under Van Dorn's command, and was preparing to fall back in order to co-operate with Van Dorn against Corinth, when he was attacked by Rosecrans (2 B. & L., 730-2).

<sup>2</sup> Greene, 43-4.



the Tennessee, thus sundering him from the rest of Grant's army. This move, if successful, would probably oblige Grant with his other troops to abandon West Tennessee.<sup>1</sup> Fighting commenced on the 3rd, and was in favour of the Confederates. Rosecrans was driven back for two miles into the line of entrenchments immediately covering the town.<sup>2</sup> But when on the following day the Confederates tried to carry these entrenchments and fight their way into Corinth, they were repulsed with heavy loss. The fighting in and around Corinth only lasted on the 4th for about an hour, and by noon the Confederates were in full retreat.<sup>3</sup> Grant had hoped to intercept their retreat by sending Ord forward from Bolivar. But Rosecrans considered his soldiers too exhausted to press the pursuit, and Van Dorn's army was too strong to be held in check for long by Ord's small force. In this battle the Federal loss was 2,359: the Confederates gave theirs as 4,838, but probably it was much heavier.<sup>4</sup>

On hearing of Van Dorn's defeat, President Davis sent Lieutenant-General Pemberton to relieve him of the supreme command.

The battle of Corinth is important as marking the point at which the wave of Confederate reaction began to recede from the Mississippi. About the same time Lee was forced to withdraw from Maryland, and Bragg's invasion of Kentucky was checked. In all the theatres of war the Confederates were again thrown on the defensive.<sup>5</sup>

At the end of October Grant had an army of 48,500 men,<sup>6</sup> and he was encouraged by the promise of reinforcements and the repulse of Van Dorn from before Corinth to take the offensive. His own idea was to reduce Vicksburg by a movement against its rear along the Mississippi Central Railroad. Earlier in the year the advance up the Tennessee from Fort Henry to Florence had turned all the Confederate positions on the Mississippi from Columbus to Memphis, and he now hoped by a similar movement to flank Pemberton out of Vicksburg. Halleck, however, favoured a movement against Vicksburg by the river, and directed Grant not to repair the railroad south from Memphis.<sup>7</sup> A discreditable intrigue was going on at Washington, by which McClernand, one of Grant's divisional commanders, hoped to gain from President Lincoln and the Secretary of War chance of an independent expedition down the Missis-

<sup>1</sup> Greene, 45.

<sup>2</sup> Greene, 48.

<sup>3</sup> Greene, 51.

<sup>4</sup> Greene, 53, thinks that it may have exceeded 9,000.

<sup>5</sup> Greene, 54. Rosecrans' force at Corinth was probably not less than 20,000 (2 B. & L., 760). Rosecrans, in his account of the battle (2 B. & L., 737-57), minimises the success gained by the Confederates on the 3rd, states that with one hour more of daylight he would have won a victory on the 3rd, and blames Grant for not following up the success gained and capturing Vicksburg.

<sup>6</sup> Greene, 55.

<sup>7</sup> Halleck seems to have really been in favour of Grant's plan, but felt himself prevented from approving of it by the support which Lincoln and Stanton were giving to McClernand's counter-proposition (Greene, 61).

issippi against Vicksburg. Grant, who was ready to take the field in the first week in November, was delayed by telegrams from Halleck which left him in doubt as to what he was expected to do and how far he could exercise control over the forces nominally under his command.

On November 24th Sherman moved out from Memphis towards the Tallahatchee River, and on the 27th McPherson advanced southward from Grand Junction along the Mississippi Central Railroad. On the same day a force which had been brought across the river from Helena under General Hovey advanced towards Grenada.

Pemberton, to meet Grant's advance, had nearly 40,000 men. The main body, about 24,000 strong, under Van Dorn, was near Holly Springs and Oxford, on the line of the Tallahatchee; a garrison of 6,000 held Vicksburg, and 5,500 were in Port Hudson, whilst a small force occupied Jackson, the capital of Mississippi, where Pemberton had fixed his headquarters.<sup>1</sup>

Pemberton did not consider that Van Dorn's force was strong enough to cope with Grant, and ordered him to fall back from the Tallahatchee and hold the line of the Yallahusha at Grenada. On December 5th Grant reached Oxford, whilst Sherman was a few miles to the north-west. His line of communications reached from Holly Springs to Columbus, a distance of 180 miles over a single-track railroad:<sup>2</sup> and he considered that it would be impossible to advance beyond Grenada and at the same time maintain his present line of communications. Having received on December 7th discretionary authority from Halleck to do what he thought best with his troops, he held a consultation with Sherman.

Two courses were open to him: either to send Sherman back to Memphis, where he might organise an expedition to go down to the mouth of the Yazoo, land there, and attack Vicksburg in the rear, whilst Grant himself should hold fast the Confederate troops on the Yallahusha, and if they retreated, follow them up even to the gates of Vicksburg: or to concentrate his whole command at Grenada, establish a dépôt there, and repair the railway back to Memphis, and having thus secured a line of supplies to move against Jackson and the rear of Vicksburg.<sup>3</sup>

Grant decided in favour of the first course, because it would give the Confederates less time in which to bring up reinforcements. The course adopted depended for its success upon two things. Sherman's movement against Vicksburg must be a surprise, and Grant's force must be able to co-operate.<sup>4</sup> Neither of these conditions was fulfilled, and in consequence the first attempt against Vicksburg proved a failure.

On December 9th Sherman started back with one division to Memphis, which he reached on the 12th. Out of the reinforce-

<sup>1</sup> Greene, 62.

<sup>2</sup> Greene, 63.

<sup>3</sup> Greene, 64.

<sup>4</sup> Greene, 74.

ments which McClernand had sent to Memphis, and the troops from Helena, he organised a force of 32,000 men,<sup>1</sup> with which he started down the river on the 20th under the escort of the gunboat fleet.

On that same day, however, Van Dorn, who had started on the 18th with all the cavalry in his army, about 3,500 in number, on a raid round Grant's left flank, captured Holly Springs and destroyed the Federal dépôt there. At the same time Forrest with 2,500 cavalry was sent by Bragg to make a raid against the northern end of Grant's line of communications, and destroyed the railroad for sixty miles between Jackson<sup>2</sup> and Columbus.

These two destructive raids against Grant's communications forced him to retreat to Grand Junction and abandon all idea of co-operating with Sherman. He was no longer able to hold fast the Confederate force on the Yallabusha, and was unable to communicate the fact to Sherman in time to prevent him taking his force up the Yazoo.

Sherman's expedition reached Milliken's Bend, twenty miles above Vicksburg, before daylight of the 25th.<sup>3</sup> One division was disembarked there to break up the railroad which runs to Vicksburg from the west. The rest of the force continued on its way to the mouth of the Yazoo, ascended that river thirteen miles, and was then disembarked, being rejoined by the detached division on the 27th.

Sherman's object was to gain possession of some point of the Walnut Hills (Map XI.), which run south-west of Haines' Bluff towards Vicksburg. Holding such a position he could supply his troops by water, and if he felt himself strong enough, could advance direct on Vicksburg, or else wait till Grant was near enough to give him a helping hand. But the success of the expedition depended upon its secrecy, and the Confederates had been receiving information of its progress through their spies ever since it started from Memphis. Pemberton was enabled, owing to Grant's withdrawal from his front, to concentrate 12,000 men in a very strong position against Sherman.<sup>4</sup> The latter made his assault on the 29th, but was repulsed with considerable loss. The ground proved most unfavourable for any combined attack, being low land intersected by a number of bayous and swamps, with only five lines of approach to the bluffs.<sup>5</sup> Most of the fighting on the Federal side was done by two brigades and one other regiment, less than a fifth part of the whole force.<sup>6</sup> In this battle of Chickasaw Bluffs the Federal loss was 1,929, whilst the entire Confederate loss, including

<sup>1</sup> Greene, 73.

<sup>2</sup> Jackson in Tennessee (Map VI.), not to be confounded with the capital of Mississippi (Map X.).

<sup>3</sup> Greene, 73.

<sup>4</sup> Greene, 75.

<sup>5</sup> Greene, 76. Pemberton's report says four (3 B. & L., 463).

<sup>6</sup> Greene, 79.



that incurred in the skirmishing of the two previous days, only amounted to 187.<sup>1</sup>

After this repulse Sherman determined to send 10,000 men under cover of the night further up the Yazoo to make an attack upon Haines' Bluff. But the atmospheric conditions rendered this movement impracticable, and on January 2nd he re-embarked his troops and returned to the mouth of the Yazoo, where he found McClernand waiting to relieve him of the command.

McClernand had been so far successful in his intrigues at Washington that he had secured a secret order from the Secretary of War, authorising him to organise and take command of an expedition against Vicksburg for the purpose of opening the Mississippi. Sherman first heard from McClernand of Grant's retreat, and as no news had been received from Banks, who was expected to co-operate with Grant from New Orleans, it seemed plain that the operations against Vicksburg had, for the time being, come to an end. Accordingly, Sherman proposed to McClernand to make an expedition up the Arkansas River against the Arkansas Post. The reduction of this fort would be a great advantage to the Federals in their further operations against Vicksburg, as their vessels would be no longer exposed to sudden attacks from Confederate gunboats and rams dashing out of the Arkansas into the main river.

On January 5th the whole force left Milliken's Bend and proceeding up the Arkansas River for fifty miles on the evening of the 9th, came in sight of the Arkansas Post, a four-sided bastioned work armed with seventeen guns and occupied by a garrison of 5,000 men.<sup>2</sup>

On the 11th the Confederates surrendered, as the artillery of the fort was no match for the heavy guns of the seven gunboats which accompanied the expedition. The total Federal loss was just over 1,000, but they captured the whole garrison and everything in the fort.<sup>3</sup> McClernand, greatly elated at his success, now proposed to push on up the Arkansas to Little Rock and initiate a campaign in the interior of Arkansas in conjunction with General Curtis, commanding the Federal troops in that State, by way of creating a diversion for the troops operating in Missouri.

On the 14th, however, he received peremptory orders from Grant recalling him to the Mississippi. Grant rightly feared that McClernand would try to carry out an independent campaign of his own, which would take off 30,000 men from the force intended for service against Vicksburg, and completely disarrange his plans

<sup>1</sup> Greene, 79. In 3 B. & L., 471, the Federal loss is stated at 1,776, and the Confederate loss, according to General Pemberton's estimate, at 207. General Morgan, who commanded one of the Federal divisions, considered that had Sherman managed the attack properly, Vicksburg would have fallen (3 B. & L., 462-70).

<sup>2</sup> Greene, 84.

<sup>3</sup> Greene, 88.

for the reduction of that place. He had already telegraphed to Halleck that "McClermand had gone on a wild goose chase" up the Arkansas and was promptly authorised by the General-in-Chief, who, for sound military reasons, disapproved of McClermand's independent command,<sup>1</sup> to relieve McClermand of the command of the expedition against Vicksburg, and either take it himself or hand it over to the next in rank. McClermand had no alternative but to return to Milliken's Bend, though he bitterly complained in a private letter to the President of Grant's interference with what he had supposed to be an independent command.

The failure of his operations at the end of 1862, and the instructions of Halleck compelled Grant to adopt the river route for his next attempt against Vicksburg. By orders from the War Department his army was organised into four Corps under the command of McClermand, Sherman, Hurlbut, and McPherson. Hurlbut's Corps—the 16th—was left to hold the line from Memphis to Corinth, and protect the railways running behind it to Columbus. The 13th and 15th Corps, under McClermand and Sherman, were at Milliken's Bend, and McPherson was directed to encamp the 17th Corps at Lake Providence, about sixty miles above Vicksburg on the western bank. One of Grant's greatest difficulties was to find solid ground on which to encamp the different portions of his army.

To move direct across the low lands of the Yazoo delta and strike the Yazoo above Haines' Bluff, thus turning the right flank of the Confederate position, was at that time of year impossible owing to the floods. Yet the only way to reduce Vicksburg was to get in its rear by turning either the right or left flank. During the months of February and March four unsuccessful attempts were made, two to turn the right flank and two to turn the left. Grant in his memoirs says that he never had much confidence in these attempts, but regarded them as worth making, mainly because they provided occupation for his troops and drew the attention of both the Governments away from another plan, which he himself considered to be the most likely to lead to success. This plan, which he ultimately carried out, was to move his troops by land from Milliken's Bend to some point on the river, well to the south of Vicksburg and then having crossed the river to operate against the railroad connecting Vicksburg with Jackson. But to execute this plan time was required: the troops could not be moved by land until the floods had subsided, and in the meantime it was necessary to be carrying on some operations, if only to satisfy the demands of the Washington Government.

Grant's first attempt was to cut a canal across the Peninsula opposite Vicksburg (Map XI.) and so turn the Confederate left flank

<sup>1</sup> Greene, 60.

by landing an army on the east bank below Vicksburg. Sherman's Corps was set to work on the construction of the canal, which followed the line begun by Williams in the previous year, and continued to labour at it from January 22nd to March 7th.<sup>1</sup> Grant, after a personal examination, satisfied himself that very little could be hoped for from this undertaking, as the southern outlet was commanded by batteries, which the Confederates had established below Vicksburg at Warrenton. A sudden flood on March 7th drove the troops out of the canal bed and though the work was continued for two weeks longer by dredge boats, the batteries at Warrenton got their range so accurately that they had to be withdrawn and the whole scheme abandoned.<sup>2</sup>

The second attempt to turn the enemy's left was by means of a passage from Lake Providence through two bayous into the tributaries of the Red River, then down the Red River into the Mississippi and up that river to some point below Vicksburg. It would have been a long route covering some four hundred miles, but might have proved useful for sending reinforcements to Banks. The initial difficulty consisted in having to clear a channel through Bayou Baxter, a small stream running out of Lake Providence, which lost itself in a cypress swamp. The work of clearing this channel was very arduous, as the stumps of the trees had to be cut beneath the surface of the water. McPherson's Corps was employed on this work throughout March. By the end of the month a channel navigable for boats having a draught of six feet was almost ready: but by that time Grant had determined to move his troops by land from Milliken's Bend.<sup>3</sup>

The first attempt to turn the Confederate right was by way of the Yazoo Pass (Map X.). The Pass is a bayou about ten miles long, running from the Mississippi nearly opposite Helena into the Coldwater River. An expedition entering the Pass would descend the Coldwater into the Tallahatchee and Yazoo Rivers and reach Yazoo City, thus turning the Confederate right at Haines' Bluff. The distance to be traversed by this route was 700 miles.<sup>4</sup> This had been the old route from Memphis to Yazoo City, but some years before the outbreak of the war a levee of substantial proportions had been built across the Pass as a protection against floods. The levee was cut on February 3rd by exploding a mine in it and the water rushed through to resume its old course.<sup>5</sup>

The next step was to clear the Pass of the felled trees, with which the Confederates had obstructed its channel. By February 21st the channel was clear into the Coldwater: and on the 23rd

<sup>1</sup> Greene, 94.

<sup>2</sup> Greene, 95.

<sup>3</sup> Greene, 96, 97. In order to get sufficient water in the channel, it was found necessary to cut the levee and let in the Mississippi. This was done on March 18th.

<sup>4</sup> Fiske, 216.

<sup>5</sup> Greene, 97.



Ross' division started from Helena, and making its way slowly through the Pass, reached the Coldwater on March 2nd.<sup>1</sup> This expedition was accompanied by several vessels of Porter's fleet.

Finding that the route was practicable, Grant sent orders to McPherson to hold his whole Corps in readiness for a movement through the Pass as soon as a sufficient number of transports could be obtained. The Confederates were kept well informed by their spies of the Federal movements. Loring, with 20,000 men,<sup>2</sup> was stationed at Grenada to defend the Yazoo, and when news reached Pemberton that Federal vessels were entering the Coldwater, he sent orders to his lieutenant to proceed to the mouth of the Yallahusha. Loring constructed Fort Pemberton on the narrow neck of land which separates the Tallahatchee from the Yazoo.<sup>3</sup> It was impossible for the Federal expedition to pass out of the Tallahatchee into the Yazoo, unless this fort were first reduced. On the 11th Ross arrived before it: the floods which covered the ground in its front confined his operations to the naval forces. On the 11th and 13th the gunboats vainly attempted to silence the guns of the fort.<sup>4</sup> As it was plain that further progress down the Tallahatchee was impossible, the expedition started to return. But on the 21st<sup>5</sup> it was met by Quinby, one of McPherson's divisional commanders, coming down the Tallahatchee with one brigade of his division, and Quinby, as senior officer, determined to renew the attempt.

The Federals reappeared before Fort Pemberton on the 23rd. Quinby, seeing that it was impossible to force a way past the fort, determined to move round to the east of it, to cross the Yallahusha by a pontoon bridge, and by thus cutting its line of communications to compel the fort to surrender.<sup>6</sup> He had sent back to Helena for bridge materials, when orders reached him from Grant directing him to return with all speed to the Mississippi. It had been found impossible to provide sufficient light-draught vessels to transport McPherson's Corps by that route into the Yazoo, and the expedition was recalled in consequence.

Whilst the expedition was in progress Grant, learning that Pemberton had sent troops from Grenada to the Yazoo, became alarmed lest overwhelming forces should be concentrated against

<sup>1</sup> Greene, 98. Mahan, 143, says the vessels entered the Coldwater on February 28th.

<sup>2</sup> "About 20,000 men (15,590 for duty)" (Greene, 100).

<sup>3</sup> "The Tallahatchee sweeps sharply to the east, and then returns again, forming a horseshoe bend thirteen miles long, the two parts of the stream approaching each other so closely that the neck of the enclosed peninsula is less than a quarter of a mile wide. It is in this bend that the Yallahusha enters, the river then taking the name of Yazoo; so that the works erected across the neck were said to be between the Tallahatchee and Yazoo, though the stream is one" (Mahan, 144).

<sup>4</sup> A third unsuccessful attempt was made on the 16th (Mahan, 146).

<sup>5</sup> Greene, 101. Mahan, 146, says the 22nd.

<sup>6</sup> Greene, 102.

Ross, and partly by way of creating a diversion for him, partly in the hope that he might find a route by which he could land a large force on the banks of the Yazoo, below Fort Pemberton, gave orders for the Steele's Bayou expedition. This was the fourth and last of the unsuccessful attempts to gain a position in the rear of Vicksburg.<sup>1</sup> The route lay up the Yazoo to Steele's Bayou, forty miles up it into a cross creek, thence into Deer Creek, thirty miles up it into another cross creek, called Rolling Fork, and through it into the Big Sunflower River. A voyage of fifty miles down the Big Sunflower would bring the expedition into the Yazoo River below Fort Pemberton, midway between Yazoo City and Haines' Bluff.<sup>2</sup>

On March 16th Porter started up the Yazoo with nine war-vessels, and Sherman accompanied him with a force of four regiments. The chief difficulty which the expedition had to encounter was in the cross creeks, whose very narrow channels were easily obstructed by felled timber. The Confederates had accurate information of the projected movement, and sent a brigade of infantry and several pieces of artillery up the Big Sunflower.<sup>3</sup> Porter, advancing slowly and with great difficulty, had almost reached the junction of Rolling Fork with the Big Sunflower when, on the 19th, he found himself in the presence of the enemy.<sup>4</sup> It was found impossible to push on under the fire of the sharpshooters, who swarmed in the woods, and at the same time the Confederates were seeking to obstruct his line of retreat. Porter, realising the gravity of the situation, sent back to Sherman to beg him to come to his aid with all speed. The infantry was brought by boat as far as the first cross creek, and then disembarked to continue the advance on land. They pressed forward as fast as they could, marching by night with lighted candles through the cane-brake, and arrived in time to secure Porter's line of retreat. But it was plain that further progress was impossible, and the expedition withdrew. On March 27th Sherman's troops were back again in their camp opposite Vicksburg.

Having now tried and failed four times to place his troops in rear of Vicksburg, Grant judged that the time had come to put into execution that plan, in which from the first he seems to have placed his chief hope. He intended to move part of his army by

<sup>1</sup> These different attempts were simultaneous rather than successive.

<sup>2</sup> Greene, 103.

<sup>3</sup> Greene, 105. It was not till the night of the 17th that the Confederate officer commanding the district first heard, at his headquarters on Deer Creek, that the Federal gunboats had entered that creek. He at once sent a battalion of sharpshooters and some artillery in a steamer down to Rolling Fork, and was lucky to get there before the gunboats (Mahan, 148-9).

<sup>4</sup> The Federal expedition failed apparently to enter Rolling Fork. The distance from Rolling Fork into the Big Sunflower is only four miles.

land to New Carthage (Map XI.), and make a landing on the opposite bank in the neighbourhood of Grand Gulf, some thirty miles below Vicksburg. Porter was requested to run past Vicksburg with his fleet, so as to co-operate with the land force in an attack upon the batteries of Grand Gulf. At the same time Grant proposed to open up a series of circuitous bayous from Milliken's Bend and Young's Point, and by that route to bring troops and supplies on flat boats and barges to his encampment at New Carthage.<sup>1</sup> In order to fill the bayous with water a canal was to be cut from Duckport.

This plan was full of danger : only success could justify it, and a failure to achieve success would probably mean the complete annihilation of the whole land force. Sherman, on sound military principles, was opposed to so desperate a venture, and advocated a return to Memphis and the recommencement of a campaign along the Mississippi Central Railroad.

But Grant saw that the political necessities of the moment required an advance and would not permit of any movement which looked like retreat, and determined to carry out his original plan. McClernand's Corps led the way in the march across the Peninsula ; and on April 6th the leading division arrived at New Carthage.<sup>2</sup> By the 20th the whole Corps was concentrated at that point.

On the night of the 16th Porter's fleet ran past the Vicksburg batteries. Seven warships and two transports safely made the passage ; one transport was lost.<sup>3</sup> The attempt to open up a route by the bayous proved a failure, for a sudden fall in the river rendered the canal useless.<sup>4</sup> All the troops had now to march by land, and part of the supplies had to be brought past the Vicksburg batteries in transports. On the night of the 22nd five out of the six transports succeeded in running past the batteries. But on reaching New Carthage himself on the 23rd, Grant found that it was still surrounded by water and wholly unsuitable for the concentration of a large force.<sup>5</sup> McClernand had already discovered a road which ran round a bayou and reached the river at Perkins' Plantation eight miles further down. This road was repaired and the cross bayous bridged, and on the 27th McClernand's Corps was assembled at Perkins' Plantation. But after a careful reconnaissance of the batteries at Grand Gulf, Grant and Porter decided that it would be too venturesome to try and reduce them from so distant a point (Perkins' Plantation being more than twenty miles above Grand Gulf), and that another point must

<sup>1</sup> Greene, 109.

<sup>2</sup> Greene, 110.

<sup>3</sup> Each warship was accompanied by a coal-barge secured on the starboard side. Two of these barges seem to have been lost (Mahan, 156).

<sup>4</sup> Greene, 114.

<sup>5</sup> Greene, 115.



be looked for further down the river. McClernand discovered another road running from Perkins' Plantation round a bayou to Hard Times, a hamlet almost opposite Grand Gulf. On the 29th McClernand's whole Corps and two divisions of McPherson's Corps were concentrated at Hard Times and ready to cross the river.<sup>1</sup>

In the beginning of March Pemberton had stationed Bowen's brigade and four batteries at Grand Gulf. But he imagined that his right flank was the point most menaced, and also believed that Grant was about to retire to Memphis.<sup>2</sup> Some of his troops were accordingly sent to reinforce Bragg, to whom nearly all the cavalry under the command of Van Dorn had been sent in February. When the passage of Porter's fleet below Vicksburg showed that the left flank was in danger, Pemberton despatched another brigade to reinforce Bowen.

But Grant took measures to mystify his opponent. Steele's division of Sherman's Corps had been sent 150 miles up the river, and after disembarking had marched as far down as Rolling Fork to divert Pemberton's attention from the movement against his left flank. On April 17th Colonel Grierson with three cavalry regiments left La Grange (near Memphis, Map X.) and made a very successful raid round the rear of Pemberton's forces. Eventually he reached Baton Rouge on May 2nd, after having ridden right through the State of Mississippi and done considerable damage to the railways connecting Vicksburg with Meridian, and Jackson with New Orleans. His own weakness in cavalry prevented Pemberton from keeping in touch with Grierson's force, and his information of the strength and intentions of that force was necessarily defective. Grierson's raid distracted the attention of the Confederate commander at a very critical moment. On April 29th Sherman went up the river with Blair's division and eight gunboats left by Porter above Vicksburg, and made a vigorous demonstration against Haines' Bluff, which still further diverted Pemberton's attention from his left flank.<sup>3</sup>

On the same day at 8 a.m. Porter's fleet opened fire on the batteries at Grand Gulf (Map XI.), and for five or six hours kept up a fierce cannonade, whilst 10,000 troops of McClernand's Corps<sup>4</sup> embarked on such transports and flat boats as were available, and waited for a favourable moment for crossing the river. But the fire of the gunboats failed to silence the batteries effectually, and the attempt to land the infantry had to be abandoned. They were

<sup>1</sup> Greene, 115-16. McClernand's Corps was taken down the river by the transports. McPherson's divisions marched by land.

<sup>2</sup> Greene, 118.

<sup>3</sup> Sherman's demonstration occupied April 30th and May 1st.

<sup>4</sup> Church, 160. Greene, 123, says three divisions.

disembarked, and during the night marched across the tongue of land facing Grand Gulf to De Shroon's plantation, three miles down the river. The fleet and transports also moved down the river during the night, and by dawn on the 30th the troops were re-embarking. The landing-place finally selected was at Bruinsburg, six miles below Grand Gulf, whence a good road led to Port Gibson.

By noon McClernand's whole Corps, numbering 18,000 men, was on the east bank of the Mississippi.<sup>1</sup> The bluffs, which at this point ran some three miles back from the river, were occupied without resistance, and Carr's division pushed on during the night, until about 1 a.m. a force of the enemy was encountered four miles out from Port Gibson, and the division halted till daylight.

On the night of the 30th the Confederates had four brigades at or near Grand Gulf. Pemberton, for the defence of the line from Vicksburg to Jackson, fifty miles long, had over 50,000 men under his command. But this force was very much scattered. Hearing from Bowen on the afternoon of the 30th that the Federals were crossing in force at Bruinsburg, he ordered his various detachments from Grenada, Columbus, Meridian, and other points to concentrate with all speed at Jackson, whilst he himself went to Vicksburg.<sup>2</sup>

Port Gibson was connected by a short line of rail with Grand Gulf, and its occupation by the Federals would compel the evacuation of Grand Gulf. It was also the nearest point to the Mississippi at which the Bayou Pierre could be crossed.

On the morning of May 1st the Federals found themselves confronted by two brigades holding the two roads which lead to Port Gibson.<sup>3</sup> To drive this force from his path Grant had the whole of the 13th Corps, and two divisions of the 17th were crossing the river and could be relied upon to render assistance later in the day.<sup>4</sup> The Confederates were presently reinforced by another brigade and a half-brigade,<sup>5</sup> and held their ground stubbornly till nearly sunset, when their right flank was turned and the troops on both roads forced to retreat. The ground was very favourable to

<sup>1</sup> Greene, 125.

<sup>2</sup> Greene, 127. The four brigades at Grand Gulf were Tracy's, Baldwin's, Green's, and Cockrell's (Cockrell was in temporary command of Bowen's brigade, whilst the latter commanded the forces at Grand Gulf). Of these four brigades Green's had moved out to Port Gibson on the afternoon of the 30th. Greene, 117, estimates the effective strength of Pemberton's forces at the end of March at about 50,000. But this estimate includes the garrison of Port Hudson, over 16,000 strong. By the beginning of May only 6,000 men remained in Port Hudson, the rest having been recalled to Vicksburg, and troops both from Beauregard in South Carolina and Bragg were on their way to Pemberton's aid. Grant (3 B. & L., 495) estimated Pemberton's strength at nearly 60,000.

<sup>3</sup> Green's and Tracy's.

<sup>4</sup> Greene, 127.

<sup>5</sup> Baldwin's and three regiments of Cockrell's.

the side acting on the defensive, as the roads ran along ridges with thickly wooded sides, separated by ravines, whose dense undergrowth was almost impenetrable.

The Federals occupied Port Gibson on the morning of the 2nd, but the Confederates had destroyed the bridges over the two forks of the Bayou Pierre. Bowen abandoned Grand Gulf on the 2nd and determined to retreat across the Big Black River in order to keep open his line of communications with Vicksburg. He moved up the left bank of the Big Black to Hankinson's Ferry, where he found reinforcements from Vicksburg awaiting him, which raised the total Confederate force to 17,000 men.<sup>1</sup> But the troops were worn out either with fighting or marching, and the retreat was continued, the river being crossed that evening.

The Federals on the 2nd constructed a bridge over the south Fork of the Bayou Pierre and McPherson's division advanced eight miles to the North Fork and commenced to repair the bridge there.<sup>2</sup> On the 3rd McPherson pushed forward to Hankinson's Ferry. A Confederate rearguard had been posted on the left bank to protect the crossing. But McPherson pressed them so closely that though the Confederates made good their retreat across the river, they had not time to destroy the boat bridge. Grant established his base at Grand Gulf, whilst McPherson's divisions encamped at Hankinson's Ferry and McClernand's Corps at Willow Springs. The troops remained in bivouac for three days awaiting the arrival of Sherman's Corps and supplies of ammunition and rations.

Grant's original plan had been, after securing Grand Gulf as a base, to send McClernand's Corps to reinforce Banks against Port Hudson, and after the reduction of that post to unite Banks' force with his own in the campaign against Vicksburg. But he now heard from Banks that he could not be ready to commence operations against Port Hudson till May 10th, and that his field force only numbered 15,000 men. To wait for Banks' co-operation would give the Confederates a month at least in which to strengthen their position and get up reinforcements, which would in all probability outnumber the force which Banks would be able to bring with him after the fall of Port Hudson.<sup>3</sup> Accordingly Grant determined to act independently of Banks, to cut loose from his base at Grand Gulf, to strike at once at the rear of Vicksburg and cut it off from Jackson, and to feed his army off the country till he could get to the north of Vicksburg and establish a new base on the Yazoo.

On the 7th the advance was resumed. Sherman had arrived with two divisions and a wagon-train loaded with rations. Grant's

<sup>1</sup> Greene, 133.

<sup>2</sup> The bridge over the north Fork was found burning, and the fire was put out.

<sup>3</sup> Greene, 139; 3 B. & L., 501.



general idea was to advance by parallel roads, keeping a careful watch upon the ferries over the Big Black River, by which his left flank might be threatened, and intervene between the Confederate forces concentrating at Vicksburg and Jackson, and defeat them in detail. The 13th and 15th Corps were moved forward so as to hold a line parallel to the railroad, as it ran through Edward's Station; McPherson's Corps was thrown forward in advance on the right flank so as to reach Jackson as quickly as possible; one division of the 13th Corps covered the left flank.

On the 12th McClermand and Sherman, after sharp skirmishing, secured the crossings over Fourteen Mile Creek, which ran parallel to and seven miles south of the railroad. McPherson, moving towards Raymond, encountered about two miles from that place a Confederate brigade and two batteries.<sup>1</sup> A sharp fight took place for two or three hours between this brigade and Logan's division, but when McPherson's second division reached the scene of fighting the Confederates, seeing themselves completely outnumbered, hastily retreated to Jackson.<sup>2</sup>

McPherson encamped that night in Raymond. Grant judged from the fight at Raymond that a larger force was gathering at Jackson than he had expected. He therefore determined, before continuing his movement against Pemberton's force collecting at Edward's Station, to concentrate his whole army against Jackson. It might prove too strongly held to be captured by McPherson's Corps unaided, and, if left in the possession of the enemy, would constitute a grave menace to Grant's flank and rear. McPherson's and Sherman's Corps were moved forward against Jackson by two roads coming into Jackson from different points,<sup>3</sup> which McClermand's Corps followed, so disposed as to be able to support either line of advance.

General Joseph E. Johnston, Commander-in-Chief of the Confederate forces in the West, reached Jackson on the night of the 13th. He found it garrisoned only by two brigades, one of which had been severely handled by McPherson on the 12th. Two more brigades were expected to arrive next day. But already McPherson's Corps was on the railroad at Clinton, cutting off all direct communication with Pemberton; Johnston despaired of being able to hold Jackson. He telegraphed to Richmond that he had arrived too late, and posted the two brigades behind entrenchments to hold the enemy in check and give himself time to remove the stores and valuable property in the town by train to Canton.

About 10 a.m. on the 14th McPherson and Sherman moved to the attack. Sherman met with a very feeble resistance from the

<sup>1</sup> Gregg's brigade from Port Hudson.

<sup>2</sup> Greene, 143.

<sup>3</sup> McPherson moved by way of Clinton, and Sherman advanced through Mississippi Springs.

brigade which had been engaged on the 12th. On the other road a stouter resistance was offered to McPherson. The two Federal columns entered Jackson about the same time in the afternoon. Thirty-five guns, with a considerable number of prisoners and the possession of the State capital, were the fruits of a victory gained at the cost of only 300 casualties.<sup>1</sup>

Having captured Jackson and driven Johnston off the direct line of communication with Vicksburg, Grant next prepared to attack Pemberton's force at Edward's Station before Johnston could come to his aid by circling round in a north-westerly direction. His task was made considerably easier by the differences of opinion existing between the two Confederate leaders as to the right course to be followed.

Johnston held a very anomalous position. Towards the end of 1862<sup>2</sup> he had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Confederate forces in the West. As such he exercised a general control over the two armies under Bragg and Pemberton, the one operating in Tennessee and the other at Vicksburg.<sup>3</sup> But it was impossible to direct the movements of armies so far apart with any satisfactory result. At the time that Grant was crossing the Mississippi Johnston was with Bragg's army. Notified by Pemberton of the Federal movement, he sent him instructions to unite all the forces available and fight a pitched battle with Grant.

Pemberton, however, took an entirely different view of the situation. He did not believe that Grant would be able to feed his troops for any length of time off the country, but expected that he would in a few days be forced to return to the river. He thought it probable in the meantime that a raid might be made against Jackson. He therefore ordered the reinforcements coming from Port Hudson and South Carolina to stop at Jackson, whilst he placed three divisions in line along the Big Black River from the railway bridge to Warrenton.

When, however, it became plain that Grant could maintain his troops with supplies gathered on the spot, he ordered the three divisions to concentrate at Edward's Station, where he expected Grant to strike his first blow.<sup>4</sup> On the same day that Pemberton was concentrating at Edward's Station Grant, however, was marching with all his forces upon Jackson.

On the night of the 13th Johnston sent an order to Pemberton to re-establish his line of communications and co-operate with the forces in Jackson in an attack on Grant's rear at Clinton. But

<sup>1</sup> Greene, 147-8. But Johnston, 177, says that the Federal reports exaggerated what was only a trifling skirmish into a heavy engagement.

<sup>2</sup> November 24th.

<sup>3</sup> Johnston also was placed in command of Kirby Smith's department of East Tennessee.

<sup>4</sup> Greene, 144-6.

Pemberton did not regard Johnston's instructions as definite orders, but only as advice, which it was in his own discretion to follow or reject. He considered himself as directly responsible to his Government for the safety of Vicksburg, and objected to taking any step which would leave it defenceless. Instead, therefore, of carrying out Johnston's orders he called a Council of War, and eventually decided to move against Grant's rear in the direction of Raymond and cut his line of communications.<sup>1</sup> Thus, whilst Johnston was moving north-west, Pemberton was advancing south-east on a wild-goose chase against a line of communications which did not exist.

On the night of the 15th Grant had massed seven divisions along a line eight miles long between Bolton Station and Raymond within easy supporting distance of each other, and two of Sherman's divisions had been left in Jackson to destroy the railroad and all public property.

Pemberton made but little progress on the 15th,<sup>2</sup> and on the following morning, having received another order from Johnston to join him north of the railroad,<sup>3</sup> abandoned his own plan, and ordered his troops to countermarch to Edward's Station. But it was now too late: skirmishing had already commenced between the advanced guards of the two armies. The only course left to him was to arrange his troops in line of battle across the roads leading to Edward's Station, and await attack. Three roads led to Edward's Station, one from Clinton just south of the railway, and two from Raymond. Along the Clinton road Hovey's division of the 13th Corps was advancing, closely followed by McPherson's Corps, and on the two Raymond roads McClernand was moving forward with four divisions.

Champion's Hill, from which the battle of the 16th (called by the Confederates the battle of Baker's Creek) takes its name, is a small hill, round whose eastern slope the Clinton road runs to join the Middle road.<sup>4</sup> It was on the northern and eastern slopes of

<sup>1</sup> The majority of this Council of War was in favour of carrying out the movement towards Clinton ordered by Johnston. But a minority, including the two senior major-generals, Loring and Stevenson, preferred a movement, the object of which was to cut off the enemy's supplies from the Mississippi. Pemberton favoured neither proposition. He was opposed to any movement which would draw him away from Vicksburg. Believing that Johnston's plan for an advance on Clinton was impracticable, he accepted the movement towards Raymond, advocated by the minority, as the best way of carrying out the spirit of Johnston's order (Johnston, 186; Greene, 149, 150).

<sup>2</sup> His troops did not commence the march till 1 p.m., and only advanced three miles from their starting-point. They actually covered twice that distance, as they were unable to follow the direct road over Baker's Creek owing to a flood.

<sup>3</sup> Johnston sent two letters to Pemberton on the nights of the 13th and 14th respectively. On the 15th at 8.30 a.m. he wrote: "Our being compelled to leave Jackson makes your plan [of a movement towards Raymond] impracticable. The only mode by which we can unite is by your moving directly to Clinton, and informing me, that we may move to that point with about six thousand" (Greene, 152).

<sup>4</sup> Greene, 155.



this hill that the fiercest fighting of the day took place. Stevenson's division, reinforced by Bowen's from the centre, held the position for several hours against the attacks of Hovey's and Logan's divisions. But when the Federals were reinforced by McPherson's second division, the Confederate left wing gave way. Stevenson's division was completely routed, but Bowen's retired in better order. Loring's division, which formed the right of the Confederate line, had been holding back McClernand's timid advance along the two Raymond roads. If McClernand with his four divisions had displayed the same energy as the Federal leaders on the right, the whole of Pemberton's army would probably have been annihilated. For McClernand could have swept Loring's one division out of his path, and intercepted the Confederate line of retreat.<sup>1</sup> As it was, the left wing made good its escape, but Loring found his retreat cut off, and was forced to march south. Being unable to return to rejoin the rest of Pemberton's forces, he ultimately made his way north and joined Johnston at Canton.

The battle of Champion's Hill was the most important in the Vicksburg campaign: the Federal loss amounted to 2,408, and the Confederate was reported as 3,839: twenty-four pieces of artillery were captured by the victors.<sup>2</sup>

Pemberton made his last stand at the railway bridge over the Big Black River. He had constructed a *tête de pont* in front of the bridge, and directed Bowen's division to hold it. It had been intended that Loring's division should hold the west bank, but Loring's division had disappeared. Stevenson's division was thoroughly demoralised, and in full retreat for Vicksburg. Consequently Bowen's division, which after its losses on Champion's Hill numbered less than 5,000 men,<sup>3</sup> was left to hold a line of entrenchments three-quarters of a mile away from the river on open ground without any supporting force on the further bank. It was impossible to defend such a position against the greatly superior numbers which the Federals brought up.

On the morning of the 17th McClernand's Corps was leading the pursuit, and three divisions advanced against Bowen. The Confederates made but a brief resistance, and fled across the river when the Federals charged. All their guns and one-third of the entire force were captured; but the fugitives succeeded in destroying the bridge which had been previously prepared for the purpose.<sup>4</sup> The

<sup>1</sup> Greene, 159-60.

<sup>2</sup> Greene, 160-1. Johnston, 182, blames Pemberton for having remained passive before a single Federal division (Hovey's) for about five hours. In 3 B. & L., 549, the Federal loss is given at 2,441.

<sup>3</sup> Greene, 163. Bowen's division had been reinforced by one brigade from Vicksburg, but the whole force in the trenches did not make more than 5,000.

<sup>4</sup> Greene, 164.

fighting was over soon after 9 a.m., and the rest of the day was spent by the Federals in constructing bridges. On that day Sherman's Corps marched to Bridgeport, north of the railway, with the only pontoon train which the army had, in order to flank the enemy out of their entrenchments at the Big Black Bridge, if they offered a protracted resistance.

During the 17th Pemberton withdrew all his troops into Vicksburg, twelve miles distant, and posted them at different points along his line of fortifications. Haines' Bluff was abandoned. The position was rendered untenable when once the line of the Big Black was lost. Sherman was the first to cross the river with his Corps, and at daybreak on the 18th was pressing on towards Vicksburg by the Bridgeport road. When he crossed the Benton road, and thus interposed between Vicksburg and Haines' Bluff, he sent a regiment of cavalry against the rear of the batteries at the latter place.<sup>1</sup> The Confederates had already evacuated the post, and fourteen heavy siege guns were captured there.

By the occupation of Haines' Bluff the Federals regained touch with the Mississippi above Vicksburg, and within a fortnight after cutting loose from all communications, Grant established his base on the Yazoo River at Chickasaw Bluffs. On the evening of the 18th Sherman took up his position across the Graveyard road, extending his right towards the Mississippi.

On the night of the 17th Johnston had sent orders to Pemberton to abandon Vicksburg and march to the north-east. He regarded the position at Vicksburg as hopeless, and his own object was now to save, if possible, the troops. Pemberton, however, instead of carrying out the order, whilst there was still time, summoned a Council of War, which decided that it was impossible to withdraw the troops in such a way as to preserve their efficiency as a fighting force, and sent word to Johnston of his determination to hold Vicksburg to the last.

Grant hoped to be able to carry the place by a *coup de main*. He believed that the troops inside the fortifications were thoroughly demoralised by their successive defeats, whereas if he settled down to a deliberate siege, Johnston would gain time to collect an army in his rear, and he would himself be obliged to send for reinforcements. Accordingly on the 19th he ordered an assault. Sherman's Corps was the only one near enough to the enemy's works to carry out actively the order. The Confederates had had time during the 17th and 18th to recover from their demoralisation, and fought well behind entrenchments. Sherman's attack was repulsed with considerable loss.

Grant directed the attack to be renewed on the 22nd. All three Corps took part in this assault. In each case the ditch was reached,

<sup>1</sup> Greene, 166-7.

and the Federal flag planted upon the parapets, but they could get no further. A misleading report from McClernand caused Grant to order a second attempt to be made. But the result was only to swell the list of killed and wounded. The Federal loss in the assaults of the 19th and 22nd amounted to over 4,000.<sup>1</sup> After the failure of the 22nd, Grant had no course but to commence siege operations.

The Confederate position at Vicksburg was a very strong one. On the land side it was defended by 128 guns, and the water batteries were armed with 44.<sup>2</sup> The nature of the ground lent itself very readily to the construction of defensive works. A ridge ran round Vicksburg, with its extremities resting on the Mississippi above and below the town.<sup>3</sup> The ground was very broken, and the plateau was cut into deep ravines. The approaches to the crest of the ridge were few and difficult. To cover these approaches the Confederates had constructed redans, and at some points closed redoubts, and between the salients an almost continuous line of entrenchments, eight miles long, had been made.<sup>4</sup>

Besides pushing siege operations, it was necessary for Grant to raise a covering force to hold Johnston in check and prevent him falling upon the Federal rear. Reinforcements were promptly forthcoming. Hurlbut sent up three divisions from Memphis: Schofield sent one from the Department of Missouri, and Burnside two from the Department of the Ohio for temporary service with Grant. Over 70,000 men were collected round Vicksburg. Seven divisions were placed under the command of Sherman to form the covering force.<sup>5</sup> The Federal works covered twelve miles, and were armed with 220 guns arranged in 89 batteries.<sup>6</sup>

By the beginning of June Johnston had organised an army of over 30,000 men in the neighbourhood of Canton.<sup>7</sup> The Richmond authorities from the very beginning of the siege were constantly pressing him to attack Grant, and at almost any risk seek to relieve Pemberton. Delay would only add to the disparity in numbers. But Johnston from the first despaired of saving Vicksburg. He was not prepared to run any risks in so desperate a cause, and to all the suggestions made by his Government he brought forward grave objections. On other fields he proved himself a master of the art of defensive warfare: but in the Vicksburg campaign, where a bold offensive was necessary if Pemberton was to be relieved, he was unequal to the occasion.

<sup>1</sup> Greene, 185.

<sup>2</sup> Greene, 176.

<sup>3</sup> 3 B. & L., 521.

<sup>4</sup> Greene, 175-6.

<sup>5</sup> Greene, 193.

<sup>6</sup> Greene, 197. Besides the 220 guns in position there was also a battery of heavy guns belonging to the navy (3 B. & L., 522).

<sup>7</sup> Greene, 190. But Johnston, 199, says on June 4th that his forces numbered less than 26,000.



On June 21st Pemberton sent a message to Johnston, proposing that he should attack Grant to the north of the railroad, whilst the garrison tried to cut its way out on the south to Hankinson's Ferry. But no answer to this proposition was ever received in Vicksburg.<sup>1</sup> On June 28th Johnston issued orders to his army to advance. Moving forward slowly and cautiously, on July 1st it was within a few miles of Vicksburg, and the next three days were spent by Johnston in making cautious reconnaissances on the north side of the railroad to see if there were any points in Sherman's lines which might be successfully assailed. Finding none, he proposed to cross the railroad and repeat the same process on the south side. But on the night of the 4th he received news of the surrender of Vicksburg, and at once retired towards Jackson.

Pemberton's position had been daily growing more desperate. The Federal gunboats prevented any attempt to escape to the opposite bank of the Mississippi: supplies were running short, and Grant's works were steadily approaching the Confederate line of entrenchments. On June 25th a mine was exploded on the Jackson road with great effect, and another was exploded on July 1st. On that day the Federal approaches were within from five to one hundred yards of the enemy's works<sup>2</sup>: and a final assault was fixed to take place on the 6th. But on the 3rd Pemberton, finding that his troops could no longer be relied upon to try and fight their way out, sent to Grant, offering to surrender. After some discussion as to the terms, the capitulation was effected on the 4th. The total force which surrendered was about 31,000 men.<sup>3</sup>

Directly after the surrender of Vicksburg, Grant despatched Sherman with two-thirds of his whole army in pursuit of Johnston.<sup>4</sup> Sherman pressed the pursuit with great vigour, and on the 9th arrived before Jackson, behind whose fortifications Johnston had placed his troops. Sherman proceeded to partially invest the place, knowing that Johnston was not likely to have sufficient provisions to stand a siege, and hoping to fall upon him as soon as he recommenced his retreat. But on the night of the 16th Johnston skilfully withdrew his troops out of the city across the river Pearl and was well on his way before the movement was detected. Further pursuit by Grant's orders was abandoned; and

<sup>1</sup> The last despatch received from Johnston in Vicksburg was dated June 22nd. Johnston, 195, says that this was in reply to Pemberton's despatch of the 21st. Greene, however, says that it was in answer to a despatch of the 15th. At any rate, it gave no definite instructions in regard to the movement proposed by Pemberton. All it says is, "I will have the means of moving towards the enemy in a day or two, and will try to make a diversion in your favour; and, if possible, communicate with you, though I fear that my force is too small to effect the latter."

<sup>2</sup> Greene, 198.

<sup>3</sup> Greene, 207.

<sup>4</sup> Greene, 194. Sherman's force consisted of twelve divisions, about 48,000 men.

after destroying the railroads so effectually that for the rest of the war Jackson ceased to have any strategic importance,<sup>1</sup> Sherman withdrew his troops to Vicksburg.

The fall of Vicksburg was followed by the surrender of Port Hudson (Map X.). On May 24th General Banks with about 30,000 men arrived before Port Hudson and invested the place, which was held by General Gardner with a force of about 7,000.<sup>2</sup> Two attempts were made to carry the fortress by assault on May 27th and June 14th. In both attacks the assailants were repulsed with heavy loss, amounting for the two days to nearly 4,000 men. On July 7th news reached Banks of the surrender of Vicksburg, and Gardner, being informed of the fact, expressed his willingness to surrender. On the 9th the garrison, which had been reduced to great straits for want of food, formally capitulated.<sup>3</sup>

The Mississippi was now open throughout its entire length to the Federals, and the main artery of the Confederacy had been severed. During the progress of operations on the east bank of the river the Confederate generals in the Trans-Mississippi Department had attempted by various diversions to relieve the pressure upon the two beleaguered garrisons. In June an attack was made by about 4,000 Confederates on the small force which Grant had left at Milliken's Bend to guard his trains; but the attack was easily repulsed.<sup>4</sup> A more serious attempt was made by Lieutenant-General Holmes, who attacked Helena on the very day that Vicksburg surrendered, with a force of about 10,000 men.<sup>5</sup> General Prentiss was in command of the Helena garrison, which numbered 4,000, and beat off the assailants with very heavy loss.

The Confederate General Taylor, who commanded a force in the Red River country, also attempted a diversion against Banks' rear by threatening New Orleans. But this expedition had no effect at all on Banks' operations at Port Hudson, and Taylor was forced to retreat, when Banks came down the river against him.<sup>6</sup>

The fall of Vicksburg, coinciding with the retreat of Lee from Gettysburg, was the turning-point of the war, but it was also the

<sup>1</sup> Greene, 196.

<sup>2</sup> Greene, 228.

<sup>3</sup> "The garrison was literally starving. With less than 3,000 famished men in line, powerful mines beneath the salients, and a last assault about to be delivered at ten paces, what else was left to do?" (3 B. & L., 597, account of Colonel Irwin, Banks' Assistant Adjutant-General).

<sup>4</sup> The Confederate force was J. G. Walker's division sent from Arkansas by General Kirby Smith, commanding the Trans-Mississippi Department, and placed under the orders of General Taylor.

<sup>5</sup> Holmes, in his report, returned his strength at 7,646. The officers (not included in that estimate) would raise the whole force to between 8,000 and 9,000. The Federal staff rated it as high as 15,000 (Greene, 234).

<sup>6</sup> Greene, 231-3, admits that the situation created by Taylor's movement was a serious one, and that the general commanding at New Orleans wrote to Banks that he must make his choice between New Orleans and Port Hudson. Taylor's *Destruction and Reconstruction*, 140-7, gives a somewhat highly coloured account of this movement.

turning-point of Grant's military career. Early in 1862 he had won the first great Federal success by the capture of Fort Donelson. But more than a year had passed, and he had not added to his laurels. Other Federal generals had begun well only to fail afterwards disastrously, and a failure before Vicksburg would have been fatal to Grant's reputation. To win the success which he saw that the political situation required, he deliberately ran a great risk. Sherman counted the risk too great and advised against it. Halleck did his best to prevent Grant from carrying out his plan of campaign. At the moment, when on the morning of May 17th the Confederates were flying across the Big Black River, a telegram was handed to Grant from Halleck, which, despatched on the 11th, directed him to abandon his operations against Vicksburg and go down the river to co-operate with Banks against Port Hudson.<sup>1</sup> But Grant, when he cut loose from his base, at the same time freed himself from the interference of the Washington authorities. Therefore to Grant belongs the entire credit of the campaign which reduced Vicksburg. The methods by which he conducted that campaign to a successful issue deserve the highest praise. At the outset of the campaign on the east bank of the river Pemberton had a rather larger force than Grant.<sup>2</sup> Yet the Confederates were repeatedly beaten on their own ground by the smaller army. Grant keeping his troops well in hand, succeeded in concentrating a superior force at every decisive point. At Port Gibson, at Raymond, at Jackson, and at Big Black Bridge the Federals had an overwhelming superiority in numbers. At Champion's Hill Pemberton did succeed in putting into line of battle 23,000 men, but Grant outnumbered him by nearly two to one.<sup>3</sup> Within eighteen days Pemberton was driven into the fortifications of Vicksburg with a total loss in fighting of over 10,000 men,<sup>4</sup> whilst the whole of Loring's division, 8,700 strong, was cut off from him and took no part in the actual defence of the town. For eighteen days the Federal troops lived on five days' rations and whatever supplies they could find in the

<sup>1</sup> 3 B. & L., 515. When Port Hudson had fallen, Grant and Banks were to conduct a combined campaign against Vicksburg.

<sup>2</sup> Greene, 136. He estimates Pemberton's force at over 50,000, and states that Grant began the campaign on the east bank of the river with about 41,000, and at no time prior to the siege had over 45,000 available. Grant says that on May 7th he had about 33,000 men, and that the enemy had a force of nearly 60,000. In 3 B. & L., 549, it is stated that the effective Federal force ranged from 43,000 at the beginning to 75,000 at the close of the campaign.

<sup>3</sup> Grant's actual force in the battle of Champion's Hill was seven divisions, 32,000 men. But two divisions of Sherman's Corps were within supporting distance.

<sup>4</sup> Grant claimed to have captured over 6,000 of the enemy and to have killed and wounded as many more (3 B. & L., 519). Greene, 170, note, estimates the Confederate loss at over 8,000, but it is not clear whether he includes in that estimate 4,500 prisoners sent to Memphis. Apparently, however, he does, in which case Grant's estimate is a decided exaggeration.



neighbourhood. A very important fact was thereby demonstrated, that it was perfectly possible for a Federal army in certain portions of Confederate territory to feed itself off the country. Sherman in his campaign of the following year showed how thoroughly he had mastered the lesson taught by Grant's campaign in rear of Vicksburg.

[For a more detailed account of the naval operations during this campaign, see Cap. XXVI.]

### NOTE ON THE VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN

The fall of Vicksburg led to a bitter controversy between General Johnston on the one side and Lieutenant-General Pemberton and President Davis on the other.

Pemberton virtually maintained that it was Johnston's order of May 13th that caused the disastrous battle of Champion's Hill and the consequent siege and fall of Vicksburg. He also reproached Johnston with underestimating the importance of Vicksburg to the Confederacy. Johnston asserts that the value of Vicksburg was gone, when once it was demonstrated that the Federal vessels could run past its batteries, and argues that it was Pemberton's failure to carry out either the letter or the spirit of all his orders that led to disaster.

It is quite clear that Pemberton regarded himself as directly responsible to his Government for the safety of Vicksburg, and did not consider Johnston's orders as absolutely binding. Johnston, both on May 1st and 2nd, ordered Pemberton to concentrate his forces and beat Grant in the open field. Pemberton might have brought a superior force against Grant on May 1st when the Federal army was crossing the Mississippi, or have attacked McClernand's and McPherson's Corps on the Big Black River, where they waited for Sherman from May 3rd to the 7th, or have fallen upon McClernand's Corps on the 13th, when the other two Corps were advancing on Raymond and Jackson. The order of May 13th Pemberton flatly disobeyed, and accepted instead the advice offered by a minority in his Council of War "in opposition to his (Pemberton's) previously expressed intentions and to the subversion of his matured plans." Again, on the night of May 17th Johnston ordered Pemberton to evacuate Vicksburg, "if it is not too late," and march to the north-east. On receipt of this order Pemberton called a second Council of War. The unanimous opinion of this Council was "that it was impossible to withdraw the army from this position with such *moral* and material as to be of further use to the Confederacy."

It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that Pemberton took upon himself the responsibility of disobeying his superior officer's orders with disastrous consequences. It also seems equally plain that Johnston with the forces immediately under his command had but little chance of breaking Grant's lines of investment and that a defeat with the Big Black River in his rear would have meant the loss of the whole of Mississippi and of Alabama. On the other hand, President Davis charged Johnston

with a grave military error in supposing that his assignment on May 9th to the immediate command of the forces at and near Vicksburg relieved him of the control over Bragg's army which he had exercised since November 24th, 1862. In effect, the President said that it was Johnston's own fault that he had not a sufficient force to break Grant's lines, because he neglected to call upon Bragg for reinforcements. From the first Johnston was opposed to weakening Bragg, who was confronted by Rosecrans with superior forces. He himself urged a concentration on the east bank of the Mississippi of Holmes' forces in Arkansas, a proposal which the President overruled. Convinced that the President would not allow troops to be drawn from the only quarter from which Johnston thought that they could be safely spared, viz. Lee's army in Virginia, he despaired of saving Vicksburg. In order to raise a sufficient force with which to extricate Pemberton from the position in which his own muddling had placed him, it was necessary to summon detachments from Bragg's army. Johnston knew that in the previous winter, when contrary to his advice, Stevenson's division was withdrawn from Bragg and sent to Vicksburg, Rosecrans had immediately seized the opportunity to march on Murfreesborough. He saw that in all probability to save the Mississippi it would be necessary to abandon Tennessee, and though it is probable enough that technically Johnston remained in control of Bragg's army, he rightly judged that the choice between two such alternatives could not be settled by a general whose whole attention was absorbed by one department, but must be decided by the Executive Government.

The difficulties of the military position, great in themselves, were aggravated by the fact that there was no real confidence between Davis and Johnston, that there was a marked divergence of opinion between Johnston and Pemberton as to the methods of warfare to be adopted, and that the President was far more in sympathy with the views of Pemberton whilst endeavouring to put upon Johnston the responsibility for ultimate failure. The worst that can be alleged against Johnston is that he perhaps inclined too much on the side of caution, that he might have made a more strenuous effort to falsify his own predictions, and that he ought to have forced from the President a definite declaration of the policy which was to be pursued on political as well as military grounds under extremely critical conditions.

## CHAPTER XVIII

### THE STRUGGLE FOR EAST TENNESSEE CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA<sup>1</sup>

Enforced inactivity of the Army of the Cumberland—The Confederate position—Cavalry operations—Rosecrans' view of the situation—Rosecrans drives Bragg into Chattanooga—Rosecrans prepares to cross the Tennessee—The theatre of war—Rosecrans crosses the Tennessee—The Federals occupy Chattanooga—Rosecrans' perilous position—Bragg prepares to assume the offensive—Bragg attempts to turn the Federal left—Arrival of Longstreet—Battle of Chickamauga—Wood's fatal mistake—Rout of the Federal right—Rosecrans cut off from Thomas—Thomas, "the Rock of Chickamauga"—Losses of the battle—The Confederates invest Chattanooga—Reinforcements sent to Rosecrans—Grant placed in supreme command in the West—Rosecrans relieved by Thomas—Changes in the Confederate army—New line of supplies opened for the Federal army in Chattanooga—Sherman advances towards Chattanooga—Burnside at Knoxville—Grant's plan of battle—Disposition of the Federal forces—Thomas' opening success—Sherman crosses the Tennessee—Hooker's "battle above the clouds"—Sherman attacks the Tunnel Hill—Thomas attacks Bragg's centre—The Confederate line broken—Retreat of the Confederate army—Relief of Burnside—Importance of the battle of Chattanooga.

THE Army of the Cumberland, after its victory at Murfreesborough, did not resume the offensive for several months. The railroad from Nashville to Louisville had been greatly damaged by Morgan's raid, and the line forward from Nashville to Murfreesborough also required repairing. It was with the greatest difficulty that Rosecrans guarded his extensive lines of communication against the raids of the Confederate cavalry, who greatly outnumbered the mounted troops in the Federal army. If the lines of communication were to be guarded by a force mainly consisting of infantry, so many troops of that arm would be required for the purpose that there would not be a sufficient force left to carry on an offensive campaign.<sup>2</sup>

In February Bragg had been reinforced by Van Dorn with the bulk of the cavalry of Pemberton's army. Rosecrans vainly urged his Government to send him additional cavalry, and when they turned a deaf ear to his appeals, proceeded to organise a brigade of mounted infantry. The Army of the Cumberland had little to hope for from the Washington Administration, because Rosecrans had lost Halleck's goodwill by his stern rebuke of what he

<sup>1</sup> See Map VI.

<sup>2</sup> *Cist*, 137.



regarded as an insult. On March 1st Halleck had written letters to Grant and Rosecrans promising that the vacant place on the major-generals' list in the regular army should be given to whichever general first achieved a decisive success. Grant received the communication with characteristic silence. But Rosecrans denounced the proposition as unfair, because it made no allowance for the difference of opportunities, and as degrading, because a patriot and man of honour should require no additional incentive to make him do his duty.<sup>1</sup>

After his defeat at Murfreesborough, Bragg had withdrawn his army to the railway, which branches off from the main line at Wartrace and runs to Shelbyville. His right wing, under Hardee, was encamped near Wartrace, and the left wing, under Polk, held Shelbyville. Both flanks were protected by his very powerful cavalry force. On the right Wheeler had his headquarters at McMinnville, the terminus of another branch line, and on the left Van Dorn was in command with his headquarters at Columbia, on the Nashville-Decatur road. Bragg had also constructed a second entrenched line at Tullahoma, where he held a strongly fortified position to which he could retire if his front line should be broken. The two armies were about twenty-five miles apart, and Bragg's second line of entrenchments about twenty miles in rear of his first.<sup>2</sup>

The operations on both sides during the first half of 1863 were of but minor importance, consisting mainly of cavalry expeditions against each others' lines of communication. Towards the end of January Bragg despatched Wheeler on an expedition against Fort Donelson, but the Confederate cavalry were repulsed with considerable loss. In March a Federal force, some 3,000 strong, marched from Franklin, where Rosecrans' right rested on the Nashville-Decatur Railway, to reconnoitre Van Dorn's front towards Columbia. This force suddenly found itself in the presence of 10,000 Confederate troops under Van Dorn himself. The artillery and cavalry made good their escape, but nearly all the infantry were captured. In April Rosecrans organised a brigade of mounted troops for a raid against the Confederate depôts in Georgia. Though a considerable amount of damage was done, and the Round Mountain Ironworks (about thirty miles south-east of Guntersville), one of the most important manufactories of war material in the South, were destroyed, the whole brigade was eventually captured by Forrest's cavalry.<sup>3</sup>

Both Grant and Halleck were anxious that Rosecrans should advance against Bragg to prevent him sending reinforcements to Vicksburg. Rosecrans, however, took a different view of the

<sup>1</sup> Cist, 150.

<sup>2</sup> Cist, 154.

<sup>3</sup> For these cavalry raids, see Cist 140-7.

situation. He considered that as long as he continued to occupy his lines at Murfreesborough, Bragg would keep all his army united in his front, because the possession of Middle Tennessee seemed to the Confederates of sufficient importance to justify Bragg's whole army remaining inactive, until the Army of the Cumberland should resume its advance. If, on the other hand, he succeeded in driving Bragg from his works at Shelbyville and Tullahoma, then the Confederate general would be very likely to move westwards, at any rate with part of his forces, and reinforce Johnston, who was operating against Grant's rear, and thus the very object of the advance urged on him would be defeated. Moreover, if Grant's operations against Vicksburg proved unsuccessful, the Confederates in the west would concentrate against the Army of the Cumberland, and its commander preferred in that case to be as near as possible to his base. Bragg, for his part, was quite satisfied to remain where he was, so long as his presence there prevented Rosecrans from sending reinforcements to Grant's aid.<sup>1</sup>

It was not till the end of June that Rosecrans resumed his long-interrupted advance against Bragg. The movement was to be made in co-operation with an advance of the Army of the Ohio under Burnside into East Tennessee against Knoxville. If Rosecrans was slow to move, he proved himself a strategist of great ability when the campaign was actually begun. His army had been organised by an order of the War Department into three Corps, the 14th under Thomas, the 20th under McCook, and the 21st under Crittenden. In February reinforcements had reached him under General Gordon Granger, which were formed into a reserve Corps under that commander. His plan of campaign was to make a feint with Granger's Corps and most of his cavalry against Polk's force at Shelbyville, whilst the three main Corps made a flanking movement round Bragg's right by way of Manchester, a point on the branch line between McMinnville and Tullahoma, and within twelve miles of the latter place.

The movement commenced on June 23rd, and met with complete success. In spite of the incessant rain, which rendered marching very difficult, the 14th Corps was concentrated at Manchester on the night of the 27th. On the same day some brilliant work by the Federal cavalry on the right revealed the fact that Bragg had abandoned his lines at Shelbyville. It remained to be seen whether Bragg would stand and fight at Tullahoma, or continue his retreat to the Tennessee.<sup>2</sup> On July 1st it was discovered that Tullahoma had been evacuated, and the troops, which had been cautiously advancing for another flanking movement, were pushed to the front in vigorous pursuit. Bragg, however, safely withdrew his

<sup>1</sup> Cist, 151-2, and 1 Sheridan, 259.

<sup>2</sup> Cist, 164.

army, retarding the pursuit by destroying the bridges over the swollen streams. He crossed the mountains and took up a fresh position at Chattanooga on the eastern bank of the Tennessee. Rosecrans' operations so far had been brilliantly successful. In a nine days' campaign he had manœuvred the enemy out of two strong positions and forced him to retire behind the Tennessee. He had captured eleven guns and 1,600 prisoners, whilst his own loss only amounted to 560 in all.<sup>1</sup>

The retreat of the Confederates across the Tennessee marked the close of the first stage of the campaign. Chattanooga, the key both to Northern Georgia and East Tennessee, was in itself a position of great strategical importance, and became the prize for which the two armies contended. But it was not merely for the possession of Chattanooga that Rosecrans fought: he recognised that his true objective was not any one position, however important, but the Confederate army itself, which he must, if possible, destroy, or at any rate decisively defeat. The problem which now confronted him was how to move his army across the Tennessee so as again to get within reach of Bragg's army. Once across the river, he could either invest Chattanooga or, if Bragg continued his retreat, could fall upon him and deal him a succession of heavy blows, before he could reach a place of safety. As a preliminary step to crossing the river Rosecrans commenced to repair both the railroads in his rear and also the line in his front to the Tennessee. This work took up some three weeks. When it was completed, Rosecrans established his new *dépôt* at Stevenson and set himself as rapidly as possible to accumulate the necessary supplies at that point.

It had been the original intention of the Washington Government, that Rosecrans' advance against Bragg should be accompanied by an invasion of East Tennessee by Burnside's Army of the Ohio, and that the two armies should co-operate. On June 2nd Burnside was ready to advance from Lexington, Kentucky, with his two Corps, but on the following day was ordered to send large reinforcements to Grant's aid, and consequently his advance had to be postponed. Rosecrans did not consider that it would be safe to cross the Tennessee and outflank Bragg's left by a movement across the mountain ranges of Northern Georgia, until he knew that Burnside could provide a diversion by capturing Knoxville and securing possession of the upper valley of the Tennessee. Consequently he was obliged to postpone his forward movement across the Tennessee until Burnside was ready to co-operate. The delay was not in itself disadvantageous, as it would give time for the corn to

<sup>1</sup> Cist, 169-70. The Federal loss is stated at 570 in 3 B. & L., 637, note. Rosecrans' flanking movements were rendered comparatively simple by his superiority in numbers. He seems to have had 63,000 against Bragg's 46,000 (3 B. & L., 635-6).



ripen, and also enable reinforcements to be brought from Grant's army, now set free from the siege of Vicksburg, to the Tennessee, and thus prevent Bragg from making any movement against the Federal rear on that flank.<sup>1</sup>

On the other hand, it was plain that Bragg, having a railroad open to his rear, might be considerably reinforced both from Johnston's army in Mississippi and from the Army of Northern Virginia.

Halleck, at Washington, adopted the same faulty policy after the fall of Vicksburg as he had in the previous year after the occupation of Corinth. Grant's victorious army was split up and dispersed, and no reinforcements were sent to Rosecrans till after his defeat at Chickamauga.

On August 16th Rosecrans moved forward from his headquarters at Winchester and Burnside advanced from Lexington. Rosecrans' plan of campaign was to feint at Bragg's right and lead him to suppose that he would cross above Chattanooga, whilst the main part of his army was crossing the river some distance below the town. In order to mystify Bragg as to the intended point of crossing, Rosecrans had spread his cavalry for 150 miles along the west bank of the river, and demonstrations were made at various points.<sup>2</sup> Bragg was completely deceived, and concluding that his opponent intended to cross above Chattanooga, concentrated all his army at and above the town, leaving the lower crossings quite unguarded.<sup>3</sup>

For a proper appreciation of the difficulties with which Rosecrans had to contend, a brief mention must be made of the topography of the region in which he was about to operate. The general course of the Alleghany Mountains is from north-east to south-west. The Cumberland Mountains form the most westerly range of the great chain, and separate the upper waters of the Cumberland and Tennessee. On the eastern bank of the latter river a succession of parallel mountain ranges confronted him. The first range, which runs parallel and very close to the river, is known as Raccoon Mountain. Parallel to this range is Look-out Mountain, a hundred miles in length, and reaching the Tennessee about two miles south of Chattanooga. The valley between these two ranges is drained by Look-out Creek and is traversed by a railway branching off from the main line at Wauhatchie and terminating at Trenton. East of Look-out Mountain rose Missionary Ridge, some forty miles long and running up to the river above the town. These two ranges enclosed the Chattanooga Valley, drained by the

<sup>1</sup> Cist, 173.

<sup>2</sup> Cist, 179. The main columns of Rosecrans' army were fifty miles apart (3 B. & L., 668).

<sup>3</sup> Bragg naturally expected that Rosecrans would cross above Chattanooga, in consequence of Burnside's advance upon Knoxville.

Chattanooga Creek, near whose mouth the town of the same name is situated. East of Missionary Ridge come Chickamauga Valley, drained by the West Chickamauga Creek, and Pigeon Mountain. Still further east rise Chickamauga Hill and Taylor's Ridge, drained by the Middle and East Chickamauga Creeks. Last of the series comes Chattanooga Mountain, and beyond it runs the railroad from Chattanooga to Atlanta, which formed Bragg's line of supplies.

From Winchester Rosecrans commenced his movement across the Cumberland Mountains. The 14th and 20th Corps reached the river near Stevenson and Bridgeport, whilst the 21st Corps moved through the Sequatchie Valley and part of it appeared opposite and above Chattanooga, thus confirming Bragg in his anticipation that the crossing would be above the town.

The movement across the river commenced on August 29th and was completed by September 4th.<sup>1</sup> The 21st Corps forming the left of the Federal army occupied Wauhatchie. Thomas' Corps held Trenton, and the 20th Corps crossed to Valley End.<sup>2</sup> Bragg finding the enemy on his left, determined to evacuate Chattanooga temporarily and concentrate his army in the Chickamauga Valley, with a view to falling upon the enemy's columns, as they emerged from the defiles of the mountains. He had called to his assistance Buckner's Corps from East Tennessee and had also received reinforcements from Mississippi. He evacuated Chattanooga on the 7th and the 8th September, and moved twenty-five miles south to Lafayette, where he covered the railroad and hoped to get a chance of defeating Rosecrans' army in detail.

On September 9th Crittenden's Corps took possession of Chattanooga. After securing the coveted prize, it would have been wiser on the part of Rosecrans to concentrate the whole of his army in Chattanooga by marching his right and centre down Look-out Valley under cover of the mountain, and then having taken possession of the crests of Look-out Mountain and Missionary Ridge, to make Chattanooga his base for a fresh and deliberate movement against Bragg's army. Unfortunately, however, Rosecrans interpreted the evacuation of Chattanooga to mean that Bragg was in full retreat. He supposed that the Confederate army was thoroughly demoralised by its abandonment of one strong position after another. Bragg sent pretended deserters into Chattanooga, whose reports Rosecrans readily believed: and their false news was actually confirmed from Washington.<sup>3</sup> He determined to press the pursuit without delay. Crittenden was ordered to leave one brigade in Chattanooga, and with the rest of his Corps move out along the railroad to Ringgold and Dalton. Thomas' Corps was directed through the gaps in Look-out

<sup>1</sup> Cist, 180.

<sup>2</sup> Fiske, 261.

<sup>3</sup> Fiske, 262-4.

Mountain into McLemore's Cove, the valley in which the Chattanooga and West Chickamauga Creeks rise. The 20th Corps was ordered to advance to Alpine and Summerville. Rosecrans had in fact fallen into the trap which his opponent had set for him.

It was not till September 12th that the Federal commander discovered his mistake. The appalling nature of the sudden revelation was enough to unnerve the stoutest heart. From Ringgold to Alpine, over a distance of fifty-seven miles, the Federal army was strung out in three main detachments, whilst at Lafayette lay Bragg with an army nearly three times the strength of any one of the isolated bodies, which seemed absolutely at his mercy.<sup>1</sup> But Bragg signally failed to rise to the height of the occasion. Though his enemy had walked straight into the trap, he made no attempt to close it upon him. He was perplexed by the wide dispersion of the Federal forces, and bewildered by the sudden appearance of those forces at so many different points in his front.<sup>2</sup> There was at the Confederate headquarters a singular ignorance of the enemy's movements.<sup>3</sup> It is possible that during this part of the campaign Bragg was not well served by his subordinates. It would seem that but little love was lost between the commanding general and his chief lieutenants, and that the confidence of the officers and men in their commander had been rudely shaken by the uninterrupted succession of reverses which had been experienced since the invasion of Kentucky in the previous year. Whatever the causes, the opportunity was lost.<sup>4</sup> By the night of the 18th Rosecrans had succeeded in reconcentrating his army in the Chickamauga Valley, near Lee and Gordon's Mills. The long delay was due to the action of McCook, who, instead of marching, as ordered by Rosecrans, straight from Alpine through Dougherty's Gap into McLemore's Cove, withdrew his Corps over Look-out Mountain to Valley End and recrossed the mountain by Johnson's Crook and Stevens' and Cooper's Gaps into the Chickamauga Valley.<sup>5</sup>

This delay almost proved fatal to Rosecrans. For in spite of Bragg's failure to seize the opportunity, it compelled the Federals

<sup>1</sup> Fiske, 264. Bragg had been reinforced by two divisions (Breckinridge's and Walker's) of Johnston's army, and two more brigades were on their way, and Buckner's division had been called in from Knoxville.

<sup>2</sup> 3 B. & L., 644.

<sup>3</sup> 3 B. & L., 640.


<sup>4</sup> Bragg made two attempts to defeat Rosecrans' army in detail. On the 10th and 11th he endeavoured to crush Negley's and Baird's divisions in McLemore's Cove. The failure of this movement he seems to have attributed to D. H. Hill, and specially Hindman. Polk was ordered on the 13th to concentrate against Crittenden, whose forces were at Ringgold and Lee and Gordon's Mills. Bragg was much dissatisfied with Polk's failure to carry out this manœuvre. But D. H. Hill (3 B. & L., 641) says of Bragg's failure to defeat Rosecrans in detail: "So far as the commanding general was concerned, the trouble with him was: first, lack of knowledge of the situation; second, lack of personal supervision of the execution of his orders." For a defence of Polk's failure to attack on the 13th, see 3 B. & L., 663.

<sup>5</sup> Fiske, 265.




# BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA


Scale of Miles



Federals Confederates



Position on evening 19th Sept. 1863  
do morning 20th do do  
do evening do do do  
Contours at 100 feet intervals  
Woods





to fight in the Chickamauga Valley instead of at Chattanooga, and also gave Bragg time to receive heavy reinforcements from the Army of Northern Virginia. Rosecrans was obliged to fight on ground which he had not selected, and against heavy odds.

It was fortunate for the Federals that Longstreet's divisions were prevented from arriving sooner. As soon as the news of the evacuation of Chattanooga reached Richmond, Jefferson Davis resolved to reinforce Bragg from Lee's army. But the Federal occupation of Knoxville closed the Virginia and East Tennessee line to the Confederates, and Longstreet was obliged to take a roundabout route through the Carolinas and Georgia, and joined Bragg by way of Atlanta.

Bragg, having failed to crush his foe in detail, determined to await the arrival of Longstreet's divisions, and then attack with his entire army. His plan of battle was to turn the Federal left flank, roll it back upon the centre, and cut Rosecrans' line of retreat to Chattanooga. On the 18th Hood, with three brigades, reported for duty, and was placed temporarily in command on the right. The movement across the West Chickamauga against the Federal left was ordered to commence on that day<sup>1</sup> (see Plan). D. H. Hill, in command on the left, was to hold the enemy fast in his front, whilst the centre, under Polk, was to be in readiness to cross the creek at the points which the turning movement of the right wing was expected to uncover. The execution of the movement proceeded very slowly, and by nightfall only Hood's division and Walker's small Corps had crossed the river.

On the 19th Bragg continued his attempt to turn the Federal left and gain possession of the roads to Chattanooga. But during the night of the 18th Rosecrans, realising Bragg's intention, moved Thomas' Corps to the extreme left and directed him to hold his position there, covering the roads to the rear at all costs, and promising to reinforce him if necessary with the rest of the army. The fighting was very sharp throughout the day. The Confederate attacks were made with great determination, but failed to achieve permanent success owing to the lack of concert which characterised all their efforts. Rosecrans kept bringing up fresh reinforcements to support his left, whilst the Confederate left was moved across the Chickamauga, and a considerable part of it was engaged in the battle against Thomas. The results of the day's fighting were, on the whole, favourable to the Federals. They had succeeded in repelling all the attacks of the Confederates, and at nightfall were holding the roads on their left in greater strength than at the beginning of the day. But Bragg was expecting further reinforcements: not all the troops actually on the field had been engaged

<sup>1</sup> D. H. Hill (3 B. & L., 649) blames Bragg for not having ordered this movement on any one of the four preceding days.



on the 19th, and with greater concert of action the Confederates could still hope to achieve their object.<sup>1</sup>

Late on the night of the 19th Longstreet arrived at Bragg's headquarters, and two brigades of McLaws' division reached the battlefield during the night. Bragg now determined to make a fresh organisation of his forces. He divided his army into two wings: the right wing, under Polk, consisting of Hill's and Walker's Corps and Cheatham's division, with Forrest's cavalry, and the left wing under Longstreet, consisting of Buckner's and Hood's Corps and Hindman's division, with Wheeler's cavalry. Polk was directed to commence the attack at daybreak with Breckinridge's division, which had not been engaged on the previous day, on the extreme right, and the attack was to be taken up successively by the divisions from right to left. When the attack of the right wing was fully developed the left was to come into action, and a sweep to the left was to be made by the whole army pivoting upon the division which held the extreme left of the line.

But Bragg's plan for concerted action again miscarried. Polk had not slept within his lines, and this caused much delay in the attack next morning.<sup>2</sup> Not till 9.30 a.m.<sup>3</sup> did Breckinridge assault the extreme left of the Federal line, which he overlapped with two of his brigades. The Federal left was held by Thomas with his four divisions and one from either of the other two Corps. McCook commanded the right with his other two divisions, and Crittenden held two divisions in reserve near the point where Thomas' and McCook's lines joined, ready to reinforce either as might be required. Granger's reserve Corps was guarding Rossville Gap in Missionary Ridge through which the road from Lafayette to Chattanooga ran. During the night the Federals had thrown up breastworks of logs and rails. Sheltered behind these, Thomas repulsed the successive assaults of Polk's wing. Gradually the tide of battle rolled from the Confederate right to the left wing,

<sup>1</sup> On the Confederate side Hindman's, Breckinridge's, and Preston's divisions had not been engaged. Rosecrans had put in all but two brigades of Thomas', McCook's, and Crittenden's Corps. Granger's Corps was held in reserve throughout the 19th (3 B. & L., 652).

<sup>2</sup> Bragg told D. H. Hill that he had "found Polk after sunrise sitting down reading a newspaper at Alexander's Bridge, two miles from the line of battle" (3 B. & L., 653). But General Polk's son denies the charge, and states that though his father slept at Alexander's Bridge, he was on the line of battle at sunrise, where he remained and first met Bragg. According to General Polk's account, the blame for the delay rests with D. H. Hill. Polk at midnight sent Hill an order to attack at sunrise, but Hill could not be found. A second order, issued at 5.30 a.m. to Hill's division commanders, directing them to attack as soon as possible, was received by Hill himself about 6.15 a.m. Hill replied that his men were getting their rations, and would not be ready to move for an hour or more (3 B. & L., 662). Hill declares that the first order which he received from Polk was at 7.25 a.m., and that he had received no intimation of the intended attack at daylight, and that therefore his troops were not ready.

<sup>3</sup> Skirmishing commenced about an hour earlier.

where Longstreet had been for several hours waiting the signal to attack.

The Federal right had been much weakened in order to reinforce Thomas. Negley's division<sup>1</sup> had been ordered to the left and its place filled by Wood's division of Crittenden's Corps. Just before Longstreet's attack was made Wood, misinterpreting an order, had withdrawn his division and marched it to the left to support Thomas' right rear.<sup>2</sup> One brigade was hastily thrown into the gap.<sup>3</sup> But before the Federal line could be closed up, Longstreet's attack struck it with crushing force. This assault was made with Hood's column of eight brigades.<sup>4</sup> Two other brigades of Sheridan's division, which had started towards the left in answer to Thomas' call for reinforcements, were hastily recalled, but were only in time to share the general rout of the right wing. Six Federal brigades were swept off the field.<sup>5</sup> Forty pieces of artillery fell into the hands of the Confederates,<sup>6</sup> and Rosecrans' army was cut in two.

Rosecrans at the moment of Longstreet's assault was on the Federal right, giving instructions to McCook to close up his line. He now found himself cut off from Thomas' position, and with his Chief of the Staff<sup>7</sup> hurried back to Rossville. After a brief consultation, as the news from the left seemed to point to its speedy defeat, Rosecrans decided to return to Chattanooga and make the necessary preparations for receiving his beaten army and posting it to the best advantage, whilst the Chief of the Staff made his way to the front and rejoined Thomas.

Soon after reaching Chattanooga Rosecrans was joined by McCook and Crittenden, who had been swept away in the rout of the right wing. The brigades of this wing retreated by the Dry Valley road, were re-formed on the west side of Missionary Ridge, and marched to Rossville.

Thomas was now the only Corps commander left upon the field on the Federal side, and it seemed as if he too must soon be overwhelmed. But, as before at Murfreesborough, so now, Thomas showed himself possessed of extraordinary staying powers as a fighter, his breastworks proved of sterling value, and the attacks of both wings of the Confederate army failed to drive him from his position.

Longstreet, as soon as he had broken the enemy's front, stopped the wheel to the left, as that movement was rendered useless by

<sup>1</sup> Negley's division of Thomas' Corps formed the extreme right of the left wing. It was now ordered to the extreme left, but only two brigades reached the designated position. The third brigade with Negley himself "drifted away from the field to Rossville" (3 B. & L., 670).

<sup>2</sup> For Wood's mistake, see note at end of chapter.

<sup>3</sup> Of Sheridan's division.

<sup>4</sup> 3 B. & L., 657.

<sup>5</sup> The six brigades, says D. H. Hill, consisted of the three of Sheridan's division, two of Davis', and one of Van Cleve's. (Cist, 211.)

<sup>6</sup> Cist, 207.

<sup>7</sup> Garfield, afterwards President of the United States.

the failure of Polk to break Thomas' line, and swung his troops round to the right, thus forming a new line almost perpendicular to the old. Whilst thus engaged, he was summoned to Bragg's side. He urged him to abandon the offensive movement of his right wing, and whilst holding it on the defensive, to draw off from it as many troops as could be spared to reinforce the left wing. But Bragg was in no mood to listen to suggestions from a subordinate: without apparently giving Longstreet any instructions, he rode off to the right wing and prepared to renew his attack against Thomas' left. Longstreet found himself obliged to fight a separate battle against Thomas' right.

On discovering the rout of the right wing, Thomas had posted his reserve division under Brannan and Wood's division, which had just joined him from the right, along the crest of a commanding ridge, known as Horseshoe Ridge, almost at right angles with the line of log works, which he still held against Polk's wing. By holding this ridge he prevented Longstreet turning his right and cutting him off from Rossville Gap. Longstreet attacked the ridge with two of his divisions (Johnson's and Hindman's), and brought up from the extreme left another division (Preston's), which had taken but little part so far in the fighting. General Granger from his position near Rossville, judging from the sound of increasing firing on the right that Thomas was hard pressed in that quarter, without waiting for any orders, moved with two brigades to the threatened point and took up his position at the extreme right of the ridge. He arrived just in time to repel a furious assault made by three of Longstreet's divisions (Johnson's, Hindman's, McLaws') against the Federal right flank. Although Longstreet renewed the attack with all the available troops of his wing, at nightfall the Horseshoe Ridge was still held by the gallant soldiers of Granger's, Wood's, and Brannan's divisions. For nearly six hours Thomas' right had held its ground against the repeated attacks of Longstreet's wing, and the last assault was hurled back with fixed bayonets and rifle-butts, as the ammunition of the defenders was almost completely exhausted. On the Confederate right two movements were made in the course of the afternoon, but were easily repulsed.

After dark Thomas withdrew his troops to Rossville, where a strong position was taken up. So skilfully was the retirement conducted, that Bragg was not aware of it until the following morning. Throughout the 21st Thomas held his position at Rossville Gap, in order to secure time for Rosecrans to put Chattanooga into a state of defence, and the same evening withdrew his forces unmolested into the town.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For a more detailed account of certain phases of the battle of Chickamauga, see note at end of chapter.



The battle of Chickamauga was one of the fiercest and bloodiest in the war. The Federal force engaged was between 55,000 and 60,000, and their losses amounted to over 16,000. On the Confederate side between 60,000 and 70,000 men took part in the battle, and their losses probably exceeded 20,000.<sup>1</sup> The fruits of the victory remained with the Confederates in the shape of some forty guns and the possession of the battlefield. But the victory in itself was a barren one. It is probable that if Rosecrans, instead of returning to Chattanooga, had gone forward to Thomas and had seen for himself the condition of affairs, the order to retire to Rossville would never have been given.

The Confederate leaders were in doubt as to the best method of following up their victory. It ought naturally to lead to the re-occupation of Chattanooga. Longstreet proposed that the army should cross the river above the town, and by threatening Rosecrans' line of retreat force the evacuation of Chattanooga. The Confederates would then have the choice of either pursuing Rosecrans or falling upon Burnside in East Tennessee. Bragg objected to this suggestion, that the country north of the river afforded no subsistence for either animals or men, and decided to invest Chattanooga.

The Federals, when they retired into the town, abandoned Look-out Mountain, and the Confederates' lines were drawn right round the town from Missionary Ridge on the right to Look-out Mountain on the left. On both hills entrenchments were thrown up, whilst an entrenched line was made through Chattanooga Valley, within a short distance of the Federal line of defence (see Plan, p. 288).

Bragg expected that the danger of starvation would compel Rosecrans to evacuate Chattanooga. On the 1st October he sent a cavalry force under Wheeler to make a raid against the Federal line of supplies. A dépôt was broken up and many wagons burned and mules killed.<sup>2</sup> The nearest road from Bridgeport, where Rosecrans had accumulated his supplies, along the north bank of the river, was promptly closed by the Confederate guns and sharpshooters, who were posted along the southern bank from Look-out Creek for some ten miles down the river. The only way in which the Federals could now get provisions was by hauling them over mountainous roads, a distance of sixty miles, into the

<sup>1</sup> In 3 B. & L., 673-6, the Federal loss is estimated at 16,179, out of a total strength of 56,965; the Confederate loss at 17,804, out of 71,551. Cist, 228, states the Federal force at 55,000, the Confederate at about 70,000. D. H. Hill considers that "Rosecrans was stronger in infantry and artillery by at least 4,000 men." The Confederates claim to have captured fifty-one guns. Cist, 228, estimates the Confederate loss at 20,950. Henderson (ii. 616) states in round numbers the Federal strength at 57,000, their loss at 17,100; the Confederate strength at 71,000, their loss at 18,000.

<sup>2</sup> Cist, 231.

Sequatchie Valley. As the rainy season made the roads more difficult and the mules began to die from exhaustion and want of forage, starvation soon stared the Army of the Cumberland in the face. Provided that the Federal Government failed to relieve Rosecrans, Bragg might expect shortly to recover Chattanooga.<sup>1</sup>

The news of Rosecrans' defeat came as a tremendous shock to the Washington Administration. Instead of hearing, as they expected, that Rosecrans was continuing his triumphant advance into Northern Georgia, they now learnt that he had been driven back into Chattanooga, and was there besieged. Burnside's position in East Tennessee was also gravely compromised by the defeat of Chickamauga. Every effort was now made to relieve the Army of the Cumberland. Part of the 11th and 12th Corps were detached from the Army of the Potomac and sent, by rail, under Hooker's command, to Tennessee, and Grant was directed to send reinforcements from the Mississippi. Immediately after Chickamauga McCook and Crittenden were relieved of their commands, and ordered to return to Washington to attend a Court of Enquiry, which was to examine into their conduct on September 19th and 20th, and their two Corps were consolidated into one under the command of Gordon Granger.

By a War Department order of 16th October the Military Division of the Mississippi was created, composed of the Departments of the Ohio, Cumberland, and Tennessee, and Grant was assigned to the command, being succeeded in the command of the Army of the Tennessee by Sherman.

At the same time Rosecrans was relieved of the command of the Army of the Cumberland, and Thomas put in his place.<sup>2</sup>

Changes were also taking place in the Confederate army. Bragg was bitterly disappointed at his failure to win a complete victory at Chickamauga and relieved Polk of his command, putting him under charges for not having opened the battle of the 20th at daybreak. The higher officers of the army were clamorous for Bragg's removal from the supreme command, and on 9th October President Davis visited Chattanooga to investigate matters for himself. His visit failed to allay the ill-feeling. Longstreet, who had expected when he left Virginia to be assigned to the command of the army, now refused to accept it, after Bragg had compromised its safety by entangling it in a siege. Consequently Bragg remained in command. To Polk's Corps the President at first proposed to appoint Pemberton. But the feeling against that unsuccessful general was so strong, that Davis gave up the idea

<sup>1</sup> Cist, 232.

<sup>2</sup> Cist, 234. The substitution of Thomas for Rosecrans was made by the advice of Grant.

and appointed Hardee.<sup>1</sup> D. H. Hill, who had been specially emphatic in expressing his opinion about Bragg, was also relieved of his command. In the beginning of November Longstreet was sent to East Tennessee against Burnside: and it seems probable that this step, unjustifiable on military grounds, was taken at the President's suggestion to put an end to the increasing bad feeling between Bragg and his chief subordinate.<sup>2</sup>

Grant reached Chattanooga on October 23rd. Hooker's force, about 15,000 strong, was already encamped at Bridgeport.<sup>3</sup> Rosecrans, judging it useless to bring more troops into Chattanooga, when he could barely feed those already there, had directed Hooker to put his troops along the Nashville Railroad, and defend it against the raids of the Confederate cavalry.

Thomas, on taking command of the Army of the Cumberland, had ordered a concentration at Bridgeport with a view to carrying out a plan for opening up a shorter and easier line of supplies. The plan had been conceived by General "Baldy" Smith, chief engineer of the Army of the Cumberland. He proposed that Hooker should cross the Tennessee and move up the south bank, sweeping aside the Confederate sharpshooters, to Brown's Ferry: at the same time a force was to be sent from Chattanooga to the same point, and a bridge was to be laid across the river. Supplies could then be brought up the river as far as Kelly's Ferry by boat, and conveyed by a good wagon road across the tongue of land, which is here formed by a sudden turn northwards of the river, to Brown's Ferry. They would then be conveyed across the river by a pontoon bridge and brought into Chattanooga by the road running along the north bank, covered from the fire and view of the enemy by the hills.

Upon Grant giving his approval, Hooker crossed the river at Bridgeport on the 26th and moved up the south bank. At 3 a.m. on the 27th, 1,300 men were put on board fifty-two boats of the pontoon train and floated down the river to Brown's Ferry, where a landing was made and the piquet guard surprised.<sup>4</sup> On the opposite bank 2,700 men had already taken up a position under

<sup>1</sup> Hardee, who had originally commanded a Corps in the Army of Tennessee, had been transferred in July to the Army of Mississippi. In November he was transferred back to the Army of Tennessee, and Polk was assigned to take his place in the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana under General Johnston.

<sup>2</sup> 3 B. & L., 709. Longstreet, in his *From Manassas to Appomattox*, gives an interesting account of the changes which took place after Chickamauga in the Army of Tennessee. It is possible that Bragg ordered Longstreet's Corps to move on Knoxville on his own initiative. He may perhaps have thought, as Longstreet had only a hundred miles to go to reach Knoxville, he would have ample time to get back again before the arrival of Sherman's reinforcements, who had taken a month to get half-way from Memphis to Chattanooga, and had still two hundred miles to come (Fiske, 294-6).

<sup>3</sup> Hooker's force consisted of two divisions of the 11th Corps, under the Corps-Commander Howard, and one division of the 12th, under Geary.

<sup>4</sup> Fiske, 290.



cover of the darkness: they were now ferried over, entrenchments thrown up covering the Ferry, and the bridge laid. On the 28th Hooker arrived, and Howard's Corps was posted at Brown's Ferry, whilst Geary's division encamped in Look-out Valley near Wauhatchie, some three miles from Howard's position.<sup>1</sup>

A division, under Palmer, of the 14th Corps, had in the meantime moved down the north bank, crossed the river lower down, and held the road in Hooker's rear.<sup>2</sup> On the night of the 28th a fierce attack was made by part of Longstreet's Corps upon Geary's camp, but, being badly supported, was repulsed with some loss. As soon as the road between Brown's and Kelly's Ferries was put in working order, all danger of starvation was removed for the army in Chattanooga.

Sherman had started from Memphis with four divisions on October 11th, but his progress was slow, because Halleck had ordered him to repair the railroad as he advanced, in order to bring up supplies. On October 27th, having advanced no further than Iuka, he received orders from Grant to discontinue the work of repairing the railroad and advance with all speed to Stevenson.<sup>3</sup> General Dodge, with 8,000 men, was ordered to be left at Athens to repair the railroad between Nashville and Decatur, and thus lighten the heavy pressure upon the Nashville-Stevenson line.

By the beginning of November, Burnside's position at Knoxville had become one of considerable peril. Leaving Lexington on August 16th, he had turned Cumberland Gap, which was held by a small Confederate force, by crossing the Cumberland Mountains at other points hitherto deemed impracticable for military purposes, and on September 3rd had occupied Knoxville. He then concentrated his forces against the garrison of Cumberland Gap and compelled its surrender on the 9th.<sup>4</sup> But after the Army of the Cumberland was besieged in Chattanooga, Burnside found himself in great difficulties for supplies. He was, in fact, cut off from his new base. He was a hundred miles from any other possible base,<sup>5</sup> and the animals of his transport were utterly exhausted by the difficult march across the mountains. When, on November 4th, Longstreet was sent with his two divisions, Corps artillery, and

<sup>1</sup> Cist, 240.

<sup>2</sup> Palmer crossed the river at Rankin's Ferry. Grant (3 B. & L., 687) says that Hooker crossed the river on the 26th, but it is stated by other authorities that Hooker crossed on the 28th (3 B. & L., 720).

<sup>3</sup> Halleck had ordered Sherman to depend for his supplies on the Memphis-Chattanooga Railway, and therefore to keep that line constantly repaired as he advanced. But Grant ordered supplies to be sent up the Tennessee from St. Louis, which met Sherman at Eastport (3 B. & L., 691).

<sup>4</sup> Cox, 12.

<sup>5</sup> On reaching Knoxville, Burnside had drawn most of his supplies from Chattanooga by boat. After the investment of Chattanooga, his nearest possible base was Big South Fork of the Cumberland River (3 B. & L., 691).







Wheeler's cavalry, a force of nearly 20,000 men,<sup>1</sup> against Knoxville, Burnside's position seemed desperate. Though his force was strong enough to hold its own in the field against Longstreet, yet the want of supplies would lead to its being besieged in Knoxville. President Lincoln was in an agony of fear for Burnside's safety, and sent repeated messages to Grant to send him aid. But Grant was powerless to help him until he had first driven Bragg from Missionary Ridge. Until that should be done, and the upper waters of the Tennessee again opened to Federal boats, it was useless to attempt to send reinforcements which could not be fed by Burnside.

Grant had already arranged his plan of battle before Sherman arrived (see Plan). He intended to move Sherman's divisions across the river to the south bank above the town from a point opposite the mouth of the South Chickamauga River, and with this force to assail the northern extremity of Missionary Ridge and endeavour to cut Bragg off from Chickamauga Station, where he had his dépôt of supplies. Hooker was to demonstrate against the Confederate position on Look-out Mountain and draw off Bragg's attention from his right, whilst Thomas' army was to come out of Chattanooga, and if necessary attack Bragg's position on the Ridge in the centre.

If Bragg could be driven from Missionary Ridge and from his dépôt, a road would be opened by which relief could be sent to Burnside. But news from Knoxville showed that haste was imperative. On the 20th came the tidings that fighting had commenced at Knoxville. On the 22nd Buckner's Corps was detached by Bragg to Longstreet's aid.<sup>2</sup>

Sherman himself reached Chattanooga on the 15th, and his Corps was on the same date at Bridgeport. After a conference with Grant he returned to his command, rowing himself down the river. On the 20th he was at Brown's Ferry with the head of his column. But many of his troops were far behind, and one division had been sent to Trenton to create the impression that an attack was intended against the southern end of Look-out Mountain.<sup>3</sup> On that day direct telegraphic communication with Burnside ceased.

Throughout the 20th and 21st the rain fell in torrents. The Tennessee rose rapidly and the pontoons at Brown's Ferry were with difficulty kept in their places. Grant had hoped to attack on the 22nd, but it was impossible for Sherman to be ready in time: and Grant had determined not to attack Missionary Ridge

<sup>1</sup> To make up this total of 20,000, two more brigades must be counted in, which, under the command of Bushrod Johnson, were sent to Longstreet later in November.

<sup>2</sup> Only one division, Johnson's, consisting of two brigades, joined Longstreet. The other division was recalled by Bragg.

<sup>3</sup> 3 B. & L., 697.

until Sherman was able to take the leading part in that attack. For, rightly or wrongly, he believed that the Army of the Cumberland was so demoralised by its defeat at Chickamauga and the subsequent weeks of semi-starvation, that it required to have a lead given it by troops which had not known the shame of defeat.<sup>1</sup>

On the night of the 21st, 116 pontoon boats were hidden from the enemy's observation in the North Chickamauga River about seven miles above Chattanooga.<sup>2</sup> Some three miles lower down the South Chickamauga enters the main river. By the night of the 23rd three of Sherman's divisions were in position close to the North Chickamauga River, concealed in the woods.<sup>3</sup> The fourth division could not be got across the pontoon bridge at Brown's Ferry owing to the swollen condition of the river. For the same reason Geary's division of Hooker's Corps was left on the southern bank in Look-out Valley. Howard's 11th Corps had already crossed to the north bank and was encamped opposite Chattanooga, ready to support either Thomas or Sherman as occasion required. Hooker's position in Look-out Valley was only necessary so long as the siege of Chattanooga continued, because it held the line by which the army was supplied. But when once the battle had actually commenced on Missionary Ridge, Look-out Mountain lost its importance: and Grant's second plan was to bring Hooker's remaining division to the north side of the river, to cross it back again at Chattanooga and array it for battle on the right bank of Chattanooga Creek, thereby turning the Confederate position on Look-out Mountain.

The news that Buckner's Corps had been sent to Longstreet's aid caused Grant to attack Bragg's position on the 23rd, in order to prevent him detaching more troops to Knoxville. As Sherman was not yet ready, the attack had to be made by Thomas' troops. At 2 p.m. Sheridan's and Wood's divisions moved out of the Federal lines, which were about a mile in front of the town, reaching from Chattanooga Creek on the right to Citico Creek on the left,

<sup>1</sup> Under pressure from Washington, Grant, on November 7th, ordered Thomas to attack the enemy's right in the hope of forcing Longstreet's recall. According to Grant's account (3 B. & L., 694) the attempt was abandoned because Thomas could not get enough animals to move even a single gun. But General W. F. Smith (3 B. & L., 715-16) gives a somewhat different version. According to him the order was countermanded, because a more thorough survey of the ground showed that Thomas' force was altogether too small to carry out the projected movement.

<sup>2</sup> The North Chickamauga rises in Tennessee, and flows south into the Tennessee. The South Chickamauga rises in Georgia, and flows north into the same river.

<sup>3</sup> Sherman was enabled to reach his position undiscovered, because the enemy, who had seen him crossing to the north bank at Brown's Ferry, mistook Howard's Corps, which had been concealed behind the hills on the north bank, and recrossed on the 22nd opposite Chattanooga, in full view of the Confederate watchmen, for Sherman's force (3 B. & L., 697).

and carried by a sudden onslaught the first line of the Confederate rifle-pits. A mile of ground was secured by this attack, at the cost of about 1,100 killed and wounded.

At 2 a.m. on the 24th the 116 pontoon boats, each with thirty soldiers on board, moved out of the North Chickamauga and dropped down the river. A small force was landed just above the mouth of the South Chickamauga, and the Confederate piquet at that point surprised. The mass of the troops landed below the mouth of the tributary, and at once the work of ferrying the rest of Sherman's forces across the river commenced. By daybreak two divisions—8,000 men<sup>1</sup>—were in position on the south bank. The work of laying the bridge was then begun, and shortly after noon the bridge was complete, as well as another across the Chickamauga. Sherman, with his three divisions, moved against Missionary Ridge at about 1 p.m. Atmospheric conditions favoured the Federals. A drizzling rain was falling, and the clouds lay low upon the hills. The attack upon Missionary Ridge took the Confederates by surprise, and Sherman reached the northern crest of the Ridge without encountering much opposition. Attempts were made by the Confederates to recover the lost position, but without success. By nightfall Sherman had fortified his position, and Bragg found himself in danger of being cut off from his depôt at Chickamauga Station.

On the right of the Federal line, Hooker, with a composite force made up of parts of his own Corps, Sherman's, and the Army of the Cumberland, fought his way across Look-out Creek and round the northern end of Look-out Mountain. A heavy mist concealed the mountain-top, and the fight of Hooker's force against the six Confederate brigades which held the mountain is known as "the battle above the clouds."

At 2 p.m. Hooker was obliged to suspend operations, owing to the thickness of the mist, but he had already secured a firm hold on the eastern slope, and his left rested near the mouth of Chattanooga Creek. During the night the Confederates, who had been driven to the very summit of the mountain, abandoned their position and retreated across Chattanooga Creek, burning the bridges behind them.<sup>2</sup>

Grant's plan of battle for the 24th had proved admirably successful. On either flank of Bragg's position the Federals were established, and the way seemed clear for a combined attack on the 25th. But it was soon found that obstacles remained to be overcome. Both Grant and Sherman had supposed that the crest of Missionary Ridge was continuous. It was found during the

<sup>1</sup> For Thomas' attack on the 23rd, see Grant's account (3 B. & L., 698-9); for Sherman's movements on the 24th, 3 B. & L., 701.

<sup>2</sup> Cist, 250-1. Hooker's force consisted of three divisions.



progress of the fighting on the 24th that between that part of the Ridge which Sherman had gained possession of and the next hill, the Tunnel Hill, through which the railway passed,<sup>1</sup> a deep depression intervened, and that the latter hill had been strongly fortified by the Confederates. At sunrise Sherman moved to the attack with one division along the eastern base, three brigades along the western, and one brigade between the two.<sup>2</sup> But so strongly was the Tunnel Hill held, that in spite of all his efforts he could make no progress. Bragg, seeing the necessity of driving Sherman from a position where he threatened the Confederate line of retreat, brought up reinforcements from the left and concentrated the greater part of his army against Sherman.

This was exactly what Grant had expected, and he had reckoned upon Hooker making an effective demonstration against the southern end of Missionary Ridge through Rossville Gap. But the hours passed, and Hooker did not appear. He had been detained four hours by the difficulty of crossing Chattanooga Creek, and in the meanwhile the pressure upon Sherman was growing heavier.

Realising the critical position of his subordinate, Grant was obliged to give up waiting for Hooker any longer, and directed Thomas to make a demonstration against Bragg's centre and carry the first line of Confederate entrenchments at the foot of the ridge. When that was carried, the troops were directed to lie down and await further orders. Thomas was slow in carrying out this order,<sup>3</sup> but about 3.30 p.m. Sheridan's and Wood's divisions, with Johnson's on the right and Baird's on the left, some 20,000 men in all,<sup>4</sup> advanced from their entrenchments and in gallant style carried the first line of Confederate works.

For a brief space they halted according to orders, under a heavy fire from the crest above. Then, apparently without any orders from their officers, the men sprang up and began to ascend the slope.<sup>5</sup> A second line of works on the slope was carried, and then a rush was made at the entrenchments on the crest. The Confederates were driven from their last line of defence down the eastern slope in full rout. The officers lost all control over their men, who abandoned the artillery and flung away their weapons in their flight. Sheridan on the right followed in pursuit of the flying foe, and did not halt finally till he had reached the Chickamauga River some hours after midnight. Wood on the left met with more opposition: a division was sent back by Hardee from Tunnel Hill, and it was only by hard fighting that he, supported by Baird's division, held his position on the crest of the Ridge.

Shortly after the Confederate centre was broken, Hooker came

<sup>1</sup> The Chattanooga and Cleveland line.

<sup>2</sup> *J. B. & L.*, 709. <sup>4</sup> *Index*, 310.

<sup>2</sup> *J. B. & L.*, 705.

<sup>6</sup> *J. B. & L.*, 725.

into action against the southern end of the Ridge, which he carried, and then went into camp near Rossville. Thus by nightfall the whole of the Ridge was in the possession of the Federals, except at the point where Hardee on Tunnel Hill confronted Sherman, but during the night he was withdrawn by Bragg. On that night Thomas was ordered to send 20,000 men under General Granger to Burnside's relief at Knoxville. The rest of the army on the 26th continued to follow up the retreating Confederates, Sherman's troops by the road through Chickamauga Station, whilst Thomas and Hooker pressed forward by the Greysville and Ringgold road<sup>1</sup> (Map VI.).

On the 28th the pursuit ceased, and Sherman was ordered to march with the 15th Corps to the relief of Knoxville, taking command as well of Granger's column. Both at Washington and in Grant's camp grave apprehensions existed for Burnside's safety. He had telegraphed that his provisions would not last out beyond the 6th December. On that day Sherman reached Knoxville, to find that Longstreet had raised the siege on the 4th, and was in full retreat up the Holston Valley. The Confederates had made an attempt to storm the works defending Knoxville on November 29th, but had been repulsed with heavy loss: and the news of Bragg's defeat at Chattanooga had rendered Longstreet's position one of considerable difficulty. Burnside seems somewhat to have exaggerated his own peril, as he was not entirely cut off by the investing force from drawing supplies from the country. Leaving Granger's Corps to aid in the pursuit of Longstreet, Sherman returned with the 15th Corps to Chattanooga.

If Chickamauga, on account of the number of forces engaged and the heaviness of the losses suffered by either side, is reckoned the great battle of the West, Chattanooga, from the point of view of its far-reaching consequences, must be considered the most important. Desperate as had been the fighting at Shiloh, Murfreesborough, and Chickamauga, in not one of these three battles had a decisive success been won by either combatant; but at Chattanooga Bragg's army was badly beaten, and his continued presence with it as its commander rendered impossible.

The Federal losses were under 6,000 in an army which numbered in round figures about 60,000.<sup>2</sup> Bragg, after weakening himself by sending detachments into East Tennessee, had not more than 33,000 troops in line on November 24th and 25th. His actual losses in killed and wounded were probably considerably less than those suffered by the Federals, as his troops were mostly fighting behind entrenchments; but he lost 40 guns and over 6,000 prisoners.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cist, 257.

<sup>2</sup> 3 B. & L., 729.

<sup>3</sup> Henderson (ii. 616) gives the Confederate strength at 33,000, and their loss in killed and wounded at 3,000. The Statistical Record states the total Confederate loss at 8,684 (Cist, 258).

By his victory at Chattanooga Grant supplemented and completed the success which he had gained earlier in the year at Vicksburg. Vicksburg cut the Confederacy in two along the line of the Mississippi; Chattanooga cut the eastern half of it in two along the line of the Alleghanies.<sup>1</sup> The net result of the two campaigns was to recover the Mississippi Valley for the Union.

### NOTE ON BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA

The battle of Chickamauga is not by any means easy to follow in all its details. Some of its features recall the battle of Murfreesborough, fought by the same armies under the same generals. In both the Federal right was routed, but the staunch resistance of the centre and left robbed the Confederates of what had promised to be a signal success. Here, however, the parallel ends. Rosecrans at Chickamauga was standing on the defensive; Bragg, as at Murfreesborough, assumed the offensive, but his attack was directed against the Federal left. His initial movement, however, lacked the vigour and success of Hardee's onslaught at Murfreesborough.

In this campaign Bragg was hampered by his ignorance of the enemy's movements, by his failure, owing partly to ill-health, to supervise in person the execution of his orders, and by the want of zeal on the part of his lieutenants, who, knowing their commander's tendency to seek a scapegoat in case of failure, shrank from assuming responsibility. The great flanking movement, which was to secure the Chattanooga road and cut the Federals off from their base, progressed but slowly. Only a small portion of the Confederate army crossed the Chickamauga on the 18th. Next day Bragg was surprised to find that the Federal line, owing to Thomas' night march from the right to left of Crittenden's Corps, extended considerably further to the left than he had supposed, and that his own right was in danger of being turned. This discovery disarranged his plan of action, and his attacks on that day, though fierce and accompanied by considerable loss on both sides, were disjointed. No permanent success was possible where there was no united effort or concerted action.

On the 20th Bragg's anticipations were again disappointed. Whatever the cause the initial movement on the right did not commence till some hours after the time ordered. Even when Polk did get into action the attacks of his different divisions were not simultaneous, but successive. The battle was opened by Breckinridge's division. His two right brigades overlapped Thomas' left and penetrated to the left of the Federal entrenchments; but Breckinridge had no reserves to support this movement, and Thomas, calling up reinforcements from his right, repulsed the attack. Meanwhile Breckinridge's third brigade made a frontal attack against the enemy's breastworks, and was so badly cut up that it had to be withdrawn from the line of battle. After the repulse of this brigade Cleburne's division took

<sup>1</sup> Fiske, 316.



up the attack, but failed to carry the entrenchments held by superior numbers.

The attack of Breckinridge's and Cleburne's divisions was over by 10.30 a.m. At 11 a.m., under an immediate order from Bragg, Stewart on the left advanced, and the attack was renewed on his right by two brigades of Walker's Corps. One brigade again outflanked Thomas' left and reached the Chattanooga road, but was forced to retreat when menaced by an attack on flank and rear. Stewart's attack led indirectly to the fatal breach in the Federal line which let in Longstreet. Thomas was calling loudly for reinforcements, and Rosecrans, having sent Negley's division to his aid, ordered Wood's division of the 21st Corps to fill its place. This movement brought Wood into line on McCook's left and on the right of Brannan's division, which was retired a short distance in the woods, but not out of line. On the left of Brannan came Reynolds. One of Thomas' Staff officers, not seeing Brannan's division, reported to Thomas that there was a gap between Wood and Reynolds. Thomas sent the information on to Rosecrans, and the latter sent the following order to Wood: "The General Commanding directs that you close upon Reynolds as fast as possible and support him." It seems plain that Wood knew that Brannan was in position on his left, and probably he guessed that there was some mistake in the order. But, possibly because he was irritated at Rosecrans' peremptory language earlier in the day in regard to his slowness to relieve Negley, he chose to interpret the order literally, and, withdrawing from the line of battle, marched to the left behind Brannan, thus creating the gap into which Longstreet's column rushed, with fatal consequences to the Federal right.

But Bragg quite failed to utilise the splendid opportunity which chance had given him. His whole attention seems to have been absorbed in the operations of his right wing, and because its attacks had all been repulsed he despaired of success. He declared that he had no troops left with which to reinforce Longstreet, and he neglected to order Wheeler's cavalry to pursue the flying Federals by the Dry Valley road. Thus in the second stage of the battle, in which Thomas was opposed to the whole of Bragg's army, the two Confederate wings fought quite separate battles, and the commanding generals of both armies were absent from the field of conflict.

Longstreet and D. H. Hill claim that they forced Thomas to retreat. Longstreet says that the Federal withdrawal was due, not to Rosecrans' order to Thomas to retire, but to the fire of a battery which he established in a commanding position, whilst Hill asserts that the combined attack of the Confederate wings forced Thomas' retreat. On the other hand, the Federal accounts attach but little importance to the attacks made in the afternoon by Polk's wing, and consider that the brunt of the fighting was borne by Longstreet's wing, whose repeated assaults were successfully met by Wood's and Brannan's divisions, Granger's two brigades, and part of Negley's division. They even go so far as to hold that Rosecrans might have taken the offensive towards the close of the day with good hope of success.

Longstreet and Hill both maintain that the fruits of the dearly won victory were thrown away by Bragg's failure to pursue on the 21st. The

narratives of both display marked hostility to Bragg and ignore the Federal contention that the Confederate army was in no condition to pursue after two days' hard fighting.

On the Federal side an interesting question has arisen as to the part played by Thomas on the 20th. His admirers hail him as the "Rock of Chickamauga," who for six weary hours with 25,000 men "stood at bay and hurled back again and again the furious onset of 60,000 rebels mad with desire to clutch the prize they had so nearly won" (Fiske, 274). On the other hand, some writers, *e.g.* Colonel Livermore (*General Thomas in the Record*, 3 Massachussetts M. H. S.), hold that the praises bestowed upon Thomas were excessive. It is pointed out that Thomas, with five divisions under his command and part of a sixth (Negley's), was quite strong enough to secure the line of retreat without making constant demands for reinforcements: that when Polk's attack commenced Thomas had 17,500 men against Polk's 12,800: that Rosecrans had so depleted his right and centre, that the force swept away by Longstreet's charge numbered less than 7,000 men, and that for the rest of the battle Thomas had at his disposal 32,000 men with which to meet the attacks of an army which, at the outset, had numbered little over 40,000. According to this estimate the strength of the forces engaged on both sides falls considerably short of the number generally accepted.

The truth seems to be that considerable jealousy existed between the Armies of the Tennessee and the Cumberland, and that while the officers of the latter were disposed to eulogise, perhaps extravagantly, the doings of their great leader, there was a distinct tendency among officers of the former organisation to underestimate Thomas' merits. It is unfortunate that Thomas' admirers have too often sought to prove their case by depreciating the services of Grant and Sherman.

## CHAPTER XIX

### LEE AND MEADE IN VIRGINIA—WINTER OPERATIONS AND PLANS<sup>1</sup>

Meade invades Virginia—Riots caused by the enforcement of the draft—Lee assumes the offensive—Hill defeated at Broad Run—Meade forces the passage of the Rappahannock—The Mine Run campaign—Federal lack of concerted action—Meade retreats behind the Rapidan—The Confederate position in the West—Sherman marches on Meridian—The Red River expedition—Banks retires before Taylor—The Federals abandon Alexandria—Longstreet in East Tennessee—Grant appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Federal armies—Grant before the war—Further changes in the Federal armies—Grant's plan of campaign—Sherman's previous history—Subsidiary operations projected—Divided counsels in the Confederate camp—Longstreet's suggested plan of campaign—Bragg's proposed plan of campaign.

ON July 14th Lee had withdrawn his army from the north bank of the Potomac into the Shenandoah Valley. It was his intention to cross the Shenandoah River and take up a position on the eastern side of the Blue Ridge, and there to meet the advance of Meade's army. But the Shenandoah was so full that for some days it was impossible to ford it, and in the meanwhile Meade crossed his army over the Potomac and moved forward along the eastern front of the Blue Ridge.<sup>2</sup>

There had been great disappointment felt in the North when Lee, after his defeat at Gettysburg, was allowed to make good his retreat into Virginia. There was a fear lest Meade, after Gettysburg, should prove as inactive as McClellan was held to have been after the Antietam. Popular clamour forced Meade to advance and endeavour to bring Lee again to battle. But the Federal general was too cautious to neglect any precaution, and his advance was slow.<sup>3</sup> On the 26th July his headquarters were at Warrenton, with his army ranged along the north bank of the Rappahannock.

The Confederate army had moved up the Valley and, crossing the Ridge, took post for a brief space at Culpeper. But Lee

<sup>1</sup> See Map III.

<sup>2</sup> Lee's *Lee*, 307.

<sup>3</sup> Swinton, 374, however, states that Meade's movement was made with much vigour, that his object was to secure Manassas Gap and strike a blow at the Confederate column as it was passing up the Valley, and that it was only the misconduct of French, commanding the 3rd Corps, which prevented him from effecting his purpose on the 23rd.



quickly resolved to fall back to his old position behind the Rapidan, and from that vantage ground defy Meade to reach Richmond. The Army of the Potomac followed cautiously across the Rappahannock to Culpeper.

Early in September Lee was obliged to reduce his strength by despatching Longstreet with Hood's and McLaws' divisions to the assistance of Bragg, who had been driven across the Tennessee by Rosecrans, whilst Pickett's division of the 1st Corps was sent to the south bank of the James River. Later in the month Meade, in his turn, had to send part of two of his Corps, the 11th and 12th, under Hooker, to the assistance of Rosecrans, who, after his defeat at Chickamauga was besieged in Chattanooga, and detachments were also sent to South Carolina and to enforce the "draft" in the North.<sup>1</sup>

The exigencies of warfare had exhausted both the supply of volunteers and the bounty system, and recourse was had to the "draft," by which, however, a commutation of 300 dollars was allowed in place of personal service. This was not unreasonably regarded by the poorer classes as an unfair advantage granted to the rich; and in several of the large cities in the North riots followed the enforcement of the "draft." These riots assumed their most formidable dimensions in New York, where for three days the whole city was at the mercy of the mob, who specially directed their vengeance against the unhappy negro. At least 1,000 people are estimated to have been killed or wounded in the riots, and the city authorities subsequently paid a million and a half dollars in compensation for damage done to property. The arrival of regular troops promptly put a stop to a movement, whose fury had already spent itself, and a month later the "draft" was enforced without any disturbance.<sup>2</sup>

Meade found that his army was weakened more than Lee's, relatively to the original strength of the two forces, by the calls made upon him in September: and the Federal advance did not proceed beyond Culpeper. As his opponent would not take the initiative, Lee determined to flank him out of his present position and force him back behind the Rappahannock. On October 9th the Confederates crossed the Rapidan, and by a wide flanking movement through Madison Court House turned the Federal right and caused Meade to recross the Rappahannock.<sup>3</sup> Lee de-

<sup>1</sup> Swinton, 375.

<sup>2</sup> Horatio Seymour, a member of the Democratic party, had been elected Governor of New York State in November, 1862.

<sup>3</sup> Lee's *Lee*, 315. After crossing the Rappahannock Meade on the 12th ordered a halt and sent three Corps back across the river in the direction of Culpeper. Lee was not, however, to be found there, as he was engaged in crossing the Rappahannock some miles farther up at Sulphur Springs. On receiving this information Meade continued his retreat, and the three Corps rejoined the rest of the army on the 13th after a night march.

terminated to continue his turning movement and force the Federals still further back. The country between the Rappahannock and Bull Run had been the scene of one of his most brilliant successes, and any mistake made by Meade might enable Lee to inflict upon him the fate of Pope. If Lee could reach some point on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad in rear of Meade's army, the latter would be forced to fight at a disadvantage in order to recover his line of communications.

Crossing the Rappahannock by the upper fords, the Army of Northern Virginia reached Warrenton on the 13th. The lack of supplies compelled Lee to remain there that day for the purpose of foraging; and Meade made good his retreat along the railway. On the following day the pursuit was hotly pressed. A. P. Hill, in his eagerness to fall upon the rear of the 5th Corps, which had just crossed Broad Run near Bristoe Station, blundered into the 2nd Corps under Warren.<sup>1</sup> Being taken completely by surprise, and assailed by a foe who, though also taken by surprise, had the advantage of being able to form line of battle under cover of the railway embankment, Hill's Corps lost heavily, and was forced to fall back behind Broad Run. This untoward event caused Lee to abandon the pursuit of Meade's army. He saw that a continuation of the flanking movement would only force the Army of the Potomac back into the impregnable fortifications of Washington. Accordingly he fell back to the line of the Rappahannock and encamped his army along the south bank, holding a strongly fortified *tête de pont* on the north bank of the river at Rappahannock Station.

If Lee hoped to make his winter quarters on the Rappahannock, he was promptly undeceived. As soon as he fell back from Broad Run, Meade's army on October 19th commenced to advance. On November 7th the *tête de pont*, which was held by two brigades of Early's division, was gallantly stormed, with but little loss, by Russell's division of the 6th Corps. The greater part of the two Confederate brigades, as well as a battery of rifled guns, were captured. It had been Lee's intention to hold the bridge at Rappahannock Station and strike in detail at the Federal forces as they crossed the river above and below it. After its loss he abandoned the line of the Rappahannock and fell back to Culpeper Court House; and as Meade followed in pursuit, on the 9th he withdrew across the Rapidan.<sup>2</sup>

Both the Government and the Press of the North demanded that Meade should make another effort, in spite of the lateness of the season, to destroy the Army of Northern Virginia. On

<sup>1</sup> Ewell seems partly to blame. Had he pressed the pursuit more vigorously he might have prevented Warren from attacking Hill's flank (Swinton, 388).

<sup>2</sup> Swinton, 387, thinks that, had this success been promptly followed up, the Confederate army might have been cut in two.

November 26th Meade set his army in motion with that end in view. His plan was to cross the Rapidan with three columns, which were to secure possession of the turnpike and plank roads, and then, moving west, seize the line of Mine Run before Lee could concentrate his army, which he had been obliged to scatter considerably for the purpose of getting supplies and forage, in the entrenchments which he had constructed behind that stream. The column, which formed the right flank of the Federal advance, and consisted of the 3rd and 6th Corps, the latter to move in support of the former, had the hardest task to perform, as they were nearest to the Confederate lines and exposed to an attack on their unguarded right flank.

On the 27th the 3rd Corps, commanded by General French, was fiercely attacked by a large part of General Ewell's Corps. French repulsed the attack, but a day had been lost, and Meade blamed his lieutenant for causing the failure of his plan of concentration, and a good deal of recrimination ensued between the two generals.

On the 28th the two armies were confronting each other on opposite sides of Mine Run. The Confederate lines, now manned by the whole of Lee's army, ran from the south of the plank road to the north of the turnpike. As the result of reconnaissances made on the 29th, Meade resolved to assail both flanks of the Confederate position the following morning. Warren, with his own Corps, the 2nd, and two divisions of the 3rd, was to attack the right flank at 8 a.m. upon a signal to be given by the batteries in the centre, whilst Sedgwick, with the 5th and 6th Corps, was to assail the left flank an hour later. Meade's plan was frustrated by Warren, who decided on the morning of the 30th that the entrenchments in his front were too strong to be assailed with any chance of success, and Sedgwick's attack, which had already commenced, had to be abandoned in consequence of the failure to co-operate of the other wing.<sup>1</sup>

As it was now plain that the Federals would not attack Lee in his entrenched position, the Confederate leader in his turn prepared

<sup>1</sup> For the Mine Run campaign, see Swinton, 390-7, and 4 B. & L., 88-91. Swinton blames French for not reaching his crossing at the Rapidan till some hours after the other columns were ready to advance. This delay, combined with the fact that the engineers had not provided pontoon bridges of sufficient length, caused the 26th to be wasted. On the 27th, according to Swinton, French took the wrong road, which led him too far to the right and exposed him to an attack from Ewell's Corps. According to General McMahon (4 B. & L., 89) Warren was to blame for the failure to attack on the 30th. He had been directed, so it was generally understood, "to make a circuit of perhaps several days' march, cutting Lee off from all communication and coming in not so much upon his immediate flank as upon his line of communication and rear." The delay on the 26th and 27th gave Lee time to strengthen and extend his lines, which, says Swinton, did not originally reach as far south as the turnpike. Meade's object, according to the same authority, was to turn the Mine Run entrenchments and defeat Ewell's and Hill's Corps in detail. According to McMahon, had Sedgwick been allowed to make his attack on the 30th, the Confederate left might have been broken.



to assume the offensive. He saw that the enemy were entangled in a difficult country at a great distance from their base and at an unfavourable season, and he had accordingly great hopes of inflicting upon them a crushing defeat. He directed two divisions to throw themselves upon Meade's left flank on the morning of December 2nd. But during the night of the 1st Meade withdrew his whole army to the north bank of the Rapidan, and the brief campaign came to an end. Lee was greatly disappointed at the failure to strike a heavy blow at Meade under such favourable conditions.

After this both armies went into winter quarters, the Confederates on the south bank of the Rapidan, with their headquarters at Orange Court House, whilst Meade's army encamped in the neighbourhood of Culpeper.

The chief importance of this brief campaign, mainly marked by strategic features and containing but little hard fighting, was that it showed that Meade, with increased experience, was improving as a commander, and was gaining confidence in himself. Previous to this campaign he had had but little opportunity to handle large bodies of troops. At Chancellorsville the 5th Corps, which he had commanded, had taken very little part in the hard fighting of that campaign, and he had been called at a moment's notice to the supreme command on the critical field of Gettysburg. As he acquired experience, he showed that he could plan an elaborate campaign and also possessed sufficient caution to avoid the mistakes which had proved so fatal in the same theatre of war to Pope and Hooker. During the winter he reorganised the Army of the Potomac. The 1st and 3rd Corps disappeared and were absorbed into the other three. Hancock, Warren, and Sedgwick were appointed the commanders of the 2nd, 5th, and 6th Corps respectively.

In the West the Confederate cause at the end of 1863 seemed in a desperate plight. The army, with which Bragg had hoped to win a great victory and even compel the surrender of the Army of the Cumberland, was divided and disheartened. A considerable part of it, under Longstreet, was in East Tennessee (Map VI.), having retired from before Knoxville to the Upper Holston Valley, and was completely cut off from communication with the rest of the army, which, after the crushing defeat at Chattanooga, had rallied at Dalton. In the winter quarters at Dalton demoralisation grew apace. Discontent was rife among both the officers and men: the bonds of discipline were loosened, and there was a danger lest the army should degenerate into a mere rabble. If discipline was to be restored and the army ever become again an organised weapon of warfare, it was essential that Bragg should be relieved of the command. This step Jefferson Davis very reluctantly took, but he made the grave mistake of calling the general to Richmond

to act as "Commander-in-Chief near the President." Bragg was thus rewarded for his signal failure at Chattanooga by promotion to a post corresponding to that which Lee had held for a short period in 1862.<sup>1</sup> Hardee for the time being succeeded to the command of the army at Dalton, but after a short while, being unwilling to assume the responsibility of supreme command, he was relieved by Joseph E. Johnston.

While the Confederate forces in the West were thus broken up and disorganised, Grant was endeavouring to improve the opportunity. Thomas and the Army of the Cumberland remained at Chattanooga keeping an eye upon the Confederate army at Dalton. Schofield succeeded Foster, who had relieved Burnside, in command of the Army of the Ohio, and was at Knoxville preparing to operate against Longstreet and, if possible, drive him out of East Tennessee. Sherman, with the Army of the Tennessee, was directed to march from Vicksburg against Meridian (Map X.) and destroy the railroads in its vicinity. At Meridian, which is near the eastern border of Mississippi, the railroad runs east and west from Vicksburg to Montgomery, and beyond crosses the line running north and south from Mobile to the Ohio. A thorough destruction of the railway system at that point would close to the Confederates Northern Mississippi as a possible theatre of war for some considerable period. Experience had shown that a large force, if engaged in protracted operations, could not subsist far from a railway or some line of water communication. Sherman's expedition, if successful, would free the Federal authorities from any fear during the next campaign of a movement in force from Northern Mississippi either in the direction of the Mississippi or towards Nashville,<sup>2</sup> and thus allow a larger force to be concentrated for the offensive movement into Georgia, which Grant and Sherman were planning.

Sherman proposed to march with about 20,000 men from Vicksburg to Meridian, whilst General Sooy Smith was to move with a strong cavalry force simultaneously from Memphis and break up the Mobile and Ohio Railroad southward from Corinth, and then join Sherman at Meridian. There was a Confederate force in Mississippi under the command of Polk, but it was not strong enough to cope single-handed with Sherman's army, and the Confederate commander at Dalton was prevented from marching to Polk's aid by the consideration that Thomas at Chattanooga would then have a clear course to Atlanta.<sup>3</sup> Consequently Sherman himself encountered no opposition: he reached Meridian on February 14th, and completely destroyed the railroads in the

<sup>1</sup> Lee had been relieved at his own request of this post, when he assumed the command in the field of the Army of Northern Virginia (2 Henderson, 602).

<sup>2</sup> *Cow. Atlanta* 7.

<sup>3</sup> Johnston, 281.

neighbourhood. Smith, however, was not so fortunate. Before he could carry out his share of the work, he had to reckon with Forrest, the ablest cavalry commander in the West. He was badly beaten and driven back into Memphis.<sup>1</sup>

In March three of Sherman's divisions were detached for service under Banks in the Red River expedition (Map X.). This expedition calls for notice as being the last directed by Halleck in his capacity as General-in-Chief of the Federal armies. After the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, Grant, Banks, and Admiral Farragut were all in favour of a combined movement of the land and naval forces against Mobile, as an effective diversion which might aid Rosecrans in his campaign against Bragg. Halleck, however, on political grounds, insisted on an attempt being made to raise the Federal flag in Texas. Napoleon III. had just established an Austrian Archduke as Emperor of Mexico under French protection; and it was feared by both the Federal and Confederate Governments that the French might try to establish an independent Republic in Texas.<sup>2</sup> To prevent such an attempt it was desirable that the Federals should gain some foothold in Texas. To Banks, as commander of the Department of the Gulf, the work was entrusted. Halleck favoured an expedition up the Red River into Northern Texas, but the Red River was only navigable in spring. Banks accordingly attempted to gain possession of the coastline of Texas by sudden descents from the sea. In September, 1863, an expedition was sent to seize the Sabine Pass, but it was easily beaten off and two gunboats forced to surrender. At the end of October Banks made a second attempt. This time he struck the mouth of the Rio Grande (on the frontier, not shown on map), and hoped to work his way eastward along the coast. But the Confederate fortifications at Galveston and the mouth of the Brazos River proved too strong to be taken except by a movement into the interior and an attack upon their rear; and to carry this out Banks needed reinforcements, which Halleck refused to give him.<sup>3</sup> He therefore found himself obliged to adopt Halleck's plan of a movement up the Red River. He was to be supported by 10,000 troops from Sherman's army and by Porter's Mississippi fleet. Sherman's contingent was to be convoyed up

<sup>1</sup> Sooy Smith's defeat seems to have been thoroughly discreditable. He had a force of at least 7,000 cavalry, and allowed himself to be driven back by Forrest with a force of not more than 2,500 men (4 B. & L., 416-17).

<sup>2</sup> On June 10th, 1863, Marshal Bazaine entered the city of Mexico, and a packed assembly at once offered the throne to Maximilian, "or, in case of his refusal, to such other Catholic prince as Napoleon might please to indicate." Maximilian refused to accept the crown, unless his choice was ratified by a vote of the Mexican people. On April 10th, 1864, he was formally crowned (Schouler, vi. 428-9). For the French designs upon Texas, see Mahan, 185-6.

<sup>3</sup> An earlier attempt upon Galveston had been made on January 1st, 1863, with signal ill-success.



the river by the fleet, and Banks' army was to march by land up the Teche to Alexandria, where the two forces were to unite on March 17th. From Alexandria an advance was to be made upon Shreveport, the most important Confederate depôt in the Trans-Mississippi Department, in conjunction with Steele's army, which was to advance from the Arkansas River. Halleck hoped by this combined movement to establish the Federal forces on the Red River, and from Shreveport as a base to push forward into Texas.

The navy and Sherman's contingent, three divisions under A. J. Smith, reached Alexandria by the appointed date.<sup>1</sup> But Banks was delayed by certain duties imposed upon him in connection with the inauguration of a Civil Government of Louisiana, and did not reach the rendezvous till a week later, and his infantry were not all up till the 26th. On April 3rd Natchitoches, within four marches of Shreveport, was reached, and in spite of an urgent message from Sherman, demanding that Smith's Corps should be returned to him by the 10th, the advance was continued.<sup>2</sup> General Richard Taylor, commanding in Western Louisiana, had succeeded in concentrating two infantry divisions and one division of cavalry for the defence of Shreveport, and advancing from Mansfield encountered Banks' column, which was strung out on a single road for twenty miles at Sabine Cross-roads on April 8th. The Federals were taken at a disadvantage, as the successive divisions were defeated in detail, until Emory's division of the 19th Corps checked the Confederate advance and saved Banks' army from an appalling disaster.<sup>3</sup>

The following day Taylor, having been reinforced by two more infantry divisions, attacked the Federal army at Pleasant Hill, but was beaten off with considerable loss, though gaining some success at the outset.<sup>4</sup> Banks, however, considered it hopeless to resume the advance against Shreveport, and retreated to Alexandria.<sup>5</sup>

Meanwhile that part of the fleet which had ascended the river above Alexandria was in great danger. It had been deserted by the army, and the river was falling so fast that it was very doubtful if it could get back to Alexandria. Had Kirby Smith, who was in general command of all the Confederate troops in the Trans-Mississippi Department, allowed Taylor to continue the pursuit of

<sup>1</sup> Two divisions of the 16th Corps and one of the 17th. Grant, after the fall of Vicksburg, had sent the 13th Corps to New Orleans to serve under Banks.

<sup>2</sup> Orders had already on March 27th been received from Grant, now Commander-in-Chief of all the Federal armies, directing that if Shreveport was not to be captured by April 25th, Sherman's divisions were to be returned by the 10th.

<sup>3</sup> Taylor, 164, claims to have driven back Emory's division (which he magnifies into the whole 19th Corps).

<sup>4</sup> Taylor again claims a victory on the ground that Banks retreated during the night.

<sup>5</sup> Banks reached Grand Ecore on the 11th, and waited there till the 22nd. Having thus secured the passage of the gunboats to Alexandria, he resumed his retreat.

Banks with all the available forces, it is not improbable that the whole Federal expedition might have been destroyed. But Kirby Smith only left his lieutenant one infantry division with the cavalry, and marched off with the bulk of his forces to encounter Steele, who had reached Camden, ninety miles distant north-east from Shreveport. The Confederate commander hoped to have time to defeat Steele and get back to rejoin Taylor before the Federal gunboats had passed below Alexandria. In this hope, however, he was disappointed. Steele made good his retreat to Little Rock, and the last of the Federal gunboats had got down the river below Alexandria on May 13th. The army at once evacuated Alexandria, and on the 19th crossed the Atchafalaya, at which point the pursuit, which Taylor attempted with his small force, came to an end. Porter's fleet owed its safety to the genius of Lieutenant-Colonel Bailey, of Wisconsin, who raised the water in the river to the required height by constructing wing-dams and stone cribs.<sup>1</sup>

The Red River expedition, having proved a failure, was fatal to Banks' military reputation, and he was relieved<sup>2</sup> by General Canby in the command of the Department of the Gulf: while the troops which took part in the expedition were prevented from having any share in the extensive and glorious campaign planned by Grant for the ensuing summer.

During the winter the one Confederate force which held a position of strategic importance was Longstreet's Corps in East Tennessee. After Bragg's defeat and retreat to Dalton, Longstreet found himself cut off from the main army. Having received from President Davis discretionary authority over all the Confederate troops in that Department, he attempted to resume the offensive. But the difficulty of getting provisions and the severity of the winter caused the operations on both sides in this theatre of war to be ineffective. Still Longstreet in East Tennessee was inconveniently near to Kentucky and the Ohio, and Halleck at Washington was urging Grant to drive him out of the Department. For a time Grant shared this view, and seems to have anticipated that the final campaign of the war might be fought out in East Tennessee; but the arguments of General Foster, who was for a short time in command of the Department, convinced him that for the

<sup>1</sup> The difficulty with which the fleet had to contend was how to cross the falls above Alexandria.

<sup>2</sup> Banks still remained for a time in command of the Department of the Gulf, but he was placed under the orders of Canby, the commander of the newly made Trans-Mississippi Division (4 B. & L., 360). General Taylor, who severely criticises Kirby Smith's military methods, claims that the Confederates lost a chance of striking a blow which would have been decisive of the war. He maintains that the capture of Porter's fleet ought to have followed upon his twofold victory, and that with that fleet the Confederates could have regained possession of the Mississippi and undone all the work of the Federals since the winter of 1861 (*Destruction and Reconstruction*, 189).

time being there was nothing to fear from Longstreet, owing to the lack of supplies, and in April that commander was recalled to Virginia, and East Tennessee ceased to be of strategic importance.<sup>1</sup>

During the winter of 1863-4 the Federal Government determined to take the very important step of appointing a single Commander-in-Chief of all the armies in the field. Halleck had been acting as General-in-Chief at Washington ever since the middle of 1862, but he had not succeeded in establishing any real co-operation between the different armies in the field, and it was gradually brought home to the Government that the Commander-in-Chief ought not to be a bureau officer, but one who could take the actual command in the field. It was, in fact, a return to the policy of the beginning of the war, when on November 1st, 1861, McClellan had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of all the Federal forces in the field. The events of 1863 had shown conclusively that Grant was the one man who could be safely entrusted with so great a responsibility.

The campaign of Vicksburg had resulted in the most notable success achieved as yet in the war. The promptitude with which Grant had marched to the relief of Chattanooga, and the crushing reverse which he had then inflicted upon Bragg, marked him out as the general for whom Lincoln had for so long and with such ill-success been looking. It was determined to revive the grade of Lieutenant-General in the Federal army. Washington alone had held that rank.<sup>2</sup> Scott had only been a Lieutenant-General by brevet. On February 26th an Act was passed by Congress for that purpose, and on March 1st the President sent the name of Grant to the Senate as the officer whom he proposed to promote to that rank. The Senate confirmed the appointment the following day, and on the 9th Grant received his commission from the hands of the President.

Hiram Ulysses Grant was born in Ohio in 1822.<sup>3</sup> He graduated at West Point in 1843, twenty-first in a class of thirty-nine. As a cadet he did not display any marked intellectual ability, but was chiefly distinguished for his skill and daring as a horseman. He was assigned to an infantry regiment, and with it served through the Mexican War, displaying conspicuous gallantry and gaining two brevets.

After the Mexican War promotion in the United States Army became very slow. A great many officers left the service in despair

<sup>1</sup> For Longstreet's operations in East Tennessee and the strategic importance of that theatre of war, see his *From Manassas to Appomattox*.

<sup>2</sup> In Washington's case the rank was really honorary; as it was known that, if the anticipated war with France broke out, he could not take the field in person (6 Schouler, 479).

<sup>3</sup> By a strange mistake Grant was entered at West Point as Ulysses Simpson, the latter having been his mother's maiden name.



of gaining further advancement and entered various walks of civil life. Grant resigned in 1854. He left the army under a cloud. He was accused of intemperate habits, and this charge, which had but a slender foundation of truth, proved prejudicial to him in later days, when he re-entered the army on the outbreak of the Civil War. After leaving the army he fell upon evil days. He tried various forms of employment, but was successful in none.

At the beginning of the war he was a clerk in his father's leather-store at Galena, Illinois. As an ex-captain of the Regular Army he quickly found employment in 1861. He served for a short while in the Adjutant-General's office under Governor Yates. An application for a post on McClellan's staff met, fortunately for Grant as it turned out, with no success. Yates appointed him colonel of one of the Illinois volunteer regiments: and his name was the first on a list of seven citizens of the State sent in by the Illinois members of Congress for appointment as Brigadier-Generals of volunteers. He served first under Frémont and next under Halleck in Missouri. His successful campaign against Forts Henry and Donelson at the beginning of 1862 established his military fame. Yet in spite of this brilliant success, Halleck was strongly prejudiced against him. After Donelson and again after Shiloh he was temporarily under a cloud. But his twofold triumph in 1863 entirely resuscitated his reputation and left him beyond dispute the first soldier in the Federal service.

His appointment to the supreme command of the Federal armies necessitated further changes. Halleck was, of course, relieved from duty as General-in-Chief and "assigned to duty in Washington as Chief of the Staff of the Army under the direction of the Secretary of War and the Lieutenant-General commanding."

Sherman succeeded Grant in command of the Military Department of the Mississippi, and McPherson succeeded Sherman in command of the Department and Army of the Tennessee. It was Grant's original intention to remain with the Army of the West, with which his whole military career in the war had been associated, and he was urged to adopt that course by Sherman. But a visit to Washington convinced him that he must place himself at the head of the Army of the Potomac to prevent the movements of that army being interfered with by the Washington authorities.

The new Commander-in-Chief quickly evolved a comprehensive plan of operations for the ensuing spring. The armies in East and West were now to act in concert with each other. A general combined movement was to be made against the Confederate armies still remaining in the field, and a campaign commenced which was to end by uniting nearly all the Federal armies against the doomed capital of the South. Grant himself, with the Army of the Potomac, was to take the field against the Army of Northern Virginia under

Lee. Wherever Lee went, Grant meant to follow : and even if he failed to destroy Lee's army in the field, he felt certain of being able to force it to take shelter within the lines of Richmond. The only other large Confederate army was concentrated at Dalton, under the command of Joseph E. Johnston. To deal with this army was the special task assigned to Sherman and the Grand Army of the West. Just as Grant would stick close to Lee until he forced him into the fortifications of Richmond, so Sherman was to stick close to Johnston until ultimately he drove him into Atlanta.

William Tecumseh Sherman, to whom was allotted a task second only in importance to that which Grant had taken for himself, had, like his Commander-in-Chief, made his reputation in the West. Born in Ohio in 1820, he graduated at West Point in 1840 sixth in his class, and received a commission in the artillery. He had not the good fortune to see service in the Mexican War, but served for some years on the Staff in California. In 1853 he retired from the United States Army and took up banking in San Francisco. In 1859 he was appointed President of the Louisiana Military Academy, and held that post until the outbreak of the war. He commanded a brigade in the battle of Bull Run and shortly after was promoted brigadier-general of volunteers. He succeeded General Anderson, of Fort Sumter fame, in the command of the Federal forces in Kentucky, but at his own request was relieved of so responsible a post and assigned to a subordinate command under Halleck in Missouri. Because he was one of the few persons who openly expressed his opinion of the vastness of the task laid upon the Federal Government, and maintained that 200,000 men would be required to conquer the Valley of the Mississippi, he was attacked by various newspapers and declared insane. Like his great chief, with whose fortunes his own were linked from the commencement of the campaign of 1862, he laboured for a time under a heavy load of prejudice. But throughout 1863 he was Grant's right-hand man, and became his natural successor in the command of the Army of the West.

Subsidiary operations were also to take place both in East and West. In the West, Banks was to organise an army of 25,000 men, for that purpose drawing off all the troops in Texas except a small force left to hold the line of the Rio Grande, and combine with the fleet under Farragut in an attempt upon Mobile.<sup>1</sup> After the fall of that city Banks' army would become a part of the Grand Army, with which Sherman was to move eastwards through Georgia. In the East, Sigel, commanding the Department of West Virginia, was to move up the Shenandoah Valley to Staunton, and

<sup>1</sup> After the failure of Banks' Red River expedition the execution of this movement passed into Canby's hands.

if practicable to Lynchburg, and then join the Army of the Potomac *viâ* Gordonsville, after destroying the railroads in that region, which served as lines of supply to Lee's army.<sup>1</sup> Another column, under General Crook, was to move through West Virginia against the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, and after breaking that up to join Sigel. General Gillmore was to be transferred with 10,000 men from South Carolina to General Butler, commanding at Fortress Monroe. The latter general was to organise a force of about 23,000 men, under the immediate command of "Baldy" Smith, with which and Gillmore's contingent he was to seize City Point and operate against Richmond from the south side of the James in co-operation with the advance of the Army of the Potomac.

At this critical time, when the Federal Government was making strenuous efforts to insure unity of action and co-operation in the forthcoming campaign, the Confederate camp was distracted by divided counsels and personal jealousies. The appointment of General Bragg to the post of Commander-in-Chief near the President was not likely to commend itself to the other general officers serving either in the East or West. Furthermore, Davis was known to be prejudiced against both Joseph Johnston and Beauregard, who had both been among the five Confederate officers appointed full generals at the beginning of the war. The President in all probability acted wisely when he refused to accede to General Lee's request, that he might be relieved of the command of the Army of Northern Virginia after the termination of the Gettysburg campaign; but his refusal was attributed not so much to a just appreciation of Lee's great military abilities as to his dislike of the other two generals, one or other of whom would have been Lee's natural successor.

The war policy of the President also was very far from finding favour in the eyes of the best Confederate officers. From the first he had adhered to the policy of standing on the strict defensive, dissipating his forces in a vain effort to cover every threatened position. It was in vain that Lee and other officers had urged the advisability of concentrating all available forces for a vigorous offensive at some carefully selected point. The failure of the Gettysburg campaign had been largely due to the fact that Lee's means were inadequate to the end proposed. The President had refused to allow any considerable body of troops to be drawn from the garrisons in the Carolinas and along the Atlantic coast, in order to form a second army of invasion under Beauregard, as he had requested. Yet the dearly bought experience of the recent campaign was powerless to convince the President of the danger of scattering his forces over a great area of country

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 6.



instead of concentrating them by a judicious use of the interior lines.

Lee and Longstreet were indeed called upon to submit schemes for a campaign, which might break up the enemy's plans and force him to make fresh combinations. Longstreet, having thought out a plan, went from East Tennessee to Lee, who approved of the suggested campaign; and the two together visited Richmond to lay the plan on which they had agreed before the President and his military advisers. Their plan was that 20,000 men should be drawn from the forts in South Carolina and placed under Beauregard's command: that this force, in conjunction with Longstreet's army in East Tennessee, should invade Kentucky, and by striking at the railroad to Louisville, the sole line of communications for the Grand Army under Sherman, force the Federal general to fall back from his position in front of Johnston's army. The latter was then to hasten with all speed, with his own army and all other troops which he could collect from Alabama and Mississippi, after Beauregard and Longstreet, and a junction would be made of all the columns at or near the Ohio, thus putting the Federal forces in the West on the defensive.<sup>1</sup>

This comprehensive plan of campaign, conceived by Longstreet and approved by Lee, was rejected by the Council of War in favour of a scheme proposed by Bragg, according to which Johnston and Longstreet were to unite their forces in East Tennessee, enter Middle Tennessee, and strike at the Federal line of communications near Nashville. This plan of campaign, which was approved by the President, was ultimately abandoned in consequence of Johnston's objection that he could not adequately supply his army in the mountainous country through which he would have to march before turning west for the invasion of Middle Tennessee.<sup>2</sup>

The net result of the Council of War was that no plan for an offensive campaign was definitely adopted, and Lee and Johnston, in command of the two principal armies of the Confederacy, were left to do the best that either could independently of the other against the superior numbers which the Federal Government was threatening to bring against the isolated forces of the enemy.

<sup>1</sup> For Longstreet's proposed plan of campaign, see *From Manassas to Appomattox*.

<sup>2</sup> Johnston was strongly opposed to Bragg's plan because, as the interior positions were held by the enemy, his own and Longstreet's armies were liable to be defeated in detail before they could unite (Johnston, 295-8).

## CHAPTER XX

### GRANT AND LEE IN VIRGINIA FROM THE WILDERNESS TO COLD HARBOUR<sup>1</sup>

The Army of the Potomac under Grant—Alternative courses open to Grant—The Army of the Potomac crosses the Rapidan—Movements of the Army of Northern Virginia—Collision with the Confederate forces in the Wilderness—The battle on the turnpike—The battle on the Plank road—Results of the day's fighting—The Federals assume the offensive—Hill driven back on the Plank road—Arrival of Longstreet—Federal attack checked—Hancock renews the attack on the Plank road—Longstreet turns Hancock's left—Longstreet wounded by his own troops—Confederate attack on Hancock's entrenchments repulsed—Ewell's flank attack against the Federal right—Results of the two days' fighting—Grant continues his movement by the left flank—Lee's countermove—The Confederates win the race to Spottsylvania Court House—Concentration of both armies—Operations on the banks of the Po—Battles round Spottsylvania Court House—Warren's attack repulsed—Hancock's attack repulsed—Partial success of Wright's attack—Grant's plan for renewing the attack—Hancock's attack on the 12th May—The Confederate lines broken—Desperate struggle for the salient—Failure of Warren's attack—Failure of Burnside's attack—Losses of both sides—Grant endeavours to crush the Confederate right—The Federals renew the attack on the salient—Grant decides to make a fresh movement by the left flank—Operations of the Federal cavalry—Death of Stuart—Sheridan threatens Richmond—Grant moves round Lee's right—Lee falls back to the North Anna—Grant reaches the North Anna—Dangerous position of the Federal army—Grant withdraws his army—Federal movement to the Pamunkey—Lee follows and covers Richmond—Fighting on the 30th—The Federals occupy Cold Harbour—Grant continues the movement to the left—Battle of Cold Harbour—Lee's movements on the 2nd—The Federal assault—Federals repulsed with heavy loss—Grant's change of plan.

BY the end of April the Army of the Potomac encamped on the north bank of the Rapidan numbered over 99,000 men with 274 guns.<sup>2</sup> It had been recently reorganised by Meade into three Corps; but it is very doubtful whether this step was a wise one. In the densely wooded country, which was to be the scene of the next campaign, the Corps, as enlarged under the new arrangement, was too unwieldy an organisation to be easily handled, and in consequence a degree of responsibility devolved upon the divisional commanders which their actual rank hardly qualified them to undertake.<sup>3</sup> North of the Rappahannock was a fourth Corps under Burnside, over 19,000 strong with 42 guns.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Map III.

<sup>2</sup> "Present for duty equipped" (Humphreys, 14).

<sup>3</sup> Humphreys, 3, 4.

<sup>4</sup> Return of the 9th Corps for April. The Morning Report for May 10th gave for its strength over 22,000 (Humphreys, 14).

This Corps, though taking part in the campaign, was not formally placed under Meade's command till a month later.<sup>1</sup> The Army of the Potomac was also handicapped by the anomalous position of General Meade. He was still commander of the army which he had led to victory at Gettysburg, and through him all orders passed. But the presence of the Commander-in-Chief led to a division of authority, which did not invariably work for good.

When Grant was appointed Commander-in-Chief of all the Federal armies, Meade had at once offered to resign his position, thinking that Grant would probably wish Sherman to take his place. But Sherman could not be spared from the West, and Meade's straightforward conduct gained him Grant's warm approval and caused him to be retained in the command.

It was open to Grant either to advance against Lee's army by land, or else to transport the Army of the Potomac by sea to the vicinity of Richmond. The latter had been the course adopted by McClellan in 1862. But there were weighty reasons which rendered it unsuitable in 1864. In the first place, Lee, both in 1862 and 1863, had invaded the North and threatened Washington. If the Army of the Potomac were removed from his front, it was probable that he would again march upon the Federal capital. In the second place, the events of the last two years had convinced Grant that his true objective was not so much Richmond as the Army of Northern Virginia. The fall of Richmond would not involve the overthrow of the Southern Confederacy. The true bulwark of the South was the Army of Northern Virginia and its great commander. Therefore Grant, in the orders which he issued to Meade, directed him to keep close to Lee's army. "Wherever Lee goes, there you will go too." An advance by land was a course dictated by sound military principles. It specially commended itself to President Lincoln, who had never succeeded in reconciling himself to the movement by water.

Grant had still to decide between two plans of campaign. He might move so as to turn either Lee's right or left flank. A movement against the Confederate left would threaten Gordonsville and the line of communications between Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley, still one of the most fruitful sources of supplies on which the Confederates could count. It had this further advantage, that it would be made in more favourable country for offensive operations. But there were two reasons which caused Grant to reject it. It would be necessary to detach considerable bodies of troops, increasing in number as the Federals advanced, in order to protect the Orange and Alexandria Railway, which would be the main line of supplies for the advancing army. Even if the railway were abandoned, a strong force would be required to

<sup>1</sup> This Corps became part of Meade's command on May 24th.



protect the wagon-trains moving to and from the navigable rivers, which might serve as an alternative line of supplies. Further, a movement by the right would necessitate a march of more than forty miles being made in full view of the Confederate signal posts on Southwest Mountain, and Lee would have ample time to entrench a formidable position on the mountain, covering all the lines of approach to Gordonsville.

On the other hand, if the Federals moved by their left, they would have, it is true, to pass through the terribly intricate country of the Wilderness, but all their supplies could be brought up from the navigable rivers by which connection was maintained with Washington, and the wagon-trains would be moving on the left, in this case, the protected flank of the Army of the Potomac. There was, moreover, the chance, judging from the experience of the Mine Run campaign, that the advancing army might get safely through the Wilderness before Lee was in a position to strike it.<sup>1</sup>

Accordingly on May 2nd Grant issued orders for an advance by the left flank. The movement commenced at midnight of the 3rd. Five bridges were laid down across the Rapidan, two at the Germanna Ford, two at Ely's Ford, and one at the Culpeper Mine Ford. The 5th Corps crossed at Germanna Ford and marched on May 4th as far as the Wilderness Tavern, the point of intersection between the Germanna Plank road and the turnpike from Orange Court House to Fredericksburg. The 6th Corps followed the 5th, and bivouacked on the night of the 4th on the south bank of the river, waiting for Burnside's Corps to come up and take its place. The 2nd Corps crossed at Ely's Ford and moved to Chancellorsville, whilst the trains crossed at Ely's and the Culpeper Mine Fords. The troops might have marched several miles further, and even have cleared the Wilderness, if their advance had not necessarily been regulated by the much slower rate of progression of the trains.

The Army of Northern Virginia numbered over 60,000 men with 224 guns.<sup>2</sup> Two Corps, Ewell's and A. P. Hill's, were near the Orange Court House.<sup>3</sup> The 1st Corps, under Longstreet, recently returned from East Tennessee, was held back at Gordonsville, in case the Federal movement should be by the right. But Lee fully expected that Grant would prefer to advance through the Wilderness, and his signallers on Clark's Mountain were ready to convey to him the earliest news of Grant's advance. The passage of the Rapidan was reported on the morning of the 4th, and the

<sup>1</sup> For a criticism of the advantages and disadvantages of the two routes, see Humphreys, 9-11.

<sup>2</sup> Humphreys, 17.

<sup>3</sup> "Ewell's Corps was on and near the Rapidan above Mine Run and Hill's on his left higher up the stream" (4 B. & L., 119). Lee's headquarters were two miles north-east of Orange Court House.

2nd Corps, under Ewell, moved out along the turnpike road and went into camp that night about five miles from the Wilderness Tavern, where Warren was encamped. A. P. Hill, with two divisions of his Corps, marched on the Plank road and halted about seven miles from Parker's Store. His third division, under R. H. Anderson, was left on the Rapidan. Orders were sent to Longstreet at Gordonsville to advance, and at 4 p.m. the two divisions, which made up the 1st Corps (Pickett's division had been sent to the southern bank of the James), were in motion. Early on the 5th the Confederate columns were again moving towards the enemy. Lee did not want to bring on a general battle until Longstreet's Corps had arrived, and both Ewell and Hill were warned to that effect. Ewell on the turnpike being some miles nearer the Federal army than was Hill on the Plank road, halted his column, when he was within two miles of the Wilderness Tavern.<sup>1</sup>

The Federals had moved at 5 a.m. Warren was directed to reach Parker's Store on the Plank road, Sedgwick was to take Warren's place at the Wilderness Tavern, whilst Hancock, from Chancellorsville, was directed to advance to Shady Grove Church, on the Catharpin road, and extend his right towards the 5th Corps at Parker's Store.<sup>2</sup> The cavalry Corps was under the command of Sheridan, who had been brought for the purpose from the West. He had organised his force into three divisions under Gregg, Wilson, and Torbert. Information was received to the effect that the larger part of the Confederate cavalry was still on the lower Rappahannock below Fredericksburg, whither they had been sent for the sake of forage, and Sheridan, with Gregg's and Torbert's divisions, was sent on a reconnaissance in the direction of Fredericksburg to find the whereabouts of this body of cavalry, whilst Wilson's division was ordered to precede the march of the 2nd Corps and keep parties out on the principal roads running west and south-west.

In the 5th Corps Griffin's division lay across the turnpike about a mile in front of its junction with the Germanna road, whilst Crawford's division, followed by Wadsworth's and Robinson's, moved toward's Parker's Store. It was shortly after 7 a.m. that Meade was informed by a despatch from Warren that Confederate infantry were in his front on the turnpike. He at once sent orders to Warren to halt his column and attack with his whole force, in order to develop the strength of the force confronting him, and orders were sent to Hancock, directing him to halt at Todd's Tavern until Warren's movement had cleared up the situation. At the time of receiving this order, 9 a.m., the head of Hancock's

<sup>1</sup> For the Confederate movements of the 4th and 5th, see Humphreys, 22-3.

<sup>2</sup> Humphreys, 21.

column was already two miles beyond Todd's Tavern. The 6th Corps was on its way from Germanna Ford. Wright's division of that Corps was directed to leave the Germanna road and take a cross-road, by which it might gain a position on Warren's right, and thus continue the Federal line of battle. Crawford's division of the 5th Corps received the order to halt, when it was within a mile of Parker's Store. A detachment of cavalry left by Wilson to observe the Plank road was skirmishing with what was supposed to be a Confederate cavalry force. On throwing out a skirmish line to support the cavalry, it was found that Confederate infantry were also moving on the Plank road. Between 9 a.m. and 10 a.m. Getty's division of the 6th Corps, which had already reached the Wilderness Tavern, was ordered to move on the Brock road to its intersection with the Plank road and to advance along the latter road and endeavour to drive the enemy back beyond Parker's Store. At the same time orders were sent to Hancock to move up the Brock road into the Plank road and be prepared to advance toward Parker's Store.

About noon Griffin's division moved forward to the attack on the turnpike, and at first gained some success, driving back two of Ewell's brigades in confusion. But as the strength of Ewell's Corps developed itself and Wright's division failed to get up in time on the right, Griffin finding himself in danger of being outflanked, fell back, leaving two guns behind him. It was after 2 p.m. that Wright's division reached the scene of battle and formed on Warren's right, where it was immediately attacked by two brigades, which were repulsed with some loss. On the left of the turnpike Wadsworth's division and one brigade of Robinson's had been endeavouring to connect with Griffin's left. But so thick and tangled was the wood through which they had to march that they lost their direction, and exposing their left flank to an attack from Ewell's right, were forced to retire in some confusion. On the extreme left of the 5th Corps Crawford, after receiving the order to halt, had taken up a strong position in open ground at Chewning's Farm. Further orders were received, directing him to send one brigade to the right to connect with the rest of the Corps. But this brigade also lost its line of direction in the forest, and being enveloped by Gordon's brigade on Ewell's right, was driven back with loss. Crawford's division being thus isolated, was withdrawn from its advanced position.

Ewell and Warren now confronted each other with a distance of about 300 yards dividing them at the nearest point, and both sides hastened to entrench their positions.

On the Plank road Getty's division was moving forward soon after 11 a.m., and found the cavalry outposts engaged with the skirmishers of Heth's division, which was leading Hill's advance.



Neither side, however, was anxious for a stand-up fight. Getty, on learning from some prisoners that Hill's Corps was in his front, decided to wait for the arrival of Hancock's Corps before assuming the offensive, and in the meantime threw up some slight entrenchments. Hill had been directed by Lee not to bring on a battle before Longstreet's arrival, and made no attempt whatever to precipitate matters, letting Heth halt in front of Getty and sending Wilcox's division to the left to assist Ewell, who was plainly engaged on the turnpike.

At 2 p.m. Hancock's leading division arrived to support Getty. The 2nd Corps was drawn up along the Brock road on Getty's left with one division, Barlow's, on the extreme left advanced somewhat forward beyond the Brock road, occupying some open and elevated ground which commanded a good deal of country both to right and left, and also covered a possible line of approach from the left along the bed of an unfinished railway. Nearly all the artillery of the 2nd Corps was posted at this point. As the afternoon wore on Grant and Meade learnt that Longstreet's Corps was not yet up, and determined to attack all along the line in the hope of dealing the Confederate army a crushing blow before the 1st Corps could arrive to the rescue. At 4.15 p.m. Getty's division moved forward to the attack, supported by Hancock with two divisions, Birney's and Mott's, and later by two brigades of Gibbon's division. Wilcox was brought over from the left to reinforce Heth, and two of his brigades having taken post on the Confederate right beyond the Plank road, struck Mott's division on the left flank and drove it back some distance, but were themselves driven back by a flank attack made by two of Barlow's brigades. Fighting continued till about 8 p.m., when the approaching darkness put an end to the combat. Hill's two divisions had suffered heavy losses, and but for the opportune arrival of night would scarcely have resisted the superior strength of Hancock's assault much longer. To the right of this fiercely contested battle on the Plank road Wadsworth's division had been ordered to fall upon Hill's left flank. But the difficulty of making a way through the dense forest for a large body of men was so great that Wadsworth only succeeded in reaching the skirmish line of the enemy, which he was vigorously pushing back, when night ended the battle.

On the extreme right the fighting was confined to an assault by two brigades, and part of a third, of the 6th Corps upon Ewell's entrenched position, which was found to be too strong to be carried by a frontal attack.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The details of the fighting on May 5th are taken from Humphreys, 23-35. The fighting on the turnpike was commenced by the Confederates (4 B. & L., 121, note). Early in the day Jones' brigade drove the Federal outposts back, then fell back about

Night found the two armies confronting each other very much in the positions occupied when they had first come into collision. On the Federal right Warren had been forced to fall back a short distance, and Ewell's line in his front was strongly entrenched. On the left Hancock's men had raised a triple line of fortifications, which played an important part in the battle of the following day, whilst, on the other hand, Hill's divisions, facing them, had only thrown up very slight entrenchments. Late at night Lee had sent orders to Longstreet to come up with all speed to Parker's Store. The 1st Corps reached this point at dawn. Anderson's division of the 3rd Corps, which had bivouacked at Verdierville, was also called up, and reached the battlefield soon after Longstreet.<sup>1</sup>

Orders were sent from the Federal headquarters to Hancock, Sedgwick, and Warren to attack at 5 a.m. Burnside was ordered to march at 2 a.m. with three of his divisions. With two of these he was to fill the gap between Hancock's and Warren's Corps in time to take part in the general assault, when he was expected to push forward into the gap, which also existed between Hill's and Ewell's Corps, and cut the Confederate line in two.<sup>2</sup> At 5 a.m. on the 6th the Federals moved to the attack. On the right neither Warren nor Sedgwick could make any impression upon Ewell's entrenched line, which had been strengthened during the night and armed with artillery. Repeated assaults were made during the morning, but without success. On the left Hancock attacked Hill's two divisions with Birney's, Mott's, and Getty's divisions and Gibbon's two brigades, whilst Wadsworth's division on the north of the Plank road assailed Hill's left. Hill's troops had apparently been told on the previous night that they would be relieved the following morning by Longstreet's Corps.<sup>3</sup> In consequence they had made no attempt to strengthen their entrenchments nor any preparations for renewing the battle. Taken more or less by surprise, they made a stout resistance for some time, but were driven back along the Plank road in ever-increasing confusion.

The Confederate right wing was on the point of giving way

two miles, in which position it was attacked by Warren. Grant did not at first suppose that Lee was attacking him with the bulk of his forces, but imagined that the attack on his flank was merely a diversion to cover Lee's withdrawal towards the North Anna (Swinton, 421). Consequently he allowed Hancock to remain at Todd's Tavern for two hours, at a distance of ten miles from the rest of the army. Professor White claims that this delay on Grant's part gave Lee a rare opportunity of cutting the Army of the Potomac in two, and blames Longstreet for not being up in time with his two divisions to take part in the attack on the 5th (White's *Lee*, 356-7; Lee's *Lee*, 331). But as Longstreet had to come from Gordonsville, it is very doubtful whether he could have arrived in time. For Mott's reverse, see Swinton, 426.

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 34-5.

<sup>2</sup> The third division was to be held in reserve at Wilderness Tavern.

<sup>3</sup> White's *Lee*, 359; 4 B. & L., 123.

when Longstreet's Corps at last reached the field, and, with Kershaw's division on the right of the road and Field's on the left, rushed into the battle to retrieve the day. Hancock's line was considerably disordered by the hard fighting and by pressing a pursuit of a mile or more over very difficult ground, and, attacked by this new foe, was first brought to a standstill and then forced some little way back. Hancock recognised the necessity of re-adjusting his line in the presence of Longstreet's reinforcements, and the first stage in the fighting on that wing came to an end about 6.30 a.m.

Whilst Hancock was engaged in re-forming his line, Heth's and Wilcox's divisions were rallied and again brought up into line on Field's left. Anderson's division of Hill's Corps had also arrived on the battlefield: part had joined Field in the attack on Hancock, and part was formed in support. The Federal leaders did not, however, know that Anderson's division had come up, and also supposed that Longstreet had with him Pickett's division as well as Kershaw's and Field's.<sup>1</sup> There seemed a danger, therefore, lest a strong Confederate force as yet unaccounted for might be marching against the Federal left flank, and Gibbon, commanding on Hancock's left, was ordered to keep a sharp look out along the Brock road. At 7 a.m. Hancock directed Gibbon to attack the enemy's right with Barlow's division and fight his way to the Plank road. But this order was only executed (presumably, owing to the fear that Longstreet was approaching on the Brock road) by one brigade, which, after some hard fighting, succeeded in connecting with Mott's left. Had Hancock's order been carried out by the whole division, Longstreet's subsequent flank attack by the unfinished railroad would have been rendered impossible.

Grant had hoped that he might have the good luck to get through the Wilderness without a pitched battle, but from the first he had seen that there was a possibility that he might be forced to fight, and now that he found himself confronted by the Army of Northern Virginia, his true objective, he was prepared to fight to a finish. Orders were sent to Hancock formally placing Wadsworth's division under his command. Stevenson's division of the 9th Corps, which had been held in reserve at the Wilderness Tavern, also reported to him for duty: and he was informed that Burnside's other two divisions would attack on his right between the Plank and turnpike roads.

This information proved inaccurate, as Burnside, whose movements were very dilatory on this day, did not come into collision with the enemy till 2 p.m. Acting on the information received, Hancock shortly before 9 a.m. renewed the attack. Getty's division had been withdrawn to the Brock road, but the last of

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 41.



Gibbon's brigades had been brought over from the left to take its place. With Birney's, Wadsworth's, Mott's, Gibbon's, and part of Stevenson's divisions, Hancock made his second attack. Fierce fighting ensued, and lasted till nearly 11 a.m., but without any material advantage being gained by either side. Barlow's division on the extreme left was engaged with the enemy's dismounted cavalry, and took no part in the main attack along the Plank road. About 10.30 a.m. orders were received by Warren and Sedgwick to make no further attack upon Ewell's lines, but to entrench their own positions more strongly, so that a part of their forces might be drawn off to support Hancock.

But it was now the turn of the Confederates to assume the offensive. Longstreet had discovered that the unfinished railroad on his right afforded a safe and covered line of advance against the left flank of Hancock's main force on the Plank road. Four brigades were moved along this railroad, and then facing north fell furiously upon the unprotected Federal flank shortly after 11 a.m. The exposed flank was rolled up "like a wet blanket,"<sup>1</sup> and the confusion spread to the other divisions. Hancock vainly endeavoured to draw the troops which had been struck in flank back to the Plank road, and at the same time with his right hold his ground against the enemy in his front. The difficulty of forming troops partially demoralised into a fresh line under heavy fire in a thick wood was too great: and he found himself obliged to withdraw his whole force into the entrenchments which had been thrown up the previous day on the Brock road.

It was Longstreet's intention to follow up this success by an immediate attack, with his Corps and Anderson's division, upon Hancock's entrenched position, but as he was riding with his Staff along the Plank road at the head of the attacking column, a volley was fired across the road by some part of the four brigades which had taken part in the flanking movement, and were now arranged on the south side of the road, about sixty yards from it. Longstreet himself was dangerously wounded, and forced to leave the field, whilst Jenkins, one of the ablest of his brigadiers, was killed on the spot. The fall of Longstreet robbed the Confederates of any chance which they had of crushing the Federal left.<sup>2</sup> Anderson was appointed to the command of the 1st Corps, and was succeeded in the command of his division by Mahone. But the change of commanders took time, and Lee himself on arriving on

<sup>1</sup> Hancock's own phrase.

<sup>2</sup> It has been claimed by some Confederate writers that Longstreet's fall alone prevented the Confederates from winning a second Bull Run or Chancellorsville. But this view ignores the fact that Hancock's left (three brigades of Barlow's Corps) had not advanced, but remained on the original line covering the Brock road (Swinton, 434, note).

the scene determined to have the line straightened out before the attack was made. Not till 4.15 p.m. did the Confederates assail Hancock's entrenchments. The attack was gallantly made.<sup>1</sup> At one point the Federals gave way, and the Confederate colours were planted upon the first line of works. But the success was only momentary: an advance from the second line promptly drove the Confederates back, and recovered the lost works; and at 5 p.m. the Confederates fell back baffled.

The repulse of this charge brought to an end the fighting on the Federal left. Grant, indeed, intent on "hammering" the enemy, had ordered another attack to be made by Hancock and Burnside at 6 p.m. But Hancock's troops had almost exhausted their stock of ammunition, and there was no time to organise a fresh attack by the hour named. On Hancock's right Burnside's two divisions had been engaged with Perry's brigade of Anderson's division and Law's brigade of Field's division. Fighting commenced in this portion of the field about 2 p.m.; and about 5.30 p.m., in order to relieve the pressure upon Hancock, Burnside made a vigorous attack with both his divisions and drove back the two brigades in his front in confusion. But reinforcements were brought up by Heth,<sup>2</sup> and Burnside was forced to fall back to the position, which he had held earlier in the day. Beyond preventing some of Hill's troops from taking part in the attack on Hancock's position, Burnside's immediate command played a very insignificant part in the day's fighting.

On the extreme right of the Federal line shortly before sunset a vigorous flank attack was delivered by Gordon with two brigades. The two Federal brigades on that flank were taken by surprise and rolled up in great confusion. Amongst the prisoners both the brigadier-generals fell into the hands of the Confederates. So complete was the surprise that one of the brigades was assailed whilst still engaged in the work of building entrenchments. Gordon did not succeed in pushing his success far. His troops were thrown into great disorder whilst pursuing the enemy through the dense wood. The rest of Wright's division stood firm in their entrenchments against an attack delivered by the rest of Early's division, and night put an end to a contest in which both opponents were in considerable confusion and heartily welcomed a cessation of hostilities.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The attacking force seems to have been composed of Field's and Anderson's divisions, less one brigade of each division, and perhaps part of Heth's (Humphreys, 49).

<sup>2</sup> Wofford's brigade of Kershaw's division also took part in Burnside's repulse (Humphreys, 46).

<sup>3</sup> According to Humphreys the attacking brigades were Gordon's and Pegram's brigades of Early's division and Johnston's of Rodes'. Gordon and Johnston attacked the Federal right flank and Pegram attacked in front. The two Federal brigades, on which the flank attack fell, were Shaler's and Seymour's. But neither of these brigades were completely routed, and part of Shaler's, which suffered the more heavily of the two,

During the night Early formed a fresh line somewhat in advance of his old one: on the Federal side the 6th Corps was withdrawn and posted in an entirely new position some distance to the rear, and the right of the 5th Corps also fell back so as to conform to this new disposition.

The net result of the day's fighting had been that the Confederates had gained a little ground on their left, and on their right had forced Hancock back into his entrenchments, but their attempt to storm those entrenchments had been a costly failure. It was a drawn battle, proving the powerlessness of either army to overwhelm the other in their present positions. But if the fighting had no decisive results, still the losses on both sides were very heavy. Grant's loss amounted to 17,666.<sup>1</sup> It is impossible to state the Confederate loss with any confidence of accuracy. It was probably considerably over 10,000.<sup>2</sup> It was undoubtedly a good deal less than that of the Federals, as the latter were in the main the attacking force. During the fighting on the 6th the woods caught fire in some places, and some of the helpless wounded perished miserably in the flames.

On the 7th May Grant determined to continue the movement by his left flank, to get clear of the Wilderness, and by pressing on towards Richmond compel Lee to give him battle in more favourable country or else sacrifice the Confederate capital. The trains were ordered to start in the middle of the afternoon, so that they might not impede the movement of that part of the army which followed on the same road. At 8.30 p.m. the 5th Corps started along the Brock road for Spottsylvania Court House, fifteen miles to the south-east. The 2nd Corps was ordered to follow the 5th to Todd's Tavern at the junction of the Brock and Catharpin roads. The 6th Corps was ordered to march to Chancellorsville and advance to a position on the left of the 5th Corps by the road from Piney Branch Church, whilst the 9th Corps followed Sedgwick, but was ordered to halt at the junction of the Orange Plank road with the Piney Branch Church road to guard the trains. The fighting on that day was confined to a cavalry encounter. Sheridan assumed the offensive with his whole force and drove Fitzhugh Lee's and Wade Hampton's divisions from Todd's Tavern, pursuing the former along the Brock road and the latter along the Catharpin road.

Lee quickly learnt that the Army of the Potomac was on the move. It was probable that Grant was doing one of two things.

stood firm, and forced the right of Gordon's brigade to give way. According to another account, Gordon's, Pegram's, and Hays' brigades were the three engaged in the Confederate attack (4 B. & L., 127, note).

<sup>1</sup> 4 B. & L., 182.

<sup>2</sup> Swinton, 439, reckons the Confederate loss at about 8,000. Phisterer's Statistical Record states it at 11,400. But see Humphreys, 54.



Either he was retiring to Fredericksburg, or he was seeking to out-flank the Army of Northern Virginia by a movement round its right. Anderson, now commanding Longstreet's Corps, started at 11 p.m. to march for Spottsylvania Court House by the Shady Grove Church road, and at daybreak of the 8th was across the river Po.<sup>1</sup> After a brief rest the Corps moved to the left on discovering that the enemy was advancing on the Brock road, and took position on a ridge about a mile and a half north of the Court House, at the intersection of the Brock and Block House roads (the latter ran from the Old Court House, intersecting the Shady Grove Church road a mile east of the crossing of the Po).

The advance of Warren's Corps along the Brock road had been considerably delayed by the presence in his front of Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry division. Trees had been felled across the road, and the dismounted cavalry offered so obstinate a resistance, that by the time the 5th Corps reached open ground, in the vicinity of Alsop's Farm, the men were thoroughly exhausted, and the 1st Corps of the Confederate army was found roughly entrenched in their front. Some sharp fighting ensued, with the result that the Federal Corps took up a position from 200 to 400 yards distant from the enemy's entrenched line and commenced to throw up entrenchments themselves.<sup>2</sup>

On the arrival of the 6th Corps in the course of the afternoon the fight was renewed, but without any decided advantage being gained on either side, as the 2nd Confederate Corps reached the battlefield shortly after Sedgwick's arrival, and the advance of Rodes' division prevented the right flank of Anderson's position being turned.<sup>3</sup> Ewell had had the longest march of any of the Confederate Corps to make, having been ordered to go round by Parker's Store, and by that route reach the Shady Grove Church road. The 3rd Corps, temporarily commanded by Early (whose division in the 2nd Corps was for the time commanded by Gordon), took a road between those followed by Anderson's and Ewell's Corps, and was ordered to move to Spottsylvania Court House by the Brock road. Having struck the Catharpin road by a cross-road from the Orange Plank road, Early was advancing towards Todd's Tavern

<sup>1</sup> The 1st Corps marched by a road running south from the Plank road into the Catharpin road between Todd's Tavern and Corbin's Bridge. After crossing the Po at Corbin's Bridge the Corps took the Shady Grove Church road to Spottsylvania Court House and crossed the Po a second time a mile west of the Block House. Two brigades of Kershaw's division marched thence to Spottsylvania Court House and hastened the retreat of Wilson's cavalry division, which had been in possession of the Court House for two hours and had just received orders to withdraw from General Sheridan (Humphreys, 62-3).

<sup>2</sup> Humphreys, 61.

<sup>3</sup> This is Ewell's statement, who says that Rodes advanced nearly half a mile, when his left coming upon strong works was checked, and he was forced to halt. On the other hand, it is stated that Crawford's division came suddenly upon Rodes' division, as it was "moving by a flank," and drove it back three-quarters of a mile (Swinton).

to get into the Brock road, when he found Wade Hampton's cavalry division in his front engaged with the Federal cavalry, and on pressing forward discovered that Hancock's Corps held Todd's Tavern, and that the route by the Brock road was closed to him. Throughout the 8th these two Corps remained confronting each other, and some skirmishing took place between their advance guards. Very early in the morning of the 9th Early marched by the Shady Grove Church road to Spottsylvania Court House, and took position on the right of the Confederate line facing Burnside's Corps, which was advancing along the Fredericksburg road. Hancock marched by the Brock road, and took position on the extreme right of the Federal line with his right resting on the Po.

The battlefield of Spottsylvania was not one of any particular strategic importance.<sup>1</sup> The Confederate position rested on a ridge which ran across the peninsula formed by the Po and Ny Rivers, but, though fairly strong in itself, it might be turned on either flank. During the 9th, Hancock was ordered to cross the Po with three of his divisions, move down the right bank, and endeavour to locate the position of the Confederate left. The other division—Mott's—of the 2nd Corps was ordered to the left of the 6th Corps. This movement round their left threatened the Louisa Court House road, by which the Confederate trains were moving, and had it been persisted in, would have turned their left.<sup>2</sup> Anxious for the safety of his trains, Lee directed Early on his right to move two divisions to the left. At an early hour on the 10th, Mahone's division entrenched a position covering the bridge, by which the Shady Grove Church road crossed the Po, a mile west of the Block House and two and a half miles west of Spottsylvania Court House, whilst Heth's division crossed the river lower down and moved out against Hancock's turning column. But the Federal Commander-in-Chief, on the morning of the 10th, had determined to assault the Confederate lines in front, and Hancock was directed to withdraw two of his divisions to the left bank and join in an attack by the 5th Corps upon Anderson's position. Grant, having got the enemy in position in front of him, was resolved to repeat the experiment, which had already proved so costly in the Wilderness, of assaulting all along the line. Barlow's division of Hancock's command was ordered to remain on the right bank to threaten the Confederate left. But Heth's advance against this isolated division necessitated its withdrawal across the Po.<sup>3</sup> The retrograde movement was not effected without some heavy fighting, in which the Federals lost a gun.

At 3.45 p.m. Warren advanced to the attack with Crawford's

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 71.

<sup>2</sup> Humphreys, 80.

<sup>3</sup> Barlow's division had already received orders to repossess the Po.

and Cutler's divisions (Cutler had succeeded to the command of Wadsworth's division after the latter's death on the 6th) and two brigades of Gibbon's division, which had recrossed the river. The assault was gallantly made. But the Confederate position was too strong to be carried by a frontal attack, and though at certain points the entrenchments were reached, the Federals were repulsed with heavy loss. When Hancock, after seeing Barlow's division safely withdrawn, reached the scene of the recent attack, he was directed to renew it at 7 p.m. He attacked with Birney's and Gibbon's divisions, and part of the 5th Corps co-operating, but met with no better success.<sup>1</sup> The really vulnerable point in the Confederate lines was further east, where, near the intersection of the Brock and Block House roads, the general line of the entrenchments turned sharply to the south; from the angle thus formed a salient, roughly in the shape of an inverted letter U, a mile long and half a mile across, projected northwards. The western half of the curved portion was, however, so flat as to be almost a straight line; it was held by Doles' brigade of Rodes' division of the 2nd Corps, and the eastern half occupied by Johnson's division of the same Corps.<sup>2</sup> Upton's brigade, with four regiments of another brigade, was ordered by General Wright (who had succeeded to the command of the 6th Corps upon the death of Sedgwick, killed by a sniper on the 9th) to assault the west shoulder, whilst Mott's division was to attack on Wright's left. Upton was able to form his regiments for the attack under cover of a wood, which reached within 200 yards of the Confederate lines. The assault at this point, delivered at 6.10 p.m.,<sup>3</sup> proved at first entirely successful. The first line of the Confederate defences was carried, as also was a second line of entrenchments 100 yards to the rear, but the failure of Mott to co-operate enabled the Confederates to concentrate a superior force against Upton, who was driven back to the first line of entrenchments, from which the Federal troops were withdrawn under cover of the darkness. Mott was obliged to form his line of attack in full view of the enemy, and was repulsed by the heavy fire of artillery and musketry without reaching the Confederate entrenchments. The nature of the ground prevented his attack from partaking of the nature of a

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 81-2, and General Webb (4 B. & L., 167-8) speak of two assaults. But Swinton, 449, states that Gibbon's two brigades attacked as early as 11 a.m. (cf. White's *Lee*, 372), that Crawford and Cutler made a preliminary assault at 3 p.m., and two more attacks were made by Warren and Hancock together. General Law (4 B. & L., 129) mentions three assaults, the second at 3 p.m. and the third some hours later.

<sup>2</sup> In Humphreys, 73-4, it is pointed out that what is usually called the salient was an east and west line about 400 yards long, and should properly be termed its apex, but the Confederate plan, made by Major Hotchkiss and reproduced in the atlas of the Official Records of the war (83. 3), shows the salient as described in the text. General Humphreys probably means the flattened western shoulder of the inverted U, which runs about east by north and west by south.

<sup>3</sup> Humphreys, 86.



surprise: and only a surprise attack had any chance of success against Lee's lines.

On this day Burnside on the Federal left pushed a reconnaissance close up to the enemy's lines on the Fredericksburg road and took up and entrenched a position there.

In spite of his heavy losses on the 10th, which probably amounted to over 4,000,<sup>1</sup> Grant was determined to make another attempt to break Lee's lines. He was encouraged in this determination by the partial success which had attended Upton's attack, and he attributed the failure to follow up that success to the want of energy displayed by Mott and Burnside. Accordingly he issued orders to Hancock to march on the night of the 11th in rear of the 5th and 6th Corps, and under cover of the darkness take up a position in the open ground of Brown's Farm, from which point Mott had made his unsuccessful attack on the 10th. Having connected the rest of his Corps with Mott's division, Hancock was ordered to attack the apex of the salient at 4 a.m. on the 12th, and Burnside on Hancock's left was to attack at the same hour. Warren and Wright were to keep their troops in readiness either to attack the enemy's lines in their respective fronts or to move to some other point, according to the orders which they might receive. The entrenchments left empty by the withdrawal of the 2nd Corps were filled by part of the 5th, whilst Wright kept one division in the trenches and held the other two in reserve. Lee was deceived by certain movements of the Federal troops on the 11th into the idea that they intended to turn his left, and ordered the withdrawal of the artillery of Johnson's division holding the apex of the salient. The order was countermanded in the course of the night owing to information received from Johnson that the enemy were massing in his front. But Hancock's assault was made before these guns had got back into position. Only two of them fired at all, and they only two rounds, and the whole of this artillery force fell into the hands of the victorious Federals.<sup>2</sup>

During the night of the 11th the 2nd Corps took up the position assigned to it. The morning was very foggy, and in consequence the assault ordered for 4 a.m. did not take place till half an hour later. Birney's division was on the right and Barlow's on the left; the former in two deployed lines, the latter in two lines of masses, each regiment formed in close column of attack.<sup>3</sup> Mott's division was in rear of Birney's in a single line, and Gibbon's was held in reserve. In advancing to the attack over the open ground, which at this point lay in front of the Confederate lines, the two lines of Barlow's division combined into one dense mass, and edging off somewhat to the left, struck the east shoulder of the salient and the entrenchments running south from it for about 600 yards. Two of

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 89.

<sup>2</sup> Humphreys, 95.

<sup>3</sup> Humphreys, 92.

Gibbon's brigades rushed forward and entered the Confederate lines at the same time as Barlow's division, continuing the storming line to the left. The Confederates were swept away by the assault. Without artillery musketry was powerless to check an advance over so short a distance of open ground. Johnson's division was almost annihilated. He himself and one of his brigadiers, G. H. Steuart, were taken prisoners, as were also a great part of his troops, variously estimated from 2,000 to 4,000,<sup>1</sup> all the artillery of the division, twenty guns, were captured, and a very heavy loss of killed and wounded inflicted, as the entrenchments were carried at the point of the bayonet. Birney's and Mott's divisions struck the Confederate lines just west of the east angle extending from that point to the west angle and for some 400 yards along the west face of the salient.<sup>2</sup>

Great as had been the success achieved, the confusion into which the assailants had fallen prevented them following up their victory. Gordon with two brigades forced back Barlow's and Gibbon's troops to the outer face of the salient, whilst on the other wing two brigades of Rodes' division drove back Birney's and Mott's divisions.<sup>3</sup> Within an hour after the entrenchments were carried, the Federals had been forced back to the further side of the lines which they had assailed. Both sides hurried up reinforcements. Wright's two divisions were ordered to attack on Hancock's right soon after 6 a.m., and throughout the day and far into the night a desperate encounter raged in the vicinity of the west shoulder, since known as the Bloody Angle.<sup>4</sup> Lee did not dare to draw any troops from his left: for if that part of the line were broken, then the troops in the salient would be exposed to attack in rear and flank. The lines, which Anderson's Corps held, formed in fact the hinge upon which Lee might swing back from the salient, and it was vitally important that they should be held intact.<sup>5</sup>

Between 9 a.m. and 10 a.m. Warren attacked the entrenchments held by Anderson's Corps, but as they were fully manned, the attack of the 12th met with the same fate as that of the 10th, and the assault was promptly ordered to cease. Still Lee did not venture to withdraw any troops from Anderson's Corps to help his sorely pressed centre till late in the afternoon. In the meantime, as soon as Warren's attack was seen to be a failure, Cutler's division was withdrawn and sent to support the 6th Corps, and preparations were made to follow with the rest of the 5th Corps.<sup>6</sup> But by

<sup>1</sup> The Confederate accounts say that nearly the whole of Johnson's division was captured, and that it numbered only 2,800. Hancock claimed to have captured nearly 4,000 of Ewell's Corps and to have inflicted very heavy loss as well in killed and wounded (Humphreys, 93). <sup>2</sup> Humphreys, 93. <sup>3</sup> Humphreys, 96-7.

<sup>4</sup> The fighting at this point continued till 3 a.m. (Humphreys, 98).

<sup>5</sup> Humphreys, 92, note.

<sup>6</sup> Except Crawford's division, which occupied the entrenchments of the Corps.

the time that Warren reached the point from which the attack was to be made, the Federal commanders had decided that it was useless to make any fresh assault.

The chief burden of the day's fighting consequently fell upon the 6th and 2nd Corps, and it extended all along their line from the right of the one Corps to the left of the other. Lee was only able to send up to the support of his centre under Ewell three brigades from the right wing. But with their support Rodes' and Gordon's divisions obstinately held their own throughout the day. Never probably in the annals of warfare has a stranger combat taken place than that which was carried on hour after hour by two large bodies of troops separated only by a line of log works.

Prisoners were taken on both sides by being simply pulled over the top of these works. The Federals advanced artillery quite close up to the breastworks, and brought an enfilading fire to bear upon the Confederates, but they held fast to their posts, and the Federals were unable to regain a footing on the southern side of the entrenchments which they had stormed so many hours ago. In the early hours of the 13th the Confederate troops were withdrawn to a retrenchment which had been constructed across the base of the salient.<sup>1</sup> The loss at the Bloody Angle at Spottsylvania Court House far surpassed that at the Bloody Lane at the Antietam. So pitiless was the storm of bullets that an oak tree within the Confederate lines with a diameter of twenty-two inches was actually cut in half.

On the left of the Federal line Burnside moved to the attack at the hour appointed. Potter's division carried the line of works held by Lane's brigade on Early's left at 5 a.m., but Lane, reinforced by two other brigades, renewed the battle and recaptured his entrenchments. Burnside made repeated attacks with his three divisions, but failed to drive the enemy from their lines.

The losses on both sides for this day's fighting were very heavy. The total Federal loss was over 6,800: the Confederate loss in killed and wounded must have been between 4,000 and 5,000,<sup>2</sup> and the prisoners may have amounted to nearly as many more. In spite of his tremendous losses, Lee had nevertheless held his own. Both on the right and left the Federal attacks had been decisively repulsed, and though the salient had been carried by Hancock, yet the retrenchment constructed across its base was of so formidable a nature that any fresh attempt to break Lee's lines by a frontal attack was likely to lead only to increased slaughter.

Even Grant at last recognised this fact. Instead of pressing the attack at the centre, he determined to transfer a considerable part of the army to the left flank, in the hope that they might break the

<sup>1</sup> This line apparently had been begun by Gordon's division, which formed Ewell's reserve, two or three days before.

<sup>2</sup> Humphreys, 105.



Confederate lines at that point before Lee could bring up reinforcements. An advance by the right flank would have probably caused Lee to abandon his lines in front of Spottsylvania Court House and withdraw towards Richmond, with which his communications would be threatened. But an advance by the left flank was not so likely to frighten Lee into a hasty retreat, and at the same time would secure the Federal communications with their depôts at Washington and the despatch of their wounded to Fredericksburg for Washington.<sup>1</sup>

Warren was directed to move his Corps on the night of the 13th towards the left to the Fredericksburg road, to form on the left of the 9th Corps and assault the Confederate right at 4 a.m. of the 14th. The 6th Corps was to follow the 5th and attack on its left along the Massaponax Church road. The commanders of the 2nd and 9th Corps were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to attack the lines in their front at 4 a.m., but to wait for actual orders to do so.<sup>2</sup> Warren's night march was made under circumstances of extreme difficulty. Rain fell throughout the night, turning the road into a slough: the darkness was intense. Not till two hours after the hour fixed for the assault did the 5th Corps reach its destination: and then the troops were so worn out with exhaustion and so reduced by straggling, that it was vain to think of making an attack on that day. The 6th Corps on the 14th took position on the left of the 5th, and some high ground on the Massaponax Church road, about half a mile south of the Ny, which commanded the surrounding country as well as the Fredericksburg road, was seized and held by the Federals.

This summed up the fighting of the 14th. On the same day the one brigade of Mahone's division, which had been left to guard the bridge near the Block House, was brought over to Early's right. But it was not till night that Field's division of Anderson's Corps was brought from its entrenchments to the Confederate right, and Kershaw's division of the same Corps did not follow till midnight of the 15th. Could Warren's Corps have been up to time, there would have been a good chance of breaking the Confederate lines before any reinforcement arrived from the left.<sup>3</sup> But the unavoidable delay gave the Confederates time to extend their lines further south as far as Snell's Bridge over the Po, and to bring over to the threatened point troops from the other flank, which was no longer menaced. Early on the morning of the 15th Hancock moved two of his divisions to the left to the Fredericksburg road, leaving Birney's division to cover Burnside's right flank. The 15th, 16th, and 17th were spent by the 5th and 6th Corps in advancing and entrenching their lines, putting batteries in position, and examining roads which led southwards.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 106. <sup>2</sup> Humphreys, 107. <sup>3</sup> Humphreys, 108. <sup>4</sup> Humphreys, 109.

As the strength of the Confederate right did not hold out any prospect of a successful attack at that point, Grant determined to move the 2nd and 6th Corps back on the night of the 17th, in order that at daylight of the 18th they might assault the retrenchment, which had been constructed across the base of the salient after the successful attack of the 2nd Corps on the 12th. It was hoped that the Confederates at that point might be caught off their guard, and a permanent lodgment effected in their lines. Burnside was to attack in conjunction with Wright and Hancock, and Warren was to open fire with all his artillery, and be prepared on receiving orders to that effect to assume the offensive.<sup>1</sup>

The attack proved, however, a complete failure. The enemy were fully prepared to meet it. The entrenchments attacked proved to be of a most formidable character, and as soon as Meade realised that failure was inevitable, he ordered the troops to be recalled. The 6th Corps at once returned to its position on the left of the 5th, and the same night the 2nd Corps was moved to the left and took position on the east bank of the Ny below the left of the 6th Corps.<sup>2</sup> The 9th Corps was also moved to the left of the 6th Corps and posted on the west bank of the Ny. Both the 6th and 9th Corps pressed up as close as they could to the Confederate lines and entrenched.<sup>3</sup>

After the failure of the attack on the 18th Grant at last decided that nothing was to be gained by further assaults upon Lee's entrenched position. He therefore determined to continue his movement by the left flank. He hoped that by throwing the 2nd Corps several miles out in advance of the rest of his army, Lee might be induced to attack it, and that thus a chance might be given of forcing him to fight, before he had time to entrench.<sup>4</sup> The movement was to be commenced by Hancock on the night of the 19th, but on that day Ewell's Corps moved out of its entrenchments round the right of the Federal line to see whether the enemy were withdrawing from their lines or not. Ewell encountered Tyler's division, which had recently joined Grant from Washington, on the Fredericksburg road near the Harris House, and a sharp engagement ensued. Hancock and Warren were ordered to send reinforcements to Tyler. Ewell was repulsed with considerable loss, but Hancock's march was postponed till the night of the 20th.

On May 8th Grant had ordered Sheridan to concentrate all his available cavalry and make a raid against the railways in Lee's rear, and after threatening Richmond to connect with Butler's army on the James, and thence rejoin the Army of the Potomac by way of the White House on the Pamunkey. Such a move-

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 110.

<sup>3</sup> Humphreys, 112.

<sup>2</sup> Humphreys, 111.

<sup>4</sup> Humphreys, 119.

ment was certain to bring the Confederate cavalry in hot pursuit of Sheridan, and a cavalry encounter might be expected to ensue, in which the Federal superiority of numbers was likely to give them the advantage. On the 9th Sheridan moved round Lee's right flank by the Telegraph road, crossed the North Anna on the same day with his leading division, and on the 10th struck the Virginia Central Railway at Beaver Dam Station, where ten miles of the track were torn up, and engines, cars, and a quantity of army supplies destroyed. At daylight on the 11th the Fredericksburg Railway was reached at Ashland Station, and a similar scene of destruction inaugurated. Stuart with three cavalry brigades promptly started in pursuit, and whilst one brigade hung on Sheridan's rear, the other two by a roundabout route got in front of him, and on the 11th confronted him at Yellow Tavern about six miles from Richmond. A fierce engagement took place, in which the Confederates were ultimately forced to retire with the loss of their commander mortally wounded.

Stuart died the following day at Richmond. His loss was a heavy blow to Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia. But to suppose that it was as great a blow to the Confederate cause as the death of Stonewall Jackson is to overstate the case. Stuart was the *beau idéal* of Southern chivalry, a dashing cavalry commander, who won a well-deserved fame for his daring raids. But there is nothing to show that he was growing as a strategist, or that he would ever have displayed the same ability in independent command as did Forrest in the West. He was succeeded in the command of the cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia by General Wade Hampton.

Having disposed of the Confederate cavalry, Sheridan pushed on towards Richmond. He entered the most advanced line of the Confederate entrenchments, but the second line of works was so strongly held that he was forced to cross to the north bank of the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge (Map VII.). He recrossed to the south bank on the 13th at Bottom Bridge, and reached Haxall's Landing on the James on the 14th, where he remained till the 17th. He rejoined the Army of the Potomac a week later.<sup>1</sup>

The Federal losses which took place about Spottsylvania Court House from the 8th to the 19th amounted to 18,399.<sup>2</sup> It is difficult to form any approximate estimate of what the Confederate losses were during the same period. Except on the 12th, they must have been considerably less than those of their opponents, as they were fighting on the defensive behind entrenchments with wire entanglements in front, new to warfare even in America.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For Sheridan's raid, see Humphreys, 134-6.

<sup>2</sup> 4 B. & L., 182.

<sup>3</sup> Humphreys, 117.



Grant commenced to withdraw his forces from Lee's front on the night of the 20th. Hancock's Corps marched during the night to Guinea Station on the Fredericksburg Railway, a distance of about eight miles. The march was continued through Bowling Green, and by noon on the 21st the leading division had crossed the Mattapony and entrenched a position after driving off a small force of Confederate infantry from the north bank of the river. The original plan was that Warren's Corps should march by the Telegraph road, to be followed by Burnside's Corps, whilst Wright's Corps followed Hancock's line of march.<sup>1</sup> But apparently Grant grew apprehensive for the safety of Hancock's advanced column, and directed Warren to take a route which would bring him nearer to Hancock's exposed flank. Under his fresh orders Warren was directed to march to Guinea Station and then take a road running south-west, which would ultimately bring him into the Telegraph road.

Lee had had timely information of the Federal movements. As soon as news reached him that a Federal force had appeared upon the Fredericksburg Railway, he brought Ewell's Corps round to the extreme right and directed him to extend along the south bank of the Po until he covered the crossing of the Telegraph road at Stannard's Mills. When he found that Warren's Corps was withdrawing on the morning of the 21st, he started Ewell's Corps, followed by Anderson's Corps, along the Telegraph road. His first impression was that Grant was moving to the left, in order to put the Mattapony between himself and his foe and to open up communications with Port Royal, and he did not anticipate meeting Grant again in the field until he should have crossed the Pamunkey on his way to Richmond.<sup>2</sup> He did not attempt, as Grant had hoped that he would, to fall upon Hancock's isolated Corps, but determined to withdraw behind the North Anna, keeping between Grant and Richmond and covering the Virginia Central Railway. This railway intersects the Fredericksburg line at Hanover Junction, about two miles south of the North Anna, and from that point runs to Richmond at a distance of about six miles to the east of the other railway. The junction is twenty-five miles north of Richmond, and by the Telegraph road twenty-eight miles south of the right of Lee's position at Snell's Bridge.<sup>3</sup>

Ewell's Corps reached Hanover Junction in the morning of the 22nd, and Anderson's Corps in the course of the afternoon took up a position on the south bank of the North Anna. Hill's Corps marched on the night of the 21st, after a brisk skirmish with the 6th Corps, by a road west of the Telegraph road, and was in position near Hanover Junction along the Virginia Central Railway on the morning of the 23rd. Hill had resumed command of the

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 120.

<sup>2</sup> Humphreys, 121, note.

<sup>3</sup> Humphreys, 123.

3rd Corps just before it marched from Spottsylvania, and Early returned to the command of his own division in the 2nd Corps, whilst Gordon was assigned to the command of Johnson's division, which had suffered so heavily on the 12th. At Hanover Junction Lee received his first reinforcements since the campaign opened. He was joined there by Pickett's division of the 1st Corps, by two infantry brigades brought by Breckinridge from the Shenandoah Valley after Sigel's defeat on the 15th, and by Hoke's brigade, which had originally belonged to Early's division. Altogether Lee's reinforcements amounted to about 9,000 men.<sup>1</sup> Grant also had received considerable reinforcements since the beginning of the campaign. On the 17th Tyler had joined him with a division of 8,000 men, and other troops had reached him as well. But the army was being so much reduced by the continual mustering out of time-expired regiments, that it may be doubted whether the reinforcements did more than make good the deficiencies thus caused.<sup>2</sup>

The 5th Corps of the Army of the Potomac started on its march for Guinea Station on the morning of the 21st, and was followed by the 9th Corps, as soon as Burnside had convinced himself by a reconnaissance that the Telegraph road crossing was too strongly held to be easily forced. Wright's Corps withdrew at nightfall. These three Corps, after reaching the Fredericksburg Railway, moved on the 22nd by parallel roads between the railway and the Telegraph road, whilst Hancock stood fast waiting for the other Corps to come into line with him. But on that night Lee had two Corps, with the third near at hand, on the south bank of the North Anna, fifteen miles in front of the nearest Federal Corps.<sup>3</sup>

The whole Army of the Potomac moved forward at 5 a.m. on the 23rd. Warren having reached Jericho Mills, four miles above the Telegraph road bridge, which was about half a mile above the Fredericksburg Railway bridge,<sup>4</sup> crossed the river, which at that point was unguarded, and though attacked towards evening by Hill's Corps advancing from the Virginia Central Railway, beat it off with considerable loss and entrenched a position.<sup>5</sup> Hancock moved forward with his right across the Telegraph road and his left across the railway, and about 6 p.m. captured some entrenchments

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 125.

<sup>2</sup> Between May 2nd and July 4th thirty-six regiments were discharged from the service (Humphreys, 110, note).

<sup>3</sup> The distance from Lee's right to Hanover Junction by the Telegraph road was twenty-eight miles. To reach the same point Hancock had to march thirty-four miles and the other Corps thirty. Had Hancock been able to take the direct route by the Telegraph road, the distance for his Corps would have been only twenty-five miles (Humphreys, 126, note).

<sup>4</sup> Humphreys, 128.

<sup>5</sup> Lee was much incensed with Hill for allowing Warren to cross the river (White's *Lee*, 381).

covering the Telegraph road bridge on the north bank of the river, and gained possession of that bridge. He did not, however, cross the river, as the Confederates held entrenchments on the south bank covering both bridges.

Burnside on Hancock's right endeavoured to cross by the Ox Ford, about a mile above the Telegraph road bridge, but found it too strongly held by the enemy.

On the 24th Hancock, finding that the enemy had abandoned their entrenchments close to the bridges, crossed the river, whilst Burnside moved a mile and a half up the river above Ox Ford and crossed one division over at Quarles' Mill. This force joined hands with Crawford's division of the 5th Corps and moved down to uncover Ox Ford, where Willcox's division of the 9th Corps was waiting (Burnside's third division had already taken position on Hancock's right on the south bank), but the Confederate lines were too strongly held, and an attempt to force them was repulsed. The 6th Corps had followed Warren's line of march and crossed on the morning of the 24th.

On the 25th the Federal army found itself in a far from enviable position. One division was still north of the river. The rest of the army was in two distinct bodies, separated from each other by Lee's whole army, holding a central position and strongly entrenched. For one wing of the Federal army to reinforce the other it would be necessary to cross the river twice. Lee's lines had been drawn with great skill. The left rested on the Little River, and ran for about a mile and a half to Ox Ford on the North Anna. This flank was held by Hill's and Pickett's troops. From Ox Ford the Confederate lines extended down the river for three-quarters of a mile, and then ran in a south-east direction until the extreme right again rested upon the river.<sup>1</sup> This part of the line covered a distance of three miles, and was held by Ewell's and Anderson's Corps.

Grant saw that there was no prospect of attacking either flank of Lee's army with any hope of success, and ordered his army to withdraw on the night of the 26th to the north bank and continue the movement by the left flank to the Pamunkey.

It has been sometimes stated that Lee's ill-health alone prevented the Army of Northern Virginia from striking a crushing blow at one or other wing of the Federal army in its uncomfortable position on the south bank of the North Anna. But when it is remembered that both wings of the Army of the Potomac were entrenched, it must be admitted that Grant had little to fear from any frontal attack. His own reluctance to attack his enemy's entrenched lines is the best proof that a Confederate assault on the Federal lines would have had but little chance of success.

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 130-2.



On the afternoon of the 26th Sheridan, with two divisions of cavalry, started for Hanover Town on the Pamunkey, some thirty-two miles south-east of the Federal position on the North Anna. During the night the Army of the Potomac was withdrawn across the North Anna, and on the 28th was in position on the south bank of the Pamunkey. The 5th and 9th Corps crossed at Hanover Town, the latter not till midnight. The 6th and 2nd Corps crossed four miles higher up.<sup>1</sup> On the same day Sheridan, after a hard fight, drove the Confederate cavalry from Hawes' Shop, four miles out from Hanover Town, on the road to Richmond.

On the morning of the 27th Lee discovered that his foe had withdrawn across the river, and was informed that some of the Federal cavalry and infantry had crossed the Pamunkey at Hanover Town. The 2nd Corps, under the command of Early, Ewell being ill, was at once started on the march. It crossed the South Anna by the Virginia Central Railway bridge, and moved through Atlee's Station on that line to Huntley's Corner (Map VIII.), where it covered the direct road from Hanover Town to Richmond and also a road from White House to Richmond. There, on the afternoon of the 28th, Early took up his position with his right close to Beaver Dam Creek and his left resting on the Totopotomoy, near Pole Green Church. The 1st Corps crossed the South Anna by the Fredericksburg Railroad bridge, and moving by Ashland and Atlee's Stations, took up its position on the same afternoon on Early's right from Huntley's Corner to Walnut Grove Church, covering another road from White House to Richmond. The 3rd Corps and Breckinridge's command formed on Early's left along the Totopotomoy, with its left across the Virginia Central Railway, a mile north of Atlee's Station. Lee's new position covered the approaches to Richmond from the Pamunkey.<sup>2</sup>

On the 29th Grant ordered reconnaissances to be made in full force by the 2nd, 5th, and 6th Corps, whilst the 9th Corps was held in reserve near Hawes' Shop (Map III.). The 6th Corps marched north-west along the river-road in the direction of Hanover Court House, but finding no infantry force in its front, was ordered to march at daylight on the 30th, and take position on Hancock's right, and try to place itself across the Confederate left flank. But the line of march lay across the swampy ground at the head of Crump's Creek, and in consequence it arrived too late to take any part in the fighting on that day. On the Federal left the 5th Corps crossed the Totopotomoy, and on the 30th moved out along the Shady Grove Church road (Map VIII.).

<sup>1</sup> But Russell's division of the 6th Corps, which led the advance, crossed at Hanover Town.

<sup>2</sup> Humphreys, 165-6.

Burnside's Corps on the 30th was brought up between the 2nd and 5th Corps, and crossed the Totopotomoy. On the right the 2nd Corps found the enemy entrenched on the south bank of the stream holding the crossing of the Richmond road. On the afternoon of the 30th Early moved his right across Beaver Dam Creek on to the Mechanicsville and Old Church turnpike, where it was on the left flank of Warren advancing along the Shady Grove Church road. Early's position at Huntley's Corner was taken by Anderson's Corps. A fierce attack was made by Rodes' division of the 2nd Corps against Warren's left by the cross-road from Bethesda Church into the Shady Grove Church road, but was repulsed with considerable loss. To lighten the pressure upon Warren, Hancock was directed to attack in his front, which he did with Barlow's division just before dark, and carried the enemy's advanced line of rifle-pits.<sup>1</sup>

W. F. Smith's Corps, the 18th, had been sent from Butler's army on the south bank of the James by water to White House, where it began to arrive on the 30th. On the afternoon of the 31st Smith was marching with 10,000 men of his command and the Corps artillery towards New Castle Ferry, on the Pamunkey, according to his original instructions. A mistake in the orders, which he received next morning, caused him to continue his march up the Pamunkey, when Grant's real intention was to send him to Cold Harbour.

On the 31st Sheridan, moving on the left of the Federal army, drove Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry division out of Cold Harbour and received orders to hold it at all costs. Cold Harbour was an important point, because it lay on the direct line of the Federal advance to the left, and was the meeting-point of various roads from the different bridges over the Chickahominy.<sup>2</sup> Grant had by this time come to the conclusion that an attack on the Confederate position, where it lay behind the Totopotomoy covering the approaches to Richmond by the Shady Grove Church road and the Mechanicsville turnpike, held out no reasonable prospect of success. He determined therefore to continue the movement by the left towards the Chickahominy, in the hope that he might have a chance of attacking the Confederate right before it had time to entrench itself strongly. Anticipating that an attack would be made upon Sheridan at Cold Harbour, he ordered the 6th Corps to make a night march, and, if possible, reach Cold Harbour by daylight of June 1st. Wright, however, had to march his troops over difficult country a distance of fifteen miles, and did not reach Cold Harbour till 9 a.m.

The capture of Cold Harbour warned Lee of danger to his right flank. On the 31st Anderson's Corps was moved to the right of

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 166-9.

<sup>2</sup> Humphreys, 171.

Early's, and the extreme right was held by Hoke's division, which had reached Lee from the south side of the James on the 28th. The intention was to make a strong movement on the 1st towards Cold Harbour.<sup>1</sup> Sheridan, however, had no difficulty in holding his ground against the attack, which was confined to two weak attempts by a part of Kershaw's division, until the arrival of the 6th Corps set him free to continue the movement towards the Chickahominy covering the left flank of the army. In the afternoon Smith's Corps arrived from New Castle Ferry and was posted on Wright's right. Some 1,400 yards separated the hostile lines. The intervening space was mainly open ground, but a good part of the Confederate skirmish line was in a narrow strip of pine wood.<sup>2</sup> At 6 p.m. Smith and Wright attacked. Ricketts' division of the 6th Corps penetrated an interval between Hoke's and Kershaw's divisions and carried the main line of entrenchments at that point, capturing 500 prisoners. The 18th Corps drove the enemy out of the pine wood and captured their advanced line of rifle-pits. The loss suffered by the two Corps amounted to about 2,200.<sup>3</sup> They entrenched themselves along the new line which they had gained, whilst the Confederates threw up a fresh line of works in rear of that portion of their lines which had been carried by Ricketts' division.

This partial success encouraged Grant to continue his plan for breaking the enemy's right, and Hancock's Corps was ordered to move that night, and by a forced march reinforce Wright's left, extending the Federal line still nearer to the Chickahominy. It was hoped that he would be in position early on the 2nd. The difficulties of a night march over unknown roads in very sultry weather were great: nevertheless Hancock reached his destination at 6.30 a.m. But his Corps was so exhausted with its hard march, that the attack was postponed till 5 p.m.

It had been Grant's original plan that the whole Army of the Potomac should attack as early as possible on the morning of the 2nd. But Smith's Corps was nearly out of ammunition, and this, in conjunction with the tired state of Hancock's Corps, led to the postponement of the attack. Meanwhile the 5th Corps had extended its left so as to connect with Smith's right, and the 9th Corps had been placed in rear of Warren's right. The assault was still further postponed until 4.30 a.m. on the 3rd. This decision was come to in consequence of the heat of the day and to give longer time for preparation.

When Lee discovered that Hancock's Corps had been withdrawn from its position in front of his left, he ordered Hill, with two divisions of his Corps and Breckinridge's division, to move to the right and extend the line to the right of Hoke's division.

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 172.

<sup>2</sup> Humphreys, 174.

<sup>3</sup> Humphreys, 176.



Hill formed on the extreme right, and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry crossed the Chickahominy and piqueted the roads leading to the James. Three brigades of Field's division were moved from the left to the right of the 1st Corps and posted in support of Kershaw.<sup>1</sup> This movement was rendered possible by the fact that the ground in Field's front was so swampy that no attack at that point need be apprehended. Heth's division of the 3rd Corps remained on Early's left. Furthermore, Lee directed Early with the left wing to place himself across the right flank of the Federal army and drive down along the front of the Confederate lines. The attempted movement led to some sharp fighting with Burnside's and Warren's Corps, which lasted till nightfall, but failed to produce the desired effect.

At 4.30 a.m. on the 3rd, the 2nd, 6th, and 18th Corps advanced to the attack. But besides the heavy artillery and musketry fire which blazed forth in their faces, a murderous cross-fire of artillery swept the flanks of each of the attacking Corps. They were, in fact, advancing on divergent lines, and consequently Hancock's right, Smith's left, and both of Wright's flanks were exposed to a deadly enfilading fire.<sup>2</sup> Against such odds the assault was doomed to failure. The advanced rifle-pits were captured, and on the extreme left Barlow's division carried an advanced line of works along the road from Despatch Station, but was speedily driven out again. The fate of the assault was settled in less than an hour.<sup>3</sup> Unable, under the tremendous fire which they encountered, to carry the main line of entrenchments, the attacking force quickly took cover and succeeded in holding the advanced positions which they gained, at some points within thirty yards of the enemy's works. The loss of the Federals in this short but desperate attack was very heavy.

In the three Corps which took the chief part in the attack over 4,000 were killed and wounded, and probably this estimate falls considerably short of the truth.<sup>4</sup> Burnside's and Warren's Corps on the Federal right were not heavily engaged. Before any regular assault by these troops could be delivered, Meade's order suspending further offensive operations was received.<sup>5</sup> The Confederate losses were in comparison very slight, probably not more than 1,700<sup>6</sup> in all. After the repulse of the first attack, Grant

<sup>1</sup> Pickett's division was on Kershaw's left.

<sup>2</sup> 4 B. & L., 217-18. Smith's right was also exposed to an enfilade fire, owing to a considerable gap existing between his right and Warren's left.

<sup>3</sup> Humphreys, 182. General McMahon (4 B. & L., 217) says that the time of actual advance did not exceed eight minutes.

<sup>4</sup> Humphreys, 182.

<sup>5</sup> The losses of these two Corps in killed and wounded amounted to about 1,200. (Humphreys, 188). The Federal loss from June 1st to 12th is given at 12,737 in 4 B. & L., 187.

<sup>6</sup> Phisterer in his Statistical Record estimates the Confederate losses from June 1st to

ordered that the assault should be renewed, but realising the hopelessness of the attempt, neither officers nor men made any effort to carry out the order.<sup>1</sup>

At 1.30 p.m. an order was issued directing the suspension of the attack, and that further advances should be made by regular approaches after due reconnaissance. In his despatch to Meade, which contained this order, Grant stated that his object now was to hold Lee's army fast until Hunter's army in the Shenandoah Valley was well on its way to Lynchburg, and that that purpose would be more easily effected by keeping Lee out of the Richmond entrenchments than by forcing him back into them.<sup>2</sup> The two armies remained confronting each other till the night of the 12th. Though the Federal lines were being pushed forward by regular approaches, there seemed no chance of making a successful assault, and on that night the Army of the Potomac withdrew from its lines and marched to cross the James.

The Federal losses suffered from the crossing of the Pamunkey to the night of June 12th exceeded 14,000.<sup>3</sup>

With the withdrawal of the Army of the Potomac from its lines at Cold Harbour ended the first stage in the great struggle between Grant and Lee for the possession of Richmond. From the Rapidan to the Po, from the Po to the North Anna, from the North Anna to the Pamunkey and Chickahominy, Grant had made a succession of movements by the left flank, the ultimate object of which had been either to destroy Lee's army in the field or force it to abandon the defence of Richmond. But at the end of every movement Lee's army had been found in position barring the further progress of the Army of the Potomac, and Grant had entirely failed to force it to fight a battle when not protected by entrenchments. It was ridiculous in Grant to complain that the Army of Northern Virginia would not fight in the open, when it was barely half the size of his own. Throughout this campaign Lee had proved himself a master of defensive warfare, and at every point had baffled Grant. But the limitations imposed upon him by his numerical inferiority had prevented him striking any crushing blow at his opponent: and though Grant was turning his back upon Richmond and preparing to seek an entrance to the Southern Capital by the "backdoor" of Petersburg, yet Lee must have felt that the policy pursued by his opponent must, sooner or later, if allowed to run unchecked, end in the reduction of Richmond. This policy consisted in attacking the Army of Northern Virginia at every possible opportunity. If the Confederate losses in these engagements amounted to one half of

12th at 1,700; Humphreys, 192, thinks that the actual number was much greater; Swinton, 487, doubts whether the Confederate losses on June 3rd reached 1,300.

<sup>1</sup> 4 B. & L., 218.

<sup>2</sup> Humphreys, 187-8.

<sup>3</sup> Humphreys, 191, note.

those of the Federals, Grant considered the work well done. For the Confederate losses could not be made good, whereas the Federals had infinite resources on which to fall back, both of men and material. Both in the Wilderness and at Spottsylvania Court House Grant had inflicted upon his foe a proportionately heavier loss. On the banks of the North Anna he had shown a wise discretion in not attacking Lee's lines, but in the battle of Cold Harbour his own losses had been out of all proportion to those of the Confederates. It was the one battle which he ever expressed regret at having fought.



## CHAPTER XXI

### THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG

Movements of the Army of the James—Butler's feeble offensive—Confederate forces in Petersburg and Richmond—Butler's procrastination—Federal advance towards Drewry's Bluff—Beauregard assumes the offensive—Battle of Drewry's Bluff—Early sent to the Shenandoah Valley—Butler's unsuccessful attempt on Petersburg—The Army of the Potomac crosses the James—Defences of Richmond and Petersburg—Partial success of Smith's Corps against Petersburg—The 2nd Corps reinforces Smith—Preparations of the Confederates—The fighting on June 16th—The 9th Corps on the 17th—Heavy losses of the Federals on the 18th—Grant resolves to attack the Confederate railways—Grant fails to secure the Weldon Railway—Wilson's raid against the railways—Sheridan's expedition to Charlottesville—The Burnside mine—Movement of the 2nd Corps to the north bank of the James—Hancock withdraws to the south bank—The mine fiasco—Hancock's second movement to the north bank of the James—Warren's movement to the Weldon Railway—Federals secure possession of the Weldon Railroad—Hill drives Hancock from Reams' Station—Grant's third movement to the north bank of the James—Ord captures Fort Harrison—Warren moves towards the Boydton Plank road—Federal success at Peebles Farm—Grant makes a final effort to secure the Southside Railway—Failure of the Federal movement.

IT was part of Grant's general plan of campaign that a co-operative movement should be made by the Army of the James under General Butler up the south bank of that river against Richmond. This army had been organised into two Corps, the 10th and the 18th, under the command of Generals Gillmore and W. F. Smith, and numbered about 36,000 men.<sup>1</sup> A small part of the force was composed of coloured troops.<sup>2</sup> The army had been concentrated on the York River with the view of deluding the Confederate Government into the idea that the line of advance would be that followed by McClellan in 1862. On the night of May 4th the troops were conveyed by water from the York to the James, and disembarked on the south bank at Bermuda Hundred Neck (Map VIII.), where the Appomattox falls into the James. Butler was directed to march on Richmond, keeping as close as possible to the river, and invest the city, establishing his left flank on the river above Richmond, where it was hoped that the Army of the Potomac might be able to effect a junction.<sup>3</sup> But unfortunately

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 137.

<sup>2</sup> One infantry division and one cavalry brigade

<sup>3</sup> Swinton, 462-3, argues with considerable force that the orders given to Butler were vague, if not contradictory. After having entrenched a position on the south bank he

for the success of the Federal plans, Butler was perhaps the most incapable officer still retained in a high command. His appointment as a major-general of volunteers had been made at the very beginning of the war on purely political grounds. He had had no military training or experience: his only claim was that he had commanded the Massachusetts militia, which had marched to the relief of Washington in 1861.

Disembarking on May 6th, the Army of the James moved forward from the landing-place about six miles and occupied and entrenched a position across the Neck, where it is only three miles wide, with the right resting on the James and the left on the Appomattox.<sup>1</sup> Two and a half miles away were the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad and turnpike. One brigade was sent the same afternoon to secure these, but withdrew on finding a small Confederate force holding the railway at Port Walthall Junction. The following day Butler despatched a force of five brigades to secure the railway, but after some sharp fighting the Federals were again beaten off.<sup>2</sup> On the 9th Butler moved out of his entrenchments with a still stronger force and succeeded in breaking up the railway for a distance of about six miles from Chester Station to Swift Creek.<sup>3</sup> At this latter point he was within three miles of Petersburg, but the Creek was held by the Confederates in force, and the following day Butler withdrew to his lines at Bermuda Hundred.

At this time the Confederate forces holding Richmond and Petersburg, twenty-two miles apart, were very weak indeed. They probably did not number on May 1st more than 6,000 infantry in addition to the artillery, who worked the heavy naval guns, which commanded the James at Chaffin's and Drewry's Bluffs and the field guns, with which the entrenchments were armed.<sup>4</sup> General Beauregard was in command, having been transferred from the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida to that of North Carolina and South Virginia, where he relieved General Pickett. He had been ordered to bring as many troops as possible from these two Departments for the protection of Richmond against an advance along the line of the James. He had succeeded in getting together about 19,000 infantry.<sup>5</sup> But at the moment when Butler commenced his movement none of these troops had even reached Petersburg.<sup>6</sup> To reach that city they had to be

was to move up the river against Richmond, which he might either capture or invest, or at the worst he might "hold a *débouché* for the Army of the Potomac above the city." But throughout the operations his action was to depend upon Grant's movements; and as events turned out very differently to what Grant expected on the north side of Richmond it is not surprising that Butler failed also on the south side.

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 139.

<sup>2</sup> Swinton, 464.

<sup>3</sup> Humphreys, 145.

<sup>4</sup> Humphreys, 141.

<sup>5</sup> Humphreys, 142.

<sup>6</sup> The leading troops only began to arrive at Petersburg on the 5th. Part of one brigade had already been called in by Pickett from the Blackwater, where it was watching the approaches from Norfolk and Suffolk.

brought from Weldon (Map VII.) by rail. But on May 5th Butler had sent a cavalry division under General Kautz from Suffolk to break up the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad at various points: and the destruction of two railway bridges proved a considerable hindrance to Beauregard in his task of forwarding troops from the south to the threatened cities.

It would have been Butler's wisest course to turn his back for the moment upon Richmond, march upon Petersburg, which he could have easily captured, garrisoned as it was by little more than a brigade,<sup>1</sup> and by securing the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad cut off Beauregard's troops from their most direct route to Richmond. The fall of Petersburg would have necessitated the immediate recall of Lee's army, or else the abandonment of the Confederate capital itself. For Butler, even if he failed to capture Richmond single-handed, could at least have closely invested it on the south side of the James, and materially assisted in forwarding Grant's plan of campaign. Possibly, if Butler had been in position in front of Richmond at the time of Sheridan's cavalry raid, the city would have fallen. Both his Corps commanders joined on the night of May 9th in urging Butler to bridge the Appomattox at the Point of Rocks (Map VIII.) and operate on the south bank of that stream against Petersburg from the east.<sup>2</sup>

With such great possibilities before him Butler adopted a policy of procrastination, which gave Beauregard time to get all his reinforcements into Richmond and Petersburg, and actually assume the offensive with a force of equal strength to that which Butler was able to put into the field. Turning a deaf ear to the sound advice of his lieutenants, the Federal commander on the 12th moved out along the turnpike towards Richmond, and advanced against the fortifications at Drewry's Bluff. From the Bluff the Confederate entrenchments ran westward for two and a half miles, crossing both the Petersburg and Richmond Railroad and turnpike, and then turned north. Near the Bluff an outer line of works branched off from the main entrenchments and reached across the railway about a mile in front of the inner line, with its right resting on a hill to the west of the railway.<sup>3</sup> On the 13th Gillmore, whose Corps formed the left of Butler's army, turned this outer line and secured possession of the aforesaid hill: and on the 14th the whole of the outer line of works was in the hands of the Federals. Butler ordered an assault against the main line of the enemy's works to be made on the morning of the 15th, but the attack had to be abandoned owing to the lack of available troops to form the assaulting column.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The original garrison of Petersburg consisted of one infantry regiment and part of a brigade on the Blackwater. Part of another brigade reached Petersburg on the 5th.

<sup>2</sup> 4 B. & L., 206, note.

<sup>3</sup> Humphreys, 141.

<sup>4</sup> Humphreys, 148.



By this time Beauregard had concentrated three infantry divisions, 17,000 strong, with an artillery battalion and a cavalry regiment to each division, within the fortifications at Drewry's Bluff.<sup>1</sup> Two infantry and one cavalry brigade held Petersburg. Butler by his delay had lost the initiative, and on the 16th Beauregard attacked. The weak point of the Federal line was the right, which was "in the air" a mile away from the river. Beauregard hoped by turning Butler's right to cut the Federal army off from its entrenchments at Bermuda Hundred and destroy it, or force its surrender in its present position before his lines. Whiting, who had been left in command at Petersburg, was ordered to make a co-operative movement and fall upon the enemy's flank or rear.<sup>2</sup> Whiting, however, found his line of advance barred at Walthall Junction by a division which Butler had posted there to cover his rear, and failed to render Beauregard any assistance.

There was some hard fighting between the two main armies on the morning of the 16th. Beauregard succeeded in turning the Federal right, but his attacks on the rest of Butler's line were firmly met and repulsed. A dense fog, which just before daybreak came up from the river, prevented Beauregard from following up the turning movement, and his left division, after its first success, was withdrawn, in order that its line might be readjusted. Butler, finding himself in danger of being cut off from his base, ordered his whole line to fall back some distance to the right rear. The Confederates recovered their first line of entrenchments, and at nightfall Butler withdrew from his second position to Bermuda Hundred.<sup>3</sup> Beauregard followed in pursuit on the following day and entrenched a position in front of Butler. The Army of the James was thus confined in a bottle, of which Beauregard held the cork.

When Grant learnt of the failure of Butler's co-operative movement, he ordered him to send all the forces not required for holding his entrenchments to White House on the Pamunkey, in order to take part in the movement of the Army of the Potomac against Lee between the Pamunkey and the Chickahominy.

Beauregard, knowing that he held Butler fast, had already despatched one division and one brigade to Lee's aid, and a little later sent a second division to join the Army of Northern Virginia.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 148.

<sup>2</sup> President Davis, in a personal conference with Beauregard, approved of his plan of battle except that part which related to Whiting's division. He urged that it should move during the night so as to join the main force in the Drewry Bluff entrenchments (Humphreys, 151).

<sup>3</sup> The Federal loss on the 16th was about 3,500, the Confederate over 2,000 (Humphreys, 157). In this engagement Smith utilised telegraph wire for the defence of part of his line, stretching it among the stumps in his front. The fog lifted about 9 a.m.

<sup>4</sup> Humphreys, 159.

Butler, in obedience to Grant's orders, sent Smith with a force of about 16,000 infantry to White House.<sup>1</sup>

On June 7th Sheridan was despatched with two cavalry divisions on an expedition to Charlottesville (Map V.). There he was expected to find Hunter who, after defeating a small Confederate force on the 5th at Piedmont, about ten miles north-east of Staunton, was moving up the Shenandoah Valley against Lynchburg. The two forces were to destroy thoroughly the Virginia Central Railroad back from Charlottesville to Hanover Junction and then join the Army of the Potomac.

After the repulse of the Federal attack at Cold Harbour, Lee felt himself strong enough to send back Breckinridge's division to the Valley, whence it had come,<sup>2</sup> and being seriously alarmed for the safety of Lynchburg, he despatched the 2nd Corps under Early on the 13th after Breckinridge. Early was directed, after defeating Hunter, to march down the Valley and crossing the Potomac to threaten Washington. It may be, as has been frequently stated, that Lee hoped by this move to cause Grant to detach a considerable force to the relief of Washington, but it is perhaps more probable that he only aimed at the relief of Lynchburg and the upper end of the Valley.<sup>3</sup> When he learnt on the 8th that Sheridan was moving in the direction of Charlottesville, he ordered Wade Hampton to follow with two divisions of cavalry.

On June 9th Butler sent across to the south bank of the Appomattox (Map VIII.) a small force under Gillmore, consisting of 3,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry, to attempt the capture of Petersburg. The cavalry carried the entrenchments to the south of the town and penetrated some way beyond them, but the commander of the expedition judged that the works in his immediate front were too strong to be successfully attacked, and withdrew the same day.<sup>4</sup>

On the night of the 12th Grant commenced to remove his army from Cold Harbour. He had decided to cross the James at Wilcox's Landing rather than higher up, in order to withdraw his troops as far as possible from the observation of Lee. The 5th and 2nd Corps crossed the Chickahominy at Long Bridge, fifteen miles below Cold Harbour, whilst the 6th and 9th Corps crossed at Jones' Bridge, five miles further down, and the trains crossed still lower. Wilson's two cavalry brigades were stationed on either flank. By midnight of the 16th the whole of the Army of the Potomac was

<sup>1</sup> Smith's force is generally spoken of in the subsequent operations at Cold Harbour as the 18th Corps, because Smith commanded that Corps in the Army of the James. It was really composed of one division of his own Corps and two of the 10th Corps (Humphreys, 159).

<sup>2</sup> Breckinridge's division had been brought from the Valley after Sigel's defeat at Newmarket, May 15th. See Cap. XXIV.

<sup>3</sup> Humphreys, 195-6.

<sup>4</sup> Humphreys, 197; 4 B. & L., 534-7.

safely established on the south bank of the James.<sup>1</sup> The 18th Corps had received orders to march with all speed to White House, re-embark on the transports, which had brought it from the James, and rejoin Butler's command at Bermuda Hundred.

Lee was led to believe from the movements of the 5th Corps, which formed the right wing of the Army of the Potomac and covered the movement from the Chickahominy to the James, that Grant intended either to march by the north bank of the James against Richmond or else to cross the river at Malvern Hill. He accordingly posted Anderson's and Hill's Corps so as to cover the approaches to Richmond from White Oak Swamp to Malvern Hill. He remained uncertain of the movements of his opponent until the afternoon of the 17th.<sup>2</sup>

The defences of Richmond comprised, first, a series of field redoubts, which encircled the city at a distance of from a mile to a mile and a half. Outside these, on the north bank of the James, a connected line of artillery redans and infantry parapets enveloped the city at a distance of from one to two miles in front of the redoubts. This line of entrenchments crossed the James two and a half miles below Richmond and continued westwards till within a mile and a half of the river above the city. On the north bank there was further a disconnected line of entrenchments at a distance varying from half a mile to three miles in front of the connected line and resting on the James at Chaffin's Bluff. Almost opposite that Bluff on the other side of the river was Drewry's Bluff, and at both these points heavy batteries of coast defence guns had been established to prevent the further advance of the Federal gunboats up the river. A number of mines had also been placed in the river, and one hostile gunboat had already been blown up. The shallowness of the bar at Trent's Reach, which was nine miles by water from Drewry's Bluff, prevented the Federal monitors going further up the river. The defences on the south bank starting from Drewry's Bluff have already been described in connection with Butler's advance from Bermuda Hundred.

The defences of Petersburg consisted of a circle of strong redans connected by infantry parapets drawn about two miles outside the city.<sup>3</sup>

On the night of the 14th General Smith with his Corps reported to General Butler at Bermuda Hundred, and was ordered to move against Petersburg along the south bank of the Appomattox at daylight.

Smith was not aware how weak was the force garrisoning Petersburg. It consisted only of one infantry brigade, numbering about 2,400 men, one cavalry brigade, and some local militia.

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 203.

<sup>2</sup> Humphreys, 202; Lee's *Lee*, 348.

<sup>3</sup> For the defences of Richmond and Petersburg, see Humphreys, 140-1.



Smith had about 14,000 infantry and artillery, and Kautz's division of cavalry. But he spent a considerable part of the day in pushing forward reconnaissances to test the strength of the enemy's lines. About 7 p.m. he advanced to the attack with a heavy skirmish line, and captured, without much difficulty, a mile and a half of the entrenchments (seven redans with their connecting infantry parapets) and sixteen guns. He did not, however, make any attempt to push his success further, although the weakness of the resistance encountered should have shown him that only a small infantry force was at the moment defending Petersburg.<sup>1</sup>

The 2nd Corps was across the James at an early hour on the 15th. It was ordered to march towards Petersburg as soon as it had been provided with rations to be sent from City Point. The rations did not, however, arrive, and at 10.30 a.m. the Corps marched without them. The instructions which Hancock had received for his line of march proved extremely inaccurate, and further delay was thereby caused. Consequently it was not till late in the evening that Hancock joined Smith, and the latter general, believing that considerable reinforcements were reaching Beauregard, urged the postponement of further operations till daylight.<sup>2</sup>

The reinforcements, which actually arrived in Petersburg on the evening of the 15th, only consisted of Hoke's division. It can hardly be doubted that if Smith, after Hancock's arrival with two fresh divisions, had renewed the attack, Petersburg must have fallen.<sup>3</sup>

During the night Beauregard withdrew the greater part of B. R. Johnson's division from its lines at Bermuda Hundred, leaving Gracie's brigade to do its best to hold those entrenchments. The Confederate general was in the awkward predicament of being obliged to abandon either his Petersburg lines or the works which he had constructed in front of Butler. He wisely determined to abandon the latter, hoping, as proved the case, that General Lee would shortly arrive and retake them. He occupied the night in throwing up a fresh line of entrenchments in rear of that portion of his lines which had been captured by Smith's attack. With the addition of Hoke's and B. R. Johnson's divisions, Beauregard had in his lines on the morning of the 16th about 14,000 infantry. But his extreme right did not reach the Jerusalem Plank road by half a mile, and for four and a half miles westwards to the Appomattox the Confederate entrenchments were unoccupied except by a few cavalry piquets.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For Smith's operation on the 15th, see Humphreys, 206-8.

<sup>2</sup> Humphreys, 211-12; Swinton, 503-4. The evidence seems to establish the contention that Hancock received no intimation from Grant that he was expected to attack Petersburg till after 5 p.m.

<sup>3</sup> Humphreys, 210.

<sup>4</sup> Humphreys, 215.

Early on the 16th the Federals at Bermuda Hundred, finding that the forces in their front had been greatly reduced, advanced, and after a short struggle carried the Confederate lines. But in the evening they were recaptured by Pickett's division, which Lee had brought early on that morning to Drewry's Bluff. Field's division followed Pickett's, but Kershaw's division and Hill's entire Corps still remained on the north bank of the James.

On the morning of the 16th the 9th Corps arrived before Petersburg. Meade had ordered Hancock to wait for its arrival before renewing the attack upon Beauregard's lines. At 6 p.m. the 2nd Corps, supported by two brigades of the 18th on the right and by two brigades of the 9th on the left, went forward to the assault and carried one redan on the right and two on the left of the breach, which Smith had already made in the Confederate works, together with their connecting lines.

During the night the Confederates constructed a new entrenched line reaching from Redan No. 3, near the Appomattox, to the works on the Norfolk Railway.<sup>1</sup> On the 17th the 5th Corps reached the scene of action. At the earliest dawn of day Potter's division of the 9th Corps carried in gallant style a mile of Confederate entrenchments on the Shand House ridge, but on pushing forward found itself confronted by the new line of works. The fighting on that day was mainly confined to the 9th Corps, though portions of the 2nd and 5th took part in the operations. Late in the afternoon Ledlie's division of the 9th Corps carried part of the Confederate lines, but a spirited charge of Gracie's brigade, which had just reached Petersburg, recovered the captured works.

During the night of the 17th Beauregard decided to fall back to yet a fresh line of entrenchments. These were constructed in rear of a ravine from 500 to 1,000 yards behind his last line, intersecting the original line of entrenchments near the Jerusalem Plank road.<sup>2</sup> As these works had only been thrown up in the night, Meade ordered a general assault to be made by the 2nd, 5th, and 9th Corps at noon of the 18th.<sup>3</sup> The 18th Corps, with the exception of one division, had been sent back on the previous day to Bermuda Hundred, and this one division with one division of the 6th Corps held the extreme right of the Federal line. At the

<sup>1</sup> It does not seem quite certain whether this entrenched line is the same as that which the Confederates threw up on the night of the 15th, or another one made on the night of the 16th. The latter seems the more likely, as on the 16th Hancock captured Redan No. 4, and the new line started from Redan No. 3 (Humphreys, 218).

<sup>2</sup> Humphreys, 219-20.

<sup>3</sup> On the night of the 17th Meade ordered the attack to be made at 4 a.m. next morning. When this movement was carried out, it was found that the enemy had fallen back to Beauregard's new line, and Meade fixed the attack for noon.

appointed hour the 2nd Corps made two assaults, but was repulsed with heavy loss. Another attack was made by the same Corps late in the afternoon with the same result. The 5th and 9th Corps found much greater difficulty in approaching the enemy's lines, as they had first to carry the Norfolk Railroad cut, which was strongly held. This cut was eventually captured, but a further assault upon the main line of entrenchments was repulsed with heavy loss. Beauregard on this day was reinforced by Kershaw's and Field's divisions (Pickett's having been left to hold the Bermuda Hundred entrenchments), and Hill's Corps also arrived later, in time to assist in repelling the assaults made in the afternoon. The positions, which had been gained by the Federal Corps close to the enemy's line, were entrenched, and these two opposing lines were held by the respective armies till the close of the siege.

After the failure of the assault of the 18th, Grant, recognising that, now that Lee with the greater part of his forces was confronting him, there was no longer any chance of success for a frontal attack, directed that his men should be put under cover and a much-needed rest given them. Since crossing the James, from the 15th to the 18th, his entire loss fell little, if at all, short of 10,000 men.<sup>1</sup> The Confederate loss must have been considerably smaller, as they were standing on the defensive.

Grant's plan of campaign after crossing the James was to reduce Richmond by destroying its lines of supply. These were from the north the Virginia Central and Fredericksburg Railroads, both of which had already been considerably damaged, and it was hoped that Sheridan's expedition to Charlottesville would permanently destroy the former. From the south three railways entered Petersburg and Richmond. Into Petersburg ran the Weldon, and Lynchburg or Southside lines, whilst the railroad from Danville entered Richmond.<sup>2</sup> It was Grant's purpose by a gradual extension of his left to gain possession of these different railroads in turn, and thus compel the surrender of Richmond. Had he succeeded in capturing Petersburg, as he had every right to expect to do, his task would have been immensely lightened. But when he found that Petersburg was impregnable against direct assault, undismayed he entered upon his more arduous undertaking. The occupation of the Weldon and Lynchburg Railways would compel the evacuation of Petersburg; the next step would then be to turn the Confederate entrenchments at Bermuda Hundred, and then to operate against the last remaining line, the

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 224.

<sup>2</sup> Beside the Weldon and Lynchburg Railways a third line entered Petersburg from the south-east--the Norfolk Railway. But Grant's advance from the James at once closed this line to the Confederates.



Richmond and Danville Railway. When that fell into his hands, starvation would oblige the Southern capital to surrender.

Accordingly he set himself to construct a line of entrenchments, steadily stretching westwards, of even greater strength than those which the Confederates held, in order that he might be able to leave a small force to hold them, and employ the greater part of his army in extensive movements to turn Lee's right flank. The costly plan of attacking all along the line was thus abandoned, but not until it had produced a more or less demoralising effect upon the soldiers of the Army of the Potomac. It was noticeable that in the operations which ensued after the crossing of the James, for some considerable period the Federal troops fought with much less determination and fire than they had displayed in the earlier part of the campaign.<sup>1</sup> This was due in part to the discouragement produced among the troops by the useless sacrifice of life in assaults which the soldiers themselves knew to be doomed to failure: partly to the deterioration in the quality of the recruits, who were steadily pouring in. These being either substitutes, or obtained through the "draft," were very inferior to the volunteers of the earlier years of the war, and tended to impair the efficiency of the organisations to which they were assigned. The Government continued the mistaken policy of forming entire regiments of the new recruits, instead of distributing them to fill up the vacancies created in the veteran regiments.

On June 21st Grant commenced a turning movement, which was confidently expected to secure the Weldon Railroad, whilst it was hoped that it might also get possession of the Southside line.<sup>2</sup> The movement was not, however, made in sufficient force to ensure success. The 2nd and 6th Corps were ordered to move to the left of the 5th, across the Jerusalem Plank road, and advance against the Weldon Railway, which was only three miles beyond the road. At the same time Wilson, with 5,500 cavalry, was ordered to make a raid against the Southside and Danville Railroads, and, if possible, break them up so completely as to render them useless for the rest of the campaign.

On the 22nd the two infantry Corps moved forward from the Jerusalem Plank road. The 2nd Corps on the right was ordered to swing its left forward and entrench a position, whilst the 6th Corps was directed to push straight for the railway. It had originally been intended that the movements of these two Corps should be made in close connection with each other, but the difficulty of moving through the dense thickets proved so great that Meade ordered the Corps commanders to operate independently,

<sup>1</sup> Walker's statement, quoted in White's *Lee*, 392.

<sup>2</sup> Humphreys, 227.

whilst impressing upon them the necessity of guarding carefully their exposed flanks.<sup>1</sup>

As soon as the movement began to develop, Lee sent Hill with Wilcox's and Mahone's divisions, supported by B. R. Johnson's, out of the Confederate lines down the railway. As the Federals advanced, the gap between the two Corps increased: and Hill, seizing the opportunity, detached Wilcox to hold the railway against the 6th Corps, and moved forward with Mahone's division to fall upon the exposed left flank of the 2nd Corps. That Corps was temporarily commanded by Birney, and he had neglected to carry out Meade's instructions to protect his left flank against just such a movement as the Confederates were now making.

Hill's attack was entirely successful. The 2nd Corps, struck on the flank and rolled up from left to right, was driven from the entrenchments, which it had thrown up, to the position which it had quitted in the morning, with a loss of four guns and 1,700 prisoners.<sup>2</sup> The loss in killed and wounded was comparatively slight and points conclusively to the impaired *moral* of a Corps which had been both the best and strongest in the Army of the Potomac. Hill, after driving the enemy, returned at dusk to his own lines, and the next morning the 2nd Corps advanced and reoccupied the line of works lost on the previous day. Wright, on the left, had been unable to gain ground in the face of Wilcox's opposition, and entrenched a position which was a mile and a half short of the Weldon Railway. The Federal infantry had completely failed to secure even the nearer of the two railways.

Very early on the morning of the 22nd Wilson started on his expedition. Crossing the Weldon Railway at Reams' Station, he struck straight for the Southside Railway. Reaching it at a point about fourteen miles from Petersburg, he destroyed it for a distance of thirty miles as far as Burkesville (Map VII.), where it intersects the Richmond and Danville line. Having completely destroyed the station and all railway appliances at the Junction, the work of destruction was continued for thirty miles south along the Danville Railway.<sup>3</sup> But on reaching the bridge over the Staunton River, further progress was barred by a strong force of infantry entrenched with artillery. W. H. F. Lee's cavalry division had followed closely after Wilson throughout these operations, but had not been able to interfere seriously with the work of breaking up the railways, though sharp skirmishing continued all the time. Finding himself unable to advance further south and being already nearly a hundred miles from Petersburg, Wilson determined to retire.

But his return journey proved to be one of extreme difficulty,

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 228.

<sup>2</sup> Humphreys, 229.

<sup>3</sup> Humphreys, 237.

and was only effected with heavy loss. Lee had made arrangements for intercepting his retreat. On approaching the Weldon Railroad on the 28th Wilson found himself confronted by Wade Hampton's cavalry division at Stony Creek Depôt, whilst Fitzhugh Lee's division and two infantry brigades had been posted at Reams' Station, ten miles to the north. Unable to fight his way through Hampton's division, he moved westwards, hoping to cross the railway nearer Petersburg, but on the 29th encountered Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry at Reams' Station. As the Federals tried to retreat, Fitzhugh Lee and Mahone, who commanded the infantry, attacked, and under their united pressure Wilson's force was broken. Kautz's division managed to get round the Confederate left, and crossing the railway a short distance south of Reams' Station, reached the Army of the Potomac in the course of the same night. But the larger part was forced to make a wide détour, and did not rejoin the rest of the army till July 2nd. Wilson lost twelve guns, his wagon-train, and 1,500 killed, wounded, or missing.<sup>1</sup> He had done considerable damage to the railways, but the Confederates found no difficulty in repairing them.

The rest of the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac had started with Sheridan on June 7th on the expedition to Charlottesville (Map III.). On the evening of the 10th the North Anna was crossed, and the Federals bivouacked about ten miles north-east of Trevilian Station. On the same night Wade Hampton's cavalry division encamped about three miles north-west of the station, and Fitzhugh Lee's division near Louisa Court House, six miles east. At daylight on the 11th the two Confederate divisions moved from their respective camps, hoping to encounter Sheridan before he could reach the railway. It was, however, very difficult to carry out a combined movement between two bodies of troops separated by several miles of wooded country.<sup>2</sup> Wade Hampton, before he could effect a junction with Fitzhugh Lee, encountered Sheridan, who had also broken up his camp early in the morning, about three miles north of the station. According to Sheridan's account Torbert's division carried the entrenchments, which Wade Hampton's men had hastily thrown up, and drove the Confederates pell-mell into Custer, who had moved between the two Confederate divisions and reached Trevilian Station. Gregg meantime had attacked Fitzhugh Lee on the Louisa Court House road, and driven him back some distance, pursuing till nightfall.<sup>3</sup> During the night the two Confederate leaders reunited their commands in the direction of Gordonsville, whilst Sheridan with his whole force occupied

<sup>1</sup> For Wilson's raid, see Humphreys, 236-41.

<sup>2</sup> Humphreys, 231.

<sup>3</sup> Gregg commanded one of Sheridan's two divisions, and Custer a brigade in Torbert's division.



the station. On the strength of his subsequent movements the Confederates claimed the victory, but it seems quite clear that they were driven beyond the Virginia Central Railway. During the night Sheridan learnt from his prisoners that General Hunter was not moving on Charlottesville, as he supposed, but was threatening Lynchburg. It was useless in the presence of Wade Hampton's united force to attempt the systematic destruction of the railroad, and accordingly he retired on the night of the 12th and reached White House on the 21st. Grant had determined to break up his *dépôt* there, and on the 22nd Sheridan started to escort a train of 900 wagons to the James. The train safely crossed on the 25th, but Gregg's division, which was covering the movement, had a hard fight on the 24th with Wade Hampton's and Fitzhugh Lee's divisions, and was driven back some distance. On the 27th Sheridan was ordered to move by the left to Reams' Station (Map VII.) to aid Wilson's return. But he did not arrive in time to take part in the fighting; for the enemy's infantry had already withdrawn within their own lines, and the cavalry, after pursuing Wilson's main body as far as the Blackwater, returned by circuitous routes to their camp on July 1st.<sup>1</sup>

Since the beginning of June the heat had been intense, and no rain fell for forty-seven days.<sup>2</sup> All the surface water disappeared, and the Federals had to rely upon wells for their supply. The dust lay thick upon the ground, and marching caused great suffering to the troops. Under the circumstances Grant decided to postpone, till a more convenient season, his flank movement to turn Lee's right and gain possession of the Petersburg Railroads: and orders were issued that the operations against the Confederate lines were to be conducted by regular approaches on the front opposed to the 5th and 9th Corps.<sup>3</sup> In July the 6th Corps had been sent north to defend Washington against Early's raid, and after its departure the left flank of the Federal army was drawn in to the Jerusalem Plank road, on which two strong redoubts were constructed about half a mile apart.<sup>4</sup> The Federal left was thus refused. A formidable siege-train, including forty rifled siege-guns

<sup>1</sup> For Sheridan's operations, see Humphreys, 230-5, 241. The Confederates claimed that on the 11th Custer's brigade was routed by Rosser's brigade, which not only recovered all that Custer had captured, but also "got possession of Custer's headquarters ambulances" (4 B. & L., 238). But the same writer, General Butler, c.s.a., admits that the day "ended disastrously." There was also some hard fighting on the 12th. Torbert's division was trying to secure a ford over the North Anna, but being opposed by both Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee, was repulsed. The Federals were therefore obliged to return by the road by which they had come (Sheridan, i. 424-5).

<sup>2</sup> Humphreys, 243.

<sup>3</sup> Humphreys, 247. The right of the 9th Corps reached to the Prince George Court House road, where it joined a division of the 18th Corps. On the left of the 9th Corps came the 5th Corps, whose left rested on the Jerusalem Plank road.

<sup>4</sup> Forts Davis and Sedgwick.

and forty heavy, as well as lighter, mortars had by this time reached Grant.<sup>1</sup>

Towards the end of June Lieutenant-Colonel Pleasants, of the 48th Pennsylvania regiment, which was largely composed of coal miners, whilst he himself had been a mining engineer, suggested to his divisional commander, Potter, the practicability of running a mine under one of the Confederate redans. The scheme was reported to Burnside, the Corps commander, and Meade gave his consent, though with some hesitation. For though the ground on the Federal side was favourable for carrying on the work unobserved, yet the space, which would have to be crossed by the columns advancing to the attack after the explosion of the mine, was exposed to a cross-fire on both flanks. The mine was commenced on June 25th, and was ready to receive the powder-charge by July 23rd. The main gallery was 511 feet long, with two lateral galleries 37 and 38 feet long, and 8,000 pounds of powder were placed in them.<sup>2</sup> The mining operations of the Federals failed to escape Beauregard's notice. He threw up entrenchments across the gorge of the salient threatened, and established batteries of heavy mortars to give a front and cross-fire on it.

On July 25th Grant ordered the 2nd Corps, again under the command of Hancock, with three cavalry divisions under Sheridan (including Kautz's cavalry division of the Army of the James),<sup>3</sup> to cross to the north bank of the James with as much secrecy as possible. The principal object of this expedition was to destroy the Virginia Central and Fredericksburg Railways from the neighbourhood of Richmond back to the North and South Anna Rivers. If a favourable opportunity presented itself, the cavalry might make a dash at Richmond. The infantry was to support the cavalry if it got into Richmond, and also to prevent troops being sent to interfere with the cavalry's operations against the railways. At the same time Grant hoped that this movement across the James would cause Lee to withdraw some of his forces from the Petersburg lines and thus weaken the opposition to be encountered, when a general assault followed the explosion of Burnside's mine.<sup>4</sup>

Two pontoon bridges had been laid across the James at Deep Bottom (Map VIII.), one just above and the other below the mouth of Bailey's Creek. They were guarded by General Foster, of the 10th Corps. Opposite the upper bridge the Confederates

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 246. This siege-train had also a reserve of six 100-pounder Parrotts.

<sup>2</sup> 4 B. & L., 545-6. Colonel Pleasants had to work under great disadvantages, as Meade and his chief engineer did not believe the undertaking was possible. "With proper tools and instruments it could have been done in one-third or one-quarter of the time."

<sup>3</sup> Kautz's division was to join Sheridan at Deep Bottom.

<sup>4</sup> For the objects of this expedition, see Humphreys, 247-8.

held an entrenched line, which did not, however, apparently extend far from the river. Before daylight on the 27th Hancock crossed by the lower bridge. The defences of Richmond on the north side of the river were under the charge of Ewell, who had under his command two militia brigades and a force of Government employés. Hancock's plan was that Foster, moving forward from the upper bridge, should threaten the enemy's entrenched line in front, whilst he himself turned its left.

But Lee had already, in anticipation of the attack, brought two infantry divisions from the south bank, and on the 27th a third division arrived. Two cavalry divisions and another infantry division were subsequently withdrawn from the Petersburg lines. In the face of so strong a force the Federal movement made no progress. Hancock had been ordered not to attack entrenchments, and a turning movement was rendered impossible by the superior numbers of the enemy. On the night of the 29th Hancock withdrew his forces to the south bank of the river, preparatory to taking part in the general assault upon Petersburg. The knowledge that Lee, by withdrawing so large a force from Petersburg, had left only three infantry divisions and one cavalry division for its defence, and the discovery that what had hitherto been supposed to be a connected line of entrenchments along a ridge 500 yards in rear of the main Confederate line was not a connected line at all, but only consisted of detached redans,<sup>1</sup> caused Grant to have great hopes of the success of the assault, which he had determined to make with all his available forces on the 30th.

The mine was to be exploded at 3.30 a.m. Burnside's Corps was to make the main assault, supported on the right by the 18th Corps, and on the left by the 5th, whilst the 2nd Corps was also expected to co-operate. Burnside had originally proposed that his fourth division, consisting of coloured troops under General Ferrero, should lead the assault, because his three white divisions had suffered considerably from the heavy fire kept up day and night from the Confederate lines, only a hundred yards away. But both Grant and Meade refused to entrust so important a task to inexperienced troops. The other three divisional commanders drew lots for the post of honour, and the lot fell upon Ledlie. Burnside had been specially directed by Meade to prepare his parapets and abatis for the passage of the assaulting columns, to equip his pioneers for the purpose of opening passages for the artillery and destroying the Confederate abatis, and to distribute the entrenching tools of the Corps. But these precautions were totally neglected by the commander of the 9th Corps. At a personal interview on the 29th Meade had endeavoured to impress

<sup>1</sup> Humpleys, 251.



upon Burnside and the commanders of his three white divisions the importance of pushing forward at once to the ridge in the enemy's rear, and the uselessness of trying to hold the crater which the explosion would make.<sup>1</sup>

Owing to some defect in the fuse the explosion did not take place till 4.40 a.m. The redan, against which the mine was directed, was held by Elliott's brigade of B. R. Johnson's division. One regiment and part of another and a battery were overwhelmed, and the Confederates in terror abandoned their lines for some 200 or 300 yards on either side of the crater. A few minutes after the explosion Ledlie's division filed slowly out of their entrenchments. The movement was necessarily slow, as no proper passages for the assaulting columns had been prepared. The division, on reaching the crater, which was about 150 feet long, 60 wide, and 25 deep,<sup>2</sup> poured into it. The divisional commander, who had been particularly cautioned not to let his troops enter the crater but to hold straight on for the ridge beyond, had not considered it part of his duty to accompany his troops, but remained behind sheltered in a bomb-proof fifty yards within his own lines, whence he could see nothing of the movements of the troops under his command. The troops, having once entered the crater, could not without much difficulty be induced to go forward, and time was thus given to the Confederates to recover from their surprise and prepare for defence. Elliott rallied the remnant of his brigade in a ravine behind the salient, and on his left Ransom's brigade and an artillery battery opened fire on such of the Federals as tried to advance beyond the crater.

Eighty-one heavy siege-guns and mortars had been carefully placed in position to beat down the fire of the Confederate batteries, and, as soon as the mine was exploded, opened fire, and about the same number of field-guns came into action. But a four-gun battery on the Confederate left and a two-gun battery on the right were so skilfully concealed, that the Federal artillery failed to silence them, and they brought a cross-fire to bear upon the troops advancing from Burnside's entrenchments. Ledlie's division was followed by Potter's, which, keeping to the right of the crater, captured, after a sharp fight, that part of the entrenchments which had been partially abandoned. A corresponding move on the left was made by Willcox's division. His first brigade entered the crater, but the second, keeping to the left, captured some portion of the enemy's entrenchments. Though on both sides of the crater part of the Confederate lines had been captured, no further progress towards the ridge was made. At 8 a.m. the coloured division advanced from the Federal entrenchments, but its commander, General Ferrero, remained behind with Ledlie in the bomb-proof.

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 254.

<sup>2</sup> Humphreys, 255, note.

A considerable part of it, in spite of the efforts of the brigadiers, hurried into the crater: the rest entered the entrenchments to the right.

Ord, commanding the 18th Corps, had been ordered on the 29th to withdraw his troops from their entrenchments and post them in rear of Burnside's Corps to follow up its attack. When ordered by Meade to advance, Ord experienced great difficulty in getting his troops through Burnside's entrenchments, owing to the lack of proper preparation. At last he got one division into open ground, and carried a part of the Confederate lines to the right of the point which the coloured troops had occupied, and was preparing to sweep along the enemy's line to the right, when he saw the troops on his left streaming back to their own entrenchments, and his own troops promptly followed suit.<sup>1</sup>

Lee, on hearing of the attack, had ordered up two brigades of Mahone's division, which held the right of the Petersburg defences. Mahone arrived shortly before 9 a.m., and seeing how large a force had occupied the Confederate entrenchments, sent back for a third brigade. One of Ferrero's brigadiers, followed by a very small fraction of his men, was attempting to push forward to the ridge, when one of Mahone's brigades charged and drove them back. Thereupon the whole of the coloured troops, who had gained a footing in the entrenchments, took to their heels, carrying away with them many of Potter's men and Ord's one division. By this precipitate flight the Confederates were enabled to recover the entrenchments which they had lost on their left of the crater. Meade, recognising that all chance of success was gone, ordered offensive operations to cease.<sup>2</sup> Warren was just advancing to attack with his right division when the order reached him, and he abandoned the movement. A large number of men were in the crater suffering great distress under the burning rays of the sun, and one brigade was holding a part of the Confederate entrenchments on the left.<sup>3</sup> Mahone attacked these troops, but was driven back. Having been reinforced by his third brigade, he renewed the attack along with part of Johnson's division between 1 p.m. and 2 p.m. Two of the brigadiers in the crater gave the order to retire, and the greater part of the troops in the crater and entrenchments fell back to their own lines, suffering heavy loss, whilst a large number of prisoners were taken in the crater.

Thus the great assault, by which Grant had hoped to gain possession of Petersburg and to cross to the north bank of the Appomattox, turned out a costly fiasco. The Federal loss nearly

<sup>1</sup> Ord, who had relieved W. F. Smith in the command of the 18th Corps, had at his disposal one division of his own Corps and one of the 10th. It was the latter which took part in the attack.

<sup>2</sup> At 9.45 a.m. (Humphreys, 262).

<sup>3</sup> One of Willcox's brigades.

reached 4,000, whilst that of the Confederates was probably not more than 1,200.<sup>1</sup>

Meade requested that a Court of Enquiry should be held to examine into the causes of the disaster. The finding of the Court fully exonerated him, and laid the blame, where it justly belonged, upon Burnside and his divisional commanders, with the exception of Potter. The Court also expressed its opinion that a single general on the spot should have been given command of all the troops which were to take part in the assault, in order to secure greater unity of action. Warren's Corps, through no fault of that commander, was kept out of the fighting: only one division of Ord's Corps was engaged, and the list of casualties shows that the 9th Corps had practically all the fighting to itself. Ledlie was allowed to resign, and Burnside was succeeded in the command of the 9th Corps by General Parke.<sup>2</sup>

In August Sheridan was sent to command the Federal forces in the Shenandoah Valley, and two cavalry divisions from the Army of the Potomac were sent with him. Lee, in turn, reinforced Early in the Valley with Kershaw's infantry division and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry division. Grant's information led him to believe that the whole of Anderson's Corps, and not a single division only, had been sent to Early.<sup>3</sup> He therefore directed Hancock to take his own Corps and the 10th, now under the command of Birney, along with the remaining cavalry division under Gregg, and make another movement along the north bank of the James on Richmond.

The object of the movement was to prevent Lee from sending more troops to the Shenandoah Valley, and, if possible, cause him to recall some of those which Grant erroneously supposed to have been sent. It was expected that Hancock would be able to break through the left of the Confederate entrenchments on Bailey's Creek, and this success, if vigorously followed up, might lead to the capture of Chaffin's Bluff, the strongest work on the north bank guarding the river approach to Richmond. The cavalry might get a chance of making a dash upon Richmond: failing that, they were to fall upon the railways coming into Richmond from the north.

Every effort was made to keep the movement a secret. The 2nd Corps was marched to City Point to give the impression that it was about to be sent by water to Washington. But in the night

<sup>1</sup> 4 B. & L., 560, note, where the Federal loss is stated at 3,798, of which 3,475 belonged to the 9th Corps.

<sup>2</sup> The Congressional Investigating Committee found that the chief cause of the disaster was due to the fact that the attack was led by white and not black troops. Ferrero's coloured division had been specially drilled in view of the contemplated movement. This view was not, however, taken by the military Court of Enquiry. For the details of Burnside's unsuccessful attack, see Humphreys, 250-65.

<sup>3</sup> Grant was deceived by the fact that R. H. Anderson, the Corps commander, accompanied Kershaw's division.



it was conveyed in steamers up the river to the lower pontoon bridge at Deep Bottom, and disembarked on the morning of August 14th.<sup>1</sup>

The northern defences of Richmond were not so weakly held as Grant imagined. The Bailey's Creek line was defended by Field's division: Wilcox's division occupied Chaffin's Bluff, and at once moved out to join Field. From the south bank Lee sent across Mahone's infantry division and two cavalry divisions: only a single brigade of cavalry was left with Beauregard in the Petersburg lines. Against such a force as Lee had thus concentrated Hancock had no chance of achieving success. On the 16th the left of the Confederate entrenchments on Bailey's Creek was carried by Terry's division of the 10th Corps, but was quickly recaptured. Though Grant now saw that the information on which he had acted was inaccurate, he still retained Hancock in front of the Bailey's Creek entrenchments until the night of the 20th, in order to prevent Lee from withdrawing troops to resist a movement which was meanwhile being carried out against the Confederate defences on the south of Petersburg.

On the 18th Warren, with the 5th Corps, marched to the Weldon Railroad at the Globe Tavern.<sup>2</sup> A single cavalry brigade was easily driven off, and Griffin's division commenced the destruction of the railway, whilst the other two divisions moved up the line towards its intersection with the Vaughan road. On learning of the appearance of Federal troops on the railway Beauregard despatched Heth with two brigades to the threatened point. A surprise attack on the left flank of Ayres' division, which was advancing on both sides of the railroad, caused the Federals to fall back a short distance, but their line was quickly restored and Heth driven off with considerable loss.<sup>3</sup>

On the 19th Mahone's infantry division and W. H. F. Lee's cavalry division arrived from Richmond, and on the Federal side the 9th Corps was gradually withdrawn from its entrenchments and sent to Warren's assistance. On that day Hill, with five brigades, attempted, whilst pressing Ayres' division in front with Heth's two brigades, to turn Crawford's right with Mahone's three. Warren had sought to establish connection by means of a skirmish line between Crawford's right and the left of the 9th Corps, which held the entrenchments just quitted by the 5th Corps. But the intervening country was very thickly wooded, and Mahone had no difficulty in breaking through the skirmish line and falling upon Crawford's right flank. Crawford was forced to fall back, and Ayres' right brigade shared in the retrograde movement, but on

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 268.

<sup>2</sup> The Globe Tavern was about four miles south of the outskirts of Petersburg (Humphreys, 272).

<sup>3</sup> Humphreys, 274-5.

two divisions of the 9th Corps coming up Warren assumed the offensive and drove Mahone back into his entrenchments with heavy loss.

As it was now plain that the enemy would not abandon the possession of the railroad without a serious struggle, Warren selected on the 20th a position about a mile in rear of his earlier one, mainly in open ground and favourable for the use of artillery.<sup>1</sup> On the 21st Hill, who had been reinforced by Wilcox's division of his own Corps and part of Hoke's division, attacked Warren's new position, but was repulsed. After this failure the Confederates made no further attempt to interfere with Warren, and the Federal entrenchments were extended from the Jerusalem Plank road to Warren's position on the Weldon Railway.<sup>2</sup>

But, though the occupation of that railroad at the Globe Tavern prevented the Confederates from running trains any longer right through into Petersburg, they could still use the railway as far as a point which was within a distance of a day's hauling by wagon to Petersburg. Grant therefore determined to destroy the railroad as far as Rowanty Creek (Map VII.). If that work were successfully accomplished, the Confederate wagon-trains would have to follow a roundabout route from Stony Creek Dépôt to Dinwiddie Court House on the Boydton plank road, a distance of fully thirty miles from Petersburg.<sup>3</sup>

On the 22nd Hancock was despatched with two of his divisions and Gregg's cavalry division to destroy the railroad to the desired point. By the night of the 24th the line had been destroyed to within five miles of Rowanty Creek, and the troops bivouacked for the night at Reams' Station.<sup>4</sup> The Confederates, realising the importance of preventing the further destruction of the railway, concentrated eight infantry brigades<sup>5</sup> and Hampton's two cavalry divisions, under the command of Hill, against Hancock, and attacking him on the afternoon of the 25th, after two unsuccessful attempts, drove him from the slight entrenchments, which had been thrown up earlier in the year at Reams' Station.<sup>6</sup> It was only the

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 277.

<sup>2</sup> It is not quite clear as to what was the strength of the forces with which Hill attacked on the 21st. Of Mahone's three brigades, which fought on the 19th, two belonged to Hoke's division, and a third brigade of that division was engaged on the 21st. Humphreys speaks of Hill having his own Corps, three divisions under Heth, Mahone, and Wilcox, in the attack of the 21st. Potter's division of the 9th Corps joined Warren in time to take part in the fight on that day. The Federal losses in the two days' fighting were 4,278 (4 B. & L., 571). The Confederate loss was not officially stated, but must have been heavy.

<sup>3</sup> Humphreys, 278. Rowanty Creek was about thirteen miles beyond Warren's left.

<sup>4</sup> The destruction of the railway had been continued three miles south of Reams' Station.

<sup>5</sup> Humphreys, 279, note.

<sup>6</sup> The unsuccessful attacks were made by Wilcox with four brigades at about 2 p.m. Hill made his successful attack about three hours later.

gallant bearing of Hancock himself and of General Miles<sup>1</sup> commanding the first division, who succeeded in rallying a part of his division, which prevented a great disaster overtaking the Federals. Miles held the road leading to the station from the Jerusalem Plank road until dusk, and the whole force was then withdrawn. Hill, having driven the 2nd Corps from the railroad, returned with his infantry to their entrenchments, leaving Hampton's cavalry at Reams' Station. If a Federal force had been sent to Hancock's assistance along the railway, it would have had a fair chance of taking the Confederates in flank and converting the defeat into a victory. Meade, however, was afraid lest the railroad should be closed to the relieving force, and preferred the safer and longer route by the Jerusalem Plank road. Consequently neither of the two divisions, sent by Meade to reinforce Hancock, arrived in time to be of any assistance.<sup>2</sup>

A month later Grant tried another co-operative movement against Lee's lines. On September 28th Ord and Birney were ordered to take part of their respective Corps, the 18th and 10th, and with Kautz's cavalry division cross to the north bank of the James.<sup>3</sup> Ord was directed to cross by a pontoon bridge, to be laid down during the night, two miles below Dutch Gap (Map VIII.). He would thus turn the enemy's line of entrenchments at Bailey's Creek, and be able to march straight up the river by the Varina road. Birney and Kautz were to cross by the upper pontoon bridge at Deep Bottom and march by the Newmarket and Darbytown roads.

By 7.30 a.m. on the 29th Ord found himself in front of the main line of Confederate entrenchments, and promptly attacked and carried Fort Harrison, the strongest work in that line. An attack upon Fort Gilmer, which was about three-quarters of a mile north of Fort Harrison, was, however, repulsed. The capture of Fort Gilmer would have given the Federals possession of the Chaffin's Bluff defences. Accordingly when Birney arrived on the ground, he renewed the attack upon Fort Gilmer, but with like ill-success. As soon as the attack developed, Lee summoned reinforcements from the Petersburg lines. Six brigades of infantry were brought across the river, and also some regiments of Pickett's command at Bermuda Hundred.

On the 30th Anderson, with five brigades, made a determined

<sup>1</sup> Late Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army.

<sup>2</sup> Willcox's division and a detachment, about 1,800 strong, from Mott's. Willcox had to march twelve miles (and Mott's troops about the same distance) instead of five. The Federal loss was 2,742 and nine guns; the Confederate was returned by Hill as 720. For details of this engagement, see Humphreys, 279-83.

<sup>3</sup> Ord took with him 2,000 men from each of his first and second divisions. Birney had under his command two divisions of his own Corps and one coloured brigade as well as Ord's third division (coloured), numbering in all about 10,000 men (Humphreys, 285).



attempt to recapture Fort Harrison, but the Federals had strengthened the fort, and the attack, though twice repeated, was repulsed with heavy loss. On the previous day Ord had attempted unsuccessfully to sweep down the Confederate lines to the river and capture their pontoon bridge. But a line of entrenchments was constructed by the Federals connecting Fort Harrison with the river at Dutch Gap.<sup>1</sup>

On the south side of the river the co-operative movement was commenced on the 30th. Warren, with two of his divisions, followed by two divisions of the 9th Corps, moved out of the Federal lines and advanced towards the Boydton plank road, whilst Gregg's cavalry division covered their left flank. About two miles west of the Weldon Railroad a redoubt and line of entrenchments at the Peebles Farm were captured by Warren,<sup>2</sup> and Parke, with his two divisions, pushed forward on Warren's left towards the Boydton plank road. Hill sent Wilcox's and Heth's divisions to drive back Parke, and Potter's division, which was leading on the right, was taken in flank and forced to fall back. Parke established a new line with Willcox's division and checked the Confederate advance. Having been reinforced the next day by Mott's division of the 2nd Corps, he again advanced and succeeded in establishing a line of entrenchments about a mile from the enemy's lines. This new line was quickly connected with the Federal entrenchments on the Weldon Railroad.

Grant was very anxious, before the approach of winter put an end to the operations of the year, to make one more attempt to seize the Southside Railroad. For this purpose a force of about 32,000 infantry with Gregg's cavalry division and a proper complement of artillery was detailed. The infantry were drawn from the 2nd, 5th, and 9th Corps. Hancock was to move on the left across Hatcher's Run by the Vaughan road, advance by Dabney's Mill to the Boydton plank road, and then to push for the Southside Railway by the White Oak and Claiborne roads.<sup>3</sup> At this time the Confederate lines almost reached to Hatcher's Run, about two miles above the Vaughan road crossing; but further up the stream there was no connected line of entrenchments, but only some infantry parapets and emplacements for artillery at the Boydton road crossing of the Run. Parke was to endeavour to surprise the entrenchments near Hatcher's Run, but in case of

<sup>1</sup> The Federal loss during the two days' fighting was 2,272; the Confederate, perhaps, 2,000 (Humphreys, 285-9).

<sup>2</sup> The importance of the Peebles Farm was that it lay at the junction of two roads coming from the south-west (Humphreys, 291). The entrenchments captured by Warren were not part of the Confederate main line, but an advanced work.

<sup>3</sup> The White Oak road intersects the Claiborne road, and by this latter Hancock's column would strike the Southside Railway east of Sutherland Station (Humphreys, 295).

failure to continue to demonstrate in front of them, whilst the 5th Corps was to cross the Run and, keeping on Hancock's right, turn the Confederate right by recrossing above the Boydton road crossing.<sup>1</sup>

Hancock crossed Hatcher's Run at daylight of the 27th October, and reached the Boydton road, but at 1 p.m. was directed not to advance further, as the forward movement of the other two Corps had been obstructed. Hill concentrated on the Boydton road Heth's and Mahone's divisions and Hampton's whole cavalry force. Mahone's division was sent across the Run lower down, and tried to turn Hancock's right, whilst Heth's division barred further progress up the plank road, and Hampton's cavalry endeavoured to fall upon the Federal left.

Hancock had just advanced one of his two divisions against the bridge at Burgess' Mills, when Mahone's brigades rushed from the woods, and falling upon the exposed flank of an isolated brigade on the east side of the road, drove it across the road and captured a couple of guns. As Mahone formed across the road, and facing south was opening fire upon the two Federal brigades, who were holding the intersection of the Dabney's Mill road with the Boydton road, he was himself taken in flank by Egan's division counter-marching from the bridge, and was driven in great confusion into the woods with the loss of the two guns just captured.

On the Federal left a fierce contest was maintained between Hampton and Gregg, whose cavalry division was covering Hancock's left flank, till dark, but though hard pressed, Gregg held his own. During the night Hancock withdrew his forces, as no reinforcements had reached him and his supply of ammunition was running short. Had he remained till the following morning a battle against superior forces could not have been avoided, as Hill, leaving only one division to hold the Hatcher's Run entrenchments, was concentrating all his available troops on the Boydton road.

Early in the afternoon of the 27th it had become plain to Grant and Meade that their attempt to seize the Southside Railway was doomed to failure. On the Boydton road Hancock was still six miles distant from the desired goal, and all chance of taking the enemy by surprise had vanished.

Parke had found the Hatcher's Run entrenchments too strong to be carried by assault. After some delay Warren was ordered to move one division across the Run lower down, and advancing up the right bank, to flank the enemy out of their lines. But

<sup>1</sup> Warren was to cross Hatcher's Run at Armstrong's Mill, about a mile below the point where the Confederate entrenchments rested on the Run. He would then be in a position to support either Parke or Hancock. But he was only to cross the Run if Parke failed to carry the entrenchments in his front.

Crawford's division, which crossed the Run at Armstrong's Mill, made very slow progress in the dense wood and intricate country. It took four hours to cover a mile and a half, and even when the division was in position opposite to the Confederate right it was found impracticable to cross the Run.<sup>1</sup> Nor was Crawford able, owing to the thickness of the intervening thicket forest, to form a junction with Hancock on his left. On the 28th the whole Federal force returned to its entrenchments.

At the same time that this unsuccessful movement against the Southside Railway was being made, Butler was directed to make a co-operative movement on the north bank of the James. Whilst part of the 10th Corps under Terry moved up the Charles City and Darbytown roads and made a demonstration against the Confederate lines in their front, Weitzel,<sup>2</sup> with part of the 18th Corps, was ordered to push through the White Oak Swamp and endeavour to carry the works reaching from the Williamsburg road across the York River railroad. It was expected that these works, if occupied at all, would only be held by a very weak force. But Longstreet, who had returned to duty and on October 19th had taken command of the forces on the north bank of the James and the Bermuda Hundred front,<sup>3</sup> quickly divined the significance of Terry's demonstration, and hurried Field's and Hoke's divisions and Gary's cavalry brigade to his left along his lines to cover the Williamsburg and Nine Mile roads.

Field was just in time to repulse Weitzel's attack, and though the Federals captured part of the entrenchments beyond the railroad, they were promptly driven out again by Gary. An attack made by Terry against the entrenchments in his front was also repulsed. Butler's demonstration proved rather a costly failure, as he lost 1,100 men and inflicted practically no loss on his enemy.<sup>4</sup>

With this double failure Grant's operations against Richmond and Petersburg came to an end for 1864.

<sup>1</sup> Crawford arrived opposite the Confederate lines about 4 p.m., at which hour Mahone was advancing against Hancock's right. Crawford was accompanied by one brigade of Ayres' division. For the whole movement, see Humphreys, 294-303; Swinton, 540-7.

<sup>2</sup> Weitzel had succeeded Ord, wounded on September 29th, in the command of the 18th Corps.

<sup>3</sup> Humphreys, 304.

<sup>4</sup> Humphreys, 306.



## CHAPTER XXII

### THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN<sup>1</sup>

The Grand Army of the West—The Confederate position—Sherman's general plan of campaign—The campaign opens—McPherson's flanking movement—Johnston abandons Dalton—Johnston's position at Resaca—Johnston abandons Resaca—Johnston falls back behind the Etowah—Davis captures Rome—Johnston's position at Allatoona—Sherman moves on Dallas—Johnston advances from the railway to meet him—Sherman unsuccessfully attacks Johnston's right—Confederate attack on Federal right repulsed—Johnston falls back towards Marietta—Johnston's new position—Death of General Polk—Confederate left outflanked—Johnston falls back to Kenesaw Mountain—The Federals continue to gain ground on the right—Hood's attack on the Federal right repulsed—Federals attack Kenesaw Mountain—The attack repulsed with loss—Schofield turns the Confederate left—Johnston falls back to the Chattahoochee—Johnston retreats behind the Chattahoochee—Sherman decides to move by his left flank—Hood supersedes Johnston—Thomas crosses Peachtree Creek—Hood attacks Thomas' left flank—The Confederates defeated—Hood attacks McPherson's left flank—Death of McPherson—The Confederates repulsed with heavy loss—Changes in the Federal army—The Atlanta railways—Sherman's movement by the right flank against the Macon Railway—Hood attacks Howard's right flank—The Confederates again defeated—Unsuccessful attempts of the Federal cavalry to break up the railways—Sherman gains ground on the right—Sherman moves with nearly all his army against the Macon Railway—Hood outwitted—Hood vainly attacks Howard—The Federals secure the Macon Railway—Unsuccessful attempt to capture Hardee's Corps at Jonesboro—Hood evacuates Atlanta.

FOR his campaign against General Joseph E. Johnston, Sherman had under his command, when he took over from Grant, the three Armies of the Tennessee, Cumberland, and Ohio. The Army of the Cumberland, under the command of Thomas, was composed of the 4th Corps, under Howard, who had relieved Gordon Granger, the 14th, under Palmer, and the 20th, under Hooker. It numbered about 60,000 men with 130 guns. The Army of the Ohio, commanded by Schofield, who had relieved Foster, only consisted of one Corps, the 23rd, and numbered 14,000 men with 28 guns. The Army of the Tennessee, under McPherson, who had succeeded Sherman upon the latter's appointment to the military division of the Mississippi, at the commencement of the campaign consisted of two Corps: the 15th under Logan and the 16th under Dodge, and numbered 25,000 men with 96 guns. The 17th Corps joined it later on. Sherman re-

<sup>1</sup> See Map XII.

ported his infantry and artillery present for duty on May 1st as numbering 98,797 men. The cavalry force, not included in this estimate, was more than 10,000 strong, consisting of four divisions under Stoneman, Garrard, McCook, and Kilpatrick. The Confederate army at the time when Sherman advanced against Dalton, and before the arrival of Polk's Corps, probably numbered about 60,000 men.<sup>1</sup>

Johnston held a strongly entrenched position at Dalton, thirty-eight miles south-east of Chattanooga on the Chattanooga-Atlanta Railroad. Before reaching Dalton the railroad passes through Rocky Face Ridge, the eastern barrier of the basin drained by the Chickamauga River.<sup>2</sup> The ridge extends some three miles north of Mile Creek Gap, through which pass the railroad runs; and continues south for several miles, completely covering Dalton on the west. From Dalton a branch line runs to Cleveland, where it joins the East Tennessee Railway. Both armies were tied for their supplies to the railway. Sherman had the choice of operating against Johnston from either Chattanooga or Cleveland as a base. But to have adopted Cleveland for that purpose would have been to lay open to Johnston a road by which he might invade Middle Tennessee and strike at the Federal lines of communication with the Ohio. Such a movement would have at once cut Sherman off from his line of supplies in the Lower Tennessee valley; and the experience of Burnside at Knoxville showed that East Tennessee would be unable to provide sufficient supplies for so large an army invading Georgia.<sup>3</sup>

Johnston saw clearly that the Federal advance must proceed along the main railroad to Atlanta, and devoted himself to strengthening his position across that line. Mill Creek was dammed so as to flood part of the country in his front, and entrenchments were thrown up in the Gap, and extended along both the northern and southern crests of Rocky Face Ridge. About four miles north of Dalton, near the northern extremity of the ridge, a line of entrenchments was constructed, running eastward to the high ground commanding the Cleveland Railway, and thence continued south, covering Dalton against any attack from the east. Johnston's position was almost impregnable to any attack from the front or either flank. He regarded Sherman as impulsive and reckless, and hoped that, in spite of the strength

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 28, 241-4. The Confederate return for April 30th gave the total "present for duty" at 52,992. To this must be added Mercer's brigade, which joined Johnston May 2nd, and is estimated at 2,800 men: and during the first week in May there was an increase in Hood's and Hardee's Corps of about 5,000. Johnston stated his "effective total" on April 30th as only 42,856. But this estimate excludes officers, and only includes sergeants, corporals, and private soldiers "for duty equipped." To form a fair comparison of the strength of the two armies the totals "present for duty" must be taken (4 B. & L., 281). <sup>2</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 29. <sup>3</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 30.

of the position, his adversary would attempt to storm it, and thus give him an opportunity of delivering a crushing counter-blow.<sup>1</sup>

Sherman, however, had no intention of wasting his troops in frontal attacks upon Johnston's entrenchments. His whole plan of campaign aimed at flanking him out of successive positions and forcing him either to stand and fight on open ground, where effective use could be made of the Federal numerical superiority, or to continue his retreat, until at length he abandoned Atlanta, or submitted to be besieged within its walls.

To carry into execution this plan the Army of the Cumberland, which was about the strength of Johnston's whole force, formed the centre of the Federal line of advance, with the two smaller armies on the wings ready to operate against either flank, as opportunity offered.

On May 4th the campaign opened. The Federal armies were concentrated along a line about sixteen miles long with the centre at Ringgold, the Army of the Cumberland being somewhat advanced in front of the wings.<sup>2</sup> On the 7th Thomas and Schofield moved forward to hold Johnston fast in his entrenched position, whilst the Army of the Tennessee made a sweep to the right through Ship Gap to Villanow. From Villanow McPherson advanced through Snake Creek Gap early on the 9th, and at 2 p.m. was close to Resaca, a station on the railway some twelve or fourteen miles south of Dalton.

Sherman's superiority of numbers made it quite safe to detach McPherson's army on this flanking movement. Johnston, considering the length of the lines which he had to hold, was not strong enough to divide his forces and detach a large enough part of his army to hold McPherson in check for any length of time, as reinforcements could be easily sent to the flanking column. Either he must hold on to Dalton with his whole army, or if he wished to attack McPherson he must abandon his present position and move against him with all his forces. In case Johnston adopted the latter course, Sherman knew that he could depend upon McPherson, who was a soldier of great ability and sound judgment, to hold his own until he was able to bring up the bulk of his army to his support. If Johnston held on to his position round Dalton, Sherman hoped that McPherson would be able to seize Resaca, and thus compel the Confederate army in its retreat to abandon the railway and move to the east: in which case its destruction would be a comparatively easy task.

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 31. But Johnston (*Narrative*, 278) disliked the position because Rocky Face Ridge covered any direct approach from Chattanooga to Resaca or Calhoun. Had he been left to himself he would have preferred to withdraw his troops to the vicinity of Calhoun, so as to free his left flank from exposure.

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 25.



Johnston apparently considered that the road through Snake Creek Gap was impracticable for the movements of large bodies of troops, and had made no attempt to secure it. At Resaca he had constructed an entrenched camp and placed two brigades as a garrison in it.<sup>1</sup> McPherson, greatly to Sherman's disappointment, did not deem it prudent to attack this camp, not knowing how large a part of Johnston's army he might have to encounter, and withdrew his forces to the mouth of Snake Creek Gap.<sup>2</sup> In the meantime the other two Federal armies had been demonstrating against various points of Johnston's lines. The Confederate skirmishers had been driven into Mill Creek Gap, and attempts had been made to gain a footing on Rocky Face both above and below the Gap. But at both points, where the attempt was made, the Confederate lines were found to be too strong to admit of any chance of success. Sherman therefore determined to leave Howard's Corps and a cavalry division to watch the Gap and follow up Johnston, as soon as he commenced his retreat, and to swing the rest of his army round to the right and join McPherson at Snake Creek Gap.

On the night of the 9th Johnston sent Hood with three divisions from his right towards Resaca, expecting that an attack would be made upon the entrenched camp at that place. But on finding that McPherson had withdrawn to Snake Creek Gap, he ordered one division to return to his right wing in front of Dalton, whilst the other two were posted at Tilton, a station between Dalton and Resaca. On the 11th Polk, with the advance division of his Corps, arrived at Resaca and reported for duty to Johnston. On the same day the general movement of the Federal army to the right commenced, and on the 12th the whole of Sherman's force was concentrated at the mouth of Snake Creek Gap, with the exception of Howard's Corps and Stoneman's cavalry, which latter force took up the position in front of Johnston's lines recently held by Schofield's Corps. On that night Johnston, finding that his position at Dalton was no longer tenable with the enemy in force threatening his rear, abandoned his lines and withdrew to Resaca. His retreat was covered by his cavalry, and Polk's division held back the advance of McPherson's column. On the morning of the 13th Howard entered Dalton.

Thus Sherman had won the first move in the great game of war to be played out between Johnston and himself. The Confederate

<sup>1</sup> Johnston seems to have considered that this entrenched position at Resaca would delay any force advancing through Snake Creek Gap long enough to enable him to make good his retreat from Dalton (4 B. & L., 262; Johnston's *Narrative*, 316-17).

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 36. Sherman has been criticised for not accepting Thomas' original plan and entrusting the flanking movement to the Army of the Cumberland. He seems at the outset of the campaign to have wished to "walk warily," and therefore preferred to retain the bulk of his forces in Johnston's front.

general was disappointed of his hope of dealing his opponent a severe counter-blow at the commencement of the campaign, and the Federal soldiers were proportionately elated at the ease with which so strong a position had been turned.

At Resaca Johnston took up a strong position with his left resting on the Oostanaula, whilst his right was bent back across the railway until it rested on the Connasauga. Strong as the position was, it had one fatal defect. There was a river in its rear, and if Sherman continued his flanking movement and threatened to cross the river below, Johnston would be obliged to continue his retreat. The left and centre of the Confederate line were covered by Camp Creek, and Polk on the left had put part of his forces across the Creek in order to secure some high ground from which, if it fell into Federal hands, the railway and wagon bridges over the river could be commanded.

During the 14th there was some sharp fighting, as Hood, commanding the Confederate right, attempted to fall upon the left flank of Howard's Corps, which on the extreme left of the Federal line, was "in the air." But Sherman, seeing the weakness of Howard's position, promptly moved Hooker's Corps to his support, and Hood's attack was repulsed. On the Federal right McPherson drove Polk's troops from their advanced position on the west bank of Camp Creek, and a footing on the east bank was secured by part of Osterhaus' division of the 15th Corps.<sup>1</sup>

On the 15th Sherman moved Schofield's Corps from the centre to the extreme left, and one division of McPherson's army crossed the Oostanaula and threatened Calhoun some seven miles south of Resaca on the railway. It was Sherman's plan to advance by the left flank, and having by that movement strengthened and contracted his lines on the left to detail a considerable part of his army for a flanking movement by the right against Calhoun.<sup>2</sup> For that purpose he had two bridges laid across the river below Resaca.

Johnston had already found his position gravely compromised by McPherson's capture of the high ground on the west bank of Camp Creek, and had been obliged to lay a pontoon bridge across the river about a mile above the railway bridge, out of range of the Federal batteries. Seeing that Sherman intended to continue his flanking movement, on the night of the 15th he retired across the Oostanaula, burning the railway bridge behind him.

The railroad from Chattanooga to Atlanta is crossed by three

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 45.

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 47. Such a flanking movement would be completely protected by the Oostanaula (4 B. & L., 267). Johnston (4 B. & L., 265) claims that on the 14th Hood drove the Federal left from its position; but Howard (4 B. & L., 302) maintains that though his left was very hard pressed, yet it held its ground by the aid of reinforcements from Hooker.

rivers flowing in a general direction from the north-east to the south-west. These rivers are the Oostanaula, the Etowah, and the Chattahoochee. After crossing the railway close to Allatoona, the Etowah flows west till it joins the Oostanaula at Rome, where the united streams form the Coosa. From Resaca to the point where the Etowah crosses the railway is a distance of about thirty miles, and in the triangle formed by the two rivers and this section of the railway the next stage in the duel between Johnston and Sherman was about to be fought out. In this district the country is more open and less broken than on the northern bank of the Oostanaula, and altogether more favourable for military operations on an extensive scale.<sup>1</sup>

Sherman was in great hopes that he could force Johnston to fight a battle before crossing the Etowah, and he had every confidence that the battle, if fought, would be decisive of the campaign. Johnston also felt that his retreat had gone quite far enough. To continue it further would only tend to discourage and demoralise his troops. He had now under his command three full Corps, and the numerical disproportion between the two armies was at this moment less than at any other part of the campaign.<sup>2</sup> Immediately after crossing the Oostanaula he began to look about for some favourable position, where he might offer battle to Sherman's army. On the 16th he was hoping to stand and fight a mile or two south of Calhoun. But on examination the position was found to be unsuitable: and he accordingly fell back to a position about a mile north of Adairsville, where his engineer officers had reported that the ground was favourable for the defensive.<sup>3</sup> This position also was finally judged unsuitable, as the breadth of the valley to be held was too great, and the retreat was continued, Hardee retiring in the direction of Kingston, and Hood and Polk towards Cassville.

Sherman, who had pressed on in pursuit as fast as he could get his various Corps across the rivers,<sup>4</sup> judged that Johnston intended to give battle at Adairsville, and directed a concentration of his troops with a view to a general engagement on the 18th. So anxious was he to finish the campaign by one decisive blow, that he directed his lieutenants to bring on a battle without waiting for supports, reckoning that such veteran troops as his, and under such able commanders, would be able to hold their own until he had time to concentrate the bulk of his army against the Confederate

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 49.

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 63. Whilst at Resaca, Johnston had been joined by two divisions of Polk's Corps, and the third division and a cavalry division joined him at Adairsville. These reinforcements amounted to nearly 20,000 men (4 B. & L., 281), making up the Confederate strength to over 80,000.

<sup>3</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 50.

<sup>4</sup> Hooker and Schofield crossed the Connasauga and Coosawattee, two tributaries of the Oostanaula.



position.<sup>1</sup> Greatly disappointed to find on the 18th that Johnston had abandoned his position at Adairsville, he continued to make vigorous pursuit. Under the impression that Johnston's main line of retreat was on Kingston, he ordered Thomas with the 4th and 14th Corps to follow that road, having the Army of the Tennessee on his right, whilst the 20th and 23rd Corps were sent along the road to Cassville.

As the railway at Kingston makes a sharp bend to the east, and the wagon road does the same, the roads on which Sherman's columns were marching rapidly diverge. The two roads are at the widest interval about seven miles apart, and between them is a gravelly plateau, somewhat broken towards the south.<sup>2</sup> On the right McPherson, in order not to crowd Thomas, was marching towards Kingston by parallel roads. Thus on the 18th Sherman's army was strung out upon a broader front than at any time since the campaign commenced,<sup>3</sup> and Johnston had such a chance as was never again presented to him of striking his foe in detail. His best chance of dealing a heavy blow would have been to order Hardee to march with all possible speed from Kingston to Cassville, and thus to concentrate the whole of his army against the exposed left of the Federal forces. Could he have massed his whole strength against Schofield's solitary Corps, or even against Schofield and Hlooker combined, he might have inflicted considerable damage upon them before Sherman could have got Thomas' two Corps across the difficult ground between the two roads to their assistance. But Johnston did not give any such orders to Hardee, who consequently fell back slowly, skirmishing with Thomas' advance guard, and did not reach Cassville until the afternoon of the 19th. Johnston claims, indeed, to have given orders to Hood and Polk to make a combined attack upon Schofield on the 18th, but Hood denies that any such movement was ordered for that day.

On the 19th Thomas occupied Kingston in the morning, and pressed close on Hardee's rearguard, until in the evening it was driven into Cassville, and the Armies of the Cumberland and the Ohio held a connected line close up to the Confederate entrenchments. The Army of the Tennessee on that day halted at Kingston.

Johnston, who was equally anxious to fight a battle, if he could find a strong defensive position, was intending to stand and fight at Cassville on the following day. But Polk and Hardee protested that their position was untenable, as part of both their lines was enfiladed by the batteries on the Federal left, and Johnston, very reluctantly throwing the responsibility upon his two Corps commanders, ordered the lines to be evacuated on the night of the 19th, and on the 20th retreated across the Etowah, burning the railway

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 56.

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 56.

<sup>3</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 53.

bridge behind him. Hood, however, has a very different version, saying that he vainly pressed Johnston to assume the offensive-defensive on the 18th, and that what he complained of was Johnston's purely defensive policy. Whatever the actual fact, it is quite clear that the difference of opinion between the Confederate generals by preventing an engagement on the north bank of the Etowah, prolonged the campaign.<sup>1</sup> Sherman was justly confident of gaining a decisive victory if he could force his adversary to give battle.

Davis' division of the 14th Corps had been detached down the west bank of the Oostanaula to support Garrard's cavalry division, which was moving towards Rome, with a view to crossing the river and operating on Johnston's flank. The cavalry did not go far down the river for fear of separating itself too much from the main column. But Davis continued to march down the river, and on the 18th, after some sharp fighting, captured Rome. This town, which was connected with Kingston by a branch line, was a *dépôt* for military stores of some size, and its occupation by Davis' division gave Sherman's advance a broad front, which tended to impose upon the enemy.<sup>2</sup>

Sherman had secured two bridges near to Kingston, and, as he could therefore count with certainty on being able to move his army across the river, he gave his troops a few days' rest, while the railway behind him was being repaired and a store of supplies accumulated for the next move.<sup>3</sup>

Johnston, after crossing the Etowah, had taken up a strong position along the railroad. His temporary base was at Marietta, about half-way between the Etowah and the Chattahoochee. After crossing the river the railway runs through the Allatoona Pass, a deep gorge which traverses a spur of high, rugged hills. This pass was held by Johnston. It was not likely that Sherman, having the means of crossing the Etowah at Kingston, would attempt to force a crossing in front of Allatoona. Accordingly Johnston kept the main part of his army along the railroad, waiting until he should have definite information of Sherman's next movement. If, as he expected, Sherman continued his flanking movement by the right, Johnston intended to move his troops to meet him and to hold the roads leading from that direction to the railway.

Sherman's plan was, after providing his army with twenty days' rations, to cut loose from the railway and make straight for Dallas, a village twenty-five miles south of Kingston and nearly twenty miles west of Marietta.<sup>4</sup> From Dallas he would then march east

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 56. For Johnston's plans and his view of the point in controversy, see *Narrative*, 319-24.

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 57.

<sup>3</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 58.

<sup>4</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 64.

and endeavour to strike the railroad near Marietta: if that line of advance proved very strongly held by the enemy, he would swing his left wing on to a road leading to Ackworth and regain the railway above Marietta. On May 22nd he gave orders for the movement to commence on the following day. He had no fear of Johnston attempting to meet him near the river in front of Kingston, as the Confederate commander could not afford to divide his army, and if he massed his troops to resist an advance at that point, Sherman could throw his left wing across the river at Allatoona and retain his hold on the railway.<sup>1</sup>

On the 24th Wheeler's Confederate cavalry, which had crossed the river on the 22nd, made a reconnaissance to Cassville to find out whether the whole of Sherman's army was crossing at Kingston. Jackson's cavalry, on the left of the Confederate army, had already come into contact with the Federal advance at Stilesboro', and it was soon plain that Sherman, with his whole force, was pushing for Dallas. Johnston accordingly ordered his troops to move forward from the railroad, and on the 25th his line of defence was formed. Hardee, on the left, lay across the road from Dallas to Atlanta, and Hood, on the right, with his centre at New Hope Church, covered the road from Dallas to Ackworth. Polk's Corps formed the centre closed up on Hood, with a thinner line connecting with Hardee.<sup>2</sup> The Confederate position was a strong one, occupying a succession of ridges with wooded summits, and approached by open valleys, which an attacking force would have to cross without shelter.<sup>3</sup> It covered all the roads from Dallas to Ackworth, Marietta, and Atlanta as well as those running in the same direction by New Hope Church.

In the Federal army McPherson was on the right, Thomas in the centre, and Schofield on the left. In the centre the 20th Corps leading the advance attacked Hood's centre at New Hope Church on the 25th, but the position was too strong to be carried by frontal attack, and the assault was repulsed with considerable loss. The 4th Corps was sent from Thomas' right to the support of the 20th, and took position on its left, extending the Federal line in that direction.

On the 26th Schofield, with two divisions of the Army of the Ohio, came into position on Howard's left, and with his left reached across the Dallas-Allatoona road. On the next day Sherman made an unsuccessful attempt to turn the Confederate right. Howard was directed to take two divisions, Wood's of his own Corps and R. W. Johnson's of the 14th, which as yet had been held in reserve, to move up the Allatoona road, face eastward, and when he overlapped the Confederate lines to fall upon their exposed flank. But what the Federal leaders took to be the extremity of the Con-

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 65.

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 68.

<sup>3</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 69.



federate lines was only an angle of the works, which at this point made a sharply refused flank :<sup>1</sup> and Hood had been reinforced by Cleburne's division from Hardee's Corps. The consequence was that Wood and Johnson found themselves taken in flank, and were repulsed with a loss of about 1,500 men.<sup>2</sup>

Sherman now determined to extend his whole army towards the left, hoping that by crowding troops in that direction he might be able to gain the road to Ackworth.<sup>3</sup> Howard's movement on the 27th, though failing to achieve the desired object, had nevertheless gained valuable ground, which helped to cover Sherman's movement to the left. But on the 28th Hardee, anticipating the movement, sent Bate's division forward to feel McPherson's lines and find out whether the whole Army of the Tennessee was still confronting him. Bate made a fierce attack on Logan's Corps, which formed McPherson's right, and after about half an hour's hard fighting was repulsed with very heavy loss. In order to withdraw Bate's troops Hardee made a demonstration against the 16th Corps on the left of Logan : and a sharp engagement took place all along McPherson's line. Logan reported a loss of 379 in all, and no special return was made of the casualties in the 16th Corps, which must consequently have been few. The Confederate loss probably reached 2,000.<sup>4</sup>

On the same night Hood moved with his Corps to the extreme right of the Confederate position, intending to fall upon Sherman's extreme left, but, finding that the Federals had not advanced as far as he expected, withdrew his troops to his own lines.<sup>5</sup> On the evening of the 29th an artillery demonstration was made by Johnston all along the line, the probable object of which was to find out whether McPherson still held the lines in Hardee's front in full force.

On June 1st Stoneman's cavalry occupied Allatoona, and on the 2nd Sherman's whole army was steadily gaining ground to the left, moving three miles in that direction.<sup>6</sup> It was now plain to Johnston that the continued extension of the Federals towards the railway rendered his position untenable, and on the night of June 4th he evacuated his lines about New Hope Church and withdrew to a fresh line of entrenchments already laid out by his engineers nearer Marietta.

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 79.

<sup>2</sup> This engagement is known as the battle of Pickett's Mill.

<sup>3</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 84.

<sup>4</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 86.

<sup>5</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 87. But, according to Johnston's *Narrative*, 333-4, Hood refrained from attack, because he found a Federal division thrown back almost at right angles to the general line and entrenching. Polk's Corps had been moved to the right of Hood, apparently after the engagement of the 27th, though Johnston says that this movement took place on the 26th, and that it was Polk's Corps and not Hood's which, with Cleburne's assistance, repulsed Howard's attack (Cox's *Atlanta*, 79, note).

<sup>6</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 92.

As soon as he discovered Johnston's withdrawal Sherman commenced to move his army to the railway, where fresh depôts could be established, and the work of rebuilding the bridge over the Etowah was pushed on with all possible speed. The Army of the Ohio was ordered to hold its ground, whilst the other two armies moved to the left, and thus became the right of the new Federal line. Thomas' army held the centre, and McPherson's formed the left wing. The work of transferring the army to its new line continued from the 5th to the 9th. The change of base was most opportune: for rain had been falling steadily, and the roads from Kingston had been rendered by the constant passage of the wagon-trains mere seas of mud, in which all traces of the original track were lost.

The first month of the campaign was over. In that period the Federal army had advanced nearly eighty miles, had forced Johnston across the Oostanaula and Etowah, and after cutting loose from the railway at Kingston had regained it at Ackworth, thus turning the Allatoona Pass. The total loss during the month of May is returned by Sherman as 9,299. Johnston stated his own loss for the same period as 5,393, but in his estimate he did not include prisoners or cavalry losses. During the Atlanta campaign 12,983 prisoners were taken by the Federals: and on the assumption that the proportion of prisoners was about the same for each month, Sherman estimated the Confederate loss for May as quite 8,600. The Federal leader had manœuvred his opponent out of a succession of strong positions, and inflicted upon him a loss relatively, and perhaps even actually, greater than that which he himself had suffered.<sup>1</sup>

Johnston's new line of entrenchments rested on the mountains to the north and west of Marietta. His right held Brush Mountain, and the line then extended over Pine Hill to Lost Mountain on the extreme left. Pine Hill in the centre stands out somewhat in isolation from the other mountains, forming a salient, and in order to protect it on the west an advanced line to the south-west was held, crossing the road from Burnt Hickory to Marietta, about a mile north of the Gilgal Church.<sup>2</sup> The left wing was held by Hardee's Corps, its left at Gilgal Church and its right on Pine Hill. In the centre, Polk's Corps reached from Pine Hill across the railway to the Ackworth and Marietta road: and on the right Hood's Corps lay along the foot of Brush Mountain behind Noonday Creek. This creek also partially covered Polk's front. The entrenchments from Gilgal Church to Lost Mountain were held by Jackson's cavalry. Formidable as the line appeared, it was really too long, covering as it did ten miles, to be held by an

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 88.

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 92-3.

Army of 60,000 men,<sup>1</sup> and the isolated position of Pine Hill in the centre was a source of weakness, as the Confederate general quickly realised.

It was open to Sherman to operate against Johnston's new line either on the east or on the west of the railway. Probably the ground east of Marietta was more favourable for offensive movements. But to have adopted that line of advance would have exposed to Johnston's attack the railroad back to Kingston. Accordingly Sherman resolved to ensure the safety of his lines of communication by advancing by the right flank, though the ground in that direction was less favourable for his operations. Rain had been falling continually since the 4th, and the discomfort of the troops was increased by a cold east wind. But advantage was taken of a partial cessation of the rain on the 14th to press close up to the Confederate entrenched lines. In the centre Thomas pushed forward into the re-entrant angle between Pine Hill and the works to the east, and advanced so far as to threaten to cut off the troops posted on that mountain from communication with the rest of the Confederate lines. A consultation was being held on the top of the mountain by Johnston, Hardee, and Polk as to the advisability of withdrawing the troops—Bate's division—holding it. A chance cannon shot killed Polk.

The fallen general had been Bishop of Louisiana, and a cousin of J. K. Polk, who was President of the United States during the Mexican War. Having had a military education at West Point, on the outbreak of the Civil War he offered his services to the Confederacy. Exercising very considerable influence from his position both in Church and State, he had been advanced to a higher command in the Confederate army—at the time of his death he was a lieutenant-general—than perhaps his purely military qualifications justified.<sup>2</sup> He was succeeded for the time being in the command of his Corps by Loring, the senior divisional commander. During the night the troops on Pine Hill were withdrawn.

Johnston's weak spot now was on the extreme left, where he had not enough troops to hold in force the lines between Gilgal Church and Lost Mountain: these lines and Lost Mountain had been committed to the charge of Jackson's cavalry, for lack of infantry to hold them. Schofield, on the Federal right, pressed Hardee vigorously, and forced him on the night of the 16th to abandon Gilgal Church and fall back about three miles to a new line of entrenchments behind Mud Creek.<sup>3</sup> With Hooker's Corps on his left, Schofield continued to press Hardee; and on the 17th,

<sup>1</sup> 4 B. & L., 252. Sherman estimated Johnston's force at this juncture at 62,000. Probably this estimate is slightly below the mark. The Confederate strength was nearer 70,000 (4 B. & L., 282).

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 98.

<sup>3</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 100.



whilst Hooker "contained" Hardee's left, Schofield moved his Corps across Mud Creek and secured a position overlapping the Confederate left flank. In the centre Thomas was pushing close up to the enemy's lines, and his batteries were getting into position to enfilade the salient angle, which Hardee's new line formed with the original line of Confederate entrenchments. On the Federal left the Army of the Tennessee, reinforced by the arrival, on June 8th, of the 17th Corps, under Blair, about 9,000 strong,<sup>1</sup> was overlapping the Confederate right. On the night of the 18th Johnston withdrew the whole of his army to a fresh line.

The key to the new position of the Confederates was Kenesaw Mountain. It was held by Loring's Corps. Hood, on the right, held the high ground beyond the railway, which, bending back north-east, runs between Kenesaw and Brush Mountains, and faced the latter mountain. On the left Hardee's Corps was drawn up behind Noses Creek. These lines formed a semicircle round Marietta facing west, but were considerably nearer the town on the north side. Hardee's Corps had fallen back some six or eight miles, whilst Hood had not retired more than two miles.<sup>2</sup>

The change of position did not bring Hardee much relief. Hooker and Schofield were promptly pressing in pursuit, and whilst Hooker crossed Noses Creek in Hardee's front, Schofield was moving round his left towards the valley of Olley's Creek and threatening to gain possession of the road from Powder Springs village to Marietta.<sup>3</sup> At the same time a general extension of the Federal troops was being made towards their right.

Johnston, in order to prevent his left being turned, on the night of the 21st moved Hood's Corps from the right to the left. Having reached his new position, Hood made an impetuous assault upon Hooker's right and Hascall's division of the 23rd Corps. But the Federal lines were too strongly held to be carried by direct assault, and Hood's attack was repulsed with a loss of about 1,000 in killed and wounded.

It would seem that Hood, after his night's march from McPherson's front, had expected to be able to outflank the Federal right.<sup>4</sup> But on the morning of the 22nd, before the Confederate attack was made, that wing of Sherman's army had been extending eastwards and thus upset Hood's calculations. For Schofield had pushed Cox's division down the Sandtown road towards the point, where it crossed the road from Powder Springs village to Marietta. Hascall's division was on the road from Powder Springs Church,

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 94.

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 104.

<sup>3</sup> Schofield's turning movement was protected by the swollen waters of Noses Creek, which was eventually crossed by aid of a dismantled bridge, whilst Hooker crossed by a bridge, which was still standing, higher up the creek at a point where the Confederate lines were drawn a considerable distance back from the stream (Cox's *Atlanta*, 105-7).

<sup>4</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 112.

which is about four miles north of the village of the same name, to Marietta, covering the road which Cox was following. At the same time Hooker had swung his Corps to the right so as to connect with Hascall, and Hood found stretching all along his front a continuous line of entrenchments. The attack on Hascall's division was so persistent that Schofield ordered Cox to send back three of his brigades to his support, though these did not reach the battlefield until the fighting was over. Cox's fourth brigade had already passed the junction of the two roads and held some high ground overlooking Olley's Creek. The loss of the Federals in this engagement, known as the battle of Culp's Farm, was but slight, being mainly confined to two brigades, and probably did not exceed 300.<sup>1</sup> Hood's attack had, however, necessitated the recall of Cox's division from a movement down the Sandtown road, which had seemed likely to produce great results.<sup>2</sup>

It was plain, that if further progress was to be made in that direction, it would be necessary to extend the whole Federal army to the right. But such an extension would carry the troops further away from their depôts, and in the shocking condition of the roads, owing to the continuous rain, it was impracticable to lengthen the lines of supply, especially as the Confederate cavalry were threatening the long line of railway in the Federal rear. Sherman was therefore obliged either to wait until the weather improved and the roads grew harder, and then accumulate supplies preparatory to a movement of a considerable part of his army by the right flank to some point on the railway well to the south of Marietta, or else to make an attempt to break Johnston's lines at some point or other. He was loath to remain inactive until such time as the weather might improve, because his adversary might seize the opportunity to detach some of his troops to Lee's aid in Virginia, and Grant in mapping out the campaign had specially impressed upon his chief lieutenant the necessity of keeping so tight a grip upon Johnston, that he could not afford to weaken himself by sending reinforcements to the Army of Northern Virginia. Besides, Hood's movement from right to left must have left that part of the Confederate lines, from which he had come, very weakly defended at some point: and Sherman hoped by a direct assault to find out that weak point, and if he could break Johnston's lines there, he expected to make the battle decisive of the campaign.

It seemed probable to him that Kenesaw Mountain, as the naturally strongest part of the Confederate lines, would be the most weakly guarded. Accordingly he ordered McPherson to attack the south-western face of the mountain, whilst Thomas was directed to assail the lines in his front at whatever point he judged most suitable. The attack was fixed for June 27th. Schofield

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 113.

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 117.

also, partly by way of creating a diversion, partly in the hope that he might gain some solid advantage, was instructed to push forward along the Sandtown road.

McPherson made the assault with one division of Logan's Corps, whilst Thomas, further to the right, launched two columns against the Confederate lines, consisting of Newton's division of the 4th Corps and Davis' division of the 14th. The rest of the Armies of the Cumberland and the Tennessee held themselves in readiness to follow up any advantage which the attacking columns might gain, whilst all along the front of the two armies the skirmish-line kept up a brisk demonstration. But the superiority of a strongly entrenched position over a frontal attack was again demonstrated, and the Federal columns were beaten off with a loss of about 2,500.<sup>1</sup>

Seeing that the sole chance of success lay in a surprise, the Federal Corps and divisional commanders did not repeat the attack after the first repulse, and the troops which had formed the columns of attack quickly entrenched themselves close to the lines which they had failed to storm. This they were enabled to do without severe loss, owing to the thickness of the forest, which reached close up to the abatis in front of the Confederate trenches.<sup>2</sup>

On the extreme right, however, Schofield made good progress. He had already, on the 26th, pushed one brigade across Olley's Creek, whilst a mile below a second brigade was threatening to cross. On the 27th the movement was continued. Cox's division reached a position beyond Olley's Creek on a ridge, which separated that valley from the valley of Nickajack Creek. The Confederate left was completely turned, and a road was now opened, by which an advance might be made to Smyrna, a station some five miles south of Marietta.<sup>3</sup>

Sherman, after his failure at Kenesaw Mountain, determined to wait until he had accumulated the necessary supplies, and then move McPherson's army over to the extreme right, and carry out in force the flank movement so successfully initiated by Schofield. He had heard from Grant on the 28th that the possibility of Johnston trying to reinforce Lee might now be dismissed from consideration, and consequently the chief motive for assaulting the Confederate entrenchments was removed.<sup>4</sup> The weather was improving: the heat of the summer sun was drying up the roads, and in a few days he expected to be able to make a big flank movement, which would force Johnston to abandon his lines and fall back behind the Chattahoochee.

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 127. Johnston (*Narrative*, 343) stated his loss at 808. General Howard (4 B. & L., 310) says that the whole Confederate line was "stronger in artificial contrivances and natural features than the cemetery at Gettysburg."

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 128.

<sup>3</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 124.

<sup>4</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 130.



Johnston, however, fully realised that Schofield's advance along the Sandtown road had rendered his position at Marietta untenable. The lie of the country beyond Olley's Creek was such that it was impossible to extend a really continuous line of entrenchments into the Nickajack valley, and on the 28th his engineers were busily occupied in laying out two fresh lines of works. The work was speedily done with the assistance of negroes and the Georgia militia.<sup>1</sup> The first line crossed the railway at Smyrna (Map XIII.), continued in a south-west direction for some three miles to the left of the railway, and then ran south behind Nickajack Creek. The second line was nearer the river, and only covered about two miles of the railway, and its left flank also reached Nickajack Creek, which, before entering the Chattahoochee, runs for some miles parallel to it at a distance of about a mile.<sup>2</sup>

Sherman having accumulated the supplies necessary for his fresh movement, on July 2nd began to move the Army of the Tennessee from the left to the extreme right. On that night Johnston fell back from the Kenesaw entrenchments and occupied the new lines in front of Smyrna. But the continued advance of the Federal right along the Sandtown road towards the Chattahoochee showed Johnston that his position at Smyrna was too far in advance of the river, and that if he wished to make any stand on its northern bank he must fall back to a position where he would be able to guard the crossings over it. Accordingly, on the night of the 4th, he retreated to his second line of entrenchments.

Sherman followed in pursuit, and from Vining's Station, where he established his headquarters, could see his goal, the city of Atlanta, nine miles south of the Chattahoochee.

Writing to Halleck, Sherman had said that, if Johnston decided to hold the line of the Chattahoochee, he should have to study the situation a little. It is likely that Johnston would have been able to make a more obstinate defence, if instead of entrenching a camp on the north side of the river he had only fortified a *tête de pont* on that bank and had withdrawn the bulk of his army to the other bank.<sup>3</sup> As it turned out, the situation did not require any prolonged study. Johnston's lines were about five or six miles long, and covered the railway bridge and principal wagon roads from Marietta to Atlanta. His cavalry were stationed along the southern bank, and all the crossings for a dozen miles were defended by separate fortifications on that bank.<sup>4</sup> Some twenty miles above the railway bridge there was a bridge at Rosswell,

<sup>1</sup> Two brigades of the Georgia militia had been brought across the Chattahoochee under the command of General G. W. Smith, who had been second in command at the battle of Seven Pines in 1862.

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 131.

<sup>3</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 137.

<sup>4</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 134.

which the Confederate cavalry burnt. Sherman invested Johnston's position with the Armies of the Cumberland and the Tennessee. McPherson held the extreme right at Turner's Ferry, whilst Howard's Corps formed the left at Pace's Ferry. Schofield's Corps was held in reserve near Smyrna, ready for a movement in any direction which seemed to promise success. Stoneman's cavalry was sent down the river to see if any crossing could be found, and on the other flank Garrard's cavalry moved up the river to Rosswell, only, however, to find the bridge already burnt.

On the 8th Schofield crossed the river without the loss of a man at the mouth of Soap Creek, some six or seven miles above Pace's Ferry.<sup>1</sup> The Confederates were completely taken by surprise, as the opposite bank was only held by a handful of cavalry with a single gun. A hasty reconnaissance convinced Johnston of the futility of trying to drive back the Federal troops across the river, and on the night of the 9th he withdrew to the south bank, destroying the bridges behind him, and marched towards Atlanta.

The second month of the campaign was ended, and Sherman's victorious progress still continued. The railroad from the Etowah to the Chattahoochee had passed into the hands of the Federals. Their total losses for June are given by Sherman as amounting to 7,530, whilst the Confederate losses are probably not over-estimated at 7,000.<sup>2</sup> Relatively to the respective strength of the two armies the Confederate loss for June, as for May, was decidedly the heavier. Of the Federal losses just one-third were accounted for by the fighting of the 27th. The remaining 5,000 show how fierce had been the fighting on the skirmish-lines. The average daily loss was about 200, and the skirmish-lines were so strongly entrenched as to be little less formidable than the main line of works, and any attack upon them rapidly assumed the dimensions and the dignity of a regular battle. A month of such fighting was worth years of ordinary experience: and Sherman's veterans might well feel confident that with the coveted prize in sight nothing could prevent them from shortly crowning their hopes with its capture.

When he had driven Johnston across the Chattahoochee, Sherman had next to decide whether he would operate against Atlanta by his right or left flank. If he chose the former course, the ground on the south side of the railway was the more favourable for offensive movements. The streams, which run into the Chattahoochee below the railway bridge, enter it at right angles, and the ravines, which their courses form, would prevent Johnston taking up a position very far from Atlanta, as they would make it difficult to move supports from one point to another with any speed. Furthermore, as soon as the Federal army was across the river on

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 138-40.

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 135-6.

the south side of the railway, it would be already in rear of Atlanta, and the railways running south from that city to Macon and Montgomery would lie at its mercy.

If, on the other hand, Sherman advanced by his left flank, the ground would favour the defensive. On that side, the streams instead of running perpendicular to the river, follow a course more or less parallel to it, and empty into Peach-tree Creek, which itself, after running parallel for some distance to the Chattahoochee, falls into it close to the railway bridge. The succession of parallel ridges would ensure Johnston a choice of strong positions. The road on the north side of the railway was both longer and more difficult; but it had this advantage, that it would enable Sherman to strike the Atlanta-Decatur Railway. There was a danger, so Grant warned his lieutenant, that the troops from the Army of Northern Virginia, which had recently been withdrawn from the Shenandoah Valley, were about to be sent to Georgia, and in such a contingency it was all important to seize this line of railroad in time to prevent their arrival. A movement by the left flank was also calculated to give more protection to the Federal lines of supply. For to have adopted the southern route would have allowed Johnston to cross his cavalry over the river at points which would be at once in the Federal rear, and to break up the railway right back to the Allatoona Pass, whereas a movement by the left flank practically covered the railway communication. It was Sherman's intention as soon as he got near to Atlanta to swing his right wing across the railway, and, when that was secured, to order the reconstruction of the bridge over the Chattahoochee with all speed.<sup>1</sup>

Having decided for the above reasons to advance by the left, Sherman gave orders for the general movement to commence on the 16th. Thomas' army was to form the right, and crossing the river at Pace's and Phillips' Ferries to march direct on Atlanta. Schofield, in the centre, was to move towards Decatur, whilst McPherson, on the left, was to strike in upon the railroad between Decatur and Stone Mountain, and after destroying the track move on Decatur. Johnston, for his part, was prepared to give battle behind the line of Peach-tree Creek. He might easily have selected a strong position nearer the river, but he was afraid lest in that case his untiring foe might strike in between him and the railway.

But another was destined to command on the field which Johnston had selected. On the night of the 17th he received a telegram from Richmond, relieving him of the command of the army and ordering him to turn it over to Hood. The Confederate President and the Southern Press had grown tired of Johnston's continued

<sup>1</sup> For the motives which decided Sherman to move by the left flank, see Cox's *Atlanta*, 144-7



retreats, and the appointment of Hood signified that a new policy was about to be adopted. As such, it was hailed with delight by the whole of the Federal army. Hood had gained a well-deserved reputation in the East as a hard fighter, especially when a divisional commander under Longstreet, but it was a dangerous experiment at this critical stage of the Confederate fortunes to put in supreme command a man whose methods savoured so much of recklessness, and it promptly proved a fatal mistake.<sup>1</sup>

The new commander adopted the general outlines of the policy which his predecessor had fixed upon. He determined, first, to attack the Federal right, as soon as it had crossed Peach-tree Creek, hoping to take it in flank, whilst it was in motion and separated from the rest of Sherman's army; and, secondly, to move troops to the south and east and fall upon the exposed flank and rear of the left wing. The Confederate lines started on the railway two miles south of the river, ran six miles eastwards to the junction of Pea Vine Creek with Peach-tree Creek, and then turned southwards along the former creek, till they reached the railway between Atlanta and Decatur.<sup>2</sup>

In carrying out Sherman's plan of advance by the left flank McPherson's army had nearly four times as far to go as Thomas', and it was plain that the latter would have to stand fast whilst the rest of the Federal forces were coming into line. Sherman fully realised that he was giving Hood an opportunity of striking at his exposed right wing, but he had every confidence in the ability of Thomas and his army of veterans to hold their own, and was most desirous that Hood should strike a blow, which, considering the well-known rashness of that commander, was likely to inflict a heavier loss upon the Confederates than their opponents. The result fully justified his expectations.

On the 19th Thomas crossed Peach-tree Creek with the heads of his three columns, and the following day the whole of the Army of the Cumberland was on the south side of the creek. Sherman had directed his lieutenant, whilst holding fast with his right, to try and connect on his left with Schofield. But the maps in the hands of the Federal commander proved faulty, and Thomas found it impossible to connect with Schofield by anything like a continuous line. Eventually he ordered Howard with two divisions of his Corps to make a détour to the left rear and press forward, until he arrived within supporting distance of Schofield. In consequence the right wing of the Federal army, consisting of the 14th and 20th Corps and one division of the 4th, was, on the morning of the 20th, on the south side of Peach-tree Creek, showing

<sup>1</sup> Hood had graduated at West Point in 1853. McPherson, Schofield, and Sheridan had belonged to the same class, McPherson graduating 1st, Schofield 7th, Sheridan 34th, and Hood 44th.

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 147.

a front of only a mile, whilst the left wing of four Corps and the other two divisions of the 4th was strung out as far as Decatur along a front of quite eight miles, and between the two wings there was a gap of two miles.<sup>1</sup> It seemed as though Hood was to have a perfect opportunity of striking Thomas a heavy blow on his exposed flank.

The Confederate commander ordered Hardee's and A. P. Stewart's Corps (Hood, after taking over the command of the army, had assigned Stewart to the command of what had been Polk's Corps and after the latter's death had been temporarily commanded by Loring, whilst Cheatham had succeeded to the command of Hood's own Corps) to fall upon Thomas' left flank, assaulting it by divisions in echelon, whilst the lines fronting the Federal left wing were to be held by G. W. Smith's Georgia militia and Cheatham's Corps. The attack was ordered to commence at 1 p.m. But the Federal left was pressing forward with a speed not anticipated by Hood, and threatening to turn the Confederate right. Accordingly Hood ordered Cheatham's Corps to take ground to the right, and the attack was thereby delayed until 3 p.m.

The assault fell first upon Newton's division of the 4th Corps, and then, as the successive divisions came into battle, spread along Hooker's front, but the 14th Corps on the extreme right was barely engaged. The attack was repulsed at every point, but, in obedience to Hood's instructions for a decisive engagement, it was renewed again and again, though, as in the Federal attack on Kenesaw Mountain, its only chance of success lay in its taking the enemy by surprise. The combat was brought to an end by an urgent summons from Hood to Hardee, who was just about to renew the attack on Newton's exposed flank, to send a division to the assistance of Cheatham. The Federal loss for the four divisions actively engaged was 1,707. The loss in the two Confederate Corps can have been but little short of 6,000. Whilst this combat was raging on his left Hood was being very hard pressed on his right. Wheeler's cavalry, which had been skirmishing in advance of the Confederate lines on the extreme right, was pushed back with great rapidity by McPherson's advance, Cheatham's line was already stretched as far as it could possibly reach, and it was only the opportune arrival of Cleburne's division, sent by Hardee in answer to Hood's summons, which prevented Wheeler being driven into the city and the Federals following him in.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 152-4.

<sup>2</sup> For the battle of Peach-tree Creek, see Cox's *Atlanta*, 155-62. Hood (4 B. & L., 337) puts the blame for his failure on to Hardee, whom he charges first with being the cause of the delay in commencing the attack, secondly with contenting himself with skirmishing instead of pressing the attack home. Sherman (4 B. & L., 253) estimates the Confederate loss at 4,796, but Cox gives the higher figure adopted in the text.

As a result of the fighting of the 20th Hood found that both his flanks were in danger of being turned. He therefore determined to abandon the Peach-tree Creek line and withdraw his troops to fresh entrenchments nearer Atlanta, and at the same time to carry out the second part of his programme of offensive action by assailing the left flank and rear of McPherson's army. This very important task he entrusted to his most capable and experienced Corps commander, Hardee.<sup>1</sup> On the night of the 21st Hardee's Corps was withdrawn from its position north of Atlanta, marched through the city, and struck south and then north-east in order to fall upon McPherson's flank somewhere near the railway between Atlanta and Decatur. The advance of the Federal left on the 21st obliged the turning column to make a considerable détour. A march of fifteen miles brought it shortly after daybreak within two or three miles of Decatur.<sup>2</sup> There the road was left, and the troops plunged into the thick wood beyond, in order to find a position on the flank of the Federals. The greater part of the Federal cavalry was away engaged in raiding expeditions against the various railways. No information reached McPherson of Hardee's approach, and the Army of the Tennessee was taken by surprise. It was Hood's intention, as soon as Hardee's Corps gained any success, to move the rest of his troops in succession out of their entrenchments, and, falling upon the Federal line as it was being rolled up from left to right, to drive it down and, if possible, into Peach-tree Creek.

Hardee, with wonderful accuracy considering the difficulties with which he had to contend, arranged his troops on the Federal flank so that his left slightly overlapped the Federal left, consisting of the 17th Corps under Blair. The Confederates moved to the attack about noon.<sup>3</sup> But to their surprise the two right divisions ran up against the 16th Corps under General Dodge, which was halted in rear of Blair preparatory to advancing to take a position on his left.<sup>4</sup> On that part of the field the Confederate attack was repulsed. But the two divisions on the left, taking Blair's Corps in the rear, gained considerable ground.

Early in the fight McPherson, riding from the 16th to the 17th Corps, encountered the skirmish-line of Cleburne's division and fell mortally wounded. Sherman, when informed of McPherson's death, sent orders to Logan, commanding the 15th Corps, to

<sup>1</sup> Hood says that he selected Hardee's Corps because it was the largest, and was comparatively fresh, as it had taken but little part in the battle of the 20th. Apparently he did not select Cheatham's Corps, because that commander had been so short a time in command of the Corps (4 B. & L., 338).

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 166.

<sup>3</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 168.

<sup>4</sup> 4 B. & L., 326. The 16th Corps had been in reserve behind the 15th Corps, north of the railway, until the 21st.



take the temporary command of the Army of the Tennessee. Gaining ground steadily on his left, Hardee drove the Federals back upon a high bald hill south of the railway, which had formed the southern extremity of Cleburne's position on the 20th, and had been captured by Blair on the 21st. Here a desperate struggle ensued, as the Federals, being attacked from the rear, were forced to leap over their entrenchments and fight from the opposite side. A brigade was sent by Logan<sup>1</sup> to fill the gap between Blair and Dodge, and with its aid the Confederate attack on the hill was repulsed.

Hood, who was watching Hardee's battle from a salient of the Atlanta fortifications, now directed Cheatham to assail the hill and the lines of the 15th Corps running to the north of it, whilst Smith's Georgia militia attacked Schofield's line, which was now only held by one division and one brigade.<sup>2</sup> Smith's attack was repulsed without much difficulty. But Cheatham made a vigorous onslaught, and that part of the 17th Corps which was holding the hill leapt back over their entrenchments and again faced towards their proper front. Cheatham failed to carry the hill, but north of it he met with more success, and a great gap was made in the line of the 15th Corps.<sup>3</sup> Schofield's artillery was, however, now brought into play, and massed so as to bear upon the flank of the Confederates as they pushed towards the east. As Cheatham and Hardee were attacking the sides of a right angle, and were personally several miles apart, their attacks lacked combination, and were defeated in detail.<sup>4</sup> Night put an end to the conflict. The Confederate leaders, following the mistaken policy of the 20th, again and again renewed the attack after all chance of success had vanished, only swelling their own list of killed and wounded. The Federal loss was 3,521, and ten pieces of artillery fell into the hands of the Confederates: but the total loss of the assailants numbered not less than 10,000.<sup>5</sup> Wheeler's cavalry had accompanied Hardee's Corps on its flank march, and had swooped down on Decatur, where a part of the Federal trains was under the protection of a single brigade. A brigade sent from Schofield's Corps assisted the garrison of Decatur to drive off the Confederate cavalry.

Thus far the policy conceived by Johnston and executed by Hood had proved a disastrous failure. Both wings of Sherman's army had been attacked in turn, and both attacks had been repulsed with a loss which the Confederacy at that crisis of the struggle could ill afford. It would seem that Hood, when he relieved Johnston of

<sup>1</sup> Commanding the 15th Corps on McPherson's right.

<sup>2</sup> Three brigades had been detached from Schofield's Corps, one to Decatur and two to cover Dodge's left flank on the railway.

<sup>3</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 173.

<sup>4</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 173.

<sup>5</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 175-6. General Cox highly commends Hardee's conduct of the flank movement, and shows how unjust were Hood's charges against his lieutenant.

the command, felt some misgivings, realising that the condition of assuming the offensive was virtually imposed on him;<sup>1</sup> but in spite of the two reverses which he had suffered in such quick succession he was still resolved to carry out at any cost what he believed to be the wishes of the Richmond Government, and was ready to seize the earliest opportunity of striking another blow at Sherman's flanks.

The death of McPherson led to various changes in the higher commands of the Federal army. Logan, who had temporarily succeeded to the command of the Army of the Tennessee, had not been a member of the regular army before the outbreak of the Civil War. Like Blair, the commander of the 17th Corps, he had been a politician before he became a soldier. It was doubtful whether the other Corps commanders of that army would give him an ungrudging obedience: and for these reasons Sherman, after consultation, recommended Howard for the vacant command, and the President approved his selection. Hooker, however, ex-commander of the Army of the Potomac, and senior major-general in Sherman's army, had regarded the appointment as his own by right. Sherman had deliberately passed him over, feeling sure that he would not find in him the sympathetic co-operation which he had a right to look for in his chief subordinates. Hooker throughout the campaign had displayed a distinct tendency to fight for his own hand: he had more than once disregarded orders in order to secure a better position for himself and his Corps. His own glorification, rather than the ultimate success of the Commander-in-Chief's plans, had been his consistent aim. The appointment of Howard, whom he had sought to make the scapegoat for his defeat at Chancellorsville, seemed to Hooker a double insult, and he promptly applied to be relieved of his command. His request was acceded to, and Slocum was summoned from Vicksburg to take command of the 20th Corps. Stanley succeeded Howard in command of the 4th Corps.

Four railways run into Atlanta. The Chattanooga line was in the hands of the Federals. The Georgia line had been destroyed by the Federal cavalry for some distance beyond Decatur, and the left wing of Sherman's army already lay astride of it. On the other side of Atlanta two railways ran south and south-west to Macon and Montgomery. For the first five miles these railways ran over the same line, but at East Point they diverged. The Montgomery Railway had already been raided by a cavalry force under Rousseau, and in its course west passed within easy striking distance of a force advancing from the Chattahoochee. It was obviously out of the question for any force operating from Atlanta to attempt to defend that line. The

<sup>1</sup> 4 B. & L., 336.

safety of Atlanta consequently depended upon Hood's ability to keep open and preserve intact the Macon Railway: and this railway naturally became the objective of Sherman's next movement. It was open to him to advance against it from either flank: he decided to move by the right because it would be easier in that case to keep his army supplied.

By July 25th the railway bridge over the Chattahoochee had been rebuilt, and the railroad completed up to the camps of Thomas' army.<sup>1</sup> On the 27th the movement to the right commenced. The Army of the Tennessee was to be transferred from the extreme left to the extreme right and commence an advance on that flank, whilst Schofield was to hold the Federal lines on the left. Dodge's Corps led the advance of the Army of the Tennessee, followed closely by Blair's Corps.

On the morning of the 28th the two Corps held a position facing due east along a road running south to Mount Ezra Church, where a road from Atlanta to Lickskillet, a village near the Chattahoochee, was crossed.<sup>2</sup> Blair's right was within a mile and a half of the railway from Atlanta to East Point.

Hood's engineers were already constructing a line of entrenchments running south-west, which should guard the junction of the two railway lines at East Point; and in the meantime S. D. Lee, who had been summoned from Alabama and placed in command of the Corps recently assigned to Cheatham, was ordered to fall upon the right flank of Howard's army, and Stewart, with two divisions of his Corps, was directed to support the assault. Hardee and Smith, with their respective commands, were to occupy the lines facing the Armies of the Cumberland and Ohio. Sherman, expecting this attack, had directed Davis' division of the 14th Corps to move round the rear of the Army of the Tennessee and get into position to fall upon the flank of any force coming out of Atlanta to attack Howard.<sup>3</sup> But Davis was not in time to take any part in the fight of the 28th, else the repulse of the Confederates might perhaps have been converted into a rout. In this engagement the brunt of the fighting was borne by Logan's Corps, which was placed on the right of Blair's Corps, bent back so as to form almost a right angle with it. But on this day the Confederates showed by no means the same determination and desperate courage as had marked their assaults on the 20th or 22nd, and were beaten off with comparative ease.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 181.

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 182.

<sup>3</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 184. But Howard says (4 B. & L., 319) that on the morning of the 28th Sherman, with whom he was riding, expressed the belief that Hood would not venture to renew the attack.

<sup>4</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 185. Sherman (4 B. & L., 254) estimated the Confederate loss at 4,632 to the Federal 700. Sherman's estimate of the Confederate losses during this campaign is generally less than Cox's, e.g. he states Hood's loss on the 22nd as only 8,499.



Howard's loss was under 600, whilst that of the Confederates probably exceeded 5,000. After this third repulse the Confederate Government took alarm, and Hood, on August 5th, was directed by President Davis to avoid, if practicable, attacking Sherman in his entrenchments.<sup>1</sup>

At the same time as the Army of the Tennessee was moved to the extreme right, the Federal cavalry had been sent in two divisions from the right and left flanks respectively to break up the Macon Railroad. Neither expedition proved very successful. McCook, who moved by the right, reached the railway at Lovejoy Station, about thirty miles south of Atlanta, and did some temporary damage to the track. But returning by the road by which he had come, he was surrounded by the enemy's cavalry, and only succeeded in cutting his way through with considerable loss. Stoneman, on the left, was even more unsuccessful. Working eastwards, he raided the railway between Macon and Augusta and then shelled the former town, but in his turn was surrounded by the Confederate cavalry and forced to surrender in person with about a quarter of his whole force.<sup>2</sup>

After this failure on the part of his cavalry, Sherman determined to strike at the railway with a strong force of infantry. The 23rd Corps moved on August 2nd round to the right of Howard's position, and the 14th Corps was also posted on the right along the Lickskillet road. Schofield was directed with his own Corps and the 14th to push ahead and reach the railway if possible above East Point. But the commander of the 14th Corps, Palmer, refused to recognise Schofield's authority, and the misunderstanding between the two generals caused the movement to hang fire, until after a couple of wasted days Palmer was relieved of his command and Davis appointed in his place.<sup>3</sup> Schofield failed to reach the railway, as the Confederates when driven from their first line of entrenchments took position behind a second strongly fortified line, which reached the Montgomery Railway about a mile below East Point.<sup>4</sup>

Sherman now considered that he had stretched his lines as far as was safe, and determined to try the effect of a bombardment with his heavy guns. This was maintained for several days without apparently producing much effect on the enemy's lines. As the cannonade produced but little result, Sherman determined to make a last attempt with his cavalry to break up the Macon Railroad. Kilpatrick made a dashing raid, starting from the right

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 187.

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 188-9.

<sup>3</sup> Davis was assigned to the command of the 14th Corps by order of President Lincoln. Till his appointment the Corps was temporarily commanded by R. W. Johnson.

<sup>4</sup> For these operations, see Cox's *Atlanta*, 189-94.

flank and riding right round Atlanta. But as had been the case with the previous cavalry raids, the damage done to the railway was speedily repaired. Sherman now found himself obliged to cut loose from his line of supplies and strike the railroad with almost his whole force. The 20th Corps was ordered back to the railway bridge over the Chattahoochee, where it entrenched itself, whilst the rest of the Federal army were directed to take rations for ten days, to be made to last fifteen, preparatory to a march to the Macon Railroad.<sup>1</sup>

The movement commenced on August 25th. The Army of the Tennessee led the way on the right, followed by the two remaining Corps of the Army of the Cumberland. Schofield remained in his lines in front of East Point with the 23rd Corps, and kept up a series of demonstrations. This final move of Sherman, which was destined to bring about the fall of Atlanta, completely baffled Hood. At that critical moment the Confederate general had stripped himself of the greater part of his cavalry.

Wheeler, early in the month, had started on a raid against the Federal lines of communication, and after being beaten off at Dalton had made his way into East Tennessee. His subsequent operations in that region had no effect upon the fortunes of the two armies battling round Atlanta. Hood, deprived of the eyes of his army, found himself in the dark as to the real object of Sherman's movements. On the evening of the 27th he jumped hastily to the conclusion that Wheeler's raid had been successful and that Sherman's army was retiring from lack of supplies to the other side of the Chattahoochee. For forty-eight hours he adhered to this strange delusion, and by that time the Federals had gained a position, from which it was impossible to dislodge them, commanding the Macon Railway.<sup>2</sup>

From the commencement of the last stage of the campaign on the south bank of the Chattahoochee, when the Federal army was beginning to close in upon Atlanta, Sherman's policy had been not to assault the city or invest it by regular approaches, but by destroying its lines of supply to compel its evacuation. It was for that purpose that he had employed his cavalry on their somewhat futile raids against the railways, in order that he might keep the bulk of his army in hand to fall upon Hood, as soon as he evacuated the city. For Sherman never forgot that his objective was not

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 196.

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 197-8. In spite of Wheeler's absence with more than half the cavalry, Hood still had a sufficient force of that arm to enable him to get fairly accurate information of Sherman's movements. The information which his cavalry reconnaissances gave him, viz. that the bulk of the Federal forces were echeloned along the Atlanta-Sandtown Road, was correct enough in itself, but Hood entirely misinterpreted its significance. Had he retained Wheeler's force, he might perhaps have discovered his error sooner.

merely Atlanta, but also the Confederate army in his front. It was with reluctance that he acknowledged the failure of cavalry raids to permanently destroy the railroad, and moved with almost his whole army to complete that task, knowing that, though the success of his movement would render the surrender of Atlanta inevitable, yet Hood's army would escape destruction and be left free to fight another campaign.

Thanks to Hood's illusion, the Federal movement encountered no opposition at first. On the 28th the Army of the Cumberland reached the Montgomery Railway at Red Oak, seven miles below East Point, and the Army of the Tennessee at Fairburn, five miles further down the line.<sup>1</sup> On the 29th Schofield's Corps came into line with the rest of the army, which devoted that day to a systematic destruction of the railway. On the 30th the march was resumed. Schofield moved up the railroad a mile and a half towards East Point, in order to cover the trains whilst the rest of the army was moving between the two railroads.<sup>2</sup>

Hood at last awoke from his dream of fancied security, but he still failed to grasp the full meaning of his opponent's movement. He directed Hardee to take his own and Lee's Corps to Jonesboro and fall upon the flank of the Federal advance the following morning.

On the 30th Howard had reached the Flint River to the west of the Macon Railway, and put Logan's Corps across the river with the other two Corps in close support but still on the west bank of the river.<sup>3</sup> On the 31st Hardee attacked Logan's lines, but the Confederate movement lacked combination. The fighting was almost entirely confined to Lee's Corps, and the assault was repulsed with ease.<sup>4</sup>

On the same day Schofield reached the Macon Railway close to Rough-and-Ready Station, and the 4th Corps struck it a little further south. Both Corps set to work to destroy the line from Rough-and-Ready Station southwards. When Hood learnt from those on board a railway train, which had returned to Atlanta on finding its way south blocked by Schofield's Corps, that the Federals were astride his line of communications, he inferred that a general assault upon Atlanta was about to take place, and that it was not the whole of the Federal army, but only an extension of the right flank, which was across the railway. He therefore sent peremptory orders to Hardee to send back Lee's Corps that night for the defence of Atlanta.<sup>5</sup> Hardee with his single Corps was directed

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 198.

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 199.

<sup>3</sup> On the morning of the 31st bridges were built across the river so that the three Corps were in mutual support.

<sup>4</sup> Hardee's own Corps, under Cleburne's command, crossed the river on Howard's right in pursuit of Kilpatrick's cavalry.

<sup>5</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 203.



to cover the railroad and guard the ammunition and provision trains which had accompanied the two Corps as best he could.

At 2 a.m. on September 1st Lee marched away towards Atlanta. Hardee stretched his troops along the lines, which had been occupied the previous day, hoping by a bold front to impose upon his opponents. In this he succeeded to a certain extent. It was impossible that the Federal commanders could foresee that Hood would take such an extraordinary step as withdrawing Lee's Corps out of supporting distance of Hardee.

Sherman, who knew that by the possession of the railway line at Rough-and-Ready the fate of Atlanta was sealed, at first directed Schofield and Thomas to move their respective forces down the railroad, destroying the track as they advanced, and to connect with Howard's left. But upon finding in the course of the afternoon that Lee's Corps had been withdrawn and only Hardee's remained in his front, he determined to try and capture this force. The knowledge that he could not hope to destroy Hood's entire army made him all the more eager to capture this, its strongest Corps. The 14th Corps was ordered to swing its left forward and endeavour to envelop Hardee's right, and the 4th Corps was directed to march with all speed towards Jonesboro. Davis with the 14th Corps assailed Hardee's right on September 1st with much determination, and after one repulse succeeded in carrying the salient angle, where the Confederate line of entrenchments was bent back across the railway, and captured nearly a whole brigade and two batteries of artillery. But the 4th Corps did not get up in time to co-operate in the assault, and Hardee's right wing took up a new position, where they showed a bold front, whilst the centre and left held their original lines confronting Howard.<sup>1</sup>

By this time Hood had learnt his fatal mistake. Lee's Corps, which was about half-way to Atlanta, received orders countermanding its advance, and directing it to cover the withdrawal of Stewart's and Smith's troops. It was too late to attempt to save anything which had not already been removed from Atlanta,<sup>2</sup> and during the night the explosions in the city, where the military stores and railway stock were being destroyed by a cavalry rearguard, made known both to Sherman and to Slocum the welcome fact that Atlanta was being evacuated. Slocum had been directed on the 1st to make a reconnaissance towards Atlanta to see if Hood had abandoned it, and on the 2nd entered the city without encountering any resistance. Under cover of the darkness Hood, marching south, rejoined Hardee, who also evacuated his lines during the night, at Lovejoy Station. But Atlanta, "the gate city of the South," was in Sherman's hands.

This campaign, which commencing on May 4th terminated on

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 204-7.

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 207.

September 2nd with the capture of Atlanta, may be fairly regarded as the most brilliant feat accomplished by any Federal general throughout the war. One hundred and thirty miles of mountainous and difficult country had been covered.<sup>1</sup> Three rivers had been crossed.<sup>2</sup> No offensive battle had been fought except the assault on Kennesaw Mountain, which was stopped immediately after the first repulse. In all other instances the Confederates had been forced to assume the offensive and had been repulsed with heavy loss. The conditions of the country were favourable to the defensive, and it was a triumph of skilful manœuvring to have forced an army strategically acting on the defensive to assume so often the temporarily offensive and with such disastrous results. Johnston's force after it had been reinforced by Polk's Corps was probably in the proportion of seven to ten, when compared with Sherman's army of invasion.<sup>3</sup> The advantages of the defensive are commonly reckoned at five to two. It cannot therefore be said that the two armies were unequally matched.

It must, however, be admitted that the substitution of Hood for Johnston greatly facilitated Sherman's task. Probably this was one of the greatest mistakes made by Jefferson Davis throughout the four troubled years of his Presidency. He had been prejudiced against Johnston from the very beginning of the war, because he considered that that commander had endeavoured to put off on to his shoulders the responsibility for not following up the victory of Bull Run.<sup>4</sup> In Johnston Sherman had found a foeman worthy to be matched against him. The Confederate general had a real genius for defensive warfare. In spite of Sherman's brilliant manœuvres Johnston again and again withdrew his troops in safety from one position to another as strong. In the series of retrograde movements, which carried him from Dalton across the Chattahoochee, he was never caught at a disadvantage, never gave Sherman a chance of striking a decisive blow, and succeeded in keeping his troops in good spirits and good health.<sup>5</sup> His removal

<sup>1</sup> Johnston, however, considers that the difficulties of the country between Dalton and Atlanta were greatly exaggerated. "That country is intersected by numerous practicable roads and is not more rugged than that near Baltimore and Washington" (4 B. & L., 267).

<sup>2</sup> The Oostanula, Etowah, and Chattahoochee.

<sup>3</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 212. But Major Dawes, who has made a special study of the numbers engaged in this campaign, estimates the odds from the end of May as less than five to four (4 B. & L., 282).

<sup>4</sup> This prejudice was greatly increased by Johnston's failure to relieve Vicksburg.

<sup>5</sup> Hood, however, states (4 B. & L., 336) that "the troops of the Army of Tennessee had for such length of time been subjected to the ruinous policy pursued from Dalton to Atlanta that they were unfitted for united action in pitched battle." The evidence is, however, all in favour of Johnston's contention that under his command the *moral* of the army had greatly improved; see Hardee's and Stewart's testimony quoted in Johnston's *Narrative*, 365-9, and Maury's *Recollections of a Virginian*, 148-9.

from command was a great mistake; the appointment of Hood in his place was a still greater error.

Since Lee's defeat at Gettysburg and the fall of Vicksburg, it was plain that the only chance which the Southern Confederacy still had of maintaining its independence was by playing a waiting game, by striving to tire out their opponents, and to gain time in the hope that the mass of the people of the North would weary of the expense and bloodshed of war and insist upon a compromise. This last chance was flung away when Hood, a fighting general of no proved strategical ability,<sup>1</sup> was appointed to supersede Johnston, who throughout this campaign had shown himself a master of Fabian tactics. It would not be safe to assert that, had Johnston been continued in the command, the fall of Atlanta might have been averted, but at any rate it would have been postponed. And time was just what the Confederacy needed. With Johnston in command the Confederate losses on July 20th and 22nd would very probably have been much smaller, and it is most unlikely that Johnston would have committed Hood's extraordinary blunder of supposing that Sherman, at the moment when he was cutting loose from his base for the purpose of seizing and holding the Macon Railway, was in retreat across the Chattahoochee. A strong line of entrenchments would have confronted Sherman on his approach to the Montgomery Railway at Red Oak and Fairburn, and another long flanking movement, probably by the left round Atlanta, would have been imposed upon the Federals.<sup>2</sup>

The Federal losses during the month of August, including the fighting at Jonesboro on September 1st, were given by Sherman as amounting to 5,139, whilst the Confederate losses for the same period were estimated at 7,443. The aggregate loss for the whole campaign on the Federal side was 31,687, whilst that of the Southern army was stated as 34,979, and this estimate given by Sherman has been generally accepted as tolerably correct.<sup>3</sup>

The conquest of Atlanta, besides being a brilliant feat of arms, was of great political significance. It exercised a great influence over the inhabitants of the North, who were on the eve of a Presidential election. Grant's operations before Petersburg, slow and costly as they were, might easily be misunderstood by the "man in the street." Lincoln might express his conviction that "Grant was in a position whence he would never be dislodged until

<sup>1</sup> Another argument against Hood's appointment is the fact that his physical activity had been impaired by wounds. At Gettysburg he was crippled in one arm; at Chickamauga he lost a leg. General G. W. Smith thinks that to some extent his failure as an army commander may have been due to this cause (4 B. & L., 335).

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 198.

<sup>3</sup> Major Dawes estimates the losses of the two armies as about equal—40,000 each.



Richmond was taken,"<sup>1</sup> but it is doubtful whether the President's conviction was shared by the majority of his supporters. But the capture of Atlanta, like that of Vicksburg in the previous year, was a definite solid fact, which no reasoning, however ingenious, could get rid of. It gave the lie to the Democratic Party, who were running General McClellan as a candidate for the Presidency on a programme which denounced the war as a failure. To Sherman's victory at Atlanta Abraham Lincoln was greatly indebted for the overwhelming majority by which he defeated McClellan at the polls.

<sup>1</sup> Speech of June 16th, 1864, at Philadelphia.

## CHAPTER XXIII

### THE MARCH TO THE SEA<sup>1</sup>

The military position after the fall of Atlanta—Farragut enters Mobile Bay—Importance of Georgia as the Confederate granary—The Confederate cavalry raids against Sherman's lines of communication—Hood crosses the Chattahoochee—Confederate attack on Allatoona repulsed—Hood's game of "hide and seek"—Sherman follows Hood to Alabama—Beauregard assigned to the chief command in the West—Hood moves west to Tuscumbia—Sherman prepares for his march through Georgia—Hood crosses the Tennessee—Sherman's army—Sherman destroys the railway in his rear—And dismantles Atlanta—Sherman's plans—The march begins—Slocum occupies Milledgeville—Movements of the Federal right wing—Howard occupies Millen—Savannah in sight—Destruction of the Georgia railways—Sherman subsists his army off the country—Hardee's plans—Hatch's failure to cut Hardee's line of retreat—Capture of Fort McAllister—Hardee abandons Savannah.

**A**FTER the fall of Atlanta the Federal army enjoyed a well-earned rest. But whilst the soldiers rested, the general was considering how the success already gained might be yet further improved. It was plain enough that the campaign was not ended by the capture of Atlanta. The Confederate army in the West still had to be dealt with. If Sherman's army was to play the part assigned to it in the general plan of campaign as devised by Grant, it could not rest upon its laurels, but must push on to deal fresh blows, which might lighten Grant's arduous task before Richmond. Sherman saw that, if he could ultimately establish his army at Columbia in South Carolina, Lee would be caught between two fires, and would be obliged to evacuate Richmond.

But in the meantime the question as to what should be the next movement called for much consideration. Sherman had partially fulfilled his allotted task in capturing Atlanta, even though he had failed to destroy the Confederate army; but Canby's movement against Mobile (Map X.) had miscarried. The divisions of the 16th Corps, under A. J. Smith, recently returned from the Red River Expedition, which were to have reinforced Canby, had been suddenly called away to aid Rosecrans in Missouri. The Confederate general, Price, had succeeded in organising a considerable force in that State, and was showing so bold a front that Rosecrans was obliged to call for reinforcements.<sup>2</sup> Without Smith's divisions

<sup>1</sup> See Map XII.

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 219.

Canby had not considered himself strong enough to attack Mobile. The navy had, indeed, done its work. On August 5th Admiral Farragut forced his way past the forts guarding the entrance to the Bay, and though he lost one of his largest iron-clads, which at the very beginning of the fight was sunk by a mine, made himself master of the harbour, and destroyed the greater part of the Confederate squadron in it.<sup>1</sup> The city itself lay at the top of the Bay, thirty miles from the sea, and was too strongly fortified for a naval attack unsupported by a land force to have any chance of success. But the forts controlling the Bay were reduced, and almost their last harbour on the Gulf was thus lost to the Confederates. Had Mobile itself fallen, Sherman from Atlanta would have been able to establish communications with Canby's army, either through Montgomery or by the lower Chattahoochee through Columbus. The two generals joining hands would have cut off another great section from the Confederacy, and the Southern troops in Mississippi and Alabama would have been prevented from taking any part in the operations going on further east.

Grant had hoped to capture either Wilmington (Map XII.) or Savannah, in which case Sherman could have safely ventured to march through the heart of Georgia, knowing that at the end of his march he would find a depôt of supplies waiting to receive him. But the fact that in September Mobile on the Gulf and Savannah and Wilmington on the Atlantic coast were still in the hands of the Confederates, decidedly complicated the position.

Georgia had become the granary of the Confederacy. As cotton could no longer find a market, the inhabitants grew bread-stuffs instead, and since the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson had deprived the East of the products of the Trans-Mississippi region, the Confederates had come largely to depend upon Georgia for their supplies. The horrors of war had as yet barely made themselves felt in that fertile State. If a Federal force were to march through it, laying waste the crops and destroying the railway system, a staggering blow would be inflicted on the Confederacy. Sherman, anxious as he was to strike this blow, decided that his immediate task should be to keep Hood fully occupied, until Grant had reduced the Atlantic seaports. Then he could march eastward, leaving Hood to follow him or not as he chose. But till then it would be dangerous to push into a hostile country, where it would be impossible to keep open his lengthening lines of communication, and Hood's Army would still constitute a serious obstacle. Sherman, therefore, was not unwilling to let his army rest at Atlanta until Hood gave some indication of his intentions. He had not long to wait.

<sup>1</sup> See Cap. XXVI.



On September 22nd President Davis delivered a speech at Macon, which clearly foreshadowed an attempt to transfer the war back again to the Valley of the Tennessee.<sup>1</sup> Hood had concentrated the bulk of his forces at Lovejoy Station. But his cavalry under Wheeler had been raiding in Northern Georgia, trying with but slight success to break up the railway from Chattanooga, and was now in East Tennessee; and on September 20th Forrest with his cavalry started on a raid into Middle Tennessee and sought to destroy the railway from Nashville to Decatur.<sup>2</sup> This attempt also was attended with but little success, and on October 6th Forrest recrossed to the south bank of the Tennessee.

Though neither of these cavalry raids had done any serious damage to the Federal lines of communication, yet when coupled with the Confederate President's speech at Macon, they caused Sherman to apprehend an attack by Hood in force against the railway in his rear. He ordered Thomas to return to Chattanooga, whither he also sent two divisions: and another division was sent to Rome, where it might protect the railroad north of the Etowah.<sup>3</sup>

The wisdom of these precautions was quickly proved. On September 29th Hood crossed the Chattahoochee twenty-four miles south-west of Atlanta. It was not at first certain whether he was marching westwards into Alabama with a view to invading Tennessee, or would turn northward against the Chattanooga-Atlanta Railroad. Sherman waited a day or two for the Confederate movement to declare itself definitely. By October 2nd it was plain that Hood was marching to strike the railroad in the neighbourhood of Marietta.<sup>4</sup> Sherman left one Corps to hold Atlanta and the railway bridge over the Chattahoochee, and with the rest of his army started in pursuit.

On the 3rd Hood's main army was in the neighbourhood of Lost Mountain. Stewart's Corps was sent to strike the railway north of Marietta and to capture, if possible, Allatoona and the railway bridge over the Etowah. Stewart on the morning of the 5th rejoined Hood, having destroyed two small posts on the railroad and having left French's division to capture Allatoona and destroy the Etowah bridge. The Army of the Cumberland led the pursuit, and on the evening of the 4th was bivouacking at the foot of Kenesaw Mountain.<sup>5</sup> The Army of the Tennessee was at Smyrna on the railroad, whilst the Army of the Ohio, which had to come from its encampment at Decatur and had been detained by swollen streams, rested for the night at Pace's Ferry on the north bank of the Chattahoochee.

On the morning of the 5th Sherman, from the top of Kenesaw

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 221.

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 222.

<sup>3</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 223.

<sup>4</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 224.

<sup>5</sup> The Army of the Cumberland was commanded in Thomas' absence by Stanley.

Mountain, could see that Hood's main army was encamped near Dallas. But he also saw the fierce fight which was raging round Allatoona, eighteen miles away. The original garrison of Allatoona consisted of three regiments. General Corse, with three more regiments, arrived from Rome just in time to take the command before the attack began. French was beaten off after a desperate struggle lasting for several hours, in which both sides lost heavily. He also failed to capture the blockhouse, which protected the railway bridge over the Etowah.

Sherman, when he commenced the retrograde movement from Atlanta, had hoped that he might find Hood's army on the railroad, and so have a chance of hemming his opponent in between the river and the Federal army.<sup>1</sup> But when he found that Hood had been too wary to make such a mistake, and that there was but little chance of forcing him to a decisive battle, his thoughts turned back to the movement on Savannah: and he wrote to Grant proposing to break up the line from Chattanooga southwards and turning his back on Hood to march through Georgia for the Atlantic coast.<sup>2</sup>

But on the 10th came the news that Hood was crossing the Coosa several miles below Rome, and seemed to be threatening Corse, who with one division held that town. Accordingly he ordered a concentration of his army at Rome, whilst at the same time orders were sent to Thomas to concentrate all available troops at Stevenson, forty miles west of Chattanooga, in case Hood, turning north-west, attempted to cross the Tennessee. On the next day he learnt that Hood had not approached Rome, but had marched in some direction at present unknown. Again he wrote to Grant asking for permission to march on Savannah. But in a day or two definite information was once more to hand of Hood's movements. After crossing the Coosa below Rome he had sent his trains and reserve artillery fifty miles west to Gadsden (on Map X.), and was now moving north with his army in light marching order to strike the railroad at Resaca. As his right flank would be covered by the Oostanaula, he hoped to carry that post by a *coup de main* and destroy the railway bridge over the Oostanaula.

Hood reached Resaca on the 12th, but when the garrison refused to surrender, did not venture upon an assault. Leaving one Corps before Resaca, he moved along the line of railway and captured both Tilton and Dalton. He failed, however, to do any permanent damage to the railroad, and on the 14th Sherman, with Howard's and Stanley's troops, reached Resaca, and Hood at once retreated west in the direction of Villanow.

Finding that Sherman was in full pursuit, Hood retreated still

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 226.

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *Atlanta*, 234.

further west to Gadsden, in Alabama, which he reached on the 20th. Sherman followed him, and on the same day that the Confederates arrived at Gadsden (Map X.) had his army concentrated at Gaylesville, on the Alabama border. For seven days the two armies remained in their respective positions watching each other.<sup>1</sup>

The result of the operations in October had been to bring Sherman back from Atlanta over a hundred miles to his rear. But Hood's dash against the Federal line of communications had failed to do any permanent damage to the railroad: and it was still open to Sherman to march eastwards towards the Atlantic coast whenever he chose. The experience of October had convinced him that this move was the right one. The rapidity with which Hood's army had moved showed how difficult it would be to overtake it and bring it to bay. If Hood now crossed the Tennessee at any point east of Guntersville, Sherman was prepared to follow in pursuit;<sup>2</sup> but if, on the other hand, Hood continued to move west, and tried to cross the river at Decatur or Florence, he was resolved not to throw away all that had been gained during the recent campaign, but to turn eastwards. He believed that Hood would feel himself obliged to follow him in that case; and he was the more strongly inclined to hold that view when he learnt that Beauregard had been assigned to the command of all the Confederate troops between the Mississippi and Middle Georgia.<sup>3</sup>

After the termination of the Atlanta campaign Hood had been writing first to General Bragg and then to President Davis, begging that all the troops in Georgia might be placed under his command, and that Hardee, to whom he attributed all his misfortunes, might be relieved of duty, and Lieutenant-General R. H. Taylor, commanding the forces in Alabama and Mississippi, might be substituted for him. The Southern President visited Hood at his headquarters on September 25th and made the following arrangements. Hardee was promoted to the command of a Department embracing East Georgia and the adjoining portions of Florida and South Carolina, whilst Beauregard was assigned to the command of Hood's and Taylor's Departments, which were now consolidated into one military division. But it seems to have been distinctly understood between Hood and Davis, and impressed by the latter upon Beauregard, that he was not to interfere with Hood's plan of campaign, but must leave him the personal control of his own troops.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For the October operations, see Cox's *Atlanta*, 224-39. Hood (4 B. & L., 426) states that it was his intention after leaving Villanow and finding that Sherman was following in pursuit, to stand and deliver battle, but he was bitterly disappointed to learn from the unanimous opinion of his principal officers that the *moral* of his troops had not sufficiently improved to justify a battle against Sherman's superior numbers.

<sup>2</sup> Such a move on Hood's part would have left his lines of communication at Sherman's mercy (see Ropes, 3 Massachusetts M. H. S., 140).

<sup>3</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 2.

<sup>4</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 9-10.



R. H. Taylor was the President's brother-in-law, and he feared that to put him in Hardee's place would cause the charge of favouritism to be brought against him, and he was painfully conscious how much already his influence was waning. For Governor Brown of Georgia was asserting for his State those very rights which had formed the basis of secession, and had granted to the State militia a furlough for the purpose of gathering in the harvest, whilst he also claimed the right to confine their operations to their native State and to appoint their officers himself.

On October 20th and 21st Beauregard and Hood discussed at Gadsden the next move, and it was agreed to invade Tennessee by way of Guntersville. But when Hood had only made a single day's march in that direction, he suddenly turned off westwards, showing how lightly he regarded Beauregard's supposed authority over him, and attempted to cross the river at Decatur.<sup>1</sup> R. S. Granger, who commanded the Federal force in that neighbourhood, repulsed an attack upon Decatur, whereupon Hood moved still further west to Tuscumbia near to the Mississippi border line.<sup>2</sup> Sherman was anxious to see whether Hood would, as he expected, turn and follow him, if he moved east, and with that end in view marched his army back in the first days of November into Georgia, and concentrated it about Rome and Kingston. On November 2nd he received from Grant the long desired permission to march eastwards through the heart of Georgia.<sup>3</sup>

The credit of conceiving this plan of marching to the coast *at this particular juncture* belongs solely to Sherman.<sup>4</sup> Thomas and Grant were both opposed to it.<sup>5</sup> The latter believed, and rightly, as events proved, that Hood having once parted company with Sherman would, instead of following him, invade Tennessee, and he did not share Sherman's confidence in Thomas' ability to beat

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 12. Hood's own explanation of his sudden change of plan is that it was due to the news that Forrest with his cavalry was near Jackson, Tennessee, and owing to the high water in the river could not join Hood in Middle Tennessee. Therefore he turned west in order to effect a junction with Forrest before crossing to the north bank of the Tennessee (4 B. & L., 427). This explanation Cox pronounces "more specious than sound" on the ground that the same orders "which apparently stopped Forrest at Jackson could have brought him back to Tuscumbia or to any other place where the Tennessee could be more easily crossed and a junction with Hood more easily made."

<sup>2</sup> Hood, however, only admits that he made a slight demonstration against Decatur in order to cover the movement to Tuscumbia (4 B. & L., 427).

<sup>3</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 2.

<sup>4</sup> A letter from Sherman to Grant written before the commencement of the Atlanta campaign shows that from the very first Sherman had been contemplating a march to the Atlantic coast (Cox's *Atlanta*, 19). The peculiar circumstances under which he carried out the details of a plan, the broad outlines of which had undoubtedly presented themselves to many other minds, were these: first, he left behind him as yet undefeated the Confederate army of the West; secondly, he started for the Atlantic coast before the Federal forces in the East had secured for him any place which might serve as a new base.

<sup>5</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 5.

Hood back. Thomas himself had been reluctant to accept a charge of such great responsibility,<sup>1</sup> yet there was certainly no one better qualified than himself to undertake it. His natural qualities pre-eminently fitted him for carrying out a Fabian policy, and at the same time no one was better able, as he proved afterwards at Nashville, to strike a crushing blow, when in his opinion the proper time for such a blow had arrived. Lincoln also viewed Sherman's proposed march with much uneasiness, though, true to his settled policy, since the appointment of Grant to the supreme command, of not interfering with the operations of the armies in the field, he raised no objection.<sup>2</sup>

Whilst he still believed that Hood would follow him to the east, Sherman had proposed only to send back the 4th Corps for service under Thomas, but when he found that Hood, so far from following him, was moving still further west, he determined to detach the 23rd Corps as well. Schofield, its commander, was ready enough to agree. He was still in command of the Department of East Tennessee, and if he were placed under Thomas' orders, there would be no need to make any fresh alterations in that Department, and at the same time he anticipated that Tennessee would be the scene of an interesting and important campaign, in which he could find full scope for the display of his military abilities.<sup>3</sup> Both Corps were sent back to report for duty to Thomas, and Schofield was assigned by that general to take command of them, with his headquarters at Pulaski, on the Nashville-Decatur Railroad (Map VI.).

Hood, from Tuscumbia, crossed the river to Florence. He had at that time under his command an army of 44,700 men, whilst Forrest's cavalry, which were placed under his orders, amounted to 9,200. The latter at the end of October had started for a raid into Tennessee, hoping to draw Thomas' attention away from Hood's passage across the river by threatening his lines of communication in rear of Nashville. On the 29th he struck the Tennessee a few miles above Fort Henry, and moving up the left bank of the river, joined Hood at Florence on November 16th. Hood had been obliged to remain for three weeks at Florence in order to accumulate a store of supplies for his next movement. These supplies were collected at various points along the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, brought to Corinth, and then conveyed eastward to Cherokee Station along a section of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, which Forrest had been able to keep open. From there they had to be transported in wagons to Tuscumbia, a distance of about fifteen miles, over a wretched country road,

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 7.

<sup>2</sup> See his letter to Sherman, quoted in 4 B. & L., 256.

<sup>3</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 8.

quickly converted by the rain into a morass.<sup>1</sup> But probably Hood was in no hurry to advance until he had satisfied himself as to what Sherman's next move would be. If that general marched into Alabama and struck the Confederate lines of supply, Hood might find himself caught between Sherman in the rear and Thomas in front among the "barrens" of Tennessee, where little subsistence for man or beast could be found.<sup>2</sup> He hoped against hope that Sherman would yet abandon his hold upon Georgia and fall back to protect Nashville, and the fact that Sherman did not follow that course, but continued to march east, probably rendered him desperate, and partially explained the recklessness which marked his disastrous campaign against Thomas. Before he moved from Gadsden he had agreed with Beauregard to send back Wheeler's cavalry, which had rejoined from East Tennessee, to hold Sherman in check, and Beauregard reckoned on being able to collect a force of about 30,000 men in all,<sup>3</sup> counting in the Georgia militia and some troops which might be brought from the Carolinas, to meet Sherman's eastward march, if that possibility became an actual fact.

The army with which Sherman started for Savannah numbered 62,000 men.<sup>4</sup> It consisted of two Corps of the Army of the Cumberland and two of the Army of the Tennessee. The former were placed under the command of Slocum and constituted the left wing. The Corps commanders were Davis and Williams. Howard, commanding the Army of the Tennessee, was at the head of the right wing. Blair still commanded the 17th Corps, but Logan, the commander of the 15th, had not returned from the North, whither he had gone to take part in the Presidential election, and his place was filled by Osterhaus. The cavalry force was under the command of Kilpatrick and only consisted of a single division.

Sherman, having received permission from Grant for his march through Georgia, had as a necessary preliminary to break up the railway back from Atlanta. He wished to leave with Thomas a force sufficient to hold Hood in check, until the fresh levies arriving from the North should give him a decided superiority of numbers.

Thomas, when reinforced by the 4th and 23rd Corps, had an army about equal to Hood's, although the Confederates had a very distinct superiority in cavalry.<sup>5</sup> A. J. Smith's three divisions were on their way from Missouri, and the detachments in Northern Georgia and also some in East Tennessee were to be called in to reinforce Thomas' army.

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 15.

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 11.

<sup>3</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 18.

<sup>4</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 16.

<sup>5</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 24.



It was Sherman's intention to hold no post beyond Nashville except Chattanooga. The supplies accumulated in Chattanooga would suffice for the garrisons retained in East Tennessee.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, as soon as the 23rd Corps had been sent back to Tennessee and a supply of provisions had been collected at Atlanta for the march eastwards, Sherman set to work to destroy the railway back from Atlanta to the Etowah (Map XII.). The foundries, factories, and machine shops at Rome were also destroyed, and the same fate befell Atlanta. Immediately after its capture in September, before he had yet fixed his future plans, Sherman had determined to convert that city into a "place of arms," and for that purpose had directed that the lines of fortifications should be contracted, so that the place could be held by a smaller garrison, and had ordered that the whole of the population should be removed either north or south, as individuals preferred. This measure, harsh indeed, yet amply justified on military grounds, had led to an angry correspondence between Sherman and Hood, in which the former had had the better of the argument. Now that he had definitely decided to advance through Georgia, he determined to make it not worth the while of the Confederates to regain possession of Atlanta, as it was no part of his plan to leave a garrison to hold it, when he required every available man to take part in the advance.

Entering a more or less unknown country, and not knowing exactly what opposition he might encounter, he did not definitely declare what route he would follow. He told Grant that he would either come out on the Atlantic coast near Charleston or Savannah, or else reach the Gulf near Mobile and Pensacola. He could reach the vicinity of Charleston by way of Augusta and the left bank of the Savannah River. The route through Milledgeville, Millen, and the Ogeechee Valley would bring him out close to Savannah; and if his progress east were effectually barred, he could still move west of Macon and reach the ports upon the Gulf.

On November 12th all communication with the rear was broken, and on the 14th the whole army was concentrated at Atlanta. On the following morning the great march commenced. At first the movement was made in two columns. The right wing feinted at Macon, the left wing at Augusta. Sherman himself accompanied the left wing, in order that he might be on the spot to decide whether Charleston or Savannah should be the point aimed at.<sup>2</sup>

The two columns were to come into communication with each other in the neighbourhood of Milledgeville, the State capital. On the evening of the 22nd the advance guard of the left wing

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 19.

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 25.

entered that city, and the next day the whole of Slocum's column was concentrated there. During the march of this column seventy miles of railroad to the east of Atlanta had been torn up, and the bridge over the Oconee River, some miles further on, destroyed.<sup>1</sup> Sherman did not, however, cross the river at that point, but moved down the right bank until he was within reach of Howard's column. During the march towards Augusta he had made up his mind that the easier route to follow would be that which led through Milledgeville and Millen to Savannah, instead of attempting to reach Charleston, in which case he would have to cross numerous deep rivers and swamps, at any one of which a determined opposition might make it almost impossible to cross.

The right wing, which was accompanied by Kilpatrick's cavalry division, advanced some distance along the railroad towards Macon. Then the infantry crossed the Ocmulgee and marched eastwards, and on the 22nd was closed up near Gordon on the Central Railroad, some twenty miles east of the Macon line, and within easy reach of the other column at Milledgeville.<sup>2</sup>

The cavalry, after capturing the works at Lovejoy Station, which were held by two brigades of Wheeler's cavalry, pressed on after the retreating enemy close up to Macon, so as to give the impression that that city was threatened by the Federal advance, and subsequently rejoined the infantry.

The Confederate authorities were at their wit's end. Beauregard, from his headquarters at Corinth, Mississippi, addressed grandiloquent appeals to the people of Georgia to rise *en masse* against the invader. On the 21st Hardee visited Macon, coming from Savannah. He correctly decided that Macon was in no danger, and that Sherman's objective was either Augusta or Savannah. He himself returned to Savannah, having directed Smith's Georgia militia to move eastward with all speed and try to get between Sherman and Augusta, whilst Wheeler's cavalry were ordered to continue to harass the Federal right flank and rear.<sup>3</sup> The Georgia militia marched in obedience to these orders to reach the Central Railroad at Gordon, and on the 22nd, when distant eight miles from that place, came up with the rearguard of Sherman's right column.<sup>4</sup> The militia promptly attacked, but after several assaults were repulsed with considerable loss.

The day after Hardee's visit to Macon a Council of War, consisting of R. H. Taylor, Governor Brown, Toombs, his adjutant,

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 27.

<sup>2</sup> Milledgeville was not on the main line of the Central Railway from Macon to Savannah, but connected with it by a branch line from Gordon. The distance from Macon to Milledgeville is about thirty miles.

<sup>3</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 28.

<sup>4</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 30.

and Howell Cobb, commanding the Georgia "reserves," assembled there. On learning the news of Smith's engagement they directed the militia to take a roundabout route, using two lines of railroad and reach Savannah, where it reported for duty to Hardee on the 30th.<sup>1</sup> Wheeler also received orders from Hardee to abandon his position on the right flank of Howard's column, and getting in front of Sherman to endeavour to cover all the roads by which he might advance. This change of policy on Wheeler's part led to a corresponding change in the movements of the Federal cavalry, and Kilpatrick was directed to leave Howard's right flank and move in front and to the left of the infantry advance.

On the 24th the left wing was again in motion from Milledgeville, and after striking the Central Railway and following it for a short distance, crossed the Ogeechee and encamped on the 29th at Louisville.<sup>2</sup> The right wing continued to advance along the Central Railroad, tearing up the rails as they advanced, to Millen, which was reached on December 3rd. The direct line of railway between Augusta and Savannah was severed by the Federal occupation of Millen.<sup>3</sup>

From Louisville and Millen the army moved towards Savannah as its next objective. Three Corps marched down the valley between the Ogeechee and the Savannah, and the 15th Corps kept along the right bank of the Ogeechee. On December 9th and 10th the whole Federal army was closing in upon Savannah. Cavalry and experienced infantry scouts were sent out to make communication with the fleet, which was off the coast, and also to cut the railroad from the Gulf to Savannah.<sup>4</sup>

During the march through Georgia Sherman had set himself to break up thoroughly the railway system of the State. If that were effectually performed, then the resources of Georgia, probably the richest State left to the Confederacy, would be completely lost to the Richmond Government. The work of destroying the railroads was pursued in a most business-like manner. A special corps of pioneers had been formed for the purpose, but it was soon found that the infantry could do the work sufficiently well. A single Corps could in one day's march thoroughly destroy some ten or fifteen miles of track.<sup>5</sup> In every direction the work of destruction went on unsparingly. From the Etowah through Atlanta, as far south as Lovejoy Station, one hundred miles of track were torn up; another hundred miles were destroyed from Fairburn, on the Montgomery Railway, through Atlanta as far

<sup>1</sup> They were first withdrawn to Macon, then took the rail to Albany, marched thence across country to Thomasville, and from that point reached Savannah by the Savannah and Gulf Railway (4 B. & L., 667).

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 31.

<sup>4</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 35.

<sup>3</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 34.

<sup>5</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 36.



as the Oconee River. The Central Railroad was completely wrecked from Gordon for one hundred and sixty miles, almost to the suburbs of Savannah; and the branch lines from Gordon to Milledgeville and from Millen to Augusta were also destroyed beyond any possibility of speedy repair.

The country itself through which Sherman marched fared very little better: over a belt of land, some fifty or sixty miles broad, a clean sweep was made of all supplies.<sup>1</sup> Along the line of march every article which could be regarded as possessing a possible military value was seized. Sherman was determined to bring home to the inhabitants of the smiling fields of Georgia the horrors of war. "War is cruelty," he said, "and you cannot refine it." The same policy, ruthless as it seemed at the time, yet perhaps most merciful in the end, which had desolated Atlanta, now laid bare the granary of the South. Sherman beyond doubt strove to hold tight the reins of discipline and to prevent the legitimate requisitioning of supplies from degenerating into mere lawless robbery and violence. Every day each regiment detailed about one-twentieth of its strength, under an officer, to collect off the country the necessary supplies.<sup>2</sup> Though the trains carried twenty days' rations, and herds of beef cattle accompanied the army, it was Sherman's policy to live as far as possible off the country and to tax the supplies of the trains only when absolutely necessary. The Vicksburg campaign had convinced him that it was quite possible for an army moving rapidly to some given destination to dispense practically with supply trains, and live off the country in the more fertile regions of the South: and if it had been possible in the Mississippi Valley, it was a still simpler process in the rich lands of Georgia.

In spite, however, of Sherman's endeavours to regulate and keep within the limits of military discipline his extensive scheme of subsisting his army off the soil, it is impossible to deny that very grave hardships were entailed upon the inhabitants by this system. Discipline was not equally strict throughout the army: and Kilpatrick in particular earned an invidious reputation for rapacity and lawlessness.<sup>3</sup> Much of the blame must be shared, however, by the Confederate soldiers themselves: for, as they began to realise the hopelessness of the struggle, they flung aside the ties of discipline and plundered the unhappy inhabitants with scant mercy.<sup>4</sup>

As the Federal army closed in on Savannah, Hardee found himself with a force of about 18,000 men with which to defend the

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 36.

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 40.

<sup>3</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 38.

<sup>4</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, Appendix C.

place.<sup>1</sup> It was quite impossible to provision Savannah against a long siege,<sup>2</sup> and the Confederate general had no intention of letting the same fate befall him as had overtaken Pemberton in Vicksburg. He intended to evacuate Savannah before there was any chance of his line of retreat being cut off, and he then proposed to rally all the troops available for the purpose of resisting Sherman's march northwards. Throughout this campaign Hardee displayed a sound military judgment and no ordinary ability in reading the designs of his opponent. He fully recognised that the garrisons must be withdrawn from the Atlantic coast, and a great effort made to prevent Sherman from marching through the Carolinas and closing in on Lee's rear, whilst Grant held the Army of Northern Virginia fast in front. It was not Hardee's fault that Sherman was enabled to march ultimately with comparative ease through the Carolinas northwards.

As Hardee did not propose to stay in Savannah till the place was completely invested, it was naturally his object to keep open the line of retreat to Charleston. For this purpose he drew his first line of defence round the city some distance out with his right covering the Charleston railway bridge over the Savannah and his left the Gulf railway bridge over the Ogeechee.

But the advance of a Federal Corps down the right bank of the latter river turned his flank and compelled him to fall back upon an inner line of defence. After thus contracting his lines his only road of retreat lay by the Union Causeway, which ran to Hardeeville, a station on the Charleston Railway in South Carolina about six miles distant from the Savannah River.<sup>3</sup>

General J. G. Foster, who was in command of a Federal force at Beaufort, had on November 29th sent Hatch's division to strike the railway at Grahamville some twenty miles from the Savannah.<sup>4</sup> If the Federals could have effected a lodgment in force on the line, it is hard to see how Hardee's army could have escaped from Savannah. But Hatch's movements on the 29th were dilatory, and gave time for Smith's Georgia militia to arrive by the Gulf Railway and take up a position covering the threatened point. There was some sharp fighting, in which the Federals lost heavily, on the 30th, but Hatch failed to reach the railroad and fell back at the close of the day.

As the Federal army approached the coast the supply of breadstuffs grew scarcer. Rice swamps took the place of cornfields, and Sherman was anxious as quickly as possible to establish a line of

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 51. But Colonel Chisolm of Beauregard's staff estimated Hardee's entire force as only about 10,000 (4 B. & L., 679). General G. W. Smith's estimate (4 B. & L., 669) approximately agrees with Cox's.

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 47.

<sup>3</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 47.

<sup>4</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 48.

communication with the fleet, by which supplies could be brought up the Ogeechee River. But before that was possible it was necessary to reduce Fort McAllister, which lay on the right bank of the Ogeechee commanding the approach from Ossabaw Sound. This fort was armed with seven heavy and eight field guns, was provisioned for fifty days, and occupied by a garrison of 200 men.<sup>1</sup> On the afternoon of the 13th it was captured at the first assault by Hazen's division of the 15th Corps: and the question of a base was thereby solved. A large store of provisions had been accumulated by Foster, and these could now be brought by water to Sherman's rear.

On arriving in the vicinity of Savannah, Sherman had received two despatches from Grant, directing him to establish an entrenched camp in a suitable position, and be prepared to come by sea with the bulk of his forces to join the Army of the Potomac before Richmond. Sherman, whilst declaring his readiness to carry out his instructions, expressed his opinion both in writing to Grant and more emphatically by word of mouth to the staff officers, who had brought the despatches, in favour of laying siege to Savannah, and then moving by land through the Carolinas to join Grant. The Commander-in-Chief, upon further reflection, had already decided to leave his subordinate free to act according to his own judgment, but before Sherman was informed of the change of plan, Savannah had already fallen. The effect of the earlier despatches, however, was to cause him to hesitate before embarking upon a siege which, if once commenced, it would be difficult to abandon, and to leave to Foster the task of cutting off Hardee's retreat by the Charleston railroad. He abstained, therefore, from sending any considerable force across to the Carolina bank of the Savannah.<sup>2</sup> Foster, indeed, succeeded in establishing himself in a position where his guns commanded the railway. But this did not prevent the Confederates using the line, as they only had to run the trains over the space commanded by the Federal artillery during the night.<sup>3</sup> On the 19th one brigade of Sherman's army crossed the Savannah. The rice fields were under water, and but little progress was made. However, a hint was enough for Hardee, who had determined on no account to be besieged in the city. On the 20th he commenced to withdraw his troops, and the evacuation was completed that night. On the following morning the Federals entered Savannah.

Thus on December 21st Sherman's great "march to the sea" was brought to a successful termination. Three hundred miles had been covered in twenty-four days. The railway system of Georgia was completely broken up, and its resources from that

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 51.

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 58-9.

<sup>3</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 56.



time forth lost to the Confederate Government. The losses incurred during the campaign had been very slight, amounting in all to only 531 killed and wounded, and 1,616 missing. Famous as this march has become, and enormous as were its consequences, it must yet be admitted that it was little more than a military promenade through Georgia. The weather had been, except for one or two days towards the end of November, most favourable, and in December the Indian summer set in. Hood's reckless invasion of Tennessee had practically freed Sherman from all opposition. Except for the rearguard action on November 22nd with the Georgia militia, the only organised force encountered consisted of Wheeler's cavalry. There was some fierce fighting towards the end of November between that force and Kilpatrick's cavalry in the neighbourhood of Waynesboro and Briar Creek to the left of the main line of advance. But from Millen onwards little opposition was met with, as Wheeler soon withdrew his troops to the left bank of the Savannah.<sup>1</sup> In point of hard fighting this campaign cannot compare with the Atlanta campaign, which preceded it, nor in hard marching with the Carolina campaign, which followed it.

Among the spoils of Savannah were over 150 heavy guns and 31,000 bales of cotton.<sup>2</sup> President Lincoln could not complain of the Christmas present which Sherman sent him.

#### NOTE ON SHERMAN'S MARCH

For an adverse criticism of the strategy which prompted the *March to the Sea*, see Ropes' masterly paper in 10 Massachusetts M. H. S., 136-52. He considers that, when Sherman gained possession of Atlanta, "he knew that he had done practically nothing towards carrying out his intention" of destroying the Army of Tennessee: that "in most respects he was far less favourably situated for destroying that army than he had been on May 1st": that "he left to Thomas the accomplishment of the task which had been originally assigned to himself": that "no margin was left for accidents," and that Grant and Sherman "counted unwarrantably upon the favours of fortune": and that, great as was the success which attended Sherman's plan of campaign, yet if he "had followed up Hood before marching to the sea, the destruction of the Confederate army could hardly have failed to be more thorough than it was."

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 34.

<sup>2</sup> Sherman, in his letter to the President, speaks of 150 heavy guns. Cox says, "The heavy guns, mounted and in store, which were captured, were found to number over two hundred and fifty" (*March to the Sea*, 61).

## CHAPTER XXIV

### THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY IN 1864<sup>1</sup>

The Federal operations in West Virginia—Sigel's advance up the Valley—Sigel defeated by Breckinridge at Newmarket—Hunter advances on Staunton—Federal victory at Piedmont—Federals occupy Staunton—And advance on Lynchburg from the West—Early arrives in time to save Lynchburg—Hunter retreats to the Kanawha Valley—Early invades the North—Early crosses the Potomac—And occupies Frederick City—Early defeats Wallace on the Monocacy—Early appears before Washington—Early retreats—Early makes good his retreat into the Valley—Early retires to Strasburg—The 6th Corps recalled by Grant—Early resumes the offensive—The Confederate cavalry cross the Potomac—Destruction of Chambersburg—McCausland defeated by Averell—Grant sends reinforcements—Grant urges the appointment of a single commander against Early—Sheridan appointed to the command—Sheridan's earlier career—Composition of the Army of the Shenandoah—Sheridan threatens Winchester—Early falls back beyond Strasburg—Reinforcements sent by Lee to the Valley—Sheridan retreats down the Valley—Early advances to the Potomac—Early falls back to Bunker Hill—Sheridan again menaces Winchester—Anderson leaves the Valley—Grant holds a conference with Sheridan—Early's defective strategy—Sheridan prepares to attack—Battle of the Opequon (or Winchester)—The Confederates attempt a counterstroke—The Confederate left driven in—The Confederate army routed—Early takes up a position at Fisher's Hill—Battle of Fisher's Hill—Rout of the Confederate army—Kershaw rejoins Early—Sheridan occupies Harrisonburg—Difference of opinion between Grant and Sheridan—Devastation of the Valley—Sheridan falls back to Strasburg—Early follows in pursuit—Confederate cavalry routed at Tom's Brook—Difference of opinion between Halleck and Sheridan—Early resumes the offensive—Sheridan starts for Washington—Early's plan of attack—Battle of Cedar Creek—Federal left surprised and routed—Federal centre retreats—The 6th Corps forms a new line—Arrival of Sheridan—Attack on the Federal right repulsed—Sheridan attacks—The Confederate army routed—The 2nd Corps returns to Richmond—Depletion of both armies—Further cavalry operations—Sheridan again moves up the Valley—Early routed at Waynesboro—Sheridan rejoins Grant.

**T**HOUGH the two chief theatres of war during 1864 were Eastern Virginia and Georgia, there was yet a third, where events of no slight importance and with a distinct bearing upon the final issue, which was being fought out between Lee and Grant, were taking place.

The Shenandoah Valley was again the scene of a campaign, which was decisive in its results and full of strategical interest. In 1862 Stonewall Jackson had conducted that Valley campaign, which exercised so profound an influence upon the fate of McClellan's Peninsular campaign. In 1863 it was down the

<sup>1</sup> See Map V.

Shenandoah Valley that Lee, after Chancellorsville, had marched the Army of Northern Virginia for the invasion of Pennsylvania, and it was at Winchester that the greater part of Milroy's command had capitulated. In 1864 the Valley was once more the scene of a campaign, which lasted longer and was more decisive in its results than either of its predecessors. But the tide of fortune had turned, and the Federals, to whom hitherto the Valley had so frequently been the scene of disaster, found themselves at the close of the campaign in undisputed possession of the whole of it.

In the spring of 1864 Major-General Sigel was in command of the Department of West Virginia, of which the Shenandoah Valley formed a part. The chief function of the commander of that Department was to stand on the defensive and cover the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, the great line of communication between Washington and the West. But at the same time it was possible to assume the offensive against two Confederate railways, the Virginia Central, which passed through Staunton, and the Virginia and Tennessee, running through Lynchburg. Grant's plan of campaign for 1864 designed an offensive movement to be made from the valley of the Kanawha River (Map II.) against the latter railway by the forces of Crook and Averell,<sup>1</sup> whilst Sigel was to advance up the Shenandoah Valley and create a diversion by threatening Staunton and the Virginia Central Railway.

Averell, with two brigades of cavalry, started on May 1st to destroy the salt works at Saltville, whilst Crook, with about 6,000 men in all,<sup>2</sup> advanced, on May 3rd, to destroy the Virginia and Tennessee Railway bridge over the New River at New Bern. On approaching Saltville, Averell decided, from the information which reached him, that it was too strongly held to be successfully attacked. Accordingly he turned towards Wythesville, on the Virginia and Tennessee Railway, in the hope of destroying the lead works there. But the Confederate general, John Morgan, promptly transferred a part of his force from Saltville to the threatened point, and drove him off with some loss.

Crook, in the meanwhile, had been more successful. On the 9th he attacked and inflicted a severe defeat upon a Confederate force strongly posted on Cloyd's Mountain, and the following day reached New Bern, gained possession of the railway bridge, and burned it. Having accomplished his object, he withdrew to Union, where he was rejoined by Averell, and the united command went into camp at Meadow Bluff.<sup>3</sup>

On April 30th Sigel commenced his advance up the Shenandoah

<sup>1</sup> Crook was commanding, under General Sigel, in the Kanawha Valley, and Averell was Crook's cavalry commander.

<sup>2</sup> Pond, 12.

<sup>3</sup> In this brief campaign, which terminated on May 19th, the total Federal loss was 745 (Pond, 15).



Valley (Map V.). He, however, regarded his force, numbering about 6,500 men, as too small for offensive purposes, and had but a vague idea of the part which he was expected to play. He would have much preferred that Crook's force should have co-operated with his own in a movement upon Staunton. He expressed the opinion that with so small a force it would not be safe to advance beyond Strasburg unless his left flank was protected against a Confederate movement by way of Front Royal. Though Grant, in reply, assured him that he did not want him to move beyond Cedar Creek, yet Sigel pushed southward, on May 11th, through Woodstock, and on the 14th came in contact with Breckinridge's force advancing down the Valley from Newmarket, a village of some strategical importance, as the turnpike from Front Royal, by way of Luray over the Massanuttons, connected with the main Valley turnpike at that point.

The numerical strength of the two armies actually engaged on the following day was fairly equal, about 5,000 troops on either side. But Sigel's lack of any definite plan of campaign had caused him to string out his troops along the turnpike, and in the battle of the 15th he was at a distinct disadvantage. Imboden's cavalry brigade turned his left flank, and he was forced to retreat with the loss of five guns. Breckinridge did not press the pursuit far, and Sigel withdrew his defeated force to Cedar Creek. He was preparing to advance again up the Valley when he was relieved of the command of the Department by General Hunter.<sup>1</sup>

On May 26th the new commander advanced up the turnpike from Cedar Creek. His force numbered 8,500 men of all arms, with twenty-one guns.<sup>2</sup> Sigel had been left to hold the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad with the reserves. Hunter's directions were to march on Staunton, and there join hands with Crook's and Averell's forces for an advance upon Charlottesville and Lynchburg. In order to march with all speed he was instructed to levy supplies from the inhabitants of the Valley, and depend as little as possible upon trains.

Since Sigel's defeat at Newmarket, Lee had called Breckinridge's command to the line of the North Anna, and the Confederate forces left in the Valley were no match for Hunter's army. The

<sup>1</sup> According to Sigel's account (4 B. & L., 487), Grant had originally assigned General Ord to command the Field Force operating against Staunton; but that general "became so diffident in regard to the whole matter that he asked to be relieved." Sigel's reason for moving beyond Cedar Creek was because he heard that there were only about 3,000 troops in the Shenandoah Valley opposed to him, and he hoped by threatening Staunton to force Breckinridge to detach troops, and thereby weaken the opposition to Crook. Sigel attributed his defeat to the fact that two of his regiments were not up in time to take part in the battle. The Federal loss was 831, the Confederate 577 (4 B. & L., 491). Sigel admitted the loss of five guns: other accounts say six (Pond, 20, note).

<sup>2</sup> Pond, 24.

Federal general, on June 2nd, left the Valley turnpike and took a road running south-east to Port Republic, in order to outflank Imboden's cavalry, which was holding the line of the North River across the turnpike at Mount Crawford.<sup>1</sup>

On the 5th the Confederate main body, which had marched from Lynchburg, under General W. E. Jones, was encountered at Piedmont, a small village on the road between Port Republic and Staunton.<sup>2</sup>

Hunter's superiority of numbers enabled him to turn Jones' right, whilst pressing heavily on his left, and the Confederates were driven from their position in rout, leaving their commander dead upon the field, and three guns and 1,500 prisoners in the hands of the victors.<sup>3</sup> The remnant of the beaten army, under Vaughan, abandoning all hope of saving Staunton, fled eastwards to Waynesboro, where they covered the road to Charlottesville.

Hunter entered Staunton without further opposition on the 6th, where he was joined on the 8th by Crook with his own and Averell's forces, a reinforcement about 10,000 strong, with two batteries.<sup>4</sup>

On the 10th Hunter, having now under his command an army of 18,000 men, with thirty guns, moved out of Staunton after destroying the Virginia Central Railroad for several miles, and advanced against Lynchburg. Instead, however, of advancing by way of Charlottesville, as Grant had intended, he chose to follow the route which led through Lexington, and approached Lynchburg from the west.

He was probably guided in this decision by the consideration that a Confederate force was holding Rockfish Gap. But it was a mistake which cost him dear later on.<sup>5</sup>

Lexington, thirty-six miles distant from Staunton, was reached on the 11th. When starting from Staunton, Hunter had sent a cavalry division to break up the Charlottesville and Lynchburg Railway. This was done at Arrington Station. But Hunter remained at Lexington till the 13th, waiting for his cavalry to rejoin him and also for a convoy of supplies to arrive.<sup>6</sup> This delay proved fatal to his chance of capturing Lynchburg, by affording time to Breckinridge and Early to reach that city. As soon as Lee heard of Jones' defeat at Piedmont, he ordered Breckinridge

<sup>1</sup> Pond, 25.

<sup>2</sup> Piedmont is four miles east of the Valley pike, and seven south-west of Port Republic (Pond, 26).

<sup>3</sup> Pond, 27. The Federal loss was only 420. Imboden (4 B. & L., 485) gives the Confederate strength at 4,500; Vaughan, however, estimated it at 5,600.

<sup>4</sup> Pond, 28.

<sup>5</sup> Grant expected Hunter to march on Charlottesville, and sent Sheridan to meet him there.

<sup>6</sup> Hunter did not move the bulk of his army from Lexington till the 14th (Pond, 32)

to return to the Valley, and shortly after sent the 2nd Corps, now under Early's command, to cross the Blue Ridge at either Brown's or Swift Run Gap and fall upon the rear of Hunter, who was supposed to be still at Staunton.<sup>1</sup>

Breckinridge passed through the Blue Ridge at Rockfish Gap, joined Vaughan's command at Waynesboro, and hastened to Lynchburg. Early left Richmond on the 13th, and on the 17th half his Corps reinforced Breckinridge at Lynchburg. On the same day the Federal army appeared before the city. Hunter had decided that to try and drive Breckinridge from Rockfish Gap might cause fatal delay, and determined to push straight for Lynchburg through the Peaks of Otter.<sup>2</sup> On the 15th his cavalry advance occupied Liberty twenty-four miles west of Lynchburg, and was there joined by two hundred of Averell's troopers, who had been sent to ride round Lynchburg and break up the Charlottesville and Southside Railways.

On the night of the 16th Hunter encamped seven miles east of Liberty, and on the following day an advanced line of Confederate entrenchments five miles out of Lynchburg was carried.<sup>3</sup> Although Hunter knew that Confederate troops were entering Lynchburg, he did not despair of success, provided that a whole Army Corps had not been sent from Richmond to reinforce the garrison.<sup>4</sup>

On the 18th he advanced against the city, and after driving in the Confederate skirmish line attacked in force. Early's infantry sallied out to meet him, but were driven back.<sup>5</sup> Although the operations on that day were, on the whole, favourable to the Federals, yet it became plain that Early's Corps was now confronting them, and on the same night Hunter ordered his army to retreat. The choice of the Lexington route to Lynchburg was now found to add to the difficulties of the situation. For the natural route up the Shenandoah Valley was now practically closed to the Federals, as Early could send troops by the railroad, which had been sufficiently repaired to admit of his troops being brought from Charlottesville to Lynchburg by train, and operate through Rockfish Gap against Hunter's line of retreat. Similarly, a road running west of and parallel to the Shenandoah Valley through the valley of the South Branch of the Potomac, which would have brought the Federals to the Baltimore and Ohio Railway at Cumberland, was considered impracticable owing to the difficulty of getting supplies, and the possibility that the enemy might move by Staunton and Harrisonburg and cut that line of retreat. Accordingly no alternative was left to Hunter but to retreat westwards into the

<sup>1</sup> Pond, 35.

<sup>2</sup> Pond, 32.

<sup>3</sup> Pond, 33.

<sup>4</sup> Pond, 37.

<sup>5</sup> Pond, 37. But Early (4 B. & L., 493) says that on the 17th he repulsed the enemy about two miles from Lynchburg, and that on the 18th a Federal attack was "handsomely repulsed."



Kanawha Valley, leaving the Shenandoah Valley at the mercy of Early.<sup>1</sup> He was already two hundred miles away from his base, his supplies were almost exhausted, and his stock of ammunition was running short.

The Federal retreat was conducted by forced marches, owing to the necessity of reaching with all possible speed a *dépôt* of supplies. Early abandoned the pursuit on the 22nd, having no intention of entangling his troops in the mountainous region of the Kanawha Valley (Map II.), and on the 27th Hunter's army arrived within a day's march of Gauley Bridge, and finding supplies awaiting them went into camp.<sup>2</sup> Though the expedition had failed to get possession of either Charlottesville or Lynchburg, and the damage done to the railways was quickly repaired, yet it had been by no means barren of result. In the first place it had called away from Richmond a considerable portion of Lee's army, and it had also destroyed at Staunton a large amount of valuable property.<sup>3</sup> Unfortunately the necessity of retreating to the Kanawha gave Hunter's retrograde movement the appearance of a hurried flight, although even during the retreat the Federal soldiers lost no opportunity of damaging the railway as long as opportunity offered.<sup>4</sup> However, the troops were so exhausted by their forced marches and insufficient supply of food, that it was found impossible to utilise them for the defence of Washington when menaced by Early.

When Early started from Cold Harbour for Lynchburg, Lee had suggested to him the possibility of marching down the Shenandoah Valley and threatening Washington. Such a move would perhaps cause Grant to detach a considerable force to the relief of the Capital, and would in any case force the Federal troops in West Virginia to abandon their plan of operations against Lynchburg, and evacuate the upper Valley. As Lynchburg was the third largest city in Virginia,<sup>5</sup> an important railway centre, and also the chief *dépôt* of a fertile district, upon which Richmond largely depended for supplies, it was of great importance to the Confederates that a Federal force should not be allowed to remain in the neighbourhood. But Hunter's retreat to the Kanawha somewhat changed the situation: and it was left to Early's discretion whether under the altered circumstances he would carry out the suggested invasion of the North.<sup>6</sup> Being of an adventurous temperament, he determined to take immediate advantage of Hunter's

<sup>1</sup> For Hunter's reasons for selecting this line of retreat, see Pond, 38.

<sup>2</sup> Hunter expected to meet his supplies at Meadow Bluff, but the officer in charge of the *dépôt*, frightened by guerilla demonstrations, had fallen back to Gauley Bridge (Pond, 40).

<sup>3</sup> Pond, 29.

<sup>4</sup> Pond, 38-9.

<sup>5</sup> Richmond and Petersburg were the two largest cities in Virginia.

<sup>6</sup> 4 B. & L., 493.

evacuation of the Valley and push straight for the Potomac. The force, which was about to invade the North for the third time, consisted of four divisions of infantry, one division of cavalry, and about forty guns, exclusive of a few pieces of horse artillery attached to the cavalry. Breckinridge was second in command, and two infantry divisions were placed under his orders: the other two divisions and the cavalry reported direct to Early. The whole Confederate force numbered about 17,000 men.<sup>1</sup>

Early's army reached Staunton (Map V.) on June 27th and Winchester on July 2nd. Sigel, who was posted at Martinsburg to protect the railway, made good his retreat across the Potomac in spite of Early's attempts to cut him off, and on the 4th took up a position on the impregnable Maryland Heights. The occupation of these heights prevented Early from carrying out his original plan of crossing the river at Harper's Ferry.<sup>2</sup> On the 6th he crossed with two divisions at Shepherdstown, Breckinridge's command having passed the river in pursuit of Sigel on the previous day. After a fruitless demonstration against Maryland Heights, Early moved eastwards towards Frederick City (Map IV.), which he occupied on the 9th. Three miles beyond General Lew Wallace was holding the line of the Monocacy. His position was well chosen: for by holding Monocacy Junction he covered both the Baltimore and Ohio Railway and also the two turnpikes from Frederick City to Baltimore and Washington.<sup>3</sup> But the force at his disposal was miserably inadequate to contend with the Confederate army. When first he took up his position, he had only about 2,500 men, mainly provisional troops and hundred-days militia, under General Tyler, but on the 8th he began to be reinforced by Ricketts' division of the 6th Corps, 3,350 strong, which Grant had sent from City Point to Baltimore. Grant for some time was under the impression that Early's Corps had returned to Richmond, and that the Washington authorities had nothing worse to fear than a plundering raid. But on July 5th he discovered that Early had not left the Valley, and directed that one division, to be followed if necessary by the rest of the 6th Army Corps, together with all the dismounted cavalry that Meade could lay his hands upon, should be sent north. The dismounted cavalry proved, however, of very little use, being mere disorganised details largely unfit for active service.<sup>4</sup>

Having occupied Frederick City at dawn of the 9th, Early pushed forward at once to drive Wallace out of his path. The Federal general had placed Ricketts' division on the left, covering the Washington turnpike, and Tyler's division on the right, holding

<sup>1</sup> Pond, 47. But Early only estimated his strength at 10,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry (4 B. & L., 493).

<sup>2</sup> Pond, 49.

<sup>3</sup> Pond, 55.

<sup>4</sup> Pond, 54.

the railway bridge and the Baltimore turnpike. The Federals made a stout resistance, but with Early's superiority in numbers, and still more overwhelming superiority in artillery,<sup>1</sup> there could be but one issue to the battle, and when Ricketts was in danger of being outflanked on the left by Gordon's division, which had crossed the river lower down, Wallace ordered a retreat along the Baltimore road. The Federal losses were nearly 2,000, falling chiefly upon Ricketts' division, which lost nearly half the force with which it went into battle. Early reported his own loss in killed and wounded as about 700.<sup>2</sup> But judging from the number of wounded, over 400, whom he left behind in the hospitals at Frederick City to fall into the enemy's hands, it is possible that his loss was somewhat heavier.

With the Washington road lying open before him, Early pushed forward at full speed through Rockville, and shortly after noon of the 11th his leading division, under General Rodes, was deploying a skirmish line within range of the artillery in the Washington forts. The rest of his army was all up about 6 p.m. But the men were exhausted with the long marches made on very dusty roads and by the great heat, and to attack that day was impossible.<sup>3</sup> About the same time that Early's troops began to appear before Washington, reinforcements from the Army of the Potomac also began to arrive. On the evening of the 9th the other two divisions of the 6th Corps left the lines before Petersburg for City Point. Reaching Washington on the afternoon of the 11th, they found that some 800 men of Emory's division of the 19th Corps from New Orleans had just arrived, and that same night part of the 6th Corps relieved the raw troops on the piquet line.<sup>4</sup> Early had concentrated most of his forces on the Seventh Street road facing Fort Stevens. The defences of Washington on that side consisted of detached forts connected by rifle pits, and so arranged that, if one fell into the hands of the enemy, it would be exposed to a cross-fire from its neighbours. Before the arrival of reinforcements the forces available for the defence of Washington amounted to 20,000. But only 9,600 of these formed the actual garrison, and nearly all the troops were either raw recruits or reservists.<sup>5</sup>

Early, from the prisoners whom he had captured on the 9th, knew that part of the 6th Corps had been fighting him on the Monocacy, and naturally imagined that the rest of the Corps had already reached Washington. In any case his troops were too exhausted to attack on the 11th, and on the following day there was no chance of a successful assault after the arrival of veteran

<sup>1</sup> Wallace had only eight guns (Pond, 57).

<sup>2</sup> Pond, 58-9.

<sup>3</sup> Early's own statement, quoted by Pond, 67.

<sup>4</sup> Pond, 66-8.

<sup>5</sup> 4 B. & L., 498, note. How General Barnard makes up the total of over 20,000 is not easy to see. The figures given by him amount to only 17,000 at the most.



reinforcements. Had Early immediately after crossing the Potomac pushed straight for Washington, instead of wasting precious time in demonstrating against Maryland Heights, he might have had just a chance of capturing Washington. But not arriving before the Capital till the 11th, he wisely judged that any such attempt could not lead to permanent success, and might involve his whole army in utter destruction. There was some sharp skirmishing on the 12th in front of Fort Stevens, and one brigade of the 6th Corps moved out and drove back the Confederate piquet line. That evening Early withdrew through Rockville, and marching all night halted near Darnestown.<sup>1</sup> It is hardly likely that Lee expected with so small a force to capture Washington.<sup>2</sup>

The invasion of the North had had the effect of withdrawing a whole Corps from Grant's army, and had given both Washington and Baltimore a sudden fright. But it had failed to disorganise Grant's plans, though it made him all the more determined to regain and hold possession of the Shenandoah Valley, in order to prevent a repetition of the invasion.

It had proved impossible to bring up Hunter's army in time to aid in the relief of Washington. Both in order to gain time and to give the exhausted soldiers some opportunity for rest, Hunter decided to transport his troops by water down the Kanawha (Map II.) and up the Ohio to Parkersburg, and thence by the Ohio and Baltimore Railway to Cumberland. But the rivers were very low and progress was slow. The troops were frequently obliged to leave the transports in order to get them over the shoals, and when the railway was reached, further delay was caused by the necessity of repairing the damage to the line, which Imboden's cavalry had done. It was not till July 11th that Hunter's leading division reached Martinsburg.<sup>3</sup>

On the 13th Wright, with his two divisions of the 6th Corps, followed by Emory's division of the 19th Corps,<sup>4</sup> marched out from Washington in pursuit of Early (Map IV.). The Confederates had, however, got a good start, and on the morning of the 14th

<sup>1</sup> Pond, 70.

<sup>2</sup> According to Early (4 B. & L., 492, note) Lee never expected him to do more than threaten Washington. Yet Early seems to have hoped to take by surprise the works defending Washington on the 11th, and had determined to order an assault on the 12th, when during the night he heard that reinforcements from Grant had arrived. These consisted of the other two divisions of the 6th Corps and 800 men forming the advance guard of the 19th Corps. Grant thought that had Early arrived one day earlier he might have entered the city before the arrival of these reinforcements. But it seems certain that he could not have held the city against the fresh troops of the Army of the Potomac. Early explained his delay on the Potomac by the necessity of either driving Sigel from, or "safely housing" him, in the fortifications on Maryland Heights.

<sup>3</sup> Pond, 52.

<sup>4</sup> The 19th Corps had come from New Orleans to join the Army of the Potomac, but on reaching Hampton Roads was hurried on without disembarking to Washington.

crossed the Potomac at White's Ford and went into camp at Leesburg. The evening of the same day Wright reached Poolesville, and the two armies remained watching each other on opposite banks of the Potomac till the morning of the 16th. Wright did not consider that he was strong enough to cross the river in the face of the enemy, until he had received definite information of Hunter's movements.

The general tendency of the Washington Government at this time was to leave everything to Grant, who at City Point could not possibly have exact knowledge of the actual state of affairs on the Potomac, as it changed from day to day. Consequently no combined movement was made against Early, who on the 16th left Leesburg and marched to Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps in the Blue Ridge (Map V.). Grant, though at first eager that an attempt should be made to cut off Early from retreating south, quickly realised that in all probability Early would make good his escape. Accordingly he wrote to Halleck to the effect that Wright, to whom by his orders had been given the command of all the troops engaged in the pursuit of Early, should be sent back to City Point with the 6th and 19th Corps, as soon as it was plain that the Confederates were really retreating. He also suggested that Hunter should move up the Valley with the view of either preventing Early from returning to Richmond, or in case Lee judged it expedient to withdraw Early in consequence of the return of Wright's force to the Army of the Potomac, of advancing against Charlottesville and Gordonsville and getting possession of the railroad between these two places. The knowledge that Grant wanted him back as quickly as possible may have caused Wright to press the pursuit with less vigour than he would otherwise have shown.

Hunter left Martinsburg on the 13th, and the following day moved part of his troops across the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, but on the same night received directions from Wright, that he should join him at Leesburg. The next morning he despatched a force of about 9,000 infantry and cavalry back across the Potomac. It seems plain that with properly concerted action Wright, who had under his immediate command some 15,000 men, whilst Ricketts with 5,000 more troops was hurrying from Baltimore to join him, as well as Hunter's force of 9,000 men, ought to have succeeded in seriously embarrassing Early's retreat. But Wright and Hunter did not join hands till the 16th, by which time Early was already across the Blue Ridge. Crook had now arrived to take command of Hunter's field force, and by Wright's orders advanced part of his troops to Snicker's Gap.

On the 18th Early was at Berryville, holding the fords of the Shenandoah. On that day one of Crook's divisions crossed that

river, but was driven back again by the overwhelming force which Early brought against it. On the 19th Early abandoned the line of the Shenandoah in consequence of a movement of Averell's cavalry, supported by one infantry brigade from Harper's Ferry, which cut his line of retreat to Winchester and threatened his trains. The Confederate army moved to the east of Winchester, and then marched towards Strasburg.

Wright crossed the Shenandoah on the 20th, and seemed at first inclined to press on in pursuit, but being hampered by Grant's expressed desire to have him back again as soon as possible at City Point, and considering that he had sufficiently verified the fact of Early's retreat, recrossed the river on the same day and returned to Leesburg. In the meantime, Early had sent Ramseur's division to Winchester to hold Averell in check; but the Confederate division was suddenly attacked by Averell and driven back with the loss of four guns. Early, therefore, sent back Rodes' division to cover Ramseur's retreat; and on the 22nd the Confederate army was concentrated at Strasburg, and on the same day Averell, marching through Winchester to Kernstown, was joined by Crook from Berryville.<sup>1</sup>

On the 23rd orders were received by Halleck from Grant, directing that the 6th Corps should be immediately returned to him, but that the 19th Corps might be retained at Washington. Grant in giving these orders acted upon the supposition that Lee would follow the precedent of 1862, when he summoned Jackson from the Valley, and would recall Early. But Lee, not considering that Early's presence was imperatively called for at Richmond, preferred to leave him in the Valley, where he constituted a standing menace to Maryland and Pennsylvania, and would also be useful in protecting the gathering in of the harvest.

As soon as Early learnt that Wright's Corps was returning towards Washington, he determined to resume the offensive, and on the 23rd moved out to attack Crook and Averell at Kernstown. On the following day he drove Crook's army back through Winchester to Bunker Hill, and on the 26th Crook retreated across the Potomac, and by Hunter's orders took up his position at Sharpsburg to hold the Gaps in the South Mountain. Early again found himself undisputed master of the Valley.<sup>2</sup>

With his infantry he proceeded to break up the railroad at Martinsburg, whilst he sent his cavalry on a plundering raid across the Potomac. McCausland, who commanded two brigades, was instructed first to move on Chambersburg, and, unless it consented to pay the ransom demanded, to burn it to the ground: then to move against Cumberland and repeat the same

<sup>1</sup> For the operations in connection with Early's retreat to Strasburg, see Pond, *Caps. V.*

<sup>2</sup> Pond, 96-100.



process, and at the same time destroy the machinery of the coal-pits there.

McCausland crossed the Potomac on the 29th, occupied Chambersburg on the 30th, and, as the ransom demanded<sup>1</sup> was not forthcoming, set it on fire. Averell's cavalry had started in pursuit of the raiders, and McCausland withdrew to the Potomac, which he reached on the 31st at Hancock. Being attacked there by Averell, he rode westward, and on August 1st appeared before Cumberland, where, however, he encountered a Federal force under Kelley. Finding himself in danger of being caught between two fires, he drew off to the east and crossed the Potomac at Old Town, near the junction of the South Branch. Failing in an attempt on August 4th to capture the railway post at New Creek, he withdrew to Moorefield. But on the 7th Averell, who had steadily followed in pursuit, suddenly dashed in upon him and routed his command, capturing all his guns and over 400 prisoners.<sup>2</sup>

The news of Crook's defeat at Kernstown caused the 6th Corps to be sent back to Harper's Ferry, and Grant despatched 4,600 more men of the 19th Corps to Washington,<sup>3</sup> at the same time insisting that someone in Washington must undertake the control of the troops on the line of the Potomac, in order to deal with sudden emergencies. On July 29th the 6th Corps was at Halltown covering Harper's Ferry, and on the same day was joined by Crook's command. The news of McCausland's raid across the Potomac caused the united force to be withdrawn across the river to hold the line of the Monocacy at Frederick City, whither Emory's division of the 19th Corps was also sent.

Grant was quite determined that Early's force must either be crushed or driven southward, and in the latter case, in order to prevent the Shenandoah Valley from serving again as an avenue, by which a Confederate force might invade the North, that the Valley must be systematically devastated, so that an army could no longer live off the country.<sup>4</sup> To ensure his object the first step was to put an end to the system, by which a multiplicity of Departmental commanders were operating more or less independently against a single united command, and concentrate all the Federal forces available for field operations in the hands of some one reliable officer. He had already written to Halleck on July 18th,

<sup>1</sup> The ransom demanded was 500,000 dollars in currency, or 100,000 in gold (Pond, 102).

<sup>2</sup> Pond, 106.

<sup>3</sup> Pond, 99.

<sup>4</sup> As the Shenandoah Valley has a general direction from south-west to north-east, it was of great importance to the Confederates as affording a line of advance for an invasion of the North. But it was of comparatively little value to the Federals, as any movement up it would lead away from Richmond. Therefore it would be a clear gain to the Federals to devastate it so thoroughly that no army could find subsistence there (4 B. & L., 500).

suggesting the advisability of merging the Departments of West Virginia, of the Susquehanna, of Washington, and the Middle Department<sup>1</sup> into one, and of calling to the chief command of the forces in these different Departments General Franklin.<sup>2</sup>

This suggestion, however, by no means found favour in the eyes of the Washington authorities. Franklin was still regarded by them as responsible for Burnside's disaster at Fredericksburg, in December, 1862; nor did the degradation of the Departments into mere districts, which must necessarily follow upon their being merged into one Department, commend itself to them.

Grant's next proposal was that the dignity of the Departmental commanders might be preserved by creating a single Military Division to include the four Departments in question, just as the Military Division of the Mississippi had been created for him in 1863, and that General Meade should be assigned to the command.<sup>3</sup> But as this suggestion met with no response, he directed Sheridan to report for temporary duty to Halleck, asking the Chief of the Staff, unless Hunter should himself take the field in person, to place Sheridan in command of the field forces. Grant had already ordered Torbert's division of cavalry to Washington; and, on Sheridan's request that more cavalry might be sent, as the country in the Valley and on the Potomac line was much more favourable for cavalry operations than the neighbourhood of Richmond, he promptly despatched Wilson's division.

On August 4th the Commander-in-Chief himself left City Point and hastened to Frederick City to hold a conference with Hunter. As a result orders were issued on the 5th that the 6th, 19th, and 8th<sup>4</sup> Corps should concentrate at Halltown: that Early's force was to be followed wherever it went, and that if only a small portion of it had gone north, then Hunter should move up the Valley and destroy all the provisions and forage which his army did not require for its own consumption.<sup>5</sup>

On the 7th a further order was issued, constituting the Middle Military Division to consist of the four Departments already named and appointing Sheridan to the temporary command of the new Division. During the conference at Frederick City Grant had expressed his wish that Sheridan should have command of the forces operating in the field, and Hunter readily falling in with

<sup>1</sup> This Department included Delaware and a part of Maryland.

<sup>2</sup> Grant had a high opinion of Franklin, and would have been glad to have him in command of the right wing of the army, besieging Petersburg (4 B. & L., 106, note). Franklin had commanded the 19th Corps in the Red River expedition, until he was wounded.

<sup>3</sup> Grant proposed that Hancock should succeed Meade in command of the Army of the Potomac, and that Gibbon should be appointed to command the 2nd Corps.

<sup>4</sup> The 8th Corps, also called the Army of West Virginia, was commanded by Crook.

<sup>5</sup> Pond, 117-18.

his wishes, had declared his willingness to be relieved entirely of command.<sup>1</sup>

Philip H. Sheridan, who has now assigned to conduct the operations in the Shenandoah Valley, was born in 1831. He graduated at West Point in the class of 1853,<sup>2</sup> standing thirty-fourth in a total of fifty-two, and received a commission in the infantry. He served in Texas and California and Oregon, and had a considerable experience of Indian warfare. The outbreak of the Civil War accelerated the rate of promotion, and when ordered east in September, 1861, he had just been made a captain. In the war itself, in which his earlier service was with the Western armies, he had won his laurels as commander of an infantry division in the Army of the Cumberland. His division played an important part in the battles of Murfreesborough and Chattanooga, and he had since increased his fame as chief of the cavalry in the Army of the Potomac. But his military genius and qualifications to be regarded as a great leader of men had not yet been revealed in their fulness.

The Army of the Shenandoah, as it was officially designated by Sheridan, consisted of three infantry Corps, the 6th under Wright, the 19th under Emory, and the 8th under Crook, and the three cavalry divisions of Torbert, Wilson, and Averell. At the moment when Sheridan assumed the command the larger part of the second division of the 19th Corps had not yet arrived, and both Wilson's and Averell's cavalry divisions were still absent.<sup>3</sup> One of his first actions as an army commander was to form the cavalry divisions into a Corps, to the command of which Torbert was assigned, being succeeded by Merritt in the command of his division.

On the 10th Sheridan moved from Halltown towards Winchester. The first day's march placed him in a strong defensive position reaching from Clifton to Berryville and covering Snicker's Gap. The next day he pushed forward towards the Opequon. Early had moved from Bunker Hill on the 4th, and crossed the Potomac the following day. His object was to gather in the corn on the farms near Sharpsburg, to cover McCausland's retreat from Maryland, and to mystify the Federal commander. But on the 6th he hastily withdrew to Martinsburg, probably in consequence of the concentration of the Federal army at Halltown.<sup>4</sup> When Sheridan commenced his movement against Winchester, Early fell back to

<sup>1</sup> Pond, 120. Sheridan was only appointed to the temporary command, because Secretary Stanton opposed his permanent appointment on the ground that he was too young for such an important post (4 B. & L., 501).

<sup>2</sup> Sheridan entered West Point in 1848, and would have graduated in the natural course of events in 1852, but he was condemned to lose a year's seniority for a serious breach of military discipline (1 Sheridan, 11-13).

<sup>3</sup> Pond, 121 (note).

<sup>4</sup> Pond, 119.



cover the threatened town. But he had no intention of fighting for its protection. He knew that his adversary had been reinforced, whilst his own reinforcements, which Lee had despatched from Richmond, were still on their way. His obvious policy was to fall back beyond Strasburg, where the reinforcements could join him by way of Chester Gap and Front Royal.

Accordingly on the 11th he continued his retreat through Winchester, and on the evening of the 12th took up a very strong position at Fisher's Hill, two miles south of Strasburg, with his right flank resting on the North Fork of the Shenandoah and his left stretching towards Little North Mountain.<sup>1</sup>

Sheridan on the same night halted on the left bank of Cedar Creek just north of Strasburg. Conflicting reports were at this time reaching him as to the strength of his opponent. On the one hand, Grant from before Petersburg was assuring him that no troops at all had been detached from Lee's Army to the Valley: on the other hand, he was informed on good authority that a strong force was on its way from Richmond.

The uncertainty ended on the 14th, when a staff officer arrived in hot haste, bearing a despatch from Washington, in which it was stated, on Grant's authority, that two infantry divisions, some cavalry, and twenty guns had been sent to join Early.<sup>2</sup> As a matter of fact the reinforcements consisted of one infantry division, Kershaw's of the 1st Corps, one cavalry division under Fitzhugh Lee, and Cutshaw's battalion of artillery. This force was commanded by R. H. Anderson, the commander of the 1st Corps, and his presence with it caused its strength to be exaggerated, a fact on which Lee had probably counted.

It was now Sheridan's turn to retreat. It was now his reinforcements which were on their way, whereas those of his adversary were close at hand. Accordingly he determined to fall back to the Clifton-Berryville line, where he would cover Snicker's Gap, through which his reinforcements were expected. He gained this position on the night of the 17th, but the activity of the enemy in assaulting his rearguard in Winchester caused him to fall back to a more compact line of defence at Charlestown.<sup>3</sup>

In his retreat down the Valley Sheridan had laid waste the country between Strasburg and Winchester. North of Winchester, however, the country had not been devastated, and Early's great object was to hold a position where he could supply himself with food and forage, and also prevent any repairs being made on the Baltimore and Ohio Railway.<sup>4</sup> He moved his own troops to Bunker Hill, whilst Anderson with his forces guarded Winchester. An attempt to make a combined movement on the 21st against the Federal position, though it failed from want of

<sup>1</sup> Pond, 125.<sup>2</sup> Pond, 127.<sup>3</sup> Pond, 131.<sup>4</sup> Pond, 133.

concerted action, decided Sheridan to fall still further back, and he retired to Halltown, where with his flanks guarded by the Potomac and Shenandoah, and within range of the guns of Harper's Ferry, he held a position practically impregnable.<sup>1</sup>

On the 25th Early, finding that Sheridan's position was too strong to attack, left Anderson with Kershaw's division, Cutshaw's artillery battalion, and a cavalry force to watch the Federal lines at Halltown, and himself moved with his four divisions towards Shepherdstown, whilst Fitzhugh Lee, with the bulk of his cavalry, started to cross the Potomac at Williamsport.<sup>2</sup> The object of this movement was to keep before the eyes of the Washington Government the possibility of another invasion of Pennsylvania and Maryland.

Sheridan despatched Wilson's cavalry division across the Potomac to hold the South Mountain Gaps; and Fitzhugh Lee, on finding that the fords in the neighbourhood of Williamsport were held by Averell's cavalry, drew off towards Shepherdstown.<sup>3</sup> Early, recognising that it was impossible to attack Sheridan in his present position with any hope of success, and that it was too dangerous a step to invade the North, when there were three cavalry divisions ready to operate against his trains, determined to withdraw to his old position at Bunker Hill west of the Opequon.

As soon as Early fell back, Sheridan in his turn moved forward to reoccupy his old position on the Clifton-Berryville line, where he was able to menace Early's line of retreat through Winchester.

On September 3rd he was in position, and on that day Anderson's command, which was returning to Richmond, blundered in upon the Federal left. A short encounter, terminated by the speedy approach of night, ensued between the Confederates and the 8th Corps. Anderson was obliged to return to Richmond by a different route, crossing the Blue Ridge higher up at Chester Gap.

As Grant had foreseen, the steady pressure which the Armies of the Potomac and James were keeping up against Lee in Richmond was bound sooner or later to necessitate the recall of some portion of the troops in the Valley. During August the Federals had both gained ground on the north bank of the James and established themselves on the Weldon railroad. Lee judged it necessary to recall Anderson, before Grant should stretch his lines further west and menace the Southside railway. Anderson took back with him Kershaw's infantry and Cutshaw's artillery, leaving Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry with Early.

Anderson's departure, which took place finally on September 14th, restored to Sheridan the numerical superiority. As soon as he

<sup>1</sup> Pond, 135.

<sup>2</sup> Pond, 137.

<sup>3</sup> Pond, 139.

found that Lee was reinforcing Early in August, he had resolved to stand strictly on the defensive until Grant's pressure upon Richmond should compel the recall of the Confederate reinforcements. Therefore he had fallen back from Cedar Creek to Berryville, to Charlestown, and finally to Halltown. He had refused to be drawn from his strong position by Early's threat of crossing the Potomac.

Grant thoroughly agreed with his lieutenant's policy. Halleck was not, however, so well satisfied. Early, at Bunker Hill, effectually closed the railway and the Ohio and Chesapeake Canal. For as often as the Federal cavalry approached the railway at Martinsburg Early marched out with a powerful infantry force and drove them off. Upon the canal both Washington and Baltimore largely depended for their coal-supply. The gas companies and the railway company were demanding of Halleck that Early should be driven south.<sup>1</sup> So strong had become the feeling in the Capital that Grant left City Point and hurried to Sheridan to see what could be done to satisfy public opinion. He arrived just after Anderson's departure, and found Sheridan preparing to strike. He had brought with him a plan of campaign, but was so satisfied with Sheridan's that he did not even mention his own to him. As a result of the conference he gave his instructions in two words, "Go in."<sup>2</sup>

Sheridan "went in" with the rapidity and vigour which are the characteristics of a plan thoroughly digested and complete in every detail. Early's mistaken policy made his task comparatively easy. Instead of retiring south of Strasburg to the strong defensive position of Fisher's Hill, a movement which prudence imperatively demanded as the corollary of Anderson's departure from the Valley, the Confederate general remained with the rest of his forces at Stephenson's Depôt, about six miles north of Winchester.

Sheridan's original plan was to move south of Winchester to Newtown and force his adversary to battle by striking at his line of retreat. But on the 17th Early moved out from his camp with two infantry divisions and advanced towards Martinsburg to drive off Averell's cavalry, who had again appeared on the railway.<sup>3</sup> He was so impressed with the importance of preventing the railroad being put into working order that he lost sight of all other considerations, and deliberately divided his forces, when a hostile army considerably stronger than his own was close at hand. He

<sup>1</sup> Pond, 150 (note).

<sup>2</sup> Pond, 151.

<sup>3</sup> Early marched on the 17th, with Rodes' and Gordon's divisions, to Bunker Hill, and on the 18th continued on to Martinsburg with Gordon's division. Having driven off Averell, he returned the same night to Bunker Hill, where he left Gordon, with orders to march to Stephenson's Depôt next morning. Rodes started to return on the night of the 18th.



underestimated his younger opponent, and misconstrued his retreat down the Valley and subsequent inactivity as the signs of feeble generalship and a halting policy.<sup>1</sup> He was destined to be terribly undeceived.

Sheridan, finding that his opponent was playing into his hands, determined to march straight on Winchester, in the hope of annihilating the two divisions under Ramseur and Breckinridge, which were posted near the town and at Stephenson's Dépôt. At 3 a.m. on the 19th the Federal army advanced. Wilson's cavalry division led the way along the Berryville Pike. His orders were to cross the Opequon, which was about six miles distant, and make a dash to secure the defile, through which the turnpike runs for two miles after crossing the Creek, so as to clear the way for the 6th and 19th Corps, which were to follow. The 8th Corps was to remain at the crossing of the river in reserve. Torbert, with Merritt's cavalry division, was to cross the Opequon by a ford further down and push forward so as to connect with Averell's division, which was expected to move down the Martinsburg Pike.

Wilson carried out his task admirably, dashing through the defile and capturing a breastwork at the southern end of it about 5 a.m. The two infantry Corps were, however, greatly delayed in getting through the defile,<sup>2</sup> and it was almost noon before Wright got them deployed in line of battle, the 6th Corps on either side of the Berryville Pike, the 19th Corps to the right, and Wilson's cavalry on the left.

This unavoidable delay frustrated Sheridan's plan of crushing his opponent in detail; for before the Federal line of battle was formed, Rodes' and Gordon's divisions, which Early had taken with him on the 17th, reached the field. Consequently Sheridan found himself called upon to fight the whole of Early's army, but he was fully equal to the task. When Wright attacked shortly before noon, the three Confederate divisions, though making an obstinate resistance, were forced back. The Berryville Pike, along which the 6th Corps was advancing, bears somewhat to the left, and as the Federals pressed forward, the gap between the right of the 6th and the left of the 19th Corps widened. Into this gap one of Rodes' brigades, which had just reached the field, was thrown, and being supported by Rodes on the right with the rest of his division, and by Gordon on the left, threw the 19th Corps<sup>3</sup> and

<sup>1</sup> "The events of the last month had satisfied me that the commander opposed to me was without enterprise and possessed an excessive caution which amounted to timidity" (4 B. & L., 522).

<sup>2</sup> The 19th Corps was delayed by the guns and trains of the 6th Corps, which were preceding it (4 B. & L., 507).

<sup>3</sup> Only one division—Grover's—of the 19th Corps was thrown into confusion, the other—Dwight's—being in reserve (2 Sheridan, 23).

Ricketts' division of the 6th into considerable confusion, and compelled the whole Federal line to fall back towards the line on which they had deployed before attacking. For a moment the issue of the battle hung in the balance. But Russell's division of the 6th Corps, which had been hitherto held in reserve, was put in, and the lost ground recovered, the Confederates being forced back to the woods from which they had charged. In this encounter both Rodes and Russell were killed.

A brief lull now followed on this part of the field. But elsewhere the Federal cavalry and Crook's Corps were operating with deadly effect. Sheridan had at first intended to move Crook to the left, so as to cut off the Confederate retreat south of Winchester, but he now ordered him to the right to support Emory. Torbert, after crossing the Opequon, found himself confronted by Wharton's division, which, under the personal direction of Breckinridge, had advanced from Stephenson's Depôt to meet him. Averell in the meanwhile had moved along the Martinsburg Pike, driving before him two brigades of Lomax's cavalry all the way from Darksville, whither they had fallen back the previous day from Martinsburg. Against the combined cavalry attack Breckinridge was forced to fall back, and with difficulty extricated his division, which he succeeded in bringing into Winchester about 2 p.m.<sup>1</sup>

Early's position had now become one of great peril; in front a superior infantry force was steadily pushing his troops back, whilst on both flanks the Federal cavalry were advancing. In order to prevent Wilson from gaining possession of the Valley turnpike, and so cutting his line of retreat, Early was forced to detach from the cavalry on his left, which were already overmatched by Torbert's two divisions. The Confederates made their final stand about 5 p.m. behind a line of breastworks a mile to the north of Winchester. At the same moment that Wright's and Crook's infantry advanced to the charge, Torbert's two divisions with drawn sabres bore down upon the left flank of Early's doomed army. The Confederates broke and fled, were "sent whirling" through Winchester, leaving five guns on the battlefield.

The Federal infantry, who had been marching and fighting since the early hours of the morning, were too exhausted to press the pursuit, but Wilson's cavalry followed the flying foe along the pike to Kernstown.<sup>2</sup> Ramseur's division had, however, preserved its organisation and effectually covered the retreat, and at 10 p.m. the pursuit was abandoned. The Federal loss amounted to about 5,000, and Early's losses nearly reached 4,000. The Confederate

<sup>1</sup> Pond, 165. Averell's cavalry, moving down the Martinsburg road, came into the rear of the infantry who were facing Torbert, and forced them to abandon their position.

<sup>2</sup> Pond, 167.

loss was considerably the greater in proportion to the actual strength of the two armies. For Sheridan put into the field about 25,000 men to Early's 17,000.<sup>1</sup> Though the number of troops engaged was not large, yet the victory was a decisive one. The lower Valley was definitely secured to the Federals. All danger of another invasion of the North vanished. Early's army had been badly beaten, and was thoroughly demoralised, as was shown at Fisher's Hill three days later. In recognition of his victory Sheridan was promoted to the rank of Brigadier-General in the regular army, and assigned to the permanent command of the Middle Division.

On the following day Early withdrew to Fisher's Hill, two miles south of Strasburg. The position which he took up was as strong as any that could be found in the Valley. The sudden uprising of the Massanutton chain there narrows the Valley to a width of four miles. The right flank of the Confederates rested on the North Fork of the Shenandoah, which washes the western face of the Massanuttons. Along the front of Early's line ran Tumbling Run, a tributary of the North Fork, whilst the left was extended across the Valley to the foot of Little North Mountain. Fisher's Hill itself was a precipitous bluff overhanging Tumbling Run, and, strengthened by artificial works, was impregnable to a frontal attack.<sup>2</sup> Earthworks had been thrown up across the Valley westwards, and artillery placed in position behind them. The only way in which the Confederate lines could be broken was by a flank movement against their left.

On the night of the 20th Sheridan's army arrived in front of Strasburg. Next day the infantry was being put in position, and the Confederates were driven from a ridge of high ground running along the north bank of Tumbling Run. Sheridan's intention was to repeat the movement which had been so successful on the 19th, and turn the Confederate left. For this purpose the 8th Corps was held back out of sight, and on the 22nd marched under cover of the thick wood to and along the foot of Little North Mountain until it had reached a position from which an attack could be made on the Confederate left rear, and their line of earthworks taken in reverse. In the meanwhile the 6th Corps and Averell's cavalry were demonstrating against the enemy's front. Torbert had already been sent through the Luray Valley to try and cross the Massanuttons in Early's rear and thus intercept his retreat.

<sup>1</sup> For the losses of the two sides, see Pond, 168-70. The estimate given in the text of the Federal strength is taken from 2 Keifer, 109; of the Confederate, from Pond, 266. Early estimated his own strength at about 8,500 infantry and 3,000 cavalry (Swinton, 558). The "field returns" of Sheridan's army, however, give the Federal strength at considerably over 40,000.

<sup>2</sup> So secure did Early feel himself that the ammunition chests were taken from the caissons and placed behind the breastworks (2 Sheridan, 34).



Early was completely deceived as to Sheridan's plan of attack. He imagined that the main assault was about to be made by the 6th Corps against his left centre, and so completely had he lost confidence in his troops after their severe defeat on the 19th, that in spite of the strength of his position he gave orders for a retreat to be commenced after dark.<sup>1</sup> Suddenly, but a short time before sunset, Crook's Corps rushed from its place of concealment against the left flank. The troops in that part of the Confederate line were dismounted cavalry. Taken in reverse, they broke and fled. As the Confederate infantry divisions tried to change front to the left to meet Crook's advance, the other two Federal Corps rushed to the attack.<sup>2</sup> The Confederates fled in great confusion. In the flight all organisation was lost. Sixteen guns became the spoil of the victors, though Early managed to save his trains.

The Federals pursued throughout the night as far as Woodstock. Sheridan's attempt to cut off Early's retreat with Torbert's cavalry was frustrated by the resistance of a Confederate cavalry force, which held a very strong position at Milford, and caused the Federals to fall back towards Front Royal.<sup>3</sup> On the right Averell's cavalry, instead of taking part in the pursuit, went into camp at dark, and did not reach Woodstock till after the infantry. On this account, and for similar conduct on the 23rd, Sheridan relieved Averell and assigned Powell to the command of his division. Sheridan's loss in this battle was only about 400; Early's can hardly have fallen short of 1,400, the larger part of whom were prisoners.<sup>4</sup>

This second defeat, following so close upon the first, for the time being destroyed Early's army as a fighting force. The upper Valley lay at Sheridan's mercy. For Early, after hurrying through Newmarket with Sheridan close upon his heels, left the Valley turnpike and turned off to the east by a cross-road leading to Port Republic. He thus left the road open to Harrisonburg and Staunton. But he hoped by taking this route to form a junction with Kershaw's division, which Lee had ordered to return to the Valley on hearing of Early's defeat at Winchester.

On the 25th Early passed through Port Republic and took up a position covering Brown's Gap, where he was joined by Wickham's two cavalry brigades, which had fallen back from the Luray Valley after the defeat at Fisher's Hill, and by Lomax's cavalry, which

<sup>1</sup> 4 B. & L., 524.

<sup>2</sup> As soon as Crook broke the Confederate left the other two Corps made a wheel half-left. This movement was commenced by Rickett's division and taken up from right to left throughout the Federal line (Sheridan, ii. 35-8).

<sup>3</sup> This Confederate force consisted of two brigades under the command of Wickham, who had succeeded Fitzhugh Lee in the command of his division after the latter had been wounded in the battle of the 19th.

<sup>4</sup> Pond, 180. In 4 B. & L., 524 (note), Sheridan's loss is stated at 528.

had been driven along the Valley turnpike to Harrisonburg. On the 26th he was joined by Kershaw's infantry division.

On the 25th Sheridan pushed the 6th and 19th Corps on to Harrisonburg, whilst the 8th remained in reserve at the junction of the Valley turnpike and the Port Republic road. Merritt was sent to Port Republic to keep an eye on Early, and draw attention away from Torbert, who with a larger force was directed against Staunton and Waynesboro to destroy the Virginia Central railway bridge over the South river at the latter place.<sup>1</sup>

When news reached Early of Torbert's movement, he left Port Republic, whither he had advanced on the 27th after receiving Kershaw's reinforcement, on the 28th and hurried his army towards Rockfish Gap to prevent Torbert destroying the railway tunnel through the Blue Ridge. Torbert was engaged in destroying the railway bridge at Waynesboro, when Early's whole army moved against him. He withdrew his forces and returned on the 29th to Bridgewater on the North river.

Sheridan's plan of campaign had been brilliantly successful. He had administered to his opponent two crushing defeats, and driven him almost entirely out of the Valley. But his remarkable success did not blind him to the limitations of his plan. His swift advance up the Valley was after all only a raid. His idea now was to devastate the upper Valley so thoroughly that no Confederate army could henceforth draw any supplies from it, and, after leaving a sufficient force in the Valley to hold in check guerilla leaders of the type of Mosby, to detach the bulk of his army to assist in Grant's operations against Petersburg. He had sent his cavalry to destroy all crops, forage, and supplies of all sorts between Harrisonburg on the north, and Staunton and Piedmont on the south and east.

Grant, however, was still anxious that an advance should be made against the Virginia Central Railway between Charlottesville and Gordonsville. He considered that such a movement against the railroad and the James Canal would be a fitting termination to the Valley campaign. Orders were sent to Halleck that a railway should be repaired to serve as a line of supplies to Sheridan in the contemplated movement, and it was left to Sheridan to decide whether he would rather have the Manassas Gap or the Alexandria and Orange Railroad repaired.

Sheridan, however, held that his campaign should end with the devastation of the Valley. He declared that it would be impossible, either to move through the Blue Ridge against Gordonsville and Charlottesville, or to advance still further up the Valley against Lynchburg, owing to the lack of supplies and want of transport for his army. He regarded the plan of repairing a rail-

<sup>1</sup> Pond, 190.

way as premature, and considered that a large force would have to be drawn off to protect the line under repair, which might be much more advantageously used elsewhere. He proposed to hold the lower Valley with Crook's Corps and send the 6th, the 19th, and a cavalry division to Grant. The Commander-in-Chief wisely left the final decision to the "man on the spot," and on October 3rd wrote to Sheridan, authorising him to carry out his plan.

On the morning of October 6th Sheridan began to withdraw his troops from Harrisonburg and marched back down the Valley, devastating it as he went from one mountain barrier to the other. Two thousand barns and seventy mills were destroyed, and a great number of cattle and sheep driven away or killed for the use of the troops.<sup>1</sup>

On the 8th the Federal army reached Strasburg. Early had on October 1st marched across from Waynesboro to Mount Sidney on the Valley turnpike, and taken up a position about half-way between Staunton and Harrisonburg.<sup>2</sup> The cavalry piquets of the two armies were confronting each other on opposite banks of the North river. Defeat had only served to fire Early's aggressive temper, and, having under his command with Kershaw's reinforcements a stronger force than he had had since his defeat on the Opequon, he was determined to try conclusions once more with Sheridan. He was only waiting for the arrival of Rosser's cavalry brigade, which, as he was informed by General Lee, was on its way from Petersburg to join him.

The expected reinforcement arrived on October 5th, and Early was preparing to move on Harrisonburg, when he learnt that Sheridan was falling back down the Valley. He immediately started in pursuit, and on the 7th entered Newmarket. His cavalry pressed on after the retiring Federals. Rosser, who had relieved Wickham of the command of Fitzhugh Lee's division, followed in pursuit along the roads to the west of the Valley turnpike, whilst Lomax pushed forward on the turnpike.

Sheridan, annoyed at the pressure of the Confederate cavalry and wishing to read Rosser a much-needed lesson, ordered Torbert to move out on the 9th and fight the pursuing force. The superiority of the Federal cavalry quickly made itself felt. Custer, who had succeeded to the command of Wilson's division, drove Rosser before him, whilst Merritt chased Lomax up the Valley turnpike. The Federals pursued the flying foe for twenty-six miles, captured eleven guns and over 300 prisoners. This cavalry affair is known as the battle of Tom's Brook, or the Woodstock Races, owing to the precipitancy of the Confederate flight.<sup>3</sup>

The sudden reverse put an end to Rosser's claims to be considered "the Saviour of the Valley," the title which the Southern

<sup>1</sup> Pond, 199.

<sup>2</sup> Pond, 194.

<sup>3</sup> 2 Sheridan, 56-9.



Press was already conferring upon him, and convinced Early of the worthlessness of his cavalry in comparison with the Federal squadrons. Throughout the campaign the Confederate cavalry had suffered a succession of reverses, commencing with the rout of McCausland's command at Moorefield. The defeats both at Winchester and Fisher's Hill had been mainly due to the weakness of the cavalry, who were holding the left wing in either battle; and now the new commander, from whom so much was expected, had proved no more successful than his predecessors.

On the 10th Sheridan withdrew across Cedar Creek, and the 6th Corps was sent to Front Royal *en route* to Washington. Halleck, with Grant's approval, had ordered the Manassas Gap railroad to be repaired when Sheridan had made it plain that he was opposed to any advance through the Blue Ridge against the Charlottesville and Gordonsville line. It had been put into working order as far as Piedmont, within fifteen miles of Front Royal. Halleck wished the 6th Corps to march to Piedmont and take the train there to Washington. But Sheridan decided instead to march the 6th Corps to Washington as a real saving of time. At the same time he directed General Augur, who was in charge of the troops guarding the railway, to fall back from that line—an order which, if carried out, involved the suspension of the work on the railroad.

But both Halleck and Stanton were very anxious that the railroad should be repaired, because they thought that its completion would be a proof of the permanent occupation of the Lower Valley, and urged Sheridan to come to Washington to confer upon the points at issue. Grant was still hankering after an advance against the Virginia Central Railway between Gordonsville and Charlottesville, and though on October 3rd he had accepted Sheridan's arguments against any such movement, yet eight days later he was urging that Sheridan should take up as advanced a position as possible toward the Virginia Central Railway, and hold himself in readiness to move against it as soon as the enemy showed any signs of a diminution of force in that direction.<sup>1</sup>

A complete change in the military situation was produced by Early, who on the 13th, hearing that Sheridan was preparing to detach troops to Grant's assistance, broke up his camp at Newmarket and moved forward to Fisher's Hill, whilst his advance guard pushed through Strasburg to Hupp's Hill, where it had quite a sharp engagement with one of Crook's divisions. This advance of Early's army took Sheridan by surprise, for till then he had supposed that the bulk of that army was either at Charlottesville or Waynesboro. Orders were at once sent to the 6th Corps

<sup>1</sup> Pond, 207. Grant's letter of the 11th was to Halleck, who communicated the substance of it to Sheridan. The latter himself heard from Grant to the same effect on October 15th.

to return from Front Royal; and it reached the camp on Cedar Creek on the afternoon of the 14th.

On the 15th Sheridan left his army and started with Merritt's division of cavalry for Front Royal. In accordance with instructions just received from Grant, he intended to send that division, reinforced by Powell's from Luray Valley, through Chester Gap against the Virginia Central Railway, and himself to go on to Washington to confer with the War Secretary.<sup>1</sup> But no sooner had he reached Front Royal than he received a startling communication from Wright, who had been left in command of the troops on Cedar Creek. A message had been read from the Confederate signal station on Three Top Mountain to the effect that Longstreet was marching to Early's assistance to crush Sheridan. The latter at once ordered the cavalry to return to Wright, but suspecting, in the light of other information, that Longstreet's supposed message might after all be only a ruse, and deeming his business at Washington of great importance, continued his journey to the Federal capital.


Early, at Fisher's Hill, found that his supplies, which had to be brought by wagon from Staunton, were running short, and that he must either forthwith advance against Sheridan or else retire up the Valley. He decided to adopt the former alternative<sup>2</sup> (see Plan). A reconnaissance to Hupp's Hill reported that the Federal position was entrenched. Accordingly he determined to make an attempt to turn its left flank. He was guided in his selection of this flank by the fact that the dreaded Federal cavalry were posted on the right.<sup>3</sup> From the summit of Three Top Mountain a view of all the Federal camps could be had, and Early made his plans accordingly. Gordon, with his own, Ramseur's, and Pegram's divisions, was to cross the Shenandoah, march under cover of the thick timber along the foot of Three Top Mountain, and recross the river just below the point where Cedar Creek falls into it. Kershaw was to turn off the Valley pike to the right and strike Cedar Creek just above its junction with the Shenandoah, whilst Wharton's division with all the artillery was to advance over Hupp's Hill against the bridge over the Creek as soon as the attack on the Federal left commenced. Rosser was to demonstrate against Torbert's cavalry on the extreme right, whilst Lomax's cavalry in the Luray Valley was ordered to elude Powell's force and strike into the Valley turnpike in rear of the Federal lines. The troops took up their allotted positions under cover of the darkness on the night of the 18th.

The Federal army was quite unconscious of the blow which

<sup>1</sup> Pond, 212.

<sup>2</sup> 4 B. & L., 526 (Early's account of the battle).

<sup>3</sup> A further reason for not attacking the Federal right was that on that flank the banks of Cedar Creek were high and precipitous (4 B. & L., 526).







was being prepared against it. Reconnaissances on the 18th had shown that there were no hostile troops in their immediate front, and it was even reported that Early was retiring up the Valley.<sup>1</sup> The Federal line following the course of Cedar Creek faced south. The different Corps were posted in echelon, so that the line from left to right had a trend northwards.<sup>2</sup> The extreme left was held by the 8th Corps, the first division on a round hill commanding the fords over Cedar Creek, and the second on another hill<sup>3</sup> close to the pike. The 19th Corps extended the line from the pike to Meadow Brook, and on its right was formed the 6th Corps. Beyond that the two cavalry divisions of Custer and Merritt were posted, Custer on the extreme right watching the fords, where the Back and Mine Bank roads cross the Creek.<sup>4</sup> On the extreme left was one brigade of Powell's cavalry division, two miles beyond Crook's left, watching Buckton's Ford, where the Front Royal road crosses the Shenandoah on its way to Middleton.<sup>5</sup>

Long before sunrise on the 19th, in a dense fog,<sup>6</sup> Kershaw's division, having forded the Creek unperceived, charged into the entrenchments of the 1st division of the 8th Corps, which was completely taken by surprise, and fled, leaving behind seven guns, which had not fired a shot. An attempt to form a line of battle on the position of the 2nd division was frustrated by the appearance of Gordon's column advancing against the Federal left flank, and the whole Corps was driven in full retreat down the pike.<sup>7</sup> Their flight uncovered the flank of the 19th Corps, which, attacked in front by Wharton's division and the Confederate artillery, and taken in reverse by Gordon's and Kershaw's troops, was forced to abandon its lines and follow Crook's troops in a hurried retreat.

By sunrise two of the three Federal Corps were streaming to the rear, and the victorious Confederates were pushing across the pike to deal with the 6th Corps.<sup>8</sup> The three divisions of this Corps had been hastily faced about and formed along Meadow

<sup>1</sup> Pond, 220.

<sup>2</sup> This formation was owing to the bends of the Creek (Pond, 222).

<sup>3</sup> "Or another part of this same hill" (Pond, 222). <sup>4</sup> Pond, 224.

<sup>5</sup> Only the 19th Corps and the 1st division of the 8th were sheltered by entrenchments.

<sup>6</sup> Pond, 224. Kershaw was ordered forward at 4.30 a.m., and "precisely at 5 a.m. his leading brigade swept over the enemy's left work" (4 B. & L., 526). At 3.30 a.m. the moon was shining, but a thick fog came up just in time to screen Kershaw's movement.

<sup>7</sup> Early states (4 B. & L., 527) that there had been a delay of an hour at the river on the part of Gordon's Corps, and that consequently it encountered a more obstinate resistance than it would otherwise have met with.

<sup>8</sup> General Emory claims for his Corps that it repulsed the first attack, but fell back in perfectly good order when its left was turned (4 B. & L., 518, note).

Brook. But there was no time to form a properly connected line, and each division was left to fight an independent battle, having continually to change front to repel flanking movements. This disjointed line faced east and extended from Cedar Creek to a point west of Middletown, covering the trains. From 6 a.m. till 9 a.m. a fierce contest raged all along this front; but in spite of all their efforts the Confederates could gain no ground, and the Federal left was gradually extending towards the turnpike so as to secure a line of retreat if necessary.

About 10 a.m., when the Confederate assaults had died away, Getty's division established itself with its left on the pike about three-quarters of a mile north of Middletown. The other two divisions came into line on its right. The 6th Corps, for the first time since the battle began, was united, and held a line fronting south.<sup>1</sup> Torbert's cavalry divisions had been brought over from the right to the left and were posted east of the pike, three regiments having been left to keep Rosser occupied.<sup>2</sup>

The tide of Confederate success was checked. They had captured twenty-four guns, over 1,300 prisoners,<sup>3</sup> and driven the Federal army back about four miles, capturing its camps. But the Federals had now formed a strong line of battle with the 6th Corps and Torbert's cavalry, which had not shared in the stampede of the other two Corps. Their line of retreat along the turnpike was secured, and Wright, calmly confident, was preparing himself to assume the offensive as soon as the ammunition boxes of his troops were replenished. Instructions had been given to his division commanders to be in readiness to attack at noon.

The presence of the Federal cavalry on the east side of the pike warned Early that the turning movement against that flank must cease. Anxious to complete the victory, which he believed to be well within his grasp, he sent orders to Gordon to take his own and Kershaw's divisions and turn the Federal right. But to his intense disappointment he learnt that so many of the soldiers had left the ranks to plunder the captured camps that it was impossible to get together enough troops for an immediate advance.<sup>4</sup> The movement had to be postponed till Early had himself visited that part of the

<sup>1</sup> But Sheridan says that on reaching the field he found the cavalry and Getty's division of the 6th Corps the only troops in the presence of, and resisting, the enemy. "They were apparently acting as a rearguard" (*Memoirs*, ii. 82).

<sup>2</sup> Pond, 232.

<sup>3</sup> Pond, 228. Early claims that he captured and brought off 1,500 prisoners (4 B. & L., 529).

<sup>4</sup> Pond, 234. General J. B. Gordon, in his recently published *Reminiscences*, chapter xxv., denies the "bad conduct" on the part of the men. He states that Early stopped him from carrying out an attack on the 6th Corps, saying, "No use in that; they will all go directly." He supports his statement by extracts from the diary of Major Hotchkiss. But for this the 6th Corps might have been overwhelmed like the 8th and 19th.



field and succeeded to some extent in restoring the organisation of those two divisions.

In the meantime Sheridan had reached the field. He had arrived at Washington on the morning of the 17th, and after a consultation with Halleck and Stanton left the same afternoon and spent the night at Martinsburg. On the 18th he was at Winchester, and, hearing reports of heavy firing in the direction of Middletown, started about 8.30 a.m. on the 19th to rejoin his army. As he rode along the turnpike he met terror-stricken fugitives with exaggerated reports of the disaster which had overtaken the army, and found the road crowded with a huge mass of camp followers and flying trains. He quickly rallied the fugitives, and the stream began to flow back towards Middletown, whilst he himself, with his cavalry escort, pressed forward at full speed. He reached the battlefield about 10.30 a.m., when Wright had already succeeded in forming a strong line of battle, and had ordered an attack to be made at noon.

Sheridan on resuming the command decided to postpone the attack till 3 p.m., in order to give time for the broken Corps to reform, and sent Custer's division back to cover the right flank.<sup>1</sup> About 1 p.m. Early made his deferred attack against the Federal right. But by that time the 19th Corps had been re-formed and placed on the right of the 6th Corps, and a temporary breastwork had been thrown up. The Confederate assault was easily repulsed.<sup>2</sup>

Early now saw that there was no likelihood of gaining further success. Both Rosser's and Lomax's cavalry had failed to come in on the Federal rear. But the Confederate leader resolved to hold his ground and keep possession of the field, which he had won in the morning. The hours which elapsed between the repulse of his 1 p.m. attack and the advance of Sheridan's whole army were spent in strengthening his position, which was naturally a strong one on an amphitheatre of hills. Rosser's cavalry held his left flank and Wharton's division was posted east of the turnpike to cover the right.

It was not till 4 p.m. that Sheridan advanced to the attack. Early had made ample preparation to meet it, and so deadly was the fire of his infantry, posted chiefly behind stone walls, that it

<sup>1</sup> Sheridan states that only one division of the 6th Corps was in line of battle, and that his first task was to bring up into line the other two divisions of that Corps and the 19th. After the repulse of Early's attack on the 19th Corps, Sheridan decided to wait for the arrival of Crook's rallied troops. A further delay was caused by a false report that Longstreet was marching on Winchester by the Front Royal road (*Memoirs*, ii. 84-7).

<sup>2</sup> This attack was made by Gordon's, Kershaw's, and Ramseur's divisions on the 19th Corps. Early goes so far as to say that no attack was made at all, but that Gordon, finding that he had before him a line of battle behind breastworks, after some skirmishing, abandoned the idea of an attack (4 B. & L., 528).

seemed as though the Federal assault must fail and Early would be left in possession of the battlefield.<sup>1</sup> The sun was already sinking behind the mountains, when a small party of soldiers belonging to Keifer's division of the 6th Corps<sup>2</sup> succeeded in entering a gap in the Confederate lines under cover of a stone wall which ran from the Federal front to the Confederate position. At the same time the rest of the division charged. Gordon's line, in which the breach had been made, turned and fled.<sup>3</sup> The panic spread to Kershaw's and Ramseur's divisions, and Custer's cavalry, swooping down from the right upon the broken ranks, drove them in wild confusion across Cedar Creek. The day was won: Pegram's and Wharton's divisions on the Confederate right were involved in the general rout, and, as the sun set, the Federal infantry re-entered the entrenchments of the 19th Corps which had been lost in the morning.<sup>4</sup>

The infantry did not pursue beyond the Creek, but the cavalry continued to press the flying army. A bridge over a small brook between Strasburg and Fisher's Hill broke down, the road was blocked, and a great haul of spoil was made by the pursuing cavalry. The Federal loss was about 5,700; the Confederate loss may have slightly exceeded 3,000.<sup>5</sup> Twenty-four Federal guns captured in the morning were retaken, and twenty-four of Early's guns also fell into the hands of the victors.

With the exception of Thomas' rout of Hood at Nashville on December 16th, no such decisive victory as Sheridan's at Cedar Creek was gained throughout the war. The dramatic arrival of Sheridan, which seemed to pluck victory out of defeat, enhanced the victor's fame. On September 19th he had "gone in," and within thirty days had won three great victories, the last of which might fairly be counted a "crowning mercy."<sup>6</sup> A few weeks later

<sup>1</sup> "I hoped that the day was finally ours" (4 B. & L., 528).

<sup>2</sup> Keifer was in temporary command of Ricketts' division.

<sup>3</sup> This successful attack is attributed by Pond, 238, to a portion of Dwight's division of the 19th Corps.

<sup>4</sup> General Emory (4 B. & L., 519, note) says that his troops reoccupied their camp an hour before sunset.

<sup>5</sup> Pond, 239.

<sup>6</sup> The account in the text of the battle of Cedar Creek is largely based upon General Keifer's narrative (vol. ii. cap. x.). His version may be regarded as representing the reaction against the Sheridan legend. The founders of that legend, in order to magnify the exploits of their hero, belittled the good work done by Wright and the 6th Corps, exaggerated the extent of the disaster which had overtaken the Federals, and minimised the obstinacy of the resistance offered by Early to Sheridan's own attack. The fact that Sheridan was on the field for five hours before making an attack must not be ignored. Keifer's contention is, that before Sheridan's arrival Wright had definitely checked the enemy, formed a fresh line of battle, and given orders for an attack, which Sheridan postponed for several hours, during which time Early was fortifying his position. It is perhaps a fair argument to say that though Wright ordered an advance, it was only Sheridan's arrival which gave the men spirit enough to go forward. But this argument, though it may apply fairly to the 8th Corps and possibly in a slight degree to the 19th, cannot be extended to the 6th Corps and the cavalry. Early's comparative inaction after

Sheridan was promoted to the rank of Major-General in the regular army.

Early's army, though routed at Cedar Creek, was not, however, done with (Map V.). On falling back to Newmarket he was reinforced by a large number of conscripts and convalescents and by Crosby's brigade from the Department of South-West Virginia.<sup>1</sup> Grant was still pressing Sheridan to advance against the Virginia Central Railway, but the latter stuck tenaciously to his original opinion, that a movement against Charlottesville through the Blue Ridge Gaps was practically out of the question. On November 9th the Federal army fell back to Kernstown in order to shorten its line of supplies. Early, apprehending that this retrograde movement was preliminary to detaching troops to Grant's aid, promptly followed in pursuit and advanced as far as Middletown. On the 12th there was a sharp engagement between the cavalry of the two armies, in which the Confederates were worsted, and under cover of the night Early withdrew to Newmarket.

Lee now ordered Kershaw's division to be returned to Richmond and Crosby's brigade to be sent to Breckinridge in south-west Virginia. In December still further reductions of Early's army were made. The whole of the 2nd Corps was recalled to Richmond, and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry division followed in January. Infantry operations were in fact terminated by the approach of winter in the Valley, and the 6th Corps left Sheridan's army for City Point. Shortly after Crook's Corps was also detached, one division to Grant, and one to West Virginia; and early in January one division of the 19th Corps was sent to join the Army of the Potomac.<sup>2</sup>

Cavalry operations, however, were continued for some little time longer in the Valley. Towards the end of November Sheridan sent Merritt's division across the Blue Ridge into Loudoun County to devastate it, and by so doing to prevent it any longer affording shelter to the guerilla leader Mosby. At the same time Early sent Rosser with two brigades to attack once more the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, and a garrisoned post at New Creek, south-west of Cumberland, was captured by the Confederates.

On December 19th Sheridan, at Grant's urgent request, sent Torbert with 8,000 cavalry to strike the Virginia Central Railway. With two divisions Torbert passed through Chester Gap on his way to Gordonsville, whilst Custer's division advanced up the Valley against Staunton. Early, after the 2nd Corps was summoned away, had fallen back to Staunton with Wharton's division. He

reaching Middletown seems to show that his troops were pretty well "fought out" and must have encountered a more strenuous resistance than is compatible with the theory of the Sheridan legend.

<sup>1</sup> Pond, 244.

<sup>2</sup> Pond, 249.



now despatched Wharton with his infantry and Rosser's cavalry towards Harrisonburg, which was threatened by Custer's advance. On the night of the 20th Rosser dashed into the Federal camp, taking it by surprise, and Custer withdrew down the Valley. Torbert arrived before Gordonsville, but, finding that place held by infantry sent from Richmond, also retired. The cavalry suffered greatly during this expedition from the cold, and it was plain that operations in the Valley were over for the winter.

As soon as a resumption of hostilities was possible, Sheridan on February 27th started up the Valley with 10,000 cavalry. By this time Early had only two infantry brigades under his command and six guns, whilst Rosser's brigade, which constituted his sole cavalry force, had been temporarily disbanded, most of the men having returned to their homes owing to the difficulty of getting forage for their horses.<sup>1</sup> Rosser hastily collected a handful of his troopers, and attempted to check Sheridan's advance at Mount Crawford, but was swept out of the path.<sup>2</sup> The next day Sheridan occupied Staunton and found that Early had retired to Waynesboro. On March 2nd Custer's division attacked Early's position. There was little or no fighting, and the greater part of Early's command with the artillery was captured. There was no longer any force in the Valley to dispute Sheridan's advance. He occupied Charlottesville and thoroughly broke up the railway both towards Gordonsville and Lynchburg. His instructions had directed him to capture Lynchburg if possible. But delay in bringing up the trains of supplies, due to the incessant rains, caused him to abandon that part of his programme, as there had been time for reinforcements to reach Lynchburg.<sup>3</sup> For a similar reason he did not attempt, as Grant had originally suggested, to form a junction with Sherman in the Carolinas, but determined to march direct to Grant, destroying the James Canal as he advanced.<sup>4</sup> He reached White House on March 19th in time to take a decisive part in the final operations round Richmond.

Sheridan's Shenandoah campaign was as brilliant as any conducted during the war. Though the forces engaged were not large, yet the results were decisive. The Confederates were completely driven out of the Valley, which, till Sheridan took command, had

<sup>1</sup> Lomax's cavalry had been sent to West Virginia. Rosser's brigade had been very hard worked, as it had crossed the mountains in the snow and surprised Beverley on January 11th.

<sup>2</sup> Pond, 252.

<sup>3</sup> Pond, 253.

<sup>4</sup> A further reason which prevented Sheridan from marching to join Sherman was the fact that the James was in flood and he would have been obliged to wait for its waters to sink. Grant's orders were to destroy the Virginia Central Railway and the James River Canal, capture Lynchburg if practicable, and then join Sherman in North Carolina or return to Winchester. Finding it impracticable to reach Sherman, and knowing that his presence at Winchester was no longer required, Sheridan assumed the responsibility of going direct to Grant (*Memoirs*, ii. 112, 113, 119).

nearly always been associated with disaster to the Federal arms. The desolation of the Valley, though a harsh measure, was justified on grounds of military expediency. Not only did the Valley cease to be a source of supplies to Richmond, it was no longer even capable of maintaining an army within its own confines; and its devastation produced a further very important result by causing wide-spread desertion in Lee's ranks, which were largely recruited from the Valley. The duty which a man owed to his starving family proved in many cases stronger even than his patriotism.

## CHAPTER XXV

### HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSEE—SHERMAN'S CAMPAIGN IN THE CAROLINAS<sup>1</sup>

Hood advances into Tennessee—Thomas decides to concentrate at Nashville—Schofield makes a stand at Columbia—Hood crosses Duck River—Hood misses his opportunity at Spring Hill—Schofield retreats to Franklin—Battle of Franklin—Schofield falls back to Nashville—Hood follows in pursuit—Excitement at Washington—Impatience of the Federal Government with Thomas—Battle of Nashville—Thomas' plan of battle—The first day's fighting—Thomas "puts in" his reserve Corps—Hood's fresh position—Position of the Federal army—Thomas' plan of battle—The battle of the second day—The Confederate left broken—Rout of Hood's army—Results of the battle—Pursuit of the flying army—Grant's plan of campaign—Unsuccessful attempt on Fort Fisher—Second and successful attempt on Fort Fisher—Federal movements against Wilmington—Fall of Wilmington—Importance of Newberne as a Federal base—Bragg's unsuccessful attack on Cox—Sherman's advance through the Carolinas—Destruction of Columbia—Fall of Charleston—Sherman occupies Cheraw—And Fayetteville—Engagement at Avera'sboro—Battle of Bentonville—Johnston retires to Smithfield—Sherman occupies Goldsboro.

ON November 15th Sherman started from Atlanta on his march to the sea. By that date Forrest had joined Hood with his cavalry at Florence on the north bank of the Tennessee. Hood now had under his command a force of nearly 54,000 Confederates, including 12,000 cavalry.<sup>2</sup> At Pulaski, eighty miles from Nashville and forty-four from the Tennessee at Decatur,<sup>3</sup> Schofield was stationed with the 4th Corps and one division of the 23rd Corps with the cavalry covering the front and right towards Florence and Waynesboro.<sup>4</sup> Hood had been detained for some time by the necessity of accumulating supplies, but Sherman's advance from Atlanta necessitated a prompt movement of the Confederate army, if the Federal invasion of Georgia was to be stopped by a counter-invasion of Tennessee; and on the 20th Beauregard telegraphed to Hood to move forward immediately.<sup>5</sup> On that day S. D. Lee's corps advanced from Florence, and on the next day the

<sup>1</sup> See Map VI.

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 12. Hood states his strength at 30,600 (4 B. & L., 435, note). But his estimate is certainly too low and does not apparently include Forrest's cavalry.

<sup>3</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 17.

<sup>4</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 18. The strength of Schofield's force at Pulaski did not exceed 23,000 (4 B. & L., 441).

<sup>5</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 64.



whole army was in motion along the Lawrenceburg and parallel roads.

It had been assumed by Sherman, and his belief was shared by Grant and the Washington authorities, that Thomas would at once concentrate all his available forces and meet Hood at some point south of the Duck River; and there is no doubt that, had Thomas chosen to call in his outlying garrisons, he could have put into the field against Hood a force numerically as strong as that which ultimately routed him at Nashville. Thomas, however, always deliberate in his movements and loath to leave anything to chance, decided that it was impracticable to assume the offensive against Hood's veteran army, until the arrival of Smith's Corps from Missouri. That reinforcement was not expected at Nashville till the 25th at the earliest;<sup>1</sup> and Thomas' orders to Schofield were to retreat as little and as slowly as possible, in order to secure time for a concentration at Nashville. These instructions placed Schofield in a very awkward position, and his attempt to carry out his orders nearly brought about the destruction of his force, and rendered its extrication from a position of the greatest peril an extremely difficult task.

As soon as news arrived of Hood's advance, Schofield commenced to withdraw. The Federal position at Pulaski was plainly untenable, when Hood was turning the right flank by his advance on the Lawrenceburg road, and Schofield fell back slowly to Columbia, where he hoped to cover the railway bridge over the Duck River. The two armies were moving on parallel roads, and Schofield moderated his pace to that of his opponent, lest Hood should suddenly move to the right and strike the railway at some point south of Columbia. But on the night of the 23rd news came that Forrest was pressing the Federal cavalry back into Columbia, and caused Schofield to quicken his march and push forward with all speed towards that town. Early on the 24th Cox's division of the 23rd Corps arrived just in time to prevent Forrest forcing his way into Columbia from the west, and on the same day the whole of Schofield's little army took up a strong position on the south bank of the river, covering the railway and pontoon bridges.

Hood was unable to get his troops to march more than about

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 65. General Cox states that Thomas, after placing garrisons in Nashville and Chattanooga, could still have concentrated an army of 47,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry in time to prevent Hood from crossing Duck River. He censures Thomas for sending Granger's division from Decatur to Stevenson, "a hundred miles east," instead of bringing it to Pulaski. On the other hand, Ropes in his article on Sherman (10 Massachusetts M. H. S.) thinks that Sherman could have spared Thomas 12,000 more troops, and considers that "not till November 30th could Thomas be said to have at Nashville a force large enough to be called an army."

ten miles a day, and his army was not concentrated in Schofield's front till the 26th.<sup>1</sup>

At Columbia some reinforcements joined Schofield: one brigade of the 23rd Corps was garrisoning the town, another brigade of the same Corps came up from Johnsonville.<sup>2</sup> During the march from Pulaski he had been joined by Wilson, sent from the Army of the Shenandoah to act as his chief of cavalry, and reinforcements of that arm were being slowly sent up from Nashville. The weakness of Schofield's position at Columbia was that he had the river behind him. This was rendered necessary in order to safeguard the bridges: for on the northern bank the ground falls away, and would be commanded by batteries placed on the higher ground of the southern bank.<sup>3</sup> The fords below the town were held by infantry detachments, whilst above the town Wilson's cavalry piqueted the river bank. The preparations which Hood made for crossing above the town compelled Schofield to abandon the south bank, and on the night of the 27th the whole Federal army was brought across the river and the bridges were destroyed.

On the 28th Forrest succeeded in passing his cavalry over the river above the town and drove Wilson's cavalry, most of which was posted further east, along the Lewisburg turnpike.<sup>4</sup> Wilson by adopting this line of retreat left the rest of Schofield's army in a very precarious position, with its left flank exposed and its line of retreat along the Franklin turnpike at the mercy of the Confederate cavalry.

On the 29th Cheatham's and Stewart's Corps with one division of Lee's Corps crossed the river about five miles above Columbia, and were directed upon Spring Hill eleven miles in rear of Columbia on the Franklin road. Lee's other two divisions with the artillery of the whole army were retained on the south bank confronting Cox's division, which, withdrawn a short distance from the river, held the north bank opposite Columbia.

Owing to the absence of Wilson's cavalry, Schofield's information as to Hood's movements on his left was very slight, and only one division of the 4th Corps was sent to hold Spring Hill, whither the trains of the army had already been sent.<sup>5</sup> This division just

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 66. Hood's march was delayed by the rain, snow, hail, and frost, which rendered the roads almost impassable.

<sup>2</sup> A third brigade had also been sent by Thomas from Johnsonville to cover a crossing of Duck River thirty miles west of Columbia.

<sup>3</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 66.

<sup>4</sup> Wilson's cavalry were strung out eastwards along the line of Duck River as far as Shelbyville (Cox's *March to the Sea*, 69).

<sup>5</sup> Schofield first ordered two divisions of the 4th Corps to Spring Hill, but subsequently ordered Kimball's division to halt at the Rutherford Creek crossing of the Franklin road.

arrived in time to prevent the trains becoming Forrest's prey; but presently found itself confronted by the whole of Cheatham's Corps.

On this day Hood had an unique chance of crushing Schofield's army. Only one Federal division was holding Spring Hill, a point absolutely vital to the safety of the army. The nearest reinforcement, Kimball's division of the 4th Corps, was seven miles distant at Rutherford Creek.<sup>1</sup> Cox's division was facing Columbia. Ruger's division of the same Corps was engaged in obstructing the fords below the town, whilst Wood's division of the 4th Corps was posted about a mile in rear of Cox's position. But a sudden fit of indecision seized Hood, and instead of at all costs securing Spring Hill, and thus getting possession of the Federal line of retreat, he at first withheld Stewart's Corps and Johnson's division from the attack on Spring Hill, and formed them in line of battle facing west, under the impression that Schofield might be meditating a movement to get between his two widely separated wings.<sup>2</sup> The solitary division at Spring Hill made so brave a show, aided by the fortunate presence of six batteries, which originally retreating towards Franklin, were detained and put in position on the west side of the turnpike,<sup>3</sup> that Hood, who was with Cheatham's Corps, imagined that he had a much larger force than one division to deal with, and instead of pressing the attack ordered Stewart's Corps to reinforce Cheatham.<sup>4</sup> But Stewart did not reach the scene of fighting till night had put an end to the combat. Thus, at the close of the day, the Federal line of retreat still remained open, and during the night, as no attempt was made by the Confederates to seize the turnpike north of Spring Hill, Schofield withdrew all his forces from their perilous position and marched to Franklin, twelve miles from Spring Hill, which was reached by the leading division before daybreak.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 4 B. & L., 446.

<sup>2</sup> Or he may have intended to attack the three Federal divisions, which were within supporting distance of each other in extension of Cox's left, but changed his mind when he found that Cheatham was encountering an obstinate resistance (Cox's *March to the Sea*, 74).

<sup>3</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 75.

<sup>4</sup> The fighting on Cheatham's part was mainly done by Cleburne's division, supported on its right by Brown's. The Federal force consisted of three brigades under Stanley, the Corps commander.

<sup>5</sup> It is impossible to reconcile the conflicting statements of Hood and Cheatham. The former says that he gave explicit orders to his lieutenant to secure Spring Hill, but that Cheatham failed to carry out his orders because he thought that the line confronting him was "a little too long for him," and waited for Stewart's Corps. He also blames Cheatham for not delaying the Federal retreat during the night. Cheatham says that Hood was with him, or near by, most of the afternoon, and that he was about to attack, though it was already dark, with his own and Stewart's Corps, when Hood ordered the movement to be postponed till the following morning. He also denies that he received any explicit orders from Hood during the night (4 B. & L., 429-32, 438-9). Cox considers that Hood was seeking a scapegoat for a failure, for which he was himself solely to blame.



Franklin is a village lying on the south bank in a bend of the Harpeth River. It was no more than Columbia, a tenable position against a foe greatly superior in numbers. But Schofield's request, that a pontoon bridge might be sent there, as both the railway and wagon bridges had been damaged or partially destroyed, had been ignored, and he was consequently obliged to form line of battle and await attack, until the bridges could be repaired and his trains and artillery got across. By noon two bridges had been sufficiently repaired to permit of the passage of the trains, and a ford had also been made available by scarping the banks, although the crossing there was a bad one. On the north bank was a fort commanding the bridges and also the railroad cut, which runs close to the river.<sup>1</sup> Here several batteries of the artillery of the 23rd Corps, which had been sent across the river first of all, were posted. South of the river one division of the 23rd Corps held the line from the Columbia pike to the railway and river on the left. The other division of that Corps extended the line to the right to the Carter Creek pike: beyond that pike one division of the 4th Corps was placed with its right resting on the river west of the village. Another division of that Corps was brought across to the north bank, whilst two brigades of Wagner's division,<sup>2</sup> which had formed the rearguard during the withdrawal from Columbia, held an advanced position across the Columbia pike about half a mile in front of the main line. But they had been ordered to fall back as soon as the enemy advanced in force, and joining the third brigade of that division, which had passed within the works, to act as a general reserve.<sup>3</sup> Wilson's cavalry were on the north bank to prevent any Confederate force crossing east of the village. The whole line was entrenched, but the Columbia turnpike was left open to admit of the passage of the trains and artillery. The trains were nearly all over by 3 p.m., and Schofield gave orders that the infantry should be prepared to cross at 6 p.m., if the enemy did not attack before sunset. But Hood had no intention of letting his foe escape a second time without a battle. For the failure of the 29th he held Cheatham responsible, and had bitterly reproached Cleburne, one of Cheatham's divisional commanders. Cleburne's fiery spirit was roused by the undeserved censure: for Hood had no one but himself to blame for not pressing the assault against the small Federal force on Spring Hill. The whole Confederate army seemed animated by a determination to prove to their commander that they knew how to fight to a finish, and were prepared to annihilate the Federal army, whatever the cost. The

<sup>1</sup> The Nashville-Decatur Railway enters Franklin from the south, running 500 yards east of and parallel to the turnpike. For a thousand yards before crossing the river it runs close to the bank, and on the eastern edge of the village (*Cox's March to the Sea*, 82).

<sup>2</sup> Of the 4th Corps.

<sup>3</sup> *Cox's March to the Sea*, 86.

fighting on the 30th was as desperate as any in the war. The slaughter of the Confederates was enormous.

About 4 p.m. the Confederates advanced to the attack. Cheatham's Corps moved along the pike with a division on either side of the road, and the third division in echelon on the left flank of the left division. Stewart's Corps continued the line to the right, and Johnson's, the only one of Lee's divisions as yet up, was held in reserve. The Federal position was, however, so strong, that probably a frontal attack would have had but little chance of success, and Hood, recognising the fact, might have suspended the attack after the first failure. But the misconduct of General Wagner gave Hood a better chance of carrying his enemy's lines than he could have reasonably hoped for, and caused him to persevere in the endeavour long after all chance of success had vanished. Two of Wagner's brigades were holding, as already described, a post of observation in front of the main line, and the third brigade was within the lines in reserve. Though he had been ordered to withdraw the two advanced brigades as soon as the enemy threatened to attack, yet in the moment of excitement he forgot the orders which he had received, and directed them to hold their ground. Enveloped on either flank by the overwhelming force of two divisions,<sup>1</sup> they were driven in wild confusion back into their own lines. As they rushed along the turnpike and flung themselves over the parapets on either side of the road, the troops constituting the first line of defence were thrown into considerable confusion. On both sides of the pike a considerable breach was made in the Federal line, and it seemed as if the hotly pursuing Confederates might fight their way in. The gap was filled by the charge of the one brigade in reserve and of the second line of one of the brigades<sup>2</sup> of the 23rd Corps, which occupied that part of the line, and after a desperate struggle the Confederates were driven out. How great the peril had been was shown by the fact that Confederate corpses were found fifty yards inside the entrenchments.<sup>3</sup> Cleburne, smarting under Hood's reproaches, was one of the first to fall at the ditch in front of the Federal entrenchments, as he led his division forward on the east of the turnpike.<sup>4</sup>

That day the air was still and hazy, and the smoke hung thick and low over the battlefield. It was impossible to see any distance, and Hood, probably believing that the success of his first onslaught had been greater than it really was, renewed the attack again and again with fearful loss to his gallant troops.<sup>5</sup> On the Confederate right Stewart's troops, though advancing with the

<sup>1</sup> Cleburne's and Brown's of Cheatham's Corps.

<sup>2</sup> Reilly's.

<sup>3</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 89.

<sup>4</sup> But according to another account (4 B. & L., 439), Cleburne's body was found fifty yards from the Federal works.

<sup>5</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 95.

greatest bravery, could make but little impression on the Federal line, and their attempt to force an entrance by the railway cutting was defeated by the heavy fire of the artillery posted in the fort on the north bank of the river. On the Confederate left the attack was not pressed so fiercely as on other parts of the line, and was easily repulsed. The fiercest fighting was in the centre across the turnpike, where the temporary breach had been made.<sup>1</sup> Here Cleburne's and Brown's divisions made repeated attacks. The larger gap was on the west side of the road, and Brown's men had succeeded in establishing themselves on the outer line of the Federal parapets, and held on to them desperately. The Federals threw up an extemporised retrenchment twenty-five yards to the rear, and across this narrow space a sanguinary conflict raged till far into the night.<sup>2</sup> Johnson's division, hitherto held in reserve, was put in at that point, when Brown's division had been fought out, but they could make no headway and only swelled the slaughter.

It was not till 9 p.m. that the Confederates were at length withdrawn from an attempt which had long been hopeless. Their losses amounted to 6,300, including twelve general officers, whilst those of their opponents amounted to 2,326, nearly half of which were in the two brigades, which had so nearly been the cause of a great disaster.<sup>3</sup> During the afternoon Wilson's cavalry were engaged in sharp skirmishing with Forrest's troopers, who vainly endeavoured to force a passage across the river to the left of Schofield's lines.

At midnight the Federals were withdrawn to the north bank and continued their retreat, reaching Nashville, twenty miles distant, the following morning.

On the same day the last of Smith's detachments reached Nashville, the whole Corps amounting to nearly 12,000 men. At the same time Steedman arrived from Chattanooga with over 5,000 men. General Donaldson, the chief Quartermaster, had also organised a division of the employés out of his own and the Commissariat Departments, which could be used for garrisoning the city, and would set free a corresponding force of regular troops for offensive operations. Another division was organised under General Cruft of convalescents and men returning from furlough, who belonged to Sherman's army, and this, in addition to the men of the same description, who had accompanied Steedman from Chattanooga, made up a total of over 5,000 men.<sup>4</sup> At Murfreesborough a force of 8,000 men under General Rousseau was concentrated.

<sup>1</sup> This gap was due to the flight of a raw infantry regiment (4 B. & L., 452).

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 90.

<sup>3</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 96-7. But Hood's official report stated his loss at 4,500.

<sup>4</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 101. Steedman brought with him two coloured brigades as well as a provisional division of Sherman's men.



Hood, in spite of the severity of his losses at Franklin, was bent on tempting Providence. It is probable that the discovery that Sherman had not allowed himself to be called back from his march through Georgia, and that consequently the Confederate invasion of Tennessee had been a fatal mistake, had made him well-nigh desperate, and impaired his powers of cool judgment. He may have really believed that Schofield's army had retreated before him in confusion, and that he need not any longer take serious account of his forces in reckoning up the odds against him. But if that was his belief, he was very much mistaken. Schofield's army had improved in *moral* as the result of the battle of Franklin, and was quite prepared to hold its ground there, if reinforcements could have been sent up from Nashville in time to prevent its flanks from being turned.

Hood, with an army reduced to about 44,000 men,<sup>1</sup> followed Schofield, and appeared before Nashville on December 2nd. Although confronted by a force stronger than his own, he seemed bent on retaining the offensive, and sent two cavalry divisions under Forrest's command with Bate's infantry division to break up the railway between Nashville and Murfreesborough.<sup>2</sup> On the 7th Forrest, having been reinforced by two more infantry brigades, advanced against Murfreesborough, but was driven back. After this Bate's division was recalled to Hood's lines before Nashville, but a third infantry brigade was sent to support Forrest, whose field of operations lay along the south bank of the Cumberland above Nashville. His third division under Chalmers was operating along the river below the city, and Hood even sent a cavalry detachment and one infantry brigade to hold the mouth of the Duck River, where it empties into the Tennessee, and thus close the latter river to the Federals.<sup>3</sup> The presence of Forrest's cavalry along the Cumberland put a stop to the usual steamboat traffic, but gunboats patrolling the river both above and below Nashville effectually prevented the Confederates from crossing to the opposite bank.

Hood's advance on Nashville caused the Washington authorities to demand that Thomas should forthwith give him battle. It had been the universal expectation that the invading army would have been met and crushed south of the Duck River. Already that river had been passed, and there seemed a possibility that a Confederate army might again be seen on the banks of the Ohio. Something

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 101. In 4 B. & L., 474, the Confederate strength is estimated at about 38,000. But Hood himself (4 B. & L., 435) says that he had only 23,000. The Confederate general consistently underestimates his effective strength and his losses.

<sup>2</sup> From General Wilson's account (4 B. & L., 466) it would appear that these two cavalry divisions had been detached before the battle of Franklin, and only Chalmer's division took part in that battle.

<sup>3</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 106.

of the same apprehension, which had been excited by Bragg's invasion of Kentucky in 1862, was now felt again, as Hood was pushing northward, and Thomas appeared to be making no effort to check him.

On December 2nd Grant telegraphed to Thomas, advising him to leave the fortifications of Nashville in charge of Donaldson's division of armed employes, and with all available forces march out and attack Hood. Though the language of Grant's telegram was so urgent as to be almost tantamount to a direct order,<sup>1</sup> Thomas took upon himself the responsibility of waiting a few days longer in order to provide remounts for his cavalry.

Then just as he was preparing to assume the offensive, on December 8th a storm of snow and sleet came on, which covered the hill slopes, over which the advance against Hood's position would have to be made, with sheets of slippery ice, rendering military operations impracticable, until a thaw came. When this fact was urged as a reason for delay, Grant and the Federal Government regarded the plea as only a part of Thomas' general dilatory policy, and peremptory orders were sent him either to attack at once or else turn over the command to Schofield.<sup>2</sup>

But neither remonstrances nor threats could hurry Thomas into taking a course, which, after personal observation, he had decided to be premature. He called his Corps commanders to a council of war, explained to them that he was required to fight or resign his command, and asked their advice. They unanimously declared that, until there came a change in the weather, active operations were impossible. Thomas replied to Halleck to this effect, expressing at the same time his perfect readiness to be relieved of the command. The patience of the Government was exhausted. On the 13th Logan, commander of the 15th Army Corps, who was on leave of absence at Washington, was ordered to proceed to Nashville and relieve Thomas of the command of the Department and the Army of the Cumberland; and Grant himself, who was daily growing more anxious lest Hood's invasion should break up his own carefully matured plans for the reduction of Richmond, started from City Point to assume the command in person against Hood. But on reaching Washington he received the welcome intelligence that Thomas had at last moved out of his fortifications, and that the first day of fighting had been altogether in favour of the Federal army. Logan had only reached Louisville when he heard the news of the victory at Nashville.

On the 14th a warm rain set in, and it was plain that operations

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 105.

<sup>2</sup> According to another account an order was actually issued relieving Thomas and placing Schofield in command, but did not get beyond the Adjutant-General's office in Washington (4 B. & L., 454). In the text Cox's account is followed.

would be possible the following day. Hood had already decided on the 10th that it was undesirable to remain longer threatening Nashville, but the same change of weather, which prevented Thomas from attacking, prevented the Confederates from retreating.<sup>1</sup> It is not easy to fathom the reasons which caused Hood to remain so long in a position of considerable peril. He himself claimed that he was expecting reinforcements from Texas. As no considerable force from Texas had succeeded in crossing the Mississippi since the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson in the summer of 1863, Hood's expectation of any aid from that quarter was unreasonable. But it is more probable that the true reason which detained him before Thomas' lines was the desire to raise recruits and gather supplies in Tennessee. That was the special work which Forrest with his cavalry was directed to carry out; and Hood was accompanied by the Confederate Governor (so-called) of Tennessee, whose presence in the camp might have, so it was hoped, a stimulating effect upon the recruiting.<sup>2</sup>

Strategically Hood's threat of investing Nashville was unsound, and his tactical dispositions were equally faulty.

Some four miles south of Nashville rise the Brentwood Hills.<sup>3</sup> From these hills flow two streams, Brown's Creek and Richland Creek, which after running parallel for some little distance turn to the right and left and fall into the Cumberland on either side of Nashville. Along a low and broken line of hills crossing the space between these two creeks the Confederate line was arrayed. Cheatham's Corps held the right, reaching beyond Brown's Creek across the Nolensville pike to the Chattanooga Railway and beyond. Lee's Corps, which had suffered the least in the battle of Franklin, formed the centre, stretching across the Franklin turn-pike, and Stewart's Corps continued the line across the Granny White pike to the Hillsboro' road. Stewart's left wing, on reaching the Hillsboro' road was sharply refused and found cover behind a stone wall running for a thousand yards along the roadside. To still further strengthen his position a strong skirmish line was thrown forward terminating in an entrenched position on Montgomery Hill close to the Hillsboro' pike. To the south-west and beyond Richland Creek redoubts had been thrown up on detached hills, and Chalmer's cavalry division was charged with the almost impossible task of covering the ground between the Hillsboro' road and the river.

Hood's weak point was his left flank, which was practically "in the air," and Thomas determined to hurl the greater part of his

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 107.

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 101. Hood says that he hoped if Thomas attacked him in his entrenched position to defeat him and "enter the city on the heels of the enemy" (4 B. & L., 436).

<sup>3</sup> See Plan, p. 452.



army obliquely against it. According to his original dispositions the interior defences of Nashville were held by Donaldson's extemporised division. Steedman's division was posted on the extreme left between the Chattanooga Railway and the Lebanon turnpike close to the river. In the centre the 4th Corps, commanded in the absence of Stanley by Wood, reached from the Granny White turnpike across the Hillsboro' pike to the Hardin pike. This line where it crossed the Hillsboro' road formed a salient angle at Laurens Hill opposite to and within six hundred yards of Stewart's advanced line on Montgomery Hill.<sup>1</sup>

The Federal right was formed by the 16th Corps under A. J. Smith, reaching across the Charlotte pike, and between that road and the river the whole of Wilson's Cavalry Corps was posted. The 23rd Corps was held in reserve within the interior line of defences, filling the gap between Steedman's and Wood's positions, and Thomas intended to make a telling use of this Corps at the fitting moment. The Federal leader's plan of battle was to make a grand left wheel with the whole of his right wing pivoting upon Wood's position on Laurens Hill,<sup>2</sup> and to aim at overlapping and crushing the Confederate left, whilst Steedman by a brisk demonstration was to hold Hood's right fast. Wood in the centre was to threaten and, if opportunity offered, attack Montgomery Hill, and Schofield's Corps was held in reserve till the decisive moment.

Early on the morning of the 15th a thick fog obscured the field of battle, but about 8 a.m. Steedman advancing along the Murfreesborough road attacked the Confederate right.<sup>3</sup> So vigorously was the Federal demonstration pushed, that Cheatham's Corps was for the whole of that eventful day held fast in its position across the Nolensville pike and Chattanooga Railroad. Not only was the Confederate right neutralised for that day, but the centre, consisting of Lee's Corps,<sup>4</sup> was prevented from detaching any considerable force to the support of either flank by the fear lest the Federal force occupying the interior line of defences might sally out along the Franklin turnpike and cut the Confederate line in twain.

The movement of the Federal right wing was considerably delayed by Smith's infantry crossing the front of Wilson's cavalry,<sup>5</sup> and it was noon before that part of Thomas' army came into close contact with the enemy.<sup>6</sup> On the Confederate left Chalmer's cavalry division, supported by a single infantry brigade, vainly endeavoured to hold its ground against a vastly superior force.

<sup>1</sup> 4 B. & L., 457.

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 110.

<sup>3</sup> Fiske, 353.

<sup>4</sup> "Lee's corps after sending two brigades to the assistance of Stewart on his left, was held in place by the threatening position of the garrison troops and did not fire a shot during the day" (4 B. & L., 457).

<sup>5</sup> 4 B. & L., 468.


<sup>6</sup> 4 B. & L., 458.

# BATTLE OF NASHVILLE

Scale of Miles



Federals	morning	15 Dec 1864	
Confederates	"	16 "	
Entrenchments	"	16 "	







Half a mile south-east of the Hardin turnpike the first of Hood's detached works was stormed by a combined attack of dismounted cavalry and infantry.<sup>1</sup> At this juncture the solitary infantry brigade was recalled to extend Stewart's line southward upon some hilly ground covering the Granny White pike. The withdrawal of the infantry force left the other detached works at the mercy of the two Federal Corps, which, after capturing them, pressed on against Stewart's main line.

In the centre about 1 p.m.<sup>2</sup> Post's brigade of the 4th Corps gallantly captured the Confederate advanced position on Montgomery Hill; and Thomas, now satisfied that the offensive lay wholly with him, ordered Schofield's Corps to move round behind Wood's and Smith's Corps and take position on the right of the latter. At the same time Wilson was directed to push straight up the valley of Richland Creek, and, if possible, plant himself across the Granny White turnpike. Under this combined assault Stewart's line crumbled away. Smith carried the southern end of the stone wall. Wood, with the 4th Corps, attacked the salient angle in Stewart's lines on the Hillsboro' road and broke through at that point. The Confederate left at once outflanked, and, broken by a frontal attack, fell back in great confusion to the Granny White turnpike.

The delay which had occurred in the earlier part of the day prevented the Federal right from reaping the full fruits of its victory, but when the short December day came to an end, sixteen guns and 1,200 prisoners had been captured and the Confederate left forced back two miles, and this great success, promising still greater results for the morrow, had been achieved with but slight loss.<sup>3</sup>

Hood had now good cause to regret that in his ill-judged desire to hold as much country as possible he had detached two cavalry divisions and three infantry brigades from his main force. He sent orders to Forrest to return with all speed. But as the cavalry commander could not rejoin, until twenty-four hours at least had elapsed, he resolved to form a second line and hold on for another day.<sup>4</sup>

The line which Hood took up during the night was two miles south of and much more contracted than that which he had already tried unsuccessfully to hold. The right rested on Overton Hill across the Franklin pike. The line then stretched to the left across the Granny White turnpike to Shy's Hill, which had been

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 111.

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 112.

<sup>3</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 114. The 23rd Corps advancing on Smith's right across the Hillsboro' road "carried the left of a series of hills parallel to the Granny White turnpike," but was unable to drive Coleman's brigade from Shy's Hill.

<sup>4</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 115.

held with the utmost difficulty against Schofield's advance. From Shy's Hill the Confederate line turned sharply to the south and extended to the Brentwood Hills along a line of lesser heights. Cheatham's Corps was brought from the right to the left, and Lee's Corps now held the right of Hood's position.

Parallel to the Confederate line the Federal army was arrayed. The 4th Corps and Steedman's division faced Overton Hill and reached across the Franklin pike, till it connected with the left of the 16th Corps, whose right was in front of Shy's Hill. Schofield's Corps occupied the line of hills which ran parallel to the sharply refused left flank of the Confederates, and extended across Richland Creek: Wilson's cavalry were on the extreme right, threatening Hood's line of retreat by the Franklin pike.<sup>1</sup>

The Confederate left flank was nearly as much exposed as on the previous day to a turning movement by the greatly superior cavalry force of their opponents, and the salient angle at Shy's Hill was a very weak point. The entrenchments on that hill, which had been thrown up during the night, were too far back from the brow of the hill to command the slope, and they could be enfiladed and taken in reverse by the Federal artillery, and during the day a considerable part of the parapet was destroyed by the fire of Schofield's and Smith's artillery from the opposite ridges.<sup>2</sup>

Thomas' plan of battle for the 16th aimed at pushing his cavalry round and beyond the Confederate left and securing possession of the Franklin turnpike, the sole line of retreat for the Confederate army. Schofield and Smith were to attack the Confederate left, when a favourable opportunity offered, and by breaking it force the whole of Hood's army to retreat by the Franklin turnpike. Thomas did not direct an assault to be made at any particular point, but left it to his Corps commanders to attack when and where they liked at their own discretion.<sup>3</sup>

The Federal battle opened with a heavy cannonade all along the line, which made itself specially felt on the Confederate left, where the rifled guns of the Federal artillery, firing across the narrow valley between the two parallel ranges of hills, quickly gained the mastery over the smooth-bore weapons of their opponents. At 3 p.m.<sup>4</sup> (the earlier part of the day having been spent in marching the troops to their respective positions over the muddy and broken ground), an attempt was made by Wood, commanding the 4th Corps and Steedman's division, to storm Overton Hill. But the position proved too strong to be taken by a frontal

<sup>1</sup> On the morning of the 16th Wilson made a wide détour beyond the Confederate left and secured a footing on the Granny White pike (4 B. & L., 462).

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 120.

<sup>3</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 118.

<sup>4</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 121.

attack, and the attempt was repulsed with considerable loss to the attacking force.

In the meanwhile Wilson's cavalry had been steadily gaining ground on the right, occupying hill after hill, and Hood became seriously alarmed for his line of retreat. In his endeavour to extend his line further south to hold Wilson in check, Hood was obliged to still further weaken his left wing. One division had been already sent to the right to reinforce Lee on Overton Hill, and one brigade was detached to the left to support Chalmer's cavalry against Wilson's advance. The Federal commanders on the right saw that their opportunity had come. The Confederate line had been stretched too far to offer any effective resistance. Smith assaulted and captured Shy's Hill about 4 p.m. At the same time Schofield attacked and carried an embasured work on the extreme left of the hostile line, and the whole Confederate army, seeing its left broken, took to flight. Wilson was already across the Granny White turnpike, but the fugitives streamed eastwards to the Franklin pike, by which they made their escape. The obstinate resistance of two brigades, which still retained their organisation, secured the passes through the Brentwood Hills long enough to save the larger part of Hood's army from capture.<sup>1</sup>

In the two days' fighting on December 15th and 16th the Federals captured fifty-three guns and about 4,500 prisoners.<sup>2</sup> It is difficult to determine what Hood's losses in killed and wounded were. The Federal loss just exceeded 3,000,<sup>3</sup> and as the Confederates were throughout acting on the defensive, it is probable that their losses in killed and wounded were less than those of their opponents.

The victory of Nashville was the most decisive gained by either side during the war. In the North an intense sense of relief was felt; and in the reaction which followed the previous irritation against Thomas, the idea arose that the victory was won in consequence rather than in spite of the dilatory measures which had characterised the earlier stages of the campaign. That Thomas was to blame for allowing the invading army to advance so far north seems probable. It is true that by letting Hood hurl his army in repeated and futile assaults against Schofield's lines at Franklin the efficiency of that army as a fighting force was greatly impaired. But that advantage cannot be regarded as adequately counterbalancing the serious derangement which was threatened by this delay to Grant's plans; and it is a fair supposition that, had

<sup>1</sup> These two brigades covered the passes through the Brentwood Hills from the Granny White road, along which the Federal cavalry were advancing to its intersection with the Franklin turnpike.

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 126.

<sup>3</sup> The available strength of the Federal army at Nashville seems to have been at least 55,000 (4 B. & L., 473).



Hood been fought and defeated in November, a more effective pursuit could have been made than was possible in December after the change of weather had broken up the roads.<sup>1</sup>

No attempt at organised resistance was made by the flying army until Columbia (Map VI.) was reached. There Forrest's cavalry rejoined, and with the assistance of eight infantry brigades formed an efficient rearguard<sup>2</sup> which covered the line of retreat until on the evening of the 27th Hood's army reached the south bank of the Tennessee. Hood rallied the remnants of his army at Tupelo in Mississippi, and applied to be relieved of his command. His request was granted. The three Corps of the defeated army subsequently took part in the campaign against Sherman in the Carolinas; but though their organisation continued the same their numerical strength was enormously reduced. During the campaign over 13,000 prisoners were taken, and seventy-two pieces of artillery, and the Confederate strength was still further diminished by desertion.<sup>3</sup>

Thomas, after Hood's escape across the Tennessee, issued orders assigning winter quarters to his various Corps. But Grant was determined to give the enemy no breathing space; and Thomas, revoking his order, made preparations for a fresh campaign.<sup>4</sup>

The 23rd Corps was ordered to go by water by the Tennessee and the Ohio to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and then proceed by rail to Washington, with a view to being transported by water to North Carolina, of which department Schofield was now placed in command.

Grant had decided to unite Sherman's army with those of the Potomac and the James in a final effort against the Army of Northern Virginia; and in order to make Sherman's task the easier and provide him with a base, in case the resistance, which he might encounter on his march through the Carolinas, should prove too strong to be easily overcome, Grant intended to capture Wilmington (Map XII.) and thus enable Sherman, if he deemed it necessary to turn aside from the direct road to Richmond, to open up communication with the Federal fleet. It was for this purpose that Schofield's corps was summoned from the west.

Wilmington lies on the left bank of the Cape Fear River about thirty miles from its mouth. The entrance to the river was com-

<sup>1</sup> For a criticism of Thomas' policy, see Cox's *March to the Sea*, 130-5. Thomas rightly or wrongly did not consider that to meet Hood's veteran army he could rely upon any but the veterans of the 4th and 23rd Corps, and therefore decided to wait for the arrival of the 16th Corps. He distrusted the quality of a considerable part of the troops which he might have concentrated earlier against Hood.

<sup>2</sup> 4 B. & L., 437.

<sup>3</sup> Hood stated in his report that his losses, including prisoners, for the whole campaign did not exceed 10,000. But Thomas claimed 13,000 prisoners and 2,000 deserters (4 B. & L., 474).

<sup>4</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 126.

manded by Fort Fisher, a strong post mounting fifty guns<sup>1</sup> on the left bank of the river close to the sea, reaching across the narrow spit of sand which separates the river from the sea. The capture of Fort Fisher would at once close Wilmington to the blockade runners, and thus seal up the last port left open on the Atlantic coast, and at the same time furnish a suitable base for further operations against Wilmington.

Towards the end of December an attempt had been made to capture Fort Fisher, but it had failed owing to the misconduct of General Butler. Grant had intended that the land forces engaged in the expedition should be under the command of General Weitzel, one of Butler's Corps commanders. But Butler, in defiance of Grant's orders, himself decided to assume the command of the expedition. Great reliance was placed upon a powder ship freighted with 235 tons of gunpowder,<sup>2</sup> which was to be exploded close to the fort. But this novel experiment in warfare proved a complete failure. There was a general lack of co-operation between the land and naval forces, and much recrimination between Admiral Porter and General Butler. The latter eventually withdrew his troops, which he had landed, without making any attempt to entrench and hold a position. Butler, who throughout the war had held a high command, but had never shown any signs of military ability, was, in consequence of this failure, relieved of the command of the Army of the James, and succeeded by General Ord.

Porter's report, however, made it plain that with proper co-operation the fall of the fort ought to be certain. So in January a second attempt was made. The land force now employed was under the command of General Terry, and consisted of two divisions and one brigade. This force landed on the 13th under cover of the fire of the fleet about five miles north of the fort.<sup>3</sup> The fleet, consisting of sixty war vessels and gunboats,<sup>4</sup> kept up a very heavy fire upon the fort on the 13th, 14th, and earlier part of the 15th, concentrating its efforts upon dismounting the heavy guns on the land face.

The navy did its work so well that at 3 p.m. on the 15th, when the land forces advanced to the attack, only one heavy gun remained serviceable in their front.<sup>5</sup> An entrance was quickly effected near the river bank. A naval force of some 2,000 sailors and marines, which attacked at the sea angle, was repulsed. Once inside the fort the Federal infantry had still a hard task before

<sup>1</sup> The armament consisted of forty-five heavy guns, three mortars, and two field pieces in a small outwork. Cox's *March to the Sea*, 140.

<sup>2</sup> Schouler, 576; but 1 Wilson, 138, says 150 tons.

<sup>3</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 141.

<sup>4</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 142.

<sup>5</sup> 4 B. & L., 649.

them, as the gun-pits and traverses afforded excellent cover for the defenders. But the fleet after the repulse of the naval contingent reopened fire, and the garrison was at length driven to seek shelter in Fort Buchanan, a small work at the very end of the sandspit, where that same evening the Confederate force capitulated, numbering about 2,000 officers and men. This signal success was won at a cost of less than 1,000 killed and wounded.<sup>1</sup>

On February 9th Cox's division of the 23rd Corps from Nashville reached Fort Fisher. Hoke's division had been sent from Wilmington to prevent any advance against the city by the left bank of the river, and held a strongly entrenched position between the river and Myrtle Sound, a long shallow bay, which is only separated from the sea by a narrow stretch of sand a few hundred yards broad.<sup>2</sup> The fall of Fort Fisher gave the Federals control of the mouth of the river, and enabled them to establish themselves on the right bank as well. But on that bank Fort Anderson, held by one of Hoke's brigades, which was about in a line with his entrenchments on the left bank, constituted a considerable obstacle. Two unsuccessful attempts were made on the nights of the 12th and 14th to turn Hoke's left by laying a pontoon bridge across Myrtle Sound in his rear. After the second failure Schofield transferred two divisions to the right bank of the river: a naval force moved up the river in co-operation.

On the 18th Fort Anderson was abandoned by the Confederates in consequence of a flanking movement carried out by Cox, who was in command of the forces on the right bank, threatening the line of retreat of the garrison. The next stand was made at Town Creek, some eight miles further back,<sup>3</sup> but Cox turned the Confederate left by crossing three brigades in a single rice boat over the stream out of sight of the enemy, and attacking the defenders in the rear, captured a number of prisoners and both their guns.<sup>4</sup>

On the 21st Cox's force was in front of Wilmington, though on the opposite bank. A battery of rifled guns was, however, able to pitch its shells into the city,<sup>5</sup> and during the night the Confederates evacuated it. Hoke's troops, which had firmly held their entrenchments on the left bank against Terry's forces, were withdrawn the same night. With but slight loss the Federals had secured the last Confederate harbour on the Atlantic coast, and in case of need a fresh base was secured for Sherman's advancing army.

<sup>1</sup> According to Bragg's official report the garrison numbered about 2,500, of whom about 500 were killed and wounded. Terry reported the capture of 2,083 prisoners (4 B. & L., 661). The Federal loss is given at 955. Cox makes the total casualties only amount to about 650.

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 141.

<sup>3</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 150.

<sup>4</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 151-2.

<sup>5</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 153.



It was not, however, Sherman's intention to turn aside to Wilmington unless compelled to do so. His chief fear was lest Lee should succeed in giving Grant the slip, and coming south with the Army of Northern Virginia should concentrate a superior force against his army marching through the Carolinas. But unless Lee succeeded in accomplishing this extremely difficult task, Sherman intended to push straight for Goldsboro.

With a view to facilitating this movement, it now became Schofield's duty to open up the line from Newberne to Goldsboro. Newberne, lying forty miles up the Neuse River, had been in the hands of the Federals ever since its capture by Burnside in March, 1862. As a base it had several advantages over Wilmington. The harbour at the mouth of the Neuse River was a better one than that which had been secured at the mouth of the Cape Fear River. A railway was in working order between Newberne and its port with cars and locomotives, whilst no rolling stock at all was to be found at Wilmington; and the railroad from Newberne to Goldsboro could be more easily repaired than that, which ran to the same point from Wilmington.<sup>1</sup>

On the last day of February Cox arrived at Newberne from Schofield's camp, and made immediate preparations for commencing the repairs upon the railway. He organised two divisions out of convalescents belonging to Sherman's army and garrison troops, and was also joined by a division of new troops, which was assigned to the 23rd Corps. With these he moved out to cover the work of repairing the railroad through Dover Swamp.

Lee had been recently appointed by Act of Congress General-in-Chief of all the Confederate forces, and on February 23rd he had summoned Joseph Johnston, who had remained unemployed since July, when he was relieved of the command of the Army of Tennessee at Atlanta, to take command of all the troops which were being concentrated to check Sherman's advance. Johnston detached Bragg with Hoke's division and such portions of the Army of the Tennessee as had by that time arrived from the West, to crush Cox's three divisions advancing from Newberne.<sup>2</sup> He expected that Bragg would have time to effect that object and still rejoin the main army, which was being concentrated about Smithfield.

Bragg took up his position at Kinston, on the Neuse River, about three miles beyond Dover Swamp, and, moving out of the town, arrayed his army along the South West Creek. On March 8th, 9th, and 10th there was some sharp fighting along that Creek.

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 154-5.

<sup>2</sup> Johnston states that the reinforcements from the Army of the Tennessee which joined Bragg numbered less than 2,000 men (*Narrative*, 379). They were under the command of D. H. Hill.

Bragg gained an initial success on the 8th by suddenly falling upon an advanced force of two regiments, which he routed, capturing nearly three-quarters of the whole command.<sup>1</sup> But he was unable to gain any further advantage against Cox's line, which was formed along the right bank of the Creek at the head of the swamp, and on the night of the 10th withdrew his forces and hastened through Goldsboro to rejoin Johnston.

Kinston was occupied by the Federal forces on the 14th, and the railroad quickly repaired as far as that point. The rest of the 23rd Corps joined Schofield at Kinston, having marched from Wilmington by land.<sup>2</sup> Terry's Corps in the meantime had advanced from Wilmington along the railroad to Goldsboro: and Schofield was now ready to march on Goldsboro and join hands with Sherman, as soon as that general came within reach.

Sherman, at Savannah, had been hoping that by the middle of January the weather might be sufficiently favourable for his Carolina campaign. His plan was to feint simultaneously at Charleston and Augusta, but Columbia, the capital of South Carolina, was his real objective. With a view to deceiving his opponents he sent the right wing early in the month by water to Beaufort, and directed Howard, its commander, to concentrate at Pocotaligo. Slocum was directed with the left wing to march some forty miles up the Savannah on both banks, and then reunite his command at Robertsville in readiness to join Howard. By these movements not only was the appearance of threatening Augusta and Charleston kept up, but the two wings at Robertsville and Pocotaligo could be easily supplied by water, and thus would be able to start on their march for Columbia with their trains full. But the weather proved exceptionally unfavourable: rain fell day after day, converting the country almost into a lake. At Sister's Ferry, where Slocum was to cross the Savannah, the river was swollen to a breadth of three miles.<sup>3</sup> On the last day of January, Howard's wing was concentrated at Pocotaligo, and the following day the advance commenced.

A series of rivers, deep and bordered by swamps, run through South Carolina into the Atlantic, keeping a line parallel to the Savannah. A small force skilfully handled might make the crossing of any one of these rivers in their lower reaches an extremely difficult task. Sherman therefore decided to move his army up the ridge, between the valleys of the Savannah and the Salkehatchie, till he reached the upper and narrower waters of the latter river.<sup>4</sup> He also intended to break up the railway system of South

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 158.

<sup>2</sup> Schofield himself had come by sea from Wilmington to Newberne on March 7th.

<sup>3</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 168.

<sup>4</sup> The Salkehatchie is the name given to the upper course of the Combahee.

Carolina, as in the previous campaign he had done that of Georgia, in order to prevent a rapid concentration of the Confederate forces against him.

At the same time as Sherman commenced his advance, a Council of War was being held near Augusta, at which Beauregard, Hardee, G. W. Smith, commanding the Georgia militia, and D. H. Hill, who had recently been appointed to the command of a division in S. D. Lee's Army Corps, were present. The Confederate generals reckoned that a force of 33,450 men could be concentrated at Augusta by February 4th or the following day.<sup>1</sup> The Richmond Government would seem, however, to have been unable to resign itself to the evacuation of Charleston at so early a date, and Sherman advanced with such speed through swamps deemed impassable by his opponents that the opportunity for concentration was lost. While the Confederate leaders were deliberating, Sherman was marching through the Salkehatchie swamps, some ten or twelve miles every day by mud roads, nearly every mile of which had to be corduroyed to admit the passage of his train of 2,500 wagons.<sup>2</sup> Wheeler's cavalry was the only force available at the moment to check his advance: and though every effort was made to delay the Federal march by burning bridges and holding the long causeways over the swamps, the leading division of a column was generally found strong enough to outflank the cavalry and force its retreat.<sup>3</sup>

Sherman's army went steadily forward. On February 7th Howard struck the Augusta and Charleston Railroad at Midway; on the 12th both forks of the Edisto were crossed, and the Columbia branch line was broken up at Orangeburg. The speed of Sherman's advance necessitated the abandonment of the proposed concentration at Augusta. The Georgia militia were left to hold that city, where they were quite useless, but they refused to serve outside the bounds of their own State. Beauregard hurried by a lengthy détour to Charlotte, in North Carolina, where it was proposed to make the next attempt at concentration, with that part of the Army of Tennessee which had reached him.

On the 17th the Federals reached Columbia. General Wade Hampton, as a South Carolinian of great popularity and influence, had been sent south by Lee in the hope that he might arouse the flagging spirits of his countrymen. His cavalry evacuated Columbia on the approach of the Federal forces, after burning the two railway-stations and setting fire to the cotton-bales piled in the middle of the street, to prevent them falling into the hands of the enemy. A strong wind rose which fanned the flames, and, in

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 169. But 3,000 men of this force did not reach Augusta till nearly a week later.

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 168.

<sup>3</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 170.



spite of the efforts of the Federal soldiers, the greater part of the city was destroyed. In the South the destruction of Columbia was represented as Sherman's deliberate act. But that general, though merciless in his destruction of everything which could be regarded as of military value to the Confederate cause, in all his orders forbade the destruction of private property and dwellings. It is true that intoxicated soldiers aided the spread of the conflagration, and, doubtless, there were many in the army who considered that the destruction of the capital was a fitting punishment for the State, which had been the first to secede, and aided at its ruin. But the charge of incendiarism cannot justly be brought against the Federal commander, and before continuing his march he took steps to provide the starving population of the ruined city with food.<sup>1</sup>

On the same day that Columbia fell into the hands of Sherman, Hardee commenced to evacuate Charleston. The systematic destruction of the railroad, which connected the South Carolinian seaport with Augusta, warned him that he had no time to waste if he wished to withdraw his forces by the sole remaining railway through Florence. He took his army by rail to Cheraw, on the Great Pedee River, where he proposed to make his next stand. On February 18th Federal troops occupied Charleston.

Though Hardee had constructed strong works behind the Great Pedee, he had not a sufficient force to prevent Slocum, with the left wing of the Federal army, turning his position; and on March 3rd the right wing occupied Cheraw. Immediately after capturing Columbia Sherman had made a demonstration in the direction of Charlotte, tearing up the railway for a distance of forty miles.<sup>2</sup> Besides the simple destruction of the railway track, his object was by threatening Charlotte to delay the concentration of Johnston's forces for the protection of Raleigh, which was the point that he was really aiming at.

Hardee from Cheraw fell back to Fayetteville on the Cape Fear River, but he was too weak to attempt to hold that line, and on the 11th Slocum entered Fayetteville.<sup>3</sup> The occupation of this town brought Sherman into communication with the Federal forces holding Wilmington. But he resolved to press on to Goldsboro, as he saw that Hardee was unable to offer any effective resistance, and learnt that the railway from Newberne was being rapidly repaired.

When at Cheraw, Sherman had heard of Johnston's appointment to command the forces in his front, and the news that his old antagonist was again in the field warned him that he would

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 173-6.

<sup>2</sup> The railway was destroyed almost up to Winnsboro.

<sup>3</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 179.

probably have to encounter a better organised opposition than he had yet met. On leaving Fayetteville, where he waited for a day or two in the vain hope of getting from Wilmington shoes and clothing, of which his soldiers were sorely in need,<sup>1</sup> he ordered that four divisions of either wing should march light, whilst the rest should accompany the trains and help them along.<sup>2</sup> By this arrangement he hoped to have a sufficient force to check any attempt that Johnston might make against either column.

On the 16th a sharp encounter took place at Averasboro, where Hardee had entrenched a position: but Slocum deploying two divisions of the 20th Corps drove Hardee back to a second entrenched position, which was abandoned during the night. Sherman argued from this engagement that Hardee had stood to fight in order to give Johnston the more time to concentrate in front of Raleigh, and the fact that only Hardee's troops were engaged seemed to indicate that Johnston could not be sufficiently strong to advance south of the Neuse River in time to prevent him reaching Goldsboro.<sup>3</sup>

There were, however, certain facts, essential to the formation of a right judgment, of which Sherman was necessarily in ignorance. He did not know that Johnston had detached a strong force under Bragg against the Federal force operating from Newberne, or that the object of Hardee's stand at Averasboro had been to give time for Bragg to return from his unsuccessful expedition. Johnston, being in telegraphic communication with his subordinates, could form a truer estimate of the military situation than was possible for Sherman, who on leaving Fayetteville had again cut himself off from communication with Schofield. Johnston saw that if a blow was to be struck at Sherman, before he could be joined by the forces of Schofield's Department, it must be struck at once. He issued orders accordingly for a general concentration at Bentonville on the 18th. This was a small village on the road from Smithfield to Clinton, about three miles west of the point where that road was crossed by another from Averasboro to Goldsboro, along which the left Federal column was advancing. Johnston's information was to the effect that Slocum's two Corps were nearly a day's march apart and that distance away from Howard's wing.<sup>4</sup> By advancing from Bentonville and striking Slocum's left flank he hoped to overwhelm the left wing in detail.

With a force of about 22,000 men,<sup>5</sup> Johnston took up a position

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 183.

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 184. Sherman ordered the left wing to march some way up the east bank of the Cape Fear River before turning off to the right towards Goldsboro. He thus created the impression that he was threatening Raleigh, the State capital.

<sup>3</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 185.

<sup>4</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 186.

<sup>5</sup> Cox estimates the Confederate force at 22,000 infantry besides cavalry, whose strength is stated as 5,500. Johnston gives his strength on the 19th in infantry and

right across the Aversboro road with the two wings swung forward, the right hidden in the woods. The right wing consisted of the troops of the Army of Tennessee and one division of Hardee's command; the left was held by Bragg with Hoke's division, reinforced by Hardee's other division.<sup>1</sup> On the 19th Slocum was pushing on towards Goldsboro with the 14th Corps leading. The 20th Corps was eight miles behind.<sup>2</sup> It had proved impossible, owing to the wretched condition of the roads from incessant rain, to keep the two Corps closed up, and the right wing was several miles away marching by parallel roads.

The Federal advance first encountered Johnston's cavalry, and thinking that he had only cavalry in his front, Davis, the Corps commander, pressed forward with his leading division under Carlin and directed Buell's brigade to move to the left of the road so as to outflank the supposed position of the Confederates. The capture of some prisoners revealed the fact that Johnston's whole army had to be encountered. Slocum, on reaching the front, ordered up the second division under Morgan and deployed it on the right of Carlin's, being ignorant that a strong force was concealed in the woods on his left. Suddenly the Confederate right rushed to the attack. Buell's brigade was swept away. Carlin's other brigades were taken in flank and successively driven back, and a gap made in the Federal line. As the Confederate centre pressed along the road in pursuit of Carlin's retreating troops, they were themselves taken in flank by a vigorous charge of one of Morgan's brigades. The pursuit was checked; and the 20th Corps, which on the sound of the guns in front, had hurried forward, now began to arrive on the battlefield. A fresh line was formed, on which Carlin's division rallied, about a mile in rear of the point where the fight commenced, and the repeated efforts of the Confederate right to drive back this line were repulsed. Between the right of the reformed line and the left of Morgan's division, which on the right of the road had entrenched itself in front of Bragg's line, a gap existed; and some of the Confederate troops penetrated this interval and tried to take Morgan's line in reverse but without success.

artillery as 14,100. According to his account the cavalry were not engaged on that day, Butler's division, which had been engaged on the 18th, having been sent to watch the movements of the Federal right wing (*Narrative*, 392).

<sup>1</sup> The troops of the Army of Tennessee, commanded by Stewart, consisted of the remnants of his own Corps and S. D. Lee's, which latter was commanded by D. H. Hill. They numbered 3,950 (Johnston's *Narrative*, 384). It had been originally intended that Hoke's division should form the left wing, posted across the road at right angles, whilst the other two were to be deployed "obliquely *en échelon* to the right" (4 B. & L., 703). But the battle had already commenced before Hardee's two divisions had come up, and in consequence of Bragg's urgent and, as it would seem, unnecessary appeal for reinforcements, one of Hardee's divisions was ordered to form on Hoke's left. Johnston and Wade Hampton both seem to regard this departure from the original plan as one of the chief reasons why the Confederates failed to gain a decisive success.

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 185.



Johnston, seeing that the fury of his attack had spent itself upon Davis' Corps, and that heavy reinforcements were coming up to Slocum's aid, called off his troops and withdrew the right wing to its former position, but Bragg's wing was drawn back and faced to the east to meet Howard's expected advance from that direction.<sup>1</sup> Johnston's sole object now was to hold Bentonville and cover the bridges over Mill Creek in his rear, whilst he was sending off his wounded and preparing for a retreat to Smithfield.

On the 20th Howard's two Corps came up and took a position fronting Bragg's line. But Sherman, who had sent orders by couriers to Schofield to move at once to Goldsboro, and to Terry with the 10th Corps to march on Cox's bridge over the Neuse, was not disposed to waste valuable life in attacks upon Johnston's entrenched position; and even, when on the 21st a favourable opportunity presented itself of breaking through Johnston's left and capturing the bridges in his rear, he declined to avail himself of it, and ordered Howard to recall his troops.<sup>2</sup> He knew that Johnston must retreat and that it was an absolute certainty that the whole of the Federal forces could be united on the north bank of the Neuse in open country, and, therefore, refused to take any unnecessary risks.<sup>3</sup>

On the night of the 21st Johnston retreated across Mill Creek to Smithfield, and on the 22nd Sherman resumed his march. Schofield had already on the 21st entered Goldsboro, and on the same day Terry had reached Cox's bridge and laid a pontoon bridge over the Neuse, by which Sherman crossed the river and himself entered Goldsboro on the 23rd. With the addition of the 23rd Corps, which was now reunited with the Grand Army of the West, and the 10th Corps, he had under his command, a force of nearly 90,000 men.<sup>4</sup>

From Savannah to Goldsboro the Grand Army of the West had

<sup>1</sup> For the details of the battle of Bentonville see Cox's *March to the Sea*, 188-193. Johnston's account of the battle differs in several points. He says that the charge of the right wing conducted by Hardee drove the Federals from two lines of entrenchments, but the victorious troops, owing to the denseness of the thicket through which they were advancing, were ordered to halt and re-form their line: then the Federals made an attempt to assume the offensive and attacked Stewart's troops, but were easily repulsed, and with this repulse the action really ceased. Throughout the engagement Bragg on the left was held in check by the troops confronting him, and in Wade Hampton's opinion handled his troops feebly. Only two brigades of the 20th Corps seem to have taken part in the fighting. Cox speaks of the Confederate general Bate as commanding two divisions of Cheatham's Corps of the Army of Tennessee and forming the extreme right of Hardee's line, but according to Johnston's account no troops of Cheatham's Corps joined him till the 20th. It would appear from Johnston's *Narrative*, 394, that a considerable number of troops from the Army of Tennessee joined him after the battle of Bentonville.

<sup>2</sup> The force which penetrated Johnston's lines was Mower's division of the 17th Corps. Both Johnston and Hampton claim that it was *driven back* by a sudden attack made by a small force under Hardee and Hampton.

<sup>3</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 195.

<sup>4</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 196.

marched 425 miles in fifty days, of which ten were allotted to rest. Though but little interfered with by the enemy's forces and attended by but slight loss (at Averasboro, 554: at Bentonville, 1,646),<sup>1</sup> yet the march through the Carolinas had been one continuous battle with the elements, and must be reckoned a much greater achievement than the more famous march through Georgia, which by comparison was a mere pleasure trip. As a triumph of physical endurance and mechanical skill on the part of the army and of inflexible resolution in the general, it stands unrivalled in the history of modern war; and it had as direct an influence upon the final issue of the campaign round Richmond as if it had been conducted within sound of Lee's guns.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 4 B. & L., 698.

<sup>2</sup> It is true, as Ropes (10 Massachusetts M. H. S., 149) points out, that it was not until the battle of Five Forks had been lost, that Lee commenced his retreat, and that it was the movements of the Armies of the Potomac and James which led up to the capitulation of Appomattox; but Sherman's march through the Carolinas prevented any reinforcements being sent to Lee, and would have compelled him to evacuate Richmond very soon, if Grant's operations had not already produced that result.

## CHAPTER XXVI

### NAVAL OPERATIONS

Naval operations in the West—The Eads gunboats—Composition of the crews—Naval success at Fort Henry—Failure of the navy at Fort Donelson—The navy at Island No. 10—The *Carondelet* runs past the batteries—Gunboats at Shiloh—Navy at Fort Pillow—Confederate rams sink the *Cincinnati*—The Ellet rams—Battle of Memphis—Importance of New Orleans—Strength of the Federal force—The Confederate defences—Bombardment of the Forts—Caldwell breaks the boom—The Battle of April 24th—Fight above the Forts—Fall of New Orleans—Advance on Vicksburg—Farragut passes Vicksburg, June 28th—The Confederate ram *Arkansas*—Destruction of the *Arkansas*—Porter relieves Davis—The *Cairo* sunk in the Yazoo—Capture of Arkansas Post—Importance of the Red River—Loss of the *Queen of the West*—Loss of the *Indianola*—Farragut passes the batteries at Port Hudson—Porter runs past the Vicksburg Batteries—Unsuccessful attack by the navy on Grand Gulf—Porter ascends the Red River to Alexandria—Sinking of the *Cincinnati*—The navy in the North Carolina Sounds—Capture of Hatteras Inlet—Capture of Roanoke Island—Capture of Port Royal—The *Merrimac*—The *Merrimac* attacks the Federal fleet, March 8th—Destruction of the *Cumberland* and *Congress*—The *Monitor*—The battle of March 9th—Operations in Charleston harbour—Raid of the Confederate ironclads—The *Monitor Montauk*—Battle of April 7th—Capture of the *Atlanta*—Du Pont relieved by Dahlgren—Confederate use of submarine boats—The Confederate ironclad, *Albemarle*—Mobile Bay—Delay imposed upon Farragut—The Confederate ironclad, *Tennessee*—Farragut's ironclads—Battle of Mobile Bay—Sinking of the *Tecumseh*—Farragut takes the lead—The fight with the gunboats—Surrender of the *Tennessee*—Capture of Fort Fisher—The Confederate commerce-destroyers: the *Alabama*, the *Florida*, the *Shenandoah*—The blockade of the Southern coast.

THE work performed by the Federal navy during the war was Titanic. Not only were the 3,000 miles of coastline effectually blockaded, but the waters of the principal rivers were controlled by Northern flotillas. The possession of these inland waters secured the lines of communication of the invading armies and enabled the Federal commanders to push into the very heart of the Confederacy without fear of being severed from their base. It was in the West that the superiority of the Federal navy made itself especially felt. The possession of the Mississippi (Map VI.) cut the Confederacy in twain, and the control of the Tennessee and the Cumberland preserved Kentucky to the Union and was an indispensable preliminary to the conquest of Tennessee.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For the naval operations on the Mississippi and its tributaries, except where special reference is made to other authorities, Mahan's *Gulf and Inland Waters* has been followed throughout.



In the West the Federal Government at first treated the naval force as if it were a division of the army, and put the construction of a river fleet under the charge of the War Office. In May, 1861, Commander Rodgers was directed to prepare a naval force. He purchased in Cincinnati three river steamers, the *Tyler*, *Lexington*, and *Conestoga*. These were converted into gunboats by receiving oak bulwarks five inches thick, but carried no iron plating. The *Tyler* was armed with seven guns, the *Lexington* with six, and the *Conestoga* with three. They reached Cairo on August 12th. Five days earlier the War Office had contracted with J. B. Eads, of St. Louis, for the construction of seven gunboats. These vessels were partially protected with armour, 175 feet long and with 50 feet beam; they carried a casemate pierced for thirteen guns. The forward end of the casemate bore  $2\frac{1}{2}$  inches of iron, with a backing of 24 inches of oak. The rest of the casemate was unprotected, except abreast of the boilers and engines, where  $2\frac{1}{2}$  inches of iron, but without backing, were carried. The sterns of these vessels were entirely unprotected, and the armour over the boilers was too weak to afford adequate protection. The vessels were of 512 tons burden, drew from 6 to 7 feet of water, and steamed about 9 knots an hour.<sup>1</sup> All seven did good work in the Western waters, and their names will constantly recur in the course of the narrative. They were called the *Cairo*, *Carondelet*, *Cincinnati*, *Louisville*, *Mound City*, *Pittsburg*, and *St. Louis* (afterwards the *De Kalb*). Two larger vessels, the *Benton* and *Essex*, were purchased by the Government. They differed from the seven built for the Government in being larger and stronger, but were of the same general type. Besides the three wooden gunboats in commission and the nine ironclads in preparation, a fleet of thirty-eight mortar-boats was also being built.

But whilst the work of construction was being rapidly pushed forward, very considerable difficulty was experienced in finding trained crews. In January, 1862, Captain Foote, who had relieved Rodgers, reported that though he hoped to have all the gunboats in commission by the 20th, he could only muster one-third crews for them. An attempt was made to fill up the deficiency by drafts from the army. But the quality of the men thus supplied was so inferior, as the army officers detailed for the purpose the worst of their men, that Foote, after a short experience, declined any further drafts. The crews were mainly made up of coasting and merchant seamen from the East, of steamboat men from the rivers, and of a few sailors from the lakes.

After the violation of the neutrality of Kentucky by Polk in September, 1861, the wooden gunboats saw some service in the Mississippi. In November the *Tyler* and *Lexington* convoyed a

<sup>1</sup> I B. & L., 339 (Eads' own statement).

land force under Grant to Belmont, and besides engaging the Confederate batteries at Columbus, played an important part in covering the re-embarkation of the troops.

On November 13th Captain Foote was promoted Flag-Officer, which placed him above the command of any army officer, except the Commander-in-Chief of the Department.

On February 2nd, 1862, Foote arrived at Paducah with the three wooden gunboats and four of the ironclads, as it had been found impossible to provide crews for the others. This naval force was intended to take part in the expedition up the Tennessee against Fort Henry and to destroy the railway bridge over the river connecting Columbus with Bowling Green. The original design embraced a joint attack by army and navy upon the fort. But such heavy rain had recently fallen that the roads were almost impassable, and the navy had to do the work unaided. The rise in the river proved, however, of great service to the attacking force, as it swept away from their moorings a number of Confederate mines and flooded the lower part of the fort, where at the close of the action the men fighting the guns were waist-deep in water.<sup>1</sup> On February 6th the ironclads moved up to the attack in line abreast with the wooden gunboats in second line. They opened fire at a distance of 1,700 yards and steamed steadily on till within 600 yards of the fort. After about an hour's engagement the *Essex* received a shot in her boilers. An explosion took place, and the vessel drifted down-stream. The other ironclads continued the action. Various disasters befell the Confederate guns. Of the two heaviest, one exploded and the other was spiked by its own priming-wire. Of the twelve guns which could be brought to bear upon the fleet, seven had been put out of action, when the Confederate flag was hauled down and the fort surrendered to the navy. The same day the wooden gunboats pushed twenty-five miles up the river to the railway bridge. This was destroyed, and the gunboats continued up the Tennessee to Florence, in Alabama, where further progress was stopped by the Muscle Shoals. They returned to Cairo on the 11th, having destroyed several steamers and bringing with them a large steamer, the *Eastport*, which was being converted into a gunboat. This vessel was taken into the Federal navy, and two years later was lost in the Red River Expedition.

The wooden gunboats were just in time to take part in the expedition against Fort Donelson. Foote was of opinion that this fort, a very much stronger work than Fort Henry, would prove more than a match for his gunboats, and would have preferred to wait till his fleet was better prepared. But yielding to the urgency of Halleck and Grant, he entered the Cumberland

<sup>1</sup> I B. & L., 371.

with four ironclads and two wooden gunboats. The *Carondelet* reached the neighbourhood of the fort on the 12th, and on the 13th engaged the hostile batteries at long range. Next day the whole naval force advanced to the attack. Again the ironclads in line abreast led the way with the wooden gunboats in second line. The action commenced about 3 p.m., when the vessels opened fire at a distance of about a mile, and continued to advance till they were within 400 yards. For an hour and a half the fight raged with great fury, and the Confederate gunners were showing signs of flinching, when a lucky shot carried away the wheel of the flagship *St. Louis*, and almost at the same time the tiller of the *Louisville* was shot away. Both vessels drifted helplessly down-stream; whereupon the other vessels abandoned the now unequal contest. Foote's anticipation had been fulfilled, though it is probable that the navy would have succeeded in silencing the batteries but for the chance which disabled simultaneously two of the four ironclads.

The capture of Forts Henry and Donelson broke through the centre of the first line of Confederate defence and necessitated the evacuation of the works at Columbus. Most of the heavy guns were transferred from those works to Island No. 10 and New Madrid, some sixty miles further down-stream.<sup>1</sup> This new Confederate post on the Mississippi lay at the point where the river makes a huge double bend, Island No. 10 being at the bottom of the first bend, and New Madrid in the second. Pope, marching through Missouri, reached the right bank below New Madrid, and by planting batteries on that bank cut off the supplies of that place and compelled its evacuation. With great labour a canal was cut through the submerged forest land on the Missouri bank, by which the transports were enabled to join the army without going near the guns on the island. But the gunboats drew too much water to follow this route, whilst, if the Confederate forces in the island and on the left bank were to be captured, it was essential that the gunboats should run past the batteries and get below to cover the passage of Pope's troops. Foote had come down the river with six ironclads and ten mortar-boats, and on March 17th attacked the batteries at long range. The distance, however, was too great to produce much effect.

At that time Foote's squadron was the only naval force which the Federals had on the Mississippi. Farragut had not yet reached New Orleans, and report declared that the Confederates were collecting a formidable squadron at Memphis. This rumour proved much exaggerated; but under the circumstances Foote refused to risk his fleet by exposing it in a close-range action, especially as his ships would now be fighting down-stream, and

<sup>1</sup> 1 B. & L., 439.



if disabled would drift into the grasp of the Confederates. On the other hand, the Confederate flotilla might soon be moving up the river, and would then make short work of Pope's transports. The army officers pressed Foote to run past the batteries in the night, but the naval commander considered the risk too great. But Commander Walke, of the *Carondelet*, believed that it could be done, and volunteered to make the attempt.<sup>1</sup>

The Confederate position was a very strong one against any force coming down-stream. On the island were four batteries mounting 23 guns, whilst 32 guns were in position along the Tennessee shore. There was also a floating battery moored off the island carrying 9 or 10 heavy guns. On the night of April 1st a boat expedition landed on the island, and taking the garrison by surprise, spiked one battery.

On the night of the 4th Walke determined to attempt his perilous feat. Every possible device had been adopted to protect the vessel. The boilers and other vulnerable spots were covered with layers of chain-cable, hawsers, and lumber. On the port side a barge was lashed to cover the magazine. The steam was allowed to escape through the wheel-houses to prevent the sound which was made when it issued through the smoke-stacks. At 10 p.m. the moon set, and a great thunderstorm was swiftly rushing up. Walke cast off from his moorings in pitch darkness, which from time to time was illuminated by the lightning flashes. Only the eastern channel between the island and the Tennessee shore was available. Fortunately the floating battery had that same day drifted down the river. The passage was made without loss, though the soot in the smoke-stacks twice caught fire, and by the sudden blaze betrayed the position of the vessel.<sup>2</sup>

But the thunderstorm disconcerted the aim of the gunners, and the *Carondelet* escaped unhit. Her arrival below New Madrid sealed the fate of the Confederates. On the 6th she engaged the batteries lower down towards Tiptonville, and one battery was captured and its guns spiked. On that night the *Pittsburg* ran past the island, and the next day the two gunboats silenced the batteries down-stream, and Pope, crossing his troops over the river, cut the line of the Confederate retreat and compelled the surrender of the whole force. Without the co-operation of the Navy such a triumph would have been impossible, and the highest credit is due to the gallant Walke for being the first to make the attempt to run past heavy batteries.

Meanwhile the *Tyler* and *Lexington* had accompanied Grant's army up the Tennessee to Pittsburg Landing, and on April 6th, in

<sup>1</sup> I B. & L., 442.

<sup>2</sup> I B. & L., 444.

the great battle of Shiloh, played an important part by covering the left of the Federal position.<sup>1</sup>

The Confederates prepared to make their next stand on the Mississippi at Fort Pillow, eighty miles below New Madrid. Pope was arranging for a combined attack with the land and naval forces upon that position, when he was called away to take part in Halleck's advance on Corinth. The Federal flotilla bombarded Fort Pillow, but found itself opposed by a new foe. In January the military authorities at New Orleans had seized fourteen river steamers and converted them into rams by strengthening their bows with iron casing, whilst the engines were protected with cotton bales and pine bulwarks. Six of these vessels were kept at New Orleans to resist Farragut's threatened advance. The other eight were sent up the river to close its upper waters against the descending fleet.

On May 10th the rams steamed up from Fort Pillow and attacked the *Cincinnati*, which was anchored off the Arkansas shore to protect a mortar-boat bombarding the fort from behind a point on that bank. The Federals were taken by surprise, and the *Cincinnati* was rammed twice and sank. The *Mound City*, which was the first to come to her aid, was also rammed, and, to escape sinking, ran ashore. Three of the rams were disabled, and drifted down-stream under the guns of the fort, followed by their comrades, as the rest of the Federal gunboats came into action. The *Cincinnati* and *Mound City* were repaired and ready for action again by the end of the month.

In March Colonel Charles Ellet, Junr., who for some years had advocated the use of the steam ram in warfare, had been instructed by the Federal Government to purchase some river steamers and convert them into rams on a plan of his own. He bought seven vessels, selecting them for their speed and strength, and built on to each three solid timber bulkheads, whilst a two-foot bulwark of oak protected the boilers.

Fort Pillow was abandoned after Beauregard's evacuation of Corinth, and the Federal fleet now under Davis<sup>2</sup> continued down the river towards Memphis. It now consisted of five ironclads with two of Ellet's rams, the *Queen of the West* and the *Monarch*.<sup>3</sup> The Confederate rams were lying off Memphis, and on June 6th

<sup>1</sup> Mahan quotes the testimony of both Grant and Beauregard to the good work done by the gunboats. Bragg, however, quoted in I B. & L., 567, says that the fire of the gunboats "did not in the slightest degree mar our prospects or our progress." But he admits that it terrified the reserves and stragglers and caused the troops to abandon the contest.

<sup>2</sup> On May 9th Foote resigned his command and went north, suffering from the effects of a wound received at Fort Donelson.

<sup>3</sup> A third of Ellet's rams, the *Switzerland*, arrived after the battle was decided, and took part in the pursuit.

steamed up to attack. The Federal ironclads were already dropping down the river with their heads up-stream. As soon as the first gun was fired, the two Federal rams unmoored and rushed straight at the Confederates through the intervals between the gunboats. The Confederate rams, expecting to have to deal only with gunboats, fell into some confusion at this sudden attack. The *Queen of the West* rammed one of her opponents and sunk her in deep water, but was herself rammed and ran ashore. The *Monarch* was charged from opposite sides by two rams, which missing their mark, collided with each other. One was so severely injured that she ran ashore; the other was rammed by the *Monarch*, and at the same time received a shot in her boiler and sank. The Federal gunboats had now come into action. Another Confederate ram received a shot in her steam-chest and ran ashore. Having lost half their number, the rest took to flight, but were hotly pursued for ten miles. One was destroyed, two captured, and only one escaped.

On the 29th Davis left Memphis with four ironclads and six mortar-boats, and on July 1st joined hands above Vicksburg with Farragut, who had ascended the river from the Gulf (Map X.).

New Orleans was considerably the largest city and the commercial capital of the Confederacy. It contained the most skilled workmen and the largest workshops in the South. Its capture would open the Mississippi, and be at any rate the first step in the process of cutting the Confederacy in twain. Moreover, its fall would checkmate Napoleon III.'s thinly veiled design of recognising the Confederacy. Had the attempt been made in the summer of 1861, it is far from unlikely that a Federal fleet would have encountered only the faintest resistance, and that the whole course of the Mississippi would have passed forthwith under Federal control.<sup>1</sup> But the Federal Government was not prepared for war, and took time to realise that the struggle was a desperate one, and could only be ended by the complete subjugation of the South. Consequently the attempt to open the Mississippi from the Gulf was not undertaken till the spring of 1862.

For the command of the naval force David Glasgow Farragut was selected. The Nelson of the American navy was then just over sixty years old. He had been a midshipman on board the *Essex*, when that vessel was captured during the war of 1812 in Valparaiso Harbour by the English cruisers *Phæbe* and *Cherub*. His service record was excellent. By birth a native of Tennessee, his Southern kinsmen and friends had vainly endeavoured to seduce him from his allegiance to the United States.

<sup>1</sup> "Any three vessels could have passed Forts Jackson and St. Philip a month after the commencement of the war, and gone on to Cairo without any trouble" (Admiral Porter, 2 B. & L., 23).



On February 20th he arrived in Mississippi Sound to take command of the Western Gulf Blockading Squadron. This force, entirely composed of wooden vessels, consisted of the 40-gun frigate, *Colorado*: four screw sloops, the *Hartford*, *Pensacola*, *Brooklyn*, and *Richmond*: one side-wheel steamer, the *Mississippi*: three screw corvettes, the *Oneida*, *Varuna*, and *Iroquois*, and nine screw gunboats. There was in addition a mortar flotilla of twenty schooners, each carrying one 13-inch mortar, with a squadron of six gunboats assigned for their special protection. This section was under the command of Commander D. D. Porter. The greatest difficulty was experienced in getting two of the heaviest vessels over the bar, and the *Colorado* in spite of every effort had to be left outside.

The Confederates profited by this respite to strengthen their defences. New Orleans lies 110 miles from the mouths of the Mississippi. Ninety miles below the city at the Plaquemine Bend stood on opposite banks Forts St. Philip and Jackson, mounting between them 126 guns.<sup>1</sup> But a large proportion of these guns were of light calibre, being 32-pounders or smaller. Fort Jackson was on the right bank, 800 yards below Fort St. Philip. Across the river between the two forts a powerful raft of cypress logs had been placed, but in March a sudden freshet carried away the centre of this boom, and the gap was filled by seven or eight schooners secured by two anchors each and fastened to each other and the ends of the boom by 1-inch chains. Their masts had been taken out, and with the rigging were suffered to drift astern to foul the screws of approaching vessels.

Major-General Mansfield Lovell was in command of the Department, but only had at his disposal some 3,000 raw troops imperfectly armed. Nearly every available man had been drawn away to assist Johnston in his great attack on Grant. The first line of the Confederate defences represented by the two forts was under the command of Brigadier-General Duncan.<sup>2</sup> The naval force in the river was commanded by Commander Mitchell, who was independent of the military commanders. It consisted of four vessels of the Confederate navy, two ships belonging to the State of Louisiana, and six steamers of the River Defence fleet.<sup>3</sup> These last were, however, under the command of a merchant captain, who refused to recognise the authority of the naval commander. The *Louisiana*, an ironclad of the *Merrimac* type, carrying sixteen heavy guns, was much the most formidable vessel in Mitchell's squadron. But her

<sup>1</sup> For this total, 74 in Fort Jackson and 52 in Fort St. Philip, see 2 B. & L., 75.

<sup>2</sup> Duncan was in general command of the coast defences. Colonel Higgins was in immediate command of the two forts.

<sup>3</sup> These six steamers were sister vessels of the eight rams which had been sent up the river and were defeated at Memphis.

gun-ports were too small, and her engines, taken from an old river steamer, were too weak.<sup>1</sup> She was not yet ready for action and was still in the hands of the artificers. The most effective vessel proved to be the cigar-shaped ironclad *Manassas*, carrying one 32-pounder carronade firing right ahead. Her engines also were defective, and she had no ram.<sup>2</sup> Another ironclad was also in process of construction.

On April 18th the mortar flotilla opened fire on the forts, and the bombardment was steadily maintained for the next five days and nights. Fort Jackson was the principal objective. The schooners took position about 3,000 yards below the fort under cover of a wood on the right bank, and their mast-heads were dressed with bushes, that they might not be distinguished from the trees. Though Fort Jackson was invisible from their decks, yet its exact position had been ascertained by triangulation, and the fire of the mortar-boats was extremely accurate.

But though 16,800 shells were fired in the six days, the fort was not forced to surrender, nor was its fire silenced, as Porter had expected. Farragut had never placed much confidence in the mortar flotilla. But the Navy Department had decided upon its employment before he received the command.<sup>3</sup> Convinced that the bombardment would not force the forts to surrender, he determined to run past their batteries and make straight for New Orleans.

But it was essential that the boom across the river should first be broken. This was done on the night of the 20th by Lieutenant Caldwell in the gunboat *Itasca*.<sup>4</sup> The original design was to torpedo one of the hulks. But the attempt failed. The gunboat then steamed up the narrow channel between the left bank and the eastern end of the boom, and charging at full speed from above broke the chains between two of the hulks.<sup>5</sup> A passage was now clear: for only two hulks at the eastern end and one at the western retained their original positions. On the same night the *Louisiana* came down the river, but Mitchell, deaf to the entreaties of the army officers, insisted on mooring her just above Fort St. Philip, as she still had the artificers on board and also lacked

<sup>1</sup> Wilson, i. 41. For description of the *Merrimac*, see p. 486.

<sup>2</sup> The *Manassas* had been originally a Boston tugboat. "An arched roof of 5-inch timber was thrown over her deck, and this covered with a layer of old-fashioned railroad iron, from three-fourths to one inch thick." When first converted into a warship she had been provided with a cast-iron prow under water. On October 12th, 1861, she had come down the river and attacked the *Richmond*. In the collision her prow was wrenched off. "She now had no prow, the iron of the hull only being carried round the stem."

<sup>3</sup> 2 B. & L., 70.

<sup>4</sup> Assisted by the gunboat *Pinola*. Fleet-Captain Bell commanded the two gunboats.

<sup>5</sup> The hulk at the eastern end of the boom had already been dislodged by the *Itasca*.

motive power. By the 23rd all preparations on board the fleet were complete. But it was necessary to make sure that the Confederates had not put any fresh obstructions in the gap between the hulks. After dark Caldwell went up the river in a row-boat and found that the passage was still quite clear.

At 2 a.m. on the 24th Farragut hoisted the signal on his flagship, the *Hartford*. He had finally decided to run past the forts in two columns, the starboard column starting first, and its last ship being followed by the leading vessel of the port column, so that the fleet would ultimately be formed in single line ahead. It took the heavy vessels some time to purchase their anchors in the strong current, and the noise of getting under way put the Confederates on the alert. The gunboat *Cayuga*, leading the starboard column, passed through the opening in the boom at 3.30 a.m., followed by the *Pensacola*, *Mississippi*, *Oneida*, *Varuna*, and three gunboats.

As the second vessel reached the gap, the Confederate guns opened fire from both banks. The *Cayuga*, *Varuna*, and another gunboat steamed rapidly ahead. The *Cayuga* was only fifteen minutes under the fire of the forts, and the *Varuna* an even shorter period. Having passed the batteries, they became engaged with the flotilla further up the river. The heavier Federal vessels advanced more slowly, engaging the forts deliberately, and sometimes stopping altogether to give more effect to their broadsides. The *Pensacola* and *Mississippi* both engaged Fort St. Philip, and their fire temporarily drove the gunners from their posts. The *Manassas*, steaming down the river after an unsuccessful attempt to ram the *Pensacola*, struck the *Mississippi*, but without disabling her. Shortly after the current carried the *Mississippi* over towards the west bank. The *Oneida*, next in line, now had her course clear before her and ran quickly by close under the left bank, where the fire of St. Philip passed over her. The two last gunboats of this column were delayed. It would seem that the port column started before the starboard column had cleared the obstacles and its leading vessels overlapped the rear vessels of the other. The *Hartford*, leading the second column, soon found herself in great peril. She was steering in to attack Fort Jackson when the advance of a fire-raft drove her across the river, and she ran aground under Fort St. Philip. In this position she was attacked by the fire-raft, which was pushed against her by the tug *Mosher*.

The flames quickly caught and leapt up her rigging, whilst the guns of both forts were playing upon her. But the crew, encouraged by the heroic example of their commander, proved staunch. The flames were got under : a shot in her boilers sank the *Mosher* with her gallant crew of six men, and the *Hartford*, getting clear



of the shoal, passed up the river out of range. The *Brooklyn*, her immediate follower, in the dense smoke lost sight of her leader and collided with one of the rear gunboats of the starboard column. She fell off across the stream under a heavy fire from St. Philip. When she got clear of the boom, she was rammed by the *Manassas*, but the blow seemed at the time to have done no serious damage. Nearing St. Philip her captain, seeing the *Hartford* aground, stopped the engines and dropped down to the help of the flagship.<sup>1</sup> When the *Hartford* extricated herself, the *Brooklyn* followed her past St. Philip, into which she poured a heavy fire, and just above the fort exchanged broadsides in passing with the *Louisiana*. The *Richmond* and a gunboat passed the forts with but little loss. But the next two vessels, the *Pinola* and *Iroquois*, suffered more severely. The former was exposed to a heavy fire from St. Philip, and the light of the fire-rafts enabled the gunners to take good aim. The *Iroquois*, after passing St. Philip, was roughly handled by the *Louisiana*, with which she collided. The last three gunboats of the second column failed to make the passage. The *Itasca* received a shot in her boilers, and the other two fouled the obstructions. But with the passage of the heavy ships the day was won.

Above the forts a confused fight had been raging between the Confederate flotilla and the Federal ships, which first passed up the river. The Confederates were overmatched, and few of their vessels acquitted themselves with credit. The rams of the River Defence Fleet, thinking only of escape, ran ashore and were fired by their crews. But the *Varuna*, which had pushed ahead out of reach of support, was fiercely engaged by the *Governor Moore*, and after being rammed by two opponents sank close to the east bank. The *Cayuga* and *Oneida* made short work of the other Confederate ships. The *Manassas* followed the Federal fleet up the river, but when the *Mississippi* turned upon her took to flight and ran ashore. Daybreak found only three Confederate vessels surviving. The *Louisiana* was moored above Fort St. Philip and two others had taken refuge under the guns of the forts.

Farragut's bold determination had been completely justified. With a loss of only one vessel and of 37 men killed and 147 wounded,<sup>2</sup> he had passed the forts, and New Orleans lay at his mercy. On the 25th the fleet continued up the river and, after easily silencing two weak batteries four miles below New Orleans, appeared before the city at noon. The wildest confusion prevailed there. Cotton and shipping had been set on fire, including the

<sup>1</sup> 2 B. & L., 63-4. The *Brooklyn* was more seriously injured by her collision with the *Manassas* than at first sight appeared. Her "side was stove in about six feet below the waterline. A little more would have sunk her." See also 2 B. & L., 69.

<sup>2</sup> 2 B. & L., 73.

*Mississippi*, an ironclad, which was nearly completed but could not be taken up-stream owing to lack of tugs. General Lovell had left the city, which was occupied by the land forces under General Butler on May 1st. The forts had been surrendered by General Duncan on April 28th, but Commander Mitchell, claiming to be independent of the military authorities, set the *Louisiana* on fire.

When once New Orleans was in the hands of the land forces, Farragut proceeded up the river. Baton Rouge and Natchez surrendered at the first summons, and no resistance was encountered till Vicksburg was reached. That city was at the time the last remaining stronghold of the Confederates on the Mississippi. Situated midway between New Orleans and Memphis, and four hundred miles distant from either, it was a position of great natural strength. Two miles above Vicksburg the river makes a great bend from north-east to south-west, and between the two parallel reaches is a narrow tongue of land not more than a mile wide. On the left bank the bluffs rise high above the river. At the top of the bend they are 260 feet high, gradually sinking to about 150 feet. Though not nearly so strong as later in the war, the batteries at Vicksburg, in the summer of 1862, were fairly formidable. They mounted twenty-six (or possibly only twenty-two) guns, ranged along a line some three miles long.

From the first it was plain that the co-operation of a land force was necessary to effect the reduction of the place. But the force under Butler was not strong enough for the purpose. So Farragut waited till the inevitable fall of Corinth should enable Halleck to send to his aid some portion of his great army of 100,000 men. But Halleck signally failed to grasp the strategic problem and left the naval forces severely alone.

Under the circumstances Farragut would have preferred to return down the river with his fleet, which sorely needed repairs. But the great anxiety of his Government for the reduction of Vicksburg determined him to run past the batteries and join hands with Davis' flotilla. He had with him besides his flagship, the *Brooklyn*, *Richmond*, *Iroquois*, *Oneida*, and six gunboats, also the steamers and seventeen mortar schooners of Porter's flotilla. The schooners commenced the bombardment on June 26th, continued it throughout the 27th, and at 3 a.m. of the 28th the fleet, covered by the fire of all Porter's vessels, started to run past the batteries. This was accomplished by the majority of the ships with but slight loss,<sup>1</sup> but the *Brooklyn* and two of the gunboats, owing to a misinterpretation of their orders after engaging the batteries for two hours, dropped down-stream again.

<sup>1</sup> The total loss was fifteen killed and thirty wounded. Eight of the former belonged to the crew of one of the steamers of the mortar flotilla, which received a shot in her boiler.

The night's work made it plain to Farragut that he could run past the batteries without much risk whenever he chose, but that he could not hope to effect more than temporarily silencing the guns. On July 1st he was joined by Davis.

It was known that a formidable ironclad ram, the *Arkansas*, was up the Yazoo, and on July 15th the *Carondelet*, *Tyler*, and the *Queen of the West* were sent up that river to look for her. The ram had been built at Memphis, but was hurried down-stream in a still incomplete condition just in time to escape capture. She was of the *Merrimac* type, carrying ten guns in a casemate protected with three inches of railroad iron. In the Yazoo her construction was rapidly completed, and coming down the river on the 15th she encountered the Federal squadron about six miles from the mouth. They turned and retreated down-stream. The *Arkansas* followed in pursuit, and a running fight ensued between her and the two gunboats, the *Queen of the West* having fled out of sight on the first discovery of the ram. The *Carondelet* was at a great disadvantage, as her stern guns were overmatched by her opponent's bow guns. After about an hour's action, having her wheel-ropes shot through, she retreated close to the bank where the *Arkansas*, with her heavier draught, could not follow her.<sup>1</sup> The ram continued down-stream in pursuit of the *Tyler*. Her speed was, however, reduced to little more than a knot an hour owing to her smoke-stack having been riddled with shot. She failed to overtake the *Tyler*, and, on entering the Mississippi, ran boldly through the Federal fleet to find shelter under the guns of Vicksburg. The Federals were caught off their guard. Only one vessel had steam up, and her captain let the opportunity escape him. The ram safely reached Vicksburg after exchanging broadsides with each of the Federal vessels as she passed.

Farragut, apprehensive lest the ram should go down-stream and play havoc with Porter's flotilla, at once determined to run past the batteries with his own squadron and endeavour to destroy the ram before she had time to refit. But the necessary preparations were not completed till night had fallen, and under cover of the darkness the *Arkansas* changed her position. Farragut's squadron passed the batteries in the night, but quite failed to damage the ram, as her position could not be made out.

A week later Davis sent the *Essex* and *Queen of the West* to attack her. The two vessels started soon after dawn of the 22nd,

<sup>1</sup> The *Carondelet* in this running fight was at a double disadvantage. Her stern was only armed with two 32-pounder smoothbores, and was unprotected by armour. The commander of the *Arkansas*, Captain Brown, claims to have disabled his opponent. He says (3 B. & L., 575) that as the *Arkansas* passed the *Carondelet*, not a shot was fired from the latter ship and no flag was flying. The Federal accounts deny this latter statement, and say that the *Arkansas'* flag was down as she passed.



but the *Arkansas* was well handled, and the *Essex* not daring to ram bow to bow, passed down the river under a heavy fire. The *Queen of the West* rammed the Confederate vessel, but without inflicting vital injury, and then returned up-stream.

As there was no prospect of a sufficiently large force becoming available for a combined attack on Vicksburg, Farragut returned with his fleet to New Orleans. The Mississippi was falling and the health of the crews was suffering.

The *Arkansas*, having been hastily refitted, was sent down the river on August 3rd to take part in the attack on Baton Rouge.<sup>1</sup> On the way her engines broke down, and she ran hard into the bank. In this plight she was discovered by the *Essex*, which came up the river to look for her. On the appearance of the Federal ironclad the *Arkansas* was set on fire by her crew and destroyed.

When Farragut withdrew from below Vicksburg, Davis with his squadron ascended the river to Helena. The *Essex*, *Sumter*,<sup>2</sup> and two gunboats were the only Federal vessels remaining in the Mississippi between Vicksburg and New Orleans. In October Davis was relieved by Porter. Two new types of vessels were now added to the Mississippi fleet. One consisted of "light-draughts" or "tinclads," vessels of very light draught, and protected against musketry by a thin coating of iron from a half to three-quarters of an inch thick. These vessels were specially intended for service in the tributaries. The other class was composed of five ironclads, intended to be faster and stronger, both for offence and defence, than the Eads gunboats, the *Chillicothe*, *Choctaw*, *Indianola*, *Lafayette*, and *Tuscumbia*.<sup>3</sup>

In November Porter ordered an expedition up the Yazoo. A number of Confederate steamers were known to be plying on this river and its tributaries, and at Yazoo City, eighty miles up the river, a navy-yard had been established, and three powerful war vessels were being built. On December 12th the *Cairo* was sunk by a mine in the Yazoo. The mines were removed and two landing-places secured, but the joint attack of the land and naval

<sup>1</sup> Made by General Breckinridge (see Cap. XVII.).

<sup>2</sup> The *Sumter* was one of Ellet's rams, which had accompanied Farragut's squadron, when it returned below Vicksburg on July 15th.

<sup>3</sup> The *Tuscumbia*, of 565 tons, carried three 11-inch guns in her forward casemate and two 100-pounder rifles in a stern casemate. The *Indianola*, of 442 tons, also had two casemates, and carried two 11-inch guns in one and two 9-inch guns in the other. The *Chillicothe*, of 303 tons, carried two 11-inch guns in one casemate. These three vessels were specially built for the Government. They drew from five to seven feet of water, but "were so weakly built as to be dangerous and comparatively inefficient vessels." The *Choctaw* and *Lafayette* of 1,000 tons each were purchased by the Government and converted into ironclads equipped with rams. They were more powerful vessels than the other three. The *Choctaw* carried three 11-inch guns and one 100-pounder rifle in the forward casemate, two 30-pounder Parrot rifles and two 24-pounder howitzers in two thwartship casemates. The *Lafayette* carried two 11-inch and four 9-inch guns, two 24-pounder howitzers, and two 100-pounder rifles in one casemate (Mahan, 111-14).

forces under General Sherman at the end of the month failed, and the beginning of the next year found the naval force back again in the Mississippi.

McClelland relieving Sherman, made a move up the Arkansas River against Arkansas Post, which was being used as a base from which Confederate vessels could dash out into the Mississippi and interfere with the Federal line of communications up the river. The land force was accompanied by three ironclads and all the light-draught gunboats of Porter's fleet. On January 11th the fort surrendered. The special work assigned to the ironclads of silencing the three heavy guns in the casemates of the fort was most efficiently done.<sup>1</sup> After the surrender the *De Kalb* ascended the White River to a point fifty miles above St. Charles, and destroyed the railway depôt on the line to Little Rock, the capital of the State.

By Farragut's withdrawal to New Orleans the Confederates had regained undisputed control of the Mississippi between Vicksburg and Port Hudson. This part of the river was of special importance to the Confederacy, as supplies could be brought from the Trans-Mississippi States down the Red River. Already the Eastern States in the South were largely dependent for their food upon the three Western States, and, if Vicksburg was to be reduced, it was essential that the Federal navy should regain possession of that section of the Mississippi into which the Red River discharges its waters.

On February 2nd, 1863, Porter despatched the *Queen of the West* to run past the batteries and prey upon the Confederate commerce in the lower Mississippi and its tributaries. The ram got safely past Vicksburg and, having replenished her bunkers from a coal barge which was floated down-stream a few nights later, started up the Red River in company with a small steamer, the *De Soto*. But the recklessness of her youthful commander, Colonel C. R. Ellet, quickly caused her loss. Dashing up the river on the 14th in pursuit of three large steamers, of which he had received information, he suddenly found himself under the guns of a battery. The *Queen* ran aground; a shot cut the steam pipe and stopped the engines. A wounded officer was on board, whom it was impossible to move. So the crew, instead of firing the vessel, left her to the Confederates and made their escape to the *De Soto*.

But a still more disastrous result was to follow from Ellet's rashness and lack of due preparation. On the night of February 12th the ironclad *Indianola* had run past the batteries to join the *Queen* in her raid. Having gone down to the mouth of the Red

<sup>1</sup> For Sherman's unsuccessful attack at Chickasaw Bluffs and McClelland's expedition to Arkansas Post, see Cap. XVII.

River, her captain, hearing that a Confederate squadron was coming to attack him, retired up-river, but on the night of the 24th was overtaken by the pursuing squadron, which consisted of the captured *Queen*, a ram and two small steamers, and after a sharp engagement was forced to surrender his vessel, which was in a sinking condition. The *Indianola* did not long remain in Confederate hands. For a dummy monitor sent down the river two nights later as a joke by Porter so alarmed the Confederates on board the prize that they set her on fire. But the river between Vicksburg and Port Hudson was again under the control of the Confederates.

By this time conditions were favourable for another advance up the river by the Gulf squadron, and after the Federals had lost control of the river below Vicksburg by the capture of the *Queen of the West* and the *Indianola*, Farragut judged that the time had come for his fleet to attempt to recover possession of that portion of the river. But the task was much more formidable than in the previous year. During the interval the Confederates had established powerful batteries at Port Hudson. This position was a strong one. The town lies on the east bank just below a sharp bend of the river. The bluffs beginning at the bend extend a mile and a half down-stream, and are of a height of from eighty to hundred feet. Just below the bend a spit runs out from the west bank opposite the town. Along the bluffs nineteen heavy guns were mounted at different points, and in the ensuing action a considerable number of field guns also took part.

On March 14th Farragut appeared below Port Hudson with the *Hartford*, *Richmond*, *Mississippi*, *Monongahela*, and three gunboats. Each of the larger vessels, with the exception of the *Mississippi*, took with them a gunboat secured on the port-side to protect these smaller vessels from the heavy fire of the batteries. The *Essex* and some mortar schooners were to remain below and cover the passage of the fleet by their fire. At 10 p.m. the ships got under weigh. The *Hartford* with the *Albatross* led and ran past the batteries without suffering serious injury, though the flagship narrowly escaped running aground. None of the other vessels were successful in the attempt. The *Richmond* had her safety-valves damaged by a shot, and losing her motive power, had to be carried down-stream by her consort. The *Monongahela* ran aground and, when at last she got off, her engines ceased to move owing to a crank-pin being heated, and she drifted down-stream. The *Mississippi* ran hard aground and had to be set on fire by her crew. But in spite of this partial failure Farragut with his two vessels was again in possession of the river between Port Hudson and Vicksburg, and the mouth of the Red River was closed to the Confederates. Having only a fraction of his fleet with him,



Farragut called upon Porter for reinforcements. In that admiral's temporary absence on a Bayou expedition, General A. W. Ellet<sup>1</sup> commanding the rams of Porter's fleet assumed the responsibility of sending down two of them, the *Lancaster* and *Switzerland*, to join Farragut. The two rams started down-river on the night of the 24th, but the sun had risen before they reached the batteries. The *Switzerland* got safely past, though repeatedly hulled and receiving two shots in her boilers, but the *Lancaster* was sunk.

In the meantime Porter above Vicksburg had made two unsuccessful attempts to turn the right flank of the Vicksburg defences by the Yazoo.<sup>2</sup> When Grant determined to put his army across the river below Vicksburg, the co-operation of the fleet was required to silence the batteries at Grand Gulf. Porter agreed to run past Vicksburg on the night of April 16th. As the sole object of the fleet was to get past the batteries with the smallest possible loss, every precaution was taken to prevent the enemy from seeing or hearing the fleet, as it passed. Each vessel was to take down on her starboard side a coal barge in order that the fleet might not be hampered by want of fuel in its operations below Vicksburg. Seven ironclads were selected for the expedition, which was accompanied by three transports laden with stores. Though the Confederates quickly discovered the ships and poured in a heavy fire as they passed, the fleet got safely by with the loss of one transport and one coal barge. On the night of the 22nd six more transports laden with stores ran past the batteries with the loss of one of their number.

When the land and naval forces were united below Vicksburg, the next step was for the navy to silence the guns of Grand Gulf, after which the troops were to cross in the transports and storm the works. To resist this attack the Confederates had two batteries of four guns each about three-quarters of a mile apart.<sup>3</sup> The upper battery was close to the water's edge, about seventy-five feet above the stream. But the bluffs, on which the lower battery was mounted, were about 300 yards distant from the river-bank. On the morning of the 29th the fleet steamed down the river. Four vessels were assigned to attack the lower battery, whilst the other three were to deal with the upper one. The lower battery was silenced, and then the efforts of all the vessels were concentrated against the other. But, as at Fort Donelson, it proved too hard a task for the ships to silence guns which could bring

<sup>1</sup> A. W. Ellet was the younger brother, and C. R. Ellet, the unlucky commander of the *Queen of the West*, the son of the creator of the ram fleet.

<sup>2</sup> For the naval expeditions by way of the Yazoo Pass and Steele's Bayou, see Cap. XVII.

<sup>3</sup> Besides the heavier guns in these two batteries, there were five light rifled guns in different parts of the Confederate works.

a plunging fire upon them from a commanding height. After an engagement of over four hours' duration, Grant and Porter decided that it was impossible to carry the works from the river. The troops were marched still further down-stream, and the ships withdrew out of range up-stream. That night they ran past the batteries and rejoined the army below.

With the land forces safely established on the east bank, the main work of the navy was done, but it continued to render valuable assistance till the end of the operations against Vicksburg and Port Hudson. The ships which had remained above Vicksburg took part on April 30th in Sherman's demonstration against Haines' Bluff. Farragut patrolled the river between the mouth of the Red River and Port Hudson, and prevented reinforcements being sent across to Port Hudson from General Taylor in Louisiana. Porter ascended the Red River with three ironclads and some smaller vessels, and without encountering any opposition reached Alexandria early in May. This movement was in co-operation with the advance of General Banks' army overland upon the same place as a preliminary to undertaking the siege of Port Hudson.

During that siege the *Essex* and six mortar-boats kept up a constant bombardment and series of engagements with the water-batteries. Porter on his return from the Red River, finding that the Confederates had abandoned Haines' Bluff, sent an expedition up the Yazoo to capture Yazoo City. The Confederate commander set fire to the navy-yard and three war steamers on the stocks, and abandoned the city.

On May 22nd Porter's fleet below Vicksburg engaged the water-batteries in co-operation with Grant's attack on the land front. On the 27th the *Cincinnati*, which had remained above Vicksburg, was sunk in an engagement with a hill battery at the northern end of the Confederate lines. After Grant formally invested Vicksburg and established his depôt of supplies on the Yazoo River, the chief duty of the navy was to keep open the line of communications up the Mississippi and prevent the Confederates interfering from the banks with the free passage of the store transports up and down the river.

On June 7th the Confederate general, Taylor, attacked a brigade of coloured troops holding Milliken's Bend. This force was driven in great confusion under the river-bank, and only saved from destruction by the presence of the *Choctaw*, whose fire compelled the Confederates to retire. A similar service was rendered on July 4th by the *Tyler* to the garrison of Helena, which was attacked by a greatly superior force under General Holmes. The commander of the gunboat placed her in such a position that her broadside played upon the enemy, who was advancing to the

attack, whilst with her bow and stern guns she raked the Confederate artillery, which was posted above and below the town. It was largely owing to the assistance thus rendered that Holmes was beaten off with heavy loss.

Shortly after the fall of Vicksburg, the *De Kalb*, when ascending the Yazoo, was sunk by a mine. She was the third of the Eads gunboats to be lost.<sup>1</sup>

Turning from the inland waters of the West to the coastline of the East (Map XII.), it will be noted that the main duty of the Federal navy was to enforce the blockade. For that purpose it was found to be more effective to seize a port and hold it with one or two vessels than to watch it with a considerably larger force from the sea.

The first operation which the Federals undertook aimed at securing control of the inland waters of North Carolina, viz. Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds. In August an expedition was sent to seize Hatteras Inlet. The two forts guarding the inlet were bombarded by the naval squadron under Flag-Officer Stringham, and on the 29th the Federals were in possession of the best sea entrance to the North Carolina Sounds.<sup>2</sup> It was not, however, till the following year that any real use was made of the position thus gained.

In January, 1862, a large expedition sailed under the command of General Burnside and Flag-Officer Goldsborough. The objective of this expedition was Roanoke Island, which divides Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds. The island was defended by five forts mounting thirty-two heavy guns,<sup>3</sup> and a squadron of seven very weak gunboats, known as the "Mosquito Fleet." On February 7th the fleet silenced the batteries, and the land forces were disembarked the same day. The next day the entrenchments were carried and the whole garrison captured. On the 10th the Mosquito Fleet was attacked and destroyed.

This victory gave the Federals complete control of the Sounds. On March 12th the greater part of Burnside's force started for Newberne on the Neuse River, the second commercial city in North Carolina,<sup>4</sup> which was captured on the 14th. On April 26th Fort Macon, commanding the channel from the Atlantic to Beaufort, North Carolina, was reduced. The Federals were thus firmly established on the coast of North Carolina.

At the end of October, 1861, a strong expedition under Major-General T. W. Sherman and Flag-Officer Du Pont sailed for the South Carolina coast. Their objective was Port Royal, which commanded the approach to Beaufort, South Carolina, lying some

<sup>1</sup> The other two were the *Cairo*, sunk by a mine in the Yazoo, December 12th, 1862, and the *Cincinnati*, sunk in action with the Vicksburg batteries, May 27th, 1863.

<sup>2</sup> I B. & L., 632-3.

<sup>3</sup> I B. & L., 645.

<sup>4</sup> I B. & L., 651.



miles up the river of the same name. Port Royal itself was defended by two forts mounting forty-three guns and three very weak gunboats. On November 7th the fleet attacked the forts, and after a spirited engagement forced their evacuation during the afternoon; on the 9th Beaufort was occupied, and the Federals thus secured one of the finest harbours on the Atlantic coast.<sup>1</sup>

When Virginia seceded, the Federal officer in command at Norfolk abandoned the navy-yard after setting fire to the ships there. Amongst these vessels was the *Merrimac*, a 40-gun frigate of 3,500 tons, one of the six screw-frigates which, constructed in 1855, were regarded at the time as the finest vessels in the United States Navy.<sup>2</sup> The *Merrimac* sank before the flames had done their work, and in the summer she was raised and rebuilt by the Confederates as an ironclad. Mr. Mallory, the Confederate Secretary of the Navy, had at once recognised the uselessness of building wooden vessels to contend against the superior numbers of the Federal navy. But believing that "invulnerability might compensate for numerical inequality," he had turned his attention to the construction of armoured vessels.<sup>3</sup> The *Merrimac* was the first of the Confederate ironclads, and the others subsequently built were modelled upon her. She was cut down to the water-line, and on her hull was constructed amidships a rectangular casemate 170 feet long. The sides of this casemate, which was rounded at both ends, were composed of twenty-four inches of wood, over which four inches of iron rolled from rails were laid, and sloped at an angle of forty-five degrees.<sup>4</sup> The iron plating was continued two feet below the water-line. Two 7-inch rifled guns were mounted in this casemate fore and aft, working on pivots, whilst each broadside carried one 6-inch rifled and three 9-inch smooth-bore Dahlgren guns. The pilot-house was at the forward end of the casemate, rising three feet above the deck, and was of solid cast iron.<sup>5</sup> A cast-iron ram projecting four feet was fitted to the stem. The stern of the vessel was almost flush with the water, but forward a light false bow of timber was built on.

The *Merrimac* had several distinct defects. Her motive power was still the same as when she had been in the United States Navy. The engines and boilers had been condemned after her last cruise, and had not been improved by their recent experience. But the mechanical skill and resources of the South were not equal to providing her with a better set. Not more than five knots an hour could be got out of them, and they could not be relied upon for more than six hours at a stretch.<sup>6</sup> She drew

<sup>1</sup> 1 B. & L., 689.

<sup>2</sup> 1 B. & L., 612.

<sup>3</sup> 1 B. & L., 631.

<sup>4</sup> Some accounts say thirty-five degrees (1 B. & L., 717).

<sup>5</sup> 1 B. & L., 717, from the account of Naval Constructor Porter, who was chiefly responsible for the reconstruction of the *Merrimac*.

<sup>6</sup> 1 B. & L., 694.

twenty-two feet of water, and steered so badly that it took thirty to forty minutes to turn her.<sup>1</sup> Her unarmoured ends extended 110 feet of her total length of 280 feet, and the rudder and propeller were quite unprotected.<sup>2</sup> She was manned by a crew of 300 men selected from the land forces, many of whom had had some experience as seamen or gunners. The officers were a very capable set, and the commander, Commodore Buchanan, had had a deservedly high reputation in the United States Navy.

As soon as it was known that Ericsson was constructing for the Federals a rival ironclad, all speed was made to enable the *Merrimac* to deal with the enemy's wooden fleet before she could be encountered by a vessel of her own kind. On March 8th, 1862, accompanied by five small gunboats,<sup>3</sup> she steamed into Hampton Roads (Map VII.). The Federal squadron in those waters was on paper a powerful one. Anchored off Fortress Monroe were two steam frigates, once sister vessels of the *Merrimac*, the *Minnesota*, and *Roanoke*, with the *St. Lawrence*, a sailing frigate of fifty guns. Off Newport News, seven miles further up, lay at anchor the 50-gun frigate *Congress* and 30-gun sloop *Cumberland*, both sailing vessels.

Soon after 1 p.m. the *Congress*, *Cumberland*, and shore batteries opened fire. But the shots glanced harmlessly off the sides of the casemate. When within short range the *Merrimac* opened fire. But Buchanan placed more reliance upon his ram than his guns. Steering straight at the *Cumberland*, he rammed her. The sloop at once began to sink. A huge hole had been made in her side, but her gallant crew refused to surrender, and continued to serve their guns until the vessel sank. The *Congress* slipped her cable and endeavoured to escape, but ran aground. The *Merrimac* took up a position within 150 yards of her, where she could rake her opponent with her whole broadside. The *Congress* was in a desperate plight, as she could only bring two guns to bear on the *Merrimac*, and the other frigates coming up to her help took the ground and could afford no assistance. After an hour's resistance, being on fire in more than one place and having suffered very heavy loss, she surrendered. The Confederates, unable to take possession of their prize, fired red-hot shot into her until she was in flames.

It was now 5 p.m.;<sup>4</sup> nearly two hours of daylight remained, and the *Minnesota*, hard aground, seemed destined to be the next victim. But the pilots on board the *Merrimac* would not venture to take the vessel into the northern channel, where she would have

<sup>1</sup> 1 B. & L., 696.

<sup>2</sup> For a description of the *Merrimac* see the article in 1 B. & L., 693-4, by Colonel Wood, C.S.A., who served on board as a lieutenant; also 1 Wilson, 4-5.

<sup>3</sup> 1 Wilson, 15. Other accounts say only two.

<sup>4</sup> 1 B. & L., 700.

had the *Minnesota* at her mercy, but kept to the southern channel at a distance of nearly a mile from the frigate. Finding it impossible to complete the work of destruction that night, and distrusting the capacity of her engines to stand any further strain, her commander withdrew. She had started a slight leak, and had left her ram in the side of the *Cumberland*.<sup>1</sup> But her armour had kept out every projectile, and there seemed nothing to prevent her returning next morning to destroy the *Minnesota*. But at 9 p.m. on that eventful day the *Monitor* reached Hampton Roads.

In August, 1861, the Washington Navy Board had at last taken alarm at the report of the progress which was being made with the *Merrimac*, and invited designs for the construction of ironclads. In September, after much difficulty, Ericsson persuaded the Navy Board to construct an ironclad after a design of his own. The keel of the *Monitor* was laid on October 25th; she was launched on January 30th, 1862, and turned over to the Government as ready for sea on February 19th.

In the construction of his vessel Ericsson was governed by three main considerations. First, she must be built in a very short space of time, as otherwise the *Merrimac* would have time to destroy the wooden fleet in Hampton Roads and then ravage the Northern seaboard at her pleasure. Secondly, she must be of light draught for use in the shallow waters of the Southern coast. Thirdly, in order to make her invulnerable she must carry a great thickness of armour, and the other two considerations dictated that therefore her guns must be few and possess an all-round fire.

The *Monitor* was Ericsson's solution of these problems. She carried two 11-inch Dahlgren smooth bores in a revolving turret. She was 172 feet long, of 1,000 tons displacement, and drew 10½ feet of water. The hull was almost entirely submerged; there was only two feet of freeboard, and this was protected by five inches of iron. The deck was protected by one inch of iron, and both anchor and propeller were sheltered by the overhang. The anchor being hung in a well forward, could be lowered without a single man being exposed to view. The turret in the centre of the ship, 20 feet in diameter inside and 9 feet high, was protected by eight inches of iron, and revolved upon a central pivot, which was supported upon the ship's bottom. The square pilot-house projected four feet above the deck, was formed of 9-inch blocks of wrought iron held down by 3-inch bolts, was forward of the turret and could barely hold three men. The ventilation was entirely artificial, air being forced into the ship and escaping through the turret, where,

<sup>1</sup> Colonel Wood, in his account, says that the ram was badly secured, and was left in the side of the *Cumberland*. But Naval Constructor Porter says that the ram was so well secured, that though broken in two by striking the *Cumberland*, the fastenings to the vessel were not broken loose (1 B. & L., 717).



in action, the atmosphere was consequently rendered very oppressive and thick. The chief defect in the vessel was that the captain in the pilot-house and the executive officer in the turret were separated, the sole communication between the two being by a speaking-tube. The commander was Lieutenant Worden, the executive officer Lieutenant Greene, and the crew all told, officers and men, numbered fifty-eight.<sup>1</sup>

The *Monitor* left New York in tow of a tug on March 6th. When once at sea her unseaworthy character was quickly demonstrated, and twice within thirty-six hours she narrowly escaped foundering.<sup>2</sup> She entered Hampton Roads by the light of the still blazing *Congress*, and was directed by the commanding officer on the station to take up her position near the *Minnesota* in order to protect her against the attack, which was certain to be made next day. Early on the 9th the *Merrimac* left her anchorage. The presence of the *Monitor* was known. But no misgivings seem to have entered the mind of Lieutenant Jones, who was in temporary command owing to Buchanan having been wounded the previous day. During the night the injuries inflicted in her first engagement had been hastily repaired, but the loss of her smoke-stack had reduced her speed. The engagement between the two ironclads commenced about 8.30 a.m., and continued with one or two lulls till about 1 p.m. For some time the fight was carried on at close quarters, but without the armour of either ship being penetrated. The *Merrimac* had no solid shot on board, whilst that of the *Monitor* was of ordinary cast iron, and the powder charge only 15 lbs., though the gun, as was subsequently proved, could have stood double that charge. The *Monitor* had the great advantage of being faster, nimbler in manœuvre, and of much lighter draught. Early in the engagement Worden made an attempt to ram, hoping to disable his opponent's screw, which, however, he just missed.

Finding that the *Monitor's* turret was invulnerable, Jones determined to leave her and devote himself to the *Minnesota*. But his pilot was in too great dread of the frigate's broadside, and instead of bringing the *Merrimac* within short range, ran her aground.<sup>3</sup> The *Monitor* unsuccessfully attempted to take advantage of this favourable opportunity of ramming her opponent.<sup>4</sup> Getting afloat again, the *Merrimac* in her turn tried to ram, but her defective engines could not get up sufficient speed to make the blow

<sup>1</sup> This account of the *Monitor* is taken from 1 Wilson, 7-11.

<sup>2</sup> 1 B. & L., 723.

<sup>3</sup> 1 B. & L., 718 (account of the *Merrimac's* surgeon).

<sup>4</sup> 1 Wilson, 29. No reference to this episode is made either by Colonel Wood or Lieutenant Greene, the executive officer of the *Monitor*. But it is admitted by the *Merrimac's* surgeon that she ran aground and did not get afloat again for fifteen or twenty minutes.

effective. Soon after the *Monitor* hauled off to shallower water, where the *Merrimac* could not follow, in order to replenish the ammunition in her turret. It was necessary to retire out of action for the purpose, as the turret had to remain stationary whilst the ammunition was being hoisted up through a scuttle in its floor from a second scuttle in the deck below. In about a quarter of an hour the *Monitor* was ready to renew the engagement. The *Merrimac's* gunners now concentrated their fire upon the *Monitor's* pilot-house. At length a shell striking it burst just outside the sight-hole where Worden had stationed himself. It drove in one of the iron blocks, of which the structure was composed, blinding the commander with powder and iron. Believing that the pilot-house was entirely wrecked, Worden gave orders to sheer off. Some time elapsed before the change of command was effected, and when the *Monitor*, now under the command of Lieutenant Greene, again came out to battle, the *Merrimac*, either because she believed her antagonist beaten, or because she no longer dared trust her crazy engines after their severe trial, had withdrawn, and the fight was over.<sup>1</sup>

Fierce and obstinate as had been the contest, the losses and injuries on either side were absurdly small. On neither ship was a single man killed, and the armour of both vessels had proved invulnerable. The *Merrimac* had suffered the more of the two, as her thinner armour was opposed to the heavier shot of the *Monitor*. But though her iron plating was in many places shattered, the wooden backing, though broken, had nowhere been perforated. The *Merrimac* retired to Norfolk to repair her injuries. Commodore Tattnall, now in command,<sup>2</sup> was eager to try conclusions again with the *Monitor*. As soon as his ship was repaired he steamed out into Hampton Roads on April 11th, but the *Monitor* was lying with the rest of the Federal squadron below Fortress Monroe, and refused to leave her shelter. The Federal authorities, content with having neutralised the *Merrimac*, reasonably declined to risk on the issue of a single combat the safety of the sole protector of the Chesapeake, and for a similar reason the Confederate Government forbade Tattnall to go below Fortress Monroe and expose in an unequal combat under the guns of the fortress the one vessel which guarded the James and closed the waterway to Richmond.

Neither of the combatants in this epoch-making battle was destined to have a long life. The doom of the *Merrimac* came

<sup>1</sup> Lieutenant Greene says that the change of commander took up about twenty minutes, that during the interval the *Merrimac*, leaking badly, began to retreat, and that the *Monitor* fired a few shots after her. Colonel Wood says that the *Merrimac* waited for an hour for the *Monitor* to renew the conflict, and then withdrew.

<sup>2</sup> Tattnall assumed command on March 29th (1 B. & L., 706).

first. When Johnston abandoned the Peninsula it was found impossible to take the *Merrimac* up the James, and Tattnall had to destroy her.<sup>1</sup> The *Monitor* did not long survive her foe. Very unwisely she was sent at the end of the year to sea to form part of the squadron blockading Charleston, and on the night of December 30th foundered off Cape Hatteras in a storm.

The naval operations off Charleston (Map XII.) form an interesting commentary upon the ability of ironclads to contend with forts. Charleston harbour was strongly defended. Right in the centre of the narrow entrance lay Fort Sumter, whilst on either flank a number of forts and batteries on Morris and Sullivan's Islands swept the approach. The channel was sown with mines, and a double line of obstructions had been drawn across it from Fort Sumter to Sullivan's Island.<sup>2</sup> The navy was now called upon to perform a very different task to that which Farragut accomplished on the Lower Mississippi, at Port Hudson and Mobile, and signally failed of success. Besides the other defences the Confederates had constructed two small ironclads of the *Merrimac* type, protected with four inches of iron upon a backing of wood, provided with a ram and carrying one four guns and the other six. At the beginning of 1863 the blockading fleet was entirely composed of unarmoured vessels, and early on the morning of January 31st the two ironclads came out under cover of a thick mist to attack the wooden ships. Two Federal vessels were taken by surprise and forced to surrender, but the ironclads returned to the harbour without waiting to secure their prizes.<sup>3</sup>

The success which had attended the *Monitor* caused the Federal Government to form a very exaggerated estimate of the offensive powers of vessels of that type. It was resolved to reinforce the blockading squadron off Charleston with ironclads as fast as they could be built, in the belief that they would be able to destroy the forts and force the surrender of Charleston itself. The *Montauk*, the first ironclad to arrive in the beginning of 1863, was regarded as an improved *Monitor*, and differed in the following details:—The pilot-house was placed above the turret, but was stationary. Her displacement was 1,850 tons. Her turret was protected by 11-inch instead of 8-inch armour. Inside the turret one of the two 11-inch guns had been replaced by a 15-inch gun.<sup>4</sup>

Rear-Admiral Du Pont was in command of the blockading squadron. He was a sailor of the old school, and had little faith

<sup>1</sup> As the *Merrimac*, the Confederate ironclad lives in history, but in the Confederate Naval List she was renamed the *Virginia*.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Wilson, 87. But see 4 B. & L., 67.

<sup>3</sup> That both Federal vessels surrendered is plain from Professor Soley's article (4 B. & L., 28). But the commander of the second Federal vessel rehoisted his colours, as no notice was taken of his surrender.

<sup>4</sup> 1 Wilson, 89.



in the new-fangled ironclads.<sup>1</sup> By way of testing the capabilities of the new battleship, he sent her to engage Fort McAllister in Ossabaw Sound. The result was not encouraging. The ironclad engaged the fort on January 27th and again on February 1st, without success. But her commander, Worden, of *Monitor* fame, succeeded in destroying, on February 28th, the commerce-destroyer *Nashville*.<sup>2</sup> This vessel had run aground a short distance above the line of obstructions drawn below Fort McAllister across the Great Ogeechee River, and lay quite at the mercy of the 15-inch gun of the ironclad, which quickly set her on fire. The Federal Government despatched ironclad after ironclad to Charleston, and on March 30th a more serious and protracted attack was made by three fresh monitors on Fort McAllister, but again without success.<sup>3</sup> In spite of these warnings the Government insisted that Du Pont should fight a pitched battle with the Charleston forts.

Du Pont ordered the attack to be made on April 7th. He had now under his command seven monitors and two other ironclads. One of these latter, the *Keokuk*, was inadequately protected by two inches of armour and carried two 11-inch guns in two casemates. The other, the *New Ironsides*, was a fine ironclad of the *Merrimac* type, but very much more powerful. She was of 3,480 tons, and carried two 150-pound rifled guns and fourteen 11-inch smooth bores in a casemate protected by 4½-inch iron plates in one thickness. The attack, as the fleet commander had foreseen, resulted in failure. His ships only carried into action thirty-four guns against seventy-four mounted in the Confederate batteries, though the Federal artillery was much heavier than that of their opponents. The engagement lasted for over an hour, but Fort Sumter, against which the attack was almost exclusively directed, remained unsilenced, whilst the attacking vessels were so severely handled that the reports of their captains dissuaded the admiral from renewing the attack next day, and during the night the *Keokuk*, which had approached nearer to the forts than any other vessel, sank.<sup>4</sup>

In June Du Pont, having been informed that a formidable ironclad of the *Merrimac* type was building at Savannah, sent two monitors to keep an eye upon her. This ironclad, the *Atlanta*, was originally an English steamer, built on the Clyde, and purchased by the Confederate Commissioners in England. On her arrival at Savannah it was resolved to convert her into an ironclad ram for coast defence. She was reconstructed in Ossabaw Sound. When

<sup>1</sup> 1 Wilson, 91.

<sup>2</sup> The *Nashville* began her career as a commerce-destroyer. She crossed the Atlantic and back again, and made two prizes. Subsequently she was employed as a blockade runner, till destroyed by the *Montauk* (1 Wilson, 165).

<sup>3</sup> 4 B. & L., 29.

<sup>4</sup> For this engagement, see 1 Wilson, 91-5.

the upper works had been removed, a massive platform of timber twenty-seven inches high, and projecting six feet from her sides, was erected upon her hull. This structure was intended to protect her from the ram. On this platform was built a casemate, protected by four inches of iron backed by eighteen inches of wood. In it she carried two 7-inch rifled guns mounted on pivots and three 100-pound rifled guns in broadside. She steamed eight knots an hour, and was regarded by the inhabitants of Savannah as a very powerful vessel. They were destined to be speedily undeceived. She started from Savannah on June 17th, expecting to make short work of the two monitors; but the result was exactly the other way. Only one monitor engaged her, and after an action of fifteen minutes, in which the *Atlanta* fired eight times and her antagonist only five, the Confederate ironclad struck her flag. Her gunners failed to make a single hit, whilst her armour afforded no adequate protection against the projectiles of the monitor's heavier gun.<sup>1</sup>

The Government had determined to recall Du Pont, and put in his place an officer who had more faith in the capabilities of the monitor. His successor was Rear-Admiral Dahlgren, a skilled artilleryman; but he met with no greater success than his predecessor, and after several ineffective attempts, confined his operations to enforcing the blockade. Morris Island was captured and Fort Sumter laid in ruins; but no Federal war vessel entered Charleston Harbour until the garrison was withdrawn in consequence of Sherman's operations.

The unsuccessful attacks of the monitors showed up the inherent defects of that type of vessel when engaged with forts. Though but little susceptible of injury themselves, they were equally incapable of inflicting injury. In Du Pont's words "whatever degree of invulnerability they might have, there was no corresponding quality of destructiveness as against forts."

The Confederate ironclads in Charleston Harbour were no match for the monitors. In the hope of destroying the Federal ironclads by stealth, the Confederates resorted to submersible torpedoes. In February, 1864, the *Housatonic* was sent to the bottom. The submarine which accomplished this feat had lateral fins by which she could be raised or submerged, but carried no reserve of air, and therefore proved the coffin of her successive crews. Five times she had sunk and been raised again.<sup>2</sup> On the sixth occasion she was manned by two army officers and five volunteers. These brave men, knowing that they were going to certain death, successfully performed their task and paid for their success with their lives.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For the *Atlanta* and her capture, see 1 Wilson, 98-100.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Wilson, 104; Morris' *American Navy*, 259.

<sup>3</sup> "Fixed in the hole that it had itself created, sucked in by the enormous inrush of water, was the ill-fated submarine," when discovered some three years later by divers sent

Among the many daring episodes of the war, the destruction of the *Albemarle* by Lieutenant Cushing stands out conspicuously. With a view to recovering the command of the North Carolina Sounds, an ironclad of the *Merrimac* type, the *Albemarle*, was constructed some miles up the Roanoke River. She started down the river on April 18th, 1864, with the artificers still on board. The unusually high water carried her over the obstructions which the Federals had placed across the river to prevent her coming down. Continuing down-stream she encountered two wooden gunboats coming up. She rammed and sank one, and put the other to flight. Thus the control of the Roanoke River was regained by the Confederates, and the Federal garrison in Plymouth, which was besieged by General Hoke, surrendered the next day.

After this prompt though easy success, the commander of the ironclad determined to venture into Albemarle Sound and dispute the control of its waters with a squadron of wooden vessels, which the admiral commanding the North Atlantic Squadron had made haste to despatch there. On May 5th a sharp encounter took place between the *Albemarle* and seven gunboats.<sup>1</sup> The Federals seem to have made but poor use of their numerical superiority, and the combat resolved itself into a duel between the *Albemarle* and the *Sassacus*. The gunboat rammed her opponent, but was considerably damaged in the process, whilst a shot from the *Albemarle* penetrated her boiler. The *Sassacus*, rendered helpless, drifted clear of her antagonist, who withdrew to the river, and the engagement ceased by mutual consent.

The result of this action made it plain that wooden vessels were unequal to the task of destroying the ironclad. No monitor could cross Hatteras Bar and enter the Sounds.<sup>2</sup> Lieutenant Cushing, already distinguished for various daring exploits, now proposed to attack the ram with steam launches. Two boats of this type were expressly constructed at New York, but one of them was lost on the voyage. Cushing took command of the survivor. His plan was to land below Plymouth, off which town the *Albemarle* was lying, carry her by boarding, and take her down-stream before the alarm could be given. On the night of October 27th he ascended the Roanoke.<sup>3</sup> About a mile below Plymouth lay the wreck of the gunboat, which had been sunk in April. Here the Confederates had established a piquet to guard against any surprise. Cushing

down to the *Housatonic* (Burgoyne's *Submarine Navigation*, i. 57). In this work a very interesting account is given of the attempts made during the war at submarine warfare. Mr. Burgoyne describes the *Kookuk*, which was sunk off Charleston, as a submersible: "When submerged to the utmost the turrets and funnel alone showed above water" (i. 62). <sup>1</sup> 4 B. & L., 628. <sup>2</sup> 4 B. & L., 634.

<sup>3</sup> The first attempt was made the previous night, but the launch ran aground and could not be got off till day was at hand (I Wilson, 111).



had intended to "rush" this piquet before it could give the alarm. But the Confederates kept so bad a look-out that the launch stole by unseen. Fortune seemed to favour the enterprise. On a point just below the *Albemarle* the Confederates had been in the habit of lighting fires to prevent a surprise. But on that particular night the fires had burnt low. Cushing was approaching the shore to land his little crew when the alarm was given by a stray dog.<sup>1</sup> The Confederates were immediately on the alert, and the launch was discovered. Seeing that it was useless to land, Cushing made a rush at the *Albemarle*, in the hope of sinking her with his torpedo.<sup>2</sup> On approaching he found her protected by a boom of logs. He backed the launch and charged the boom at full speed. The launch jumped the logs, and he found himself by the side of the ironclad. The torpedo was lowered and fired. The ironclad began to sink. But the launch was damaged beyond possibility of escape. Most of her crew were made prisoners. One man only—her gallant commander—escaped to rejoin the Federal fleet.

The destruction of the *Albemarle* bore immediate fruit. The undisputed control of Albemarle Sound was restored to the Federals, and on the last day of the month Plymouth was recaptured.

Mobile (Map X.) was the most important port held by the Confederates on the Gulf after the fall of New Orleans and the evacuation of Pensacola. The city stands at the head of a bay which is thirty miles long and from six to fifteen miles broad. The main entrance lies between Dauphin Island on the west and Mobile Point on the east, and is nearly three miles broad. But from Dauphin Island a sand-bank runs out, narrowing the deep water channel to less than 2,000 yards. On Dauphin Island was Fort Gaines, too far distant, however, to constitute a serious obstacle to a fleet trying to enter the Bay. On Mobile Point was Fort Morgan, mounting forty heavy guns with seven others mounted in a water battery thrown up close alongside. Another entrance into the Bay from Mississippi Sound was protected by Fort Powell, mounting six guns, but was not practicable for ships of heavy draught. A line of piles had been driven in from Fort Gaines across the sand-bank to prevent any light vessel from entering, and where the line of obstructions ceased a triple line of mines extended as far as a red buoy, which was little over 200 yards from the guns on Mobile Point.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> I Wilson, 112. Cushing simply says: "Just as I was sheering in close to the wharf a hail came from the ironclad, and was repeated" (4 B. & L., 636). Captain Warley, commander of the *Albemarle*, is also silent on the subject of the dog's barking, and says: "The launch was quite close to us when we hailed, and the alarm was given" (4 B. & L., 642).

<sup>2</sup> The torpedo was a spar torpedo. In the infancy of torpedo warfare the torpedo was fitted to a spar, which could be run out from the stem of the vessel.

<sup>3</sup> These details are taken from Mahan's *Gulf and Inland Waters*, Cap. VIII., whose account has been closely followed for the whole engagement.

This narrow passage had been left for the benefit of blockade runners, and by it alone could a Federal fleet enter the Bay.

Farragut, who had resumed the command of the Western Gulf Blockading Squadron in January, 1864, was anxious to take possession of Mobile Bay as quickly as possible. He knew that Mobile itself could not be reduced except by a considerable land force, but he also knew that the Confederates were building ironclads in the river above the city, and he wished to gain possession of the Bay before these formidable antagonists should be completed. Once in possession of the Bay he could prevent the ironclads from being brought over the Dog River Bar, and enforce the blockade more effectively than was possible from without; but to accomplish his purpose he required the co-operation of one brigade of troops to reduce the forts, after he had run past and isolated them, and of at least one ironclad to aid his wooden vessels in their encounter with the works on Mobile Point.<sup>1</sup> The task was a far harder one than that which he had so successfully surmounted two years earlier in the Lower Mississippi. Then the fall of New Orleans was inevitable, if once the fleet passed the Mississippi forts. But Mobile City was impregnable against a purely naval attack, and to maintain himself inside the Bay it was necessary for the forts commanding the entrance to be reduced. But the Government turned a deaf ear to his entreaties. The ironclads were required for blockading purposes at other points, and no land force could be spared, as the ill-fated Red River Expedition absorbed all the available troops in the Department.

Meanwhile the Confederates were pushing on the construction of their great ironclad, the *Tennessee*, with all speed. She was unquestionably the most powerful war vessel ever possessed by the Confederacy. Her hull had been constructed in 1863 at Selma, 150 miles up the Alabama River, and, when completed, was towed down to Mobile to receive the iron plating specially prepared in the rolling mills at Atlanta. Her length was 209 feet, and, when fully armed, she drew 14 feet of water. Midway between bow and stern the casemate, 79 feet long and 29 feet broad, was constructed of 25 inches of wood. Over this was laid the iron plating, 6 inches thick at the forward end and 5 inches everywhere else. She carried six guns, a 7.12-inch R.M.L. at each end and two 6-inch R.M.L. on either broadside. A solid knuckle, formed by continuing the sides of the casemate two feet below the waterline, and then inclining them inwards to meet the hull, protected the vessel against ramming. Covered with four inches of iron, the knuckle, when continued round the bows, became a ram. But powerful as was the vessel thus constructed, she still had two very grave defects. Her engines, which had been transferred from a

<sup>1</sup> 4 B. & L., 379.

river steamer, were too weak, and could not do more than six knots an hour on the day of battle; and her steering chains, instead of being carried under the armoured deck, ran over it, and were thus exposed to the fire of an opponent. In March, 1864, the *Tennessee* was ready for service, but it was two months later before she was got over the Dog River Bar and brought into the lower bay. Her commander, Admiral Buchanan, had hoped to take the blockading fleet by surprise, and intended on May 19th to cross the outer bar and attack Farragut's wooden vessels. But the ironclad was found to be aground when the anchor was weighed. Her presence in the Bay was discovered, and Buchanan contented himself, when the tide floated off his ship, with taking her down to Fort Morgan.

By August Farragut's repeated demands for troops and ironclads had been at length answered. On the 3rd General Gordon Granger with a division of troops appeared off Dauphin Island, and four monitors had either arrived or were on the point of doing so. Two of these, the *Chickasaw* and *Winnebago*, came from the Mississippi; they carried four 11-inch guns in two turrets protected by eight and a half inches of armour. The other two, the *Tecumseh* and *Manhattan*, came from the Atlantic coast, and were larger vessels, carrying two 15-inch guns in a single turret protected by ten inches of armour. It had been intended to make a joint attack on the 4th, and on that day Granger disembarked his troops, but Farragut was unable to co-operate, as all his vessels had not yet arrived. On the morning of the 5th the fleet steamed in to attack. As at Port Hudson, the wooden vessels were lashed together in pairs. The monitors formed a starboard squadron slightly in advance of the *Brooklyn*, the leading wooden vessel.

The first gun was fired at 6.47 a.m.,<sup>1</sup> and at 7.15 a.m. the action became general. The *Brooklyn* began to overhaul the monitors, which were steaming slowly to give full effect to their fire; and her captain, not wishing to pass them, stopped her engines and then began to back.<sup>2</sup> Orders were signalled from the *Hartford*, next in line, to go on. But the *Brooklyn* continued backing, and, as her bows fell off towards the fort, threatened to block the channel. The *Hartford* had stopped her engines, but the flood tide was carrying her on to the leader, and the *Richmond* was coming up close behind. A collision seemed inevitable. In the meanwhile a terrible disaster had overtaken the *Tecumseh*, leading the ironclad

<sup>1</sup> 4 B. & L., 398 (note).

<sup>2</sup> 4 B. & L., 387. It seems quite plain from the narrative of Lieutenant Kinney, who was acting as signal-officer on board the *Hartford*, that the *Brooklyn* stopped before the disaster which overtook the *Tecumseh*. After the ironclad sank, Farragut signalled to the *Brooklyn* to go on, but the order was not obeyed. Mahan (p. 232) states that the *Brooklyn* stopped after the *Tecumseh* sank, and attributes her action to the appearance of "certain objects in the water ahead, which were taken for the moment for buoys or torpedoes."



squadron. Her captain seems to have considered that his special task was to engage the *Tennessee*, which with three gunboats was stationed just above the mine field in the centre of the channel, from which position a raking fire was poured into the attacking fleet. As the *Tennessee* shifted her position slightly to the west, the *Tecumseh* passed on the wrong side of the red buoy<sup>1</sup> in pursuit, was struck by a mine, and immediately sank.

It was at this crisis of the battle that Farragut took the lead of his fleet. There was no room to pass the *Brooklyn* in the main channel. Though he had just seen the *Tecumseh* sink, he ordered full speed ahead and steered to the west of the red buoy. As the *Hartford* crossed the fatal line, the primers of the mines were heard snapping under her bottom, but no explosion took place, and the flagship passed out of the range of the fort into the Bay.<sup>2</sup> But she had still to reckon with the *Tennessee* and the gunboats.<sup>3</sup> The latter retreated as the *Hartford* advanced, and kept up a raking fire, which inflicted heavy loss. The *Tennessee* waited, intending to ram as soon as her opponent came within reach. But the *Hartford*, being the faster vessel, easily avoided her thrust, and continued up the Bay in pursuit of the gunboats. The *Tennessee* followed her for some little distance; then Buchanan suddenly changed his plan, and turning his ship steamed down to attack the other wooden vessels.

The *Tennessee* ran past the Federal line, exchanging broadsides with the successive vessels, but without ramming.<sup>4</sup> The *Monongahela* made a gallant effort to ram the ironclad, and struck her a slanting blow, which inflicted no injury. Last of the line was the *Onaida*, crippled by a shot in her boiler. In her the *Tennessee* hoped to find an easy victim, but the approach of the monitors drove her off under the guns of Fort Morgan.

Whilst the ram was running past the rest of the Federal fleet, the flagship and her consort, the *Metacomet*, were disposing of the Confederate gunboats. The *Metacomet*, the fastest vessel in the fleet, cut loose from the *Hartford*, and going in pursuit of the *Selma*, whose fire had been much the most deadly, compelled her to surrender. Of the other two gunboats, one was so disabled by the

<sup>1</sup> Farragut had issued a special order, directing his captains to pass to the east of the red buoy.

<sup>2</sup> Mahan suggests as a probable explanation that "the tin torpedoes were poorly lacquered and corroded rapidly under the sea-water," whilst "those which sunk the *Tecumseh* had been [there is good reason to believe] planted but two or three days before."

<sup>3</sup> The three Confederate gunboats were paddle-wheel steamers, unarmoured except round the boilers. They were the *Selma*, carrying four guns, and the *Gaines* and the *Morgan* carrying six each.

<sup>4</sup> The *Tennessee* apparently tried to ram the *Monongahela*, but failed. It does not seem that she tried to ram any of the other vessels. She certainly avoided the first three, the *Brooklyn*, *Richmond*, and *Lackawanna* (4 B. & L., 393).

*Hartford's* fire that she was run aground under the guns of the fort and afterwards set on fire by her crew ; the other retreated into the shallow water near the fort, and, when night came, escaped to Mobile.

It was now a little after 8.30 a.m. The Federal fleet, having successfully accomplished the passage, anchored about four miles above the fort. It was not expected that the *Tennessee* would come out from under the shelter of Fort Morgan, and the crews were just sitting down to breakfast, when the ironclad was seen steaming up for battle. It was a counsel of despair, though the *Tennessee* had suffered but little thus far. As she approached, Farragut signalled to his fastest vessels to try to run her down. He was determined not to let the ram escape, whatever it might cost him. First the *Monongahela* and then the *Lackawanna* rammed the *Tennessee*, but both suffered more damage than they inflicted. Next came the turn of the *Hartford*. The two admirals approached as if they would ram bow to bow. But at the last moment the *Tennessee* slightly changed her course. The vessels grazed each other as they passed.<sup>1</sup> The *Hartford* fired her port broadside of seven 9-inch guns into her opponent, but, though the ships were only ten feet apart, no harm was done the *Tennessee*. The Confederate gunners only succeeded in replying with one gun, and this was the last shot fired by them during the action. The *Hartford* was preparing to ram again, when she came into violent collision with the *Lackawanna*, which was also seeking to ram the *Tennessee* a second time. The monitors now joined in the fight. The *Chickasaw* hung close under the *Tennessee's* stern, pounding her with her 11-inch guns. The fate of the Confederate ironclad was now settled. Her smoke-stack had been shot away and her speed reduced to barely four knots an hour.<sup>2</sup> The forward and aft port shutters had been jammed and her two heaviest guns thus rendered useless, whilst the broadside guns could not be brought to bear. The rudder chains had been cut by a shot from the *Chickasaw*, and the ship would no longer answer her helm. Buchanan had been severely wounded. The *Ossipee* was approaching to ram, and the other wooden vessels were getting into position for the same purpose. At 10 a.m. the *Tennessee* struck her flag, not having been able to fire a shot for over twenty minutes, and the battle of Mobile Bay came to an end. The fruits of victory were quickly gathered in. Fort Powell was evacuated the same night. Fort Gaines surrendered on the 7th and Fort Morgan on the 23rd, and the whole Bay passed under the control of the Federal fleet.

The capture of nearly all the important ports on the Confederate coast, with the exception of Charleston and Wilmington, enabled

<sup>1</sup> I Wilson, 130.

<sup>2</sup> 4 B. & L., 404.

the Federal Government to concentrate for the two expeditions against Fort Fisher in December, 1864, and January, 1865, "the largest fleet ever assembled under one command in the history of the American Navy." It numbered nearly sixty vessels and carried over 600 guns.<sup>1</sup> Four monitors, the *New Ironsides*, and three of the largest steam frigates in the service were included. Admiral Porter was appointed to the command of this great fleet, owing to the ill health of Farragut, which obliged him to decline the command originally designed for him.<sup>2</sup>

The remarkable success which attended the Confederate commerce-destroyers was largely due to the neglect of the Federal Government to safeguard the principal trade routes. Small as was the number of the cruisers, the Federal merchant marine was driven from the seas and carrying trade destroyed. By far the most famous of these cruisers was the *Alabama*. At the outset of the war the Confederate Government, recognising that it was impossible with its very limited resources to build fast cruisers, sent agents to purchase vessels in Europe. Captain Bulloch, of the Confederate navy, arrived in England in June, 1861, and made a contract with the firm of Lairds, of Birkenhead, for the construction of the *Alabama*. Owing to the dilatoriness of the British Government in acting upon the representations of the Federal minister in London, the *Alabama* was allowed to leave port on a pretended trial trip on July 29th, 1862. Off the Azores she was met by another steamer with her outfit and crew, and commissioned as a Confederate cruiser by Captain Raphael Semmes on August 24th. Her cruise lasted for twenty-two months, and during that period she captured sixty-eight prizes. She began by capturing ten whalers in the neighbourhood of the Azores, then crossed the Atlantic and captured twelve corn vessels off the Newfoundland banks. Coming south, she captured the mail steamer *Ariel* off Hayti, and then learning of Banks' intended expedition against Galveston, Semmes crossed the Gulf, hoping to work havoc among the transports.<sup>3</sup> He found a naval squadron off Galveston, and the *Hatteras* gave chase to the *Alabama*. Having drawn his pursuer several miles away from the rest of the squadron, Semmes turned upon her, and in fifteen minutes compelled her to surrender, as she was in a sinking condition (January 11th, 1863). The *Hatteras* was a converted river excursion boat, and no match at all for the *Alabama*.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 4 B. & L., 655.

<sup>2</sup> For the operations leading up to the capture of Fort Fisher, see Cap. XXV.

<sup>3</sup> Galveston had been occupied by the Federals in October, 1862, but recaptured January 1st, 1863, by a force under General Magruder.

<sup>4</sup> The *Alabama* was built for speed rather than battle. She carried one 100-pounder rifled gun pivoted forward, one 8-inch smooth-bore on a pivot aft, and six 32-pounders. The *Hatteras* carried four 32-pounders and one 12-pounder smooth-bores, with two



After this victory Semmes judged it wise to leave home waters, and steered into the central Atlantic till he reached the junction of the African and South American trade routes. Following the latter southwards to the Brazilian coast, he made twenty-four prizes. Having spent two months in those waters, he crossed the Atlantic to Cape Town; thence he betook himself across the Indian Ocean to the China Sea. Making but few prizes in his eastern voyage, he returned back down the east coast of Africa to Cape Town, and then went up the Atlantic to Cherbourg, entering that port on June 11th, 1864. Eight days later, having hastily refitted his vessel, he came out to fight the Federal warship *Kearsarge*.<sup>1</sup> The two ships were not unequally matched, but the Federal was in much better fighting trim, and after an hour's action the *Alabama* struck her flag, and immediately sank. It is curious to notice that this, the most famous of the commerce-destroyers, never entered a Confederate port.

Next to the *Alabama* the *Florida* was the most successful of the commerce-destroyers. Built in England and designed as a warship, she left Liverpool in March, 1862. Having taken on board her armament in West Indian waters, she ran the blockade into Mobile. There she remained four months, completing her equipment and collecting a crew, and on January 15th, 1863, ran out to sea through the blockading squadron.<sup>2</sup> Her principal cruising ground was in the North Atlantic between Brazil and the Federal States. She captured a mail steamer when within ten miles of the Delaware coast, and took in all thirty-seven prizes;<sup>3</sup> but on October 7th, 1864, she was attacked, when totally unprepared, by the Federal sloop *Wachusett*, in the neutral harbour of Bahia, and in violation of international law captured.

The *Shenandoah* was another English-built cruiser, which met with considerable success. Originally built for the Bombay trade, she was secured by the indefatigable Bulloch, and left England in October, 1864. Her chief objective was to be the whaling fleet in the North Pacific. Being very shorthanded at the commencement of the voyage, she was obliged to stop at Melbourne, and there completed her crew. It was not till June, 1865, that she reached the Behring Sea. Having no authentic news that the war was

30-pounder and one 20-pounder rifles. The weight of her broadside was not half that of the *Alabama* (1 Wilson, 154).

<sup>1</sup> The *Kearsarge* had her engines protected by a 6-foot belt of armour improvised from chain cable, but carried one less gun than the *Alabama*, two 11-inch smooth-bores, one 30-pounder rifle, and four 32-pounder guns. Her 11-inch guns gave her a marked superiority, and her gunpowder was in a much better condition than that on board the *Alabama*. The weight of the Federal broadside was 366 pounds, that of the Confederate 305. Moreover, the crew of the *Alabama* during their long cruise had received no artillery practice. The fight lasted one hour and two minutes. The action commenced at 10.57 a.m., and the *Alabama* sank at 12.24 p.m. (4 B. & L., 616-621). For the details of the *Alabama's* voyage, 1 Wilson, 152-164, has been followed.

<sup>2</sup> 4 B. & L., 595.

<sup>3</sup> 1 Wilson, 151.

over, her commander fell upon the whaling fleet, and in a week captured twenty-five prizes.<sup>1</sup>

For the damage done by these three cruisers the British Government in 1872 was condemned by the Geneva Arbitration Board to pay 15½ million dollars to the United States.

The successes achieved by the Southern commerce-destroyers had no effect upon the result of the war. Far otherwise was it with the blockade of the Confederate coasts maintained by the Federal navy. This blockade of over 3,000 miles of coast-line had two objects: to prevent the export of cotton, and to stop the import of military stores. At first, with the limited number of vessels at the disposal of the Federal Government, it was impossible to enforce the blockade strictly, and all sorts of vessels, sailing as well as steamers, went in and out of the Confederate ports. But as the great exertions of the North rapidly increased the size of their fleet by buying up all kinds of vessels and converting them into warships, the difficulty of running the blockade became increasingly great. The unseaworthy character of the hastily improvised ships, which formed the blockading squadrons, necessitated the occupation of Southern ports, which might serve as bases for refitting the vessels thus employed,<sup>2</sup> and at the same time the occupation of such positions tended to interrupt the water intercourse between the chief centres of population in the South, a large proportion of which were on or near the sea-coast. By the middle of 1862 blockade-running was practically confined to steamers specially built, and all the efforts of the Federal navy failed to prevent blockade-running as carried on by these vessels from being a profitable speculation. It was the occupation of the Confederate ports, much more than the watch kept by the Federal cruisers, which put an end to the blockade-running. The occupation of Mobile Bay in August, 1864, closed what was virtually the last port on the Gulf,<sup>3</sup> and with the fall of Charleston and Wilmington early in 1865 the last ports on the Atlantic coast were lost. The blockade of the coast-line, thus conducted, in conjunction with the conquest of the Mississippi, starved the Confederacy into submission.

<sup>1</sup> 4 B. & L., 599.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Wilson, 184.

<sup>3</sup> Though the Confederates still retained Galveston on the Gulf, the conquest of the Mississippi prevented that port from being of any service to the eastern half of the Confederacy.

## CHAPTER XXVII

### FALL OF RICHMOND AND COLLAPSE OF THE CONFEDERACY

Richmond during the winter—Lee appointed Commander-in-Chief—Difficulties of Lee's task—Re-election of Abraham Lincoln—Slavery abolished by the Federal Congress—Federal movement against the Boydton road—Confederate attack on Fort Stedman—Fort Stedman in the hands of the Confederates—Fort Stedman recaptured—Grant prepares to strike in force the Southside Railway—Instructions given to Sheridan and the Corps commanders—Lee's counterpreparations—Skirmishing on the 29th and 30th March—Lee's failure to crush Warren's Corps—Fitzhugh Lee and Pickett drive back Sheridan's cavalry—Battle of Five Forks—The Confederate left turned—Warren relieved of the command of the 5th Corps—General assault on the Petersburg lines—Lee's lines broken—Death of A. P. Hill—Capture of Forts Gregg and Whitworth—Lee abandons Petersburg—Surrender of Petersburg and Richmond—Grant's pursuit—Battle of Sailor's Creek—Surrender of Ewell's Corps—The Confederates cross the Appomattox—Humphreys holds Lee fast—Sheridan intercepts Lee's retreat—Communications between Grant and Lee—The Confederates vainly attempt to drive Sheridan out of their path—Surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia—Collapse of the Confederacy—Surrender of Johnston's army—Wilson's successful expedition—Fall of Selma and Mobile—Surrender of Taylor and of Kirby Smith—Capture of President Davis.

THE winter of 1864-5 was a period of unrelieved gloom and depression in Richmond. Grant had been steadily extending his lines on the south side of the Appomattox towards the left (Map VIII.). It was certain that, as soon as the return of spring rendered military operations possible, a determined attempt would be made by the Federals to secure possession of the Southside Railway. Lee would be compelled to extend his lines still farther to the right, and sooner or later the Confederate line of defence must become so thin that it could be broken at some point or other. The limits of conscription had been reached;<sup>1</sup> the refusal of the Federal Government in 1864 to exchange prisoners prevented their opponents from filling the vacancies in their ranks; and the already scanty numbers were being diminished by an increasing stream of deserters.

In the Confederate capital the stock of provisions was running short. Lee's troops were dependent for their supplies upon the

<sup>1</sup> Conscription, which in 1862 applied to men between eighteen and thirty-five, had been gradually extended, until it embraced all between the ages of seventeen and fifty, "robbing alike the cradle and the grave."



two railways, the Southside and Danville lines, which alone remained open; the rolling stock upon these lines was so worn out as to be inadequate to the heavy work now put upon it.<sup>1</sup> There was not enough bread in Virginia to feed Lee's army, and meat had to be imported from abroad. When the capture of Fort Fisher closed the port of Wilmington, starvation stared the Confederate armies in the face.<sup>2</sup> It is probable, indeed, that a considerable store of provisions could have been brought into Richmond and Petersburg from the country districts if the Government had been able to pay for them in gold; but the farmers refused to take the worthless Confederate paper money in payment. Longstreet went so far as to suggest the desperate expedient, that the Government should impress gold as well as bread and mealstuffs.<sup>3</sup> But the suggestion was not adopted.

In various States the people were beginning more or less openly to dissociate themselves from the cause of their leaders. In Richmond itself there was a growing feeling of discontent with President Davis' administration. An Act of Congress was passed appointing a Commander-in-Chief of all the Confederate forces in the field. This Act took out of Davis' hands the control of the war and invested the Commander-in-Chief with virtually dictatorial powers.<sup>4</sup> Sorely against his will Davis was obliged to ratify the Act and appoint Lee to the post. The substitution of General Breckinridge for Mr. Seddon as Secretary of War was another concession which the sorely tried President had to make to public opinion.

The task, which Lee in his new position had to face, was one of stupendous difficulty. In no quarter was any gleam of hope to be seen. In the Shenandoah Valley Early had been hopelessly beaten; and Sheridan was free either to operate against Lynchburg and secure one of Lee's two lines of retreat, or else to join forces with Grant and still further increase the overwhelming superiority of the Federal armies round Richmond.

In Tennessee Hood had suffered a crushing defeat, and an advance into South-West Virginia or North Carolina by Thomas' victorious troops might be looked for. Sherman had occupied Savannah on December 21st; and whether he transported his army by sea to City Point or marched overland to effect a junction with Grant, his army would shortly have to be reckoned with.

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 311.

<sup>2</sup> In February the Commissariat arrangements had been so far improved that three and a half million rations of meat and two and a half million rations of bread had been collected in the reserve depôts at Richmond, Lynchburg, Danville, and Greenboro.

<sup>3</sup> President Davis, in a message to Congress in March, proposed to impress the supplies needed for the army, if the owners would not sell.

<sup>4</sup> It does not seem that Lee exercised the powers with which he had been invested, but considered himself as still subordinate to the President.

To meet this overwhelming concentration of force Lee could draw upon no fresh troops. The ill-fed, ill-clad, ill-shod Army of Northern Virginia was practically the only organised army left to the Confederacy. Too late, President Davis recognised the error of tying down that gallant army to the defence of Richmond. It would have been no light matter to abandon the national capital with its arsenals, workshops, and foundries; and its evacuation would have been a heavy blow to the Confederate cause. But at any rate Lee's army, the chief bulwark of that cause, would have been set free to manœuvre in the open field, instead of being cooped up behind entrenchments, where its efficiency as a fighting force was being daily impaired.

Had Davis realised in time that the strength of a nation consists in its armies rather than its cities, the struggle might have been prolonged; and there was always a chance, whilst the Confederate armies remained in the field, that the North, weary of the gigantic efforts which it had been called upon to make, might recognise the independence of the Southern Confederacy. But the re-election of Lincoln to the Presidency by an overwhelming majority in November, 1864, was a proof that the North meant to see the war through. Lincoln's great victory at the polls over the Democratic candidate, General McClellan, was largely due to the successes which Sherman and Sheridan had been winning in Georgia and the Shenandoah Valley, whilst Lee was held to the defence of Richmond and prevented by the mistaken views of his Government from striking a counterblow. Lincoln, encouraged by his re-election, about which he had at one time entertained grave doubts,<sup>1</sup> was confirmed in his determination to continue the war, until the restoration of the Union should be accomplished. He bore no rancour towards the Southern States, and was ready to make peace on the two conditions of the Restoration of the Union and the Emancipation of the Slaves. In this latter point his hand was immensely strengthened by an amendment to the Constitution, passed in Congress by the necessary two-thirds majority on January 31st, 1865, which made Abolition of Slavery a fundamental part of the Constitution.<sup>2</sup>

On February 3rd Lincoln consented to meet informally on board a steamer in Hampton Roads three Confederate commissioners to discuss the possibilities of peace. But it was quickly seen that no common understanding could be arrived at, as the Confederate commissioners made it a *sine quâ non* that the independence of the South should be recognised. The negotiations came to nothing. The sword alone could untie the Gordian knot.

In December Warren had destroyed the Weldon Railway as far

<sup>1</sup> Schouler, 471-2, 478.

<sup>2</sup> This amendment still required to be ratified by three-fourths of the States.

south as Hicksford (Map VII.), forty miles from Petersburg. Information was received that supplies were still being brought by wagon from Hicksford by the Boydton road to Petersburg, and on February 5th Gregg's cavalry division was sent to strike that road at Dinwiddie Court House and interrupt the trains supposed to be upon the road. The cavalry was supported by the 5th Corps and two divisions of the 2nd Corps, now under the command of General Humphreys in place of Hancock, who had been sent to Washington to organise a new 1st Army Corps.

During the winter the Confederates had strengthened and extended their entrenchments on and about Hatcher's Run (Map VIII.). Their entrenched line now reached from Hatcher's Run on the south of the Appomattox to White Oak Swamp on the north of the James, a distance of thirty-seven miles.<sup>1</sup> To protect his extreme right against Warren's threatened advance, Lee concentrated parts of Hill's and Gordon's Corps in the Hatcher's Run entrenchments, and some sharp fighting took place on the 5th and 6th. Warren, advancing to Dabney's Mill, was driven back; and Gregg on reaching the Boydton road found that it was but little used. The chief result of the three days' operations, from February 5th to the 7th, was that the Federals extended their lines as far as the Vaughan road crossing of Hatcher's Run.<sup>2</sup>

Lee after assuming supreme command had quickly decided that to save his army he must abandon Richmond. His intention was to withdraw to Danville (Map VII.), unite with Johnston's force in North Carolina, and attack Sherman before Grant could come to his assistance. But the animals of the artillery and transport trains were in so emaciated a condition as to be useless for heavy work, until the roads should have recovered, and Lee feared lest before he could withdraw his army, Grant might extend so far to the left as to make retreat impossible.<sup>3</sup> He therefore determined to make a sortie in force against the Federal lines near the Appomattox, in the hope that Grant would be compelled to draw back his left to reinforce his right. The task was assigned to Gordon, commanding the 2nd Army Corps, whose reputation as a leader of dash and enterprise had been steadily growing. The point selected for attack was Fort Stedman, about a mile and a half south of the Appomattox, where the main lines of the two armies were but 150 yards apart and the piquet lines only a third of that distance.<sup>4</sup> In addition to the 2nd Corps reinforcements were ordered to Gordon from Hill's and Longstreet's Corps as well as a detachment of cavalry, whose special task was to be the destruction of the Federal telegraph wires and pontoon bridges over the Appo-

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 310, note.

<sup>2</sup> Humphreys, 312-15.

<sup>3</sup> Lee intended to take the shorter road to Amelia Court House along the south bank of the Appomattox (Swinton, 574-5).

<sup>4</sup> Humphreys, 317.



mattox.<sup>1</sup> As soon as Fort Stedman was carried, the attacking force was to push forward to the high ground in rear of the Federal lines, where it was erroneously supposed that three forts had been built, whose fire commanded Fort Stedman and the adjacent portion of the Federal lines. But as a matter of fact no such forts existed; and the redoubts whose fire would sweep Fort Stedman and its approaches were in the main line of entrenchments. An infantry division was held in reserve which, as soon as the Federal lines were broken, was to sweep down their entrenchments to the Federal left, and this movement was to be supported by the other troops holding the Confederate lines as fast as their fronts were cleared.<sup>2</sup>

At 4.30 a.m. on March 25th Gordon assaulted. As Confederate deserters were allowed to enter the Federal lines with their arms, the piquet posts were easily surprised, and the storming party, rushing forward to the main line, carried Fort Stedman and three adjacent batteries. There, however, the Confederate success ended. Gordon's attack was left almost entirely unsupported. The detachments, which were sent forward to seize the supposed forts, penetrated to the military railroad from City Point, but were then driven back by Hartranft's division of the 9th Corps.<sup>3</sup> Assaults made from Fort Stedman upon the forts on its right and left were repulsed: and as soon as there was sufficient light to distinguish friend from foe, the Federal artillery in the main works and from the high ground in the rear, where General Parke ordered part of his field artillery to be posted, opened fire upon Fort Stedman. So heavy a fire swept the space between the lines of the two armies that neither could reinforcements be sent from Lee's lines to Gordon in Fort Stedman, nor could the Confederates in their enemy's works escape.

Shortly before 8 a.m. Hartranft's division attacked and recaptured Fort Stedman. Of Gordon's command 1,949 were taken prisoners, and his loss in killed and wounded was also heavy.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 318.

<sup>2</sup> Humphreys, 318.

<sup>3</sup> Humphreys, 319.

<sup>4</sup> Humphreys, 321, estimates the Confederate loss at nearly 4,000 and the Federal about 2,000. The Confederates captured Fort Stedman and Batteries X., XI., and XII. But they failed to gain possession of Fort Haskell to their right and Fort McGilvery to their left. This failure prevented Gordon from securing a broad front on which he might deploy his forces for a forward movement. It is not clear what was the force which reached the railway. Humphreys thinks that they were Gordon's three detachments. Gordon says that he never knew what became of these detachments, and Hartranft thinks that the force which he encountered was a heavy line and groups of skirmishers. From his account (4 B. & L., 584-9) it would follow that a considerably larger force pressed forward towards the railway than is generally recognised. Most accounts represent Gordon's main efforts as being directed against Fort Haskell and Battery IX., which latter effectually blocked the road to Fort McGilvery. Gordon accounts for his failure on the ground that the attack was delayed owing to the late arrival of Longstreet's troops from the north bank of the James, and daylight found "the plan only half executed." It is plain that the Confederate plan of attack miscarried, as

Following upon Gordon's repulse the commanders of the 2nd and 6th Corps attacked and carried the Confederate piquet lines, but found the main lines of entrenchments too strongly held to justify an assault. Gordon's sortie, so far from relieving the pressure upon Lee's right, had enabled the Federals to gain an advanced position from which a few days later a successful assault was made.

Grant had come to the conclusion that it would be desirable, if possible, to leave to the Armies of the Potomac and the James the work of crushing Lee's army. If Sherman's army were to participate therein, sectional jealousy might be aroused. Throughout the war the Army of the Potomac had been pitted against the Army of Northern Virginia, but except at Gettysburg had failed to gain any marked success over it. It seemed but just that, as a reward for the years of toil and of dogged perseverance in the face of continued failure, it should have the honour of forcing its old antagonist to surrender at last. Grant saw that Lee must abandon Richmond within a few days at the latest. If Lee succeeded in effecting a junction with Johnston's forces, the struggle might be prolonged some time longer. But the Federal general was now on the point of striking a blow, which, if successful, would probably prevent Lee from reaching Johnston, and would leave him no alternative except to surrender. On March 24th Grant had issued orders for a general movement to commence on the 29th.<sup>1</sup> The defeat of Gordon's sortie confirmed him in his determination. He had visited upon his enemy a very much heavier loss than he had himself suffered. On the 26th Sheridan's cavalry were brought from the north bank of the James and posted on the left of the Federal position, and on the night of the 27th, General Ord, commanding the Army of the James, made a secret march with three infantry divisions and one cavalry division, and, unknown to the Confederates, was placed in rear of the 2nd Corps. General Weitzel was left in command of the troops immediately threatening Richmond. Two divisions occupied the Bermuda Hundred entrenchments, and only one division held the lines on the north bank of the James.<sup>2</sup>

Grant's purpose was to concentrate all his available forces on his left, and with them strike such a blow as would force Lee to abandon his lines. Abraham Lincoln had already arrived at Grant's headquarters in anticipation of the speedy fall of the Southern capital. On the 27th Sherman arrived at City Point by water. He was informed of Grant's plans for the reduction of

Lee had concentrated about half his army to take part in the movement. General Parke, commanding the 9th Corps, was the senior officer in the absence of Meade on that part of the Federal lines which was attacked.

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 316.

<sup>2</sup> Humphreys, 323.

Richmond, and it was settled that, if the co-operation of his army should after all be required, he should move from Goldsboro on April 10th, and after feinting at Raleigh (Map I.) turn sharp to the right and reach the Roanoke River near Weldon, where he would be within sixty miles of Petersburg. Having arrived there, he would either move to Burkesville, the junction of the Southside and Danville railroads, and prevent Lee escaping by either of these roads, or hold himself in readiness for any movement which Grant might direct. Grant, however, was full of hope that before the day fixed for the commencement of Sherman's co-operative movement Lee's army would have ceased to exist.

Sheridan on the 28th received orders to move with his cavalry early on the following morning to Dinwiddie Court House (Map VII.). He was informed that the 2nd and 5th Corps would be within supporting distance, and was directed to try and force the enemy out of their entrenchments into open ground by threatening to turn their right. But if the Confederates clung to their entrenchments he was told to "cut loose" and ride straight for the Danville Railway. This he was to thoroughly destroy as near the Appomattox as possible, and he was then to break up the Southside Railway west of Burkesville. Having ruined the two railroads, he could either return to Grant or join Sherman. These orders were, however, subject to modification, and actually were altered the following day. The 2nd Corps was ordered to cross Hatcher's Run (Map VIII.) by the Vaughan road crossing on the morning of the 29th as soon as its entrenchments had been occupied by Ord's troops, and to move forward with its right on the Run and its left in communication with the 5th Corps, which was ordered to cross the Run lower down and move along the Quaker road towards the Boydton road. Wright was ordered to hold himself in readiness to withdraw his Corps from their entrenchments, which were then to be occupied by an extension of the 9th Corps to its left.<sup>1</sup>

Lee, as soon as he discovered Grant's new movement, hurried up reinforcements to the extreme right. The works constructed in the neighbourhood of Hatcher's Run during the winter had not been permanently garrisoned, but were only occupied by a sentry line.<sup>2</sup> Now, as Grant's movement developed, troops from other parts of the Confederate lines came pouring into these entrenchments. Anderson with Johnson's division and Wise's brigade occupied the extreme right of the entrenchments along the White

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 324-5.

<sup>2</sup> These works started at the Crow House, and then ran from the Boydton road crossing along the south side of Hatcher's Run, covering the White Oak road to its intersection with the Claiborne road; they then turned northward, covering the latter road till they reached the Run (Humphreys, 310).



Oak road. Pickett's division was ordered to the same point. Hill extended to the right so as to connect with Anderson's left. Four of his brigades under Heth held the entrenchments on the south side of the Run, and Wilcox with four more brigades occupied those on the north side. Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry division was ordered from the extreme left across the James to the extreme right at Five Forks, as soon as Sheridan's movement to Grant's left was known to Lee. He reached Sutherland Station on the Southside railroad on the night of the 29th.<sup>1</sup>

During the 29th Sheridan received orders from Grant not to strike at the railways, but to co-operate with the 2nd and 5th Corps against the Confederate right. The only fighting on the 29th was done by the leading division of Warren's Corps, which being attacked on the Quaker road by two brigades of Anderson's command, drove them back into the White Oak road entrenchments. As rain fell heavily during the night of the 29th and throughout the 30th, rendering it necessary to corduroy the roads for the passage of the artillery and trains,<sup>2</sup> the Federal infantry confined themselves to pushing close up to the entrenchments in their front without attacking. There was some sharp skirmishing on the road from Dinwiddie Court House to Five Forks, between Sheridan's and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry. On the evening of the 30th Fitzhugh Lee was joined by the cavalry of W. H. F. Lee and Rosser, from Stony Creek dépôt, and Pickett reached Five Forks with five infantry brigades. General Lee directed Pickett with his infantry and all the cavalry to move from Five Forks on the 31st, and drive Sheridan from the Court House, whilst he himself proposed with the troops in the White Oak road entrenchments to fall upon the left flank of the 5th Corps. But in order to effect this concentration on his extreme right, he was obliged to leave the rest of his line but weakly defended. Parke and Wright, as the result of the reconnaissances made on the 30th, reported to Grant their confidence that they could carry by assault the works in their respective fronts.<sup>3</sup>

Grant now determined to reinforce Sheridan with one infantry Corps, so as to enable him to turn Lee's right, and with the rest of his infantry to attack the Petersburg entrenchments. But the heavy rain, which fell continuously, caused a postponement of the proposed operation.<sup>4</sup> On the morning of the 31st Warren advanced

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 326.

<sup>2</sup> Humphreys, 327.

<sup>3</sup> Humphreys, 329. At one period on the 30th Grant had been so discouraged by the foul weather that he determined to suspend operations, but he was dissuaded by Sheridan, who rode over on purpose to expostulate, and Rawlins, his chief-of-the-staff (2 Sheridan's *Memoirs*, 142-5).

<sup>4</sup> Orders were sent to the Corps-commanders at 8.30 a.m. that there would be no movement of the troops that day, but in consequence of information received from Warren, the 5th Corps was ordered to gain possession of the White Oak road, if a

with the 5th Corps to gain possession of the White Oak road. The Confederate entrenchments on the south side of Hatcher's Run ran along that road for some distance and then turned northwards so as to cover the Claiborne road, until they again reached the Run. The White Oak road from its junction with the Claiborne road extended four miles west to Five Forks, and if Warren could secure possession of this part of the road, which was not defended by entrenchments, Lee's extreme right at Five Forks would be separated from the troops holding the entrenchments in front of the Claiborne road. But at the same time as the 5th Corps was advancing to secure the White Oak road Lee was in person preparing to attack its left flank. The leading Federal division was close to the road, when it was assailed on the front and left flank by four Confederate brigades. It was driven back in considerable confusion. Crawford's division, which was supporting Ayres' advance, shared the same fate, and both divisions were forced across a tributary of Gravelly Run, where the third division under Griffin was in reserve. But a sudden attack by Miles' division of the 2nd Corps struck the advancing Confederates on the left flank. Griffin's division moved against their right flank, and they fell back to the position south of the road, which Ayres had occupied earlier in the morning. In the course of the afternoon Warren again moved forward to the White Oak road and drove the enemy from the slight breastwork which they had thrown up, and gained the road, forcing the Confederate brigades, which had attacked him in the morning, to retreat to their fortified lines. Humphreys on Warren's right kept up a vigorous demonstration against the works south of Hatcher's Run and prevented the troops holding them from sending reinforcements to the brigades which were engaged by Warren.<sup>1</sup>

Fitzhugh Lee, on the morning of the 31st, started from Five Forks with his three cavalry divisions. His object was, whilst pressing the hostile cavalry in front with one division, to throw the other two against their left flank. But the crossings over Chamberlain's Creek, across which lay the approach to the Federal left, were so strongly held, that it was not until the arrival of Pickett's infantry upon the scene that the Federals were forced to retire. Part of Sheridan's cavalry were driven eastwards to the Boydton road, but rejoined their commander after nightfall. With the rest of his force Sheridan formed line of battle in front of Dinwiddie Court House, and, though hard pressed, succeeded in holding the enemy's superior numbers at bay, till night put an end to the

reconnaissance, which Warren had already ordered, showed that it was practicable (Humphreys, 330).

<sup>1</sup> Mott's division attacked the works at the Boydton road crossing and Hays' the Crow House redoubt, both unsuccessfully.

combat. Warren on the White Oak road heard the sound of Sheridan's battle steadily receding southwards, and, judging that he was being driven back, sent a brigade across country to attack the enemy's flank and rear.<sup>1</sup>

Sheridan finding that he could not hold on to Dinwiddie Court House unless reinforced, sent both to Warren and Meade for help. The situation was grave. The Confederate forces in front of the Court House were in a position to intervene between Sheridan and Warren's and Humphreys' Corps, and after leaving a force to hold the cavalry in check might move against the left rear of the infantry.<sup>2</sup> Warren was directed to fall back from the White Oak road to the Boydton road and to send one division by the latter road to Sheridan's aid. But the Boydton road bridge over Gravelly Run had been destroyed, and the stream was so swollen as to be unfordable for infantry.<sup>3</sup> Sheridan's purpose was to make a combined attack with his own cavalry and Warren's reinforcements upon the enemy in his front at daybreak of April 1st.

During the night Pickett, learning of the presence of a Federal force in his rear, withdrew his troops to Five Forks, where he entrenched a position<sup>4</sup> (see Plan). The Confederate line was about a mile and three-quarters in length, with a short return about one hundred yards long on its left. The infantry brigades occupied the entrenchments with W. H. F. Lee's cavalry division on the right, Rosser's in rear at the Ford road crossing of Hatcher's Run

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 336.

<sup>2</sup> At the same time, as Sheridan clearly saw, the Confederate infantry by following him to Dinwiddie Court House had completely isolated itself, and a rare opportunity was offered the Federal army (2 Sheridan's *Memoirs*, 154).

<sup>3</sup> Warren's operations on the night of the 31st were severely censured by Grant and Sheridan. But his position was a very difficult one. The order directing him to send one division to Sheridan and withdraw the rest of his corps to the Boydton road was received about 9.30 p.m., the fourth order which he had had since 5 p.m. But at 10.50 p.m. he received another order directing him whilst sending one division down the Boydton road to move the other two across country into the road from Dinwiddie Court House to Five Forks, so as to fall upon the enemy's rear, whilst Sheridan attacked their front. A further order, received at 1 a.m., made it perfectly plain that in Meade's eyes the important thing was to send a division direct to Sheridan's help. But as it was very doubtful whether that reinforcement could possibly reach Sheridan by daybreak, at which hour he was expecting to be attacked, and as it was anticipated that without such reinforcement Sheridan would be obliged to retreat by the Vaughan road, Warren, instead of starting his two divisions at once against the enemy's rear, waited until he knew that his other division had established connection with Sheridan. Ayres' division was crossing Gravelly Run at 2 a.m., and the other two divisions did not commence their march till 5 a.m. For this delay Warren was censured by the Court of Enquiry which met many years later to investigate his conduct (Humphreys, 336-43).

<sup>4</sup> Pickett's withdrawal seems to have been due to the movements of Bartlett's brigade, which, about 5 p.m. on the 31st, Warren had sent across country from the White Oak road to Sheridan's aid. This brigade struck the direct road from Dinwiddie Court House to the White Oak road near Dr. Boisseau's, and drove some Confederate skirmishers across Gravelly Run. Bartlett's presence in his rear became known to Pickett about 10 p.m., and he did not learn that the Federal brigade had subsequently been withdrawn, in accordance with Meade's orders (Humphreys, 342).




# BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS

1st April 1865 about 4 p.m.



Federal Cavalry Brigade  
as Infantry Division  
Confederate Cavalry Brigade  
as Infantry Division





guarding the trains, and Munford's on the left, dismounted, covering the ground beyond the left flank of the infantry and connecting with a cavalry force which was covering the ground to the right of the Claiborne road entrenchments.

Sheridan, since daylight,<sup>1</sup> had been following Pickett with two of his cavalry divisions. Finding that the Confederate generals intended to make a stand at Five Forks, he determined to demonstrate with his cavalry against the right of their line, whilst the 5th Corps, which was now concentrated near Gravelly Run Church, was to assault the left.<sup>2</sup> Mackenzie's cavalry division,<sup>3</sup> which had been placed under Sheridan's command, was to strike the White Oak road, move along it in conjunction with and to the right of the 5th Corps, and try to cut off the Confederate line of retreat by securing the Ford road crossing over Hatcher's Run.

About 4 p.m. the 5th Corps advanced to the attack. Warren was under the impression that the Confederate line reached nearly half a mile further east than was really the case.<sup>4</sup> Consequently only Ayres' division came at once into action. It assaulted and carried the return on the Confederate left. The other two divisions passed through the woods north of the White Oak road, where they had some sharp skirmishing with Munford's dismounted cavalry and got right in the rear of the Confederate entrenchments, Crawford's division, which was leading, having reached the Ford road. Fronting south they moved on Five Forks.<sup>5</sup> The Confederates with their line of retreat cut off made desperate efforts to repel the assaults, which were directed against them from three sides. On the extreme right W. H. F. Lee repulsed an attack of two of Custer's brigades. But the infantry brigades successively changing front to the left, were forced back by the superior numbers of the 5th Corps, one upon the other, until at last the whole line gave way and fled west through the woods towards the Southside Railway.

Neither Pickett nor Fitzhugh Lee were with their troops when the attack commenced: they had ridden to the north side of Hatcher's Run, and the density of the woods prevented the sound of firing from reaching them. Pickett, receiving information that

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 343.

<sup>2</sup> As the 5th Corps had not been in time to intercept Pickett's retreat, it was halted by Sheridan's orders at J. Boisseau's, near the forks of the road. It was not ordered up to the front till 1 p.m.

<sup>3</sup> This division belonged to the Army of the James, and had originally been commanded by Kautz. On joining Sheridan on the morning of the 1st, it was at first posted at Dinwiddie Court House, awaiting further orders.

<sup>4</sup> An impression apparently shared by Sheridan (Humphreys, 346-7).

<sup>5</sup> Crawford's division was facing south on the Ford road. Griffin's division, which formed Warren's centre, moved south-west against the enemy's rear, and after a hard struggle carried a new line of entrenchments, which the Confederate infantry on the left were trying to throw up in order to check Ayres' advance from the return, which he had already captured (Humphreys, 349).



the battle had begun, hastened to the scene of action; but before he arrived, Ayres had broken the Confederate left, and all his efforts to retrieve the day were vain. Fitzhugh Lee only got back to Hatcher's Run in time to find that the Ford road was in the hands of the Federals, and consequently was prevented from taking any part in the engagement. After the battle he collected his three cavalry divisions on the north bank of Hatcher's Run and withdrew to Sutherland Station (Map VIII.), where he was joined during the night by four infantry brigades under R. H. Anderson, which Lee had sent from the right of his entrenchments to aid in rallying Pickett's beaten troops and to close that line of approach to Petersburg.<sup>1</sup> On the morning of the 2d Pickett, with the remnants of his infantry, joined Anderson at Sutherland Station.

The battle of Five Forks was decisive of the fate of Petersburg. It gave the Federals possession of the Southside Railway, and forced Lee to send such heavy detachments to prevent the Federals entering Petersburg by the line of that railway, that at other points he was unable to hold his lines in sufficient strength. It was almost certainly a mistaken policy which required Pickett to fight at Five Forks at all.<sup>2</sup> He was forced to hold an isolated position, four miles away from the nearest point of the Confederate entrenchments, without any strong natural obstacles to protect either flank, and if his left were turned he would be cut off from the rest of Lee's army. A strong defensive position might have been taken up on Hatcher's Run or at Sutherland Station, where the consequences of defeat would have been less disastrous. As it was, he lost at least 4,500 prisoners and six guns. On neither side were the losses in killed and wounded heavy.<sup>3</sup>

In the hour of victory, when the Confederate infantry were flying from the field, Sheridan relieved Warren of the command of the 5th Corps. He had been authorised by Grant early that day to take this step if he judged it expedient. Owing probably to the fact that the Army of the Potomac had practically two commanders, its Corps commanders had developed the habit of deciding at their own discretion the manner and time in which the movements ordered from headquarters should be executed. Warren was an engineer officer of high scientific attainments and with a brilliant war record, but his caution rendered him an unsuitable colleague for the fiery Sheridan, who was always eager to snatch at any opportunity which chance might present. In the battle of April 1st

<sup>1</sup> Fitzhugh Lee thinks that if Anderson had marched by the direct road to Five Forks he would have come in on the flank and rear of the enemy's right, and would have "probably changed the result of the uneven contest" (4 B. & L., 712). These troops, however, seem not to have been despatched to the right till after news had reached Lee of Pickett's defeat (Humphreys, 354).

<sup>2</sup> Humphreys, 355; Lee's *Lee*, 376.

<sup>3</sup> Humphreys, 353-4.

Sheridan did not consider that Warren had displayed sufficient energy in bringing his troops into action or in pushing the attack, and accordingly called Griffin to take his place at the head of the 5th Corps. In the Court of Enquiry held in 1879 after Warren's repeated requests, Sheridan, though readily admitting that Warren had displayed the skill and energy in handling his Corps which might be required of an *ordinary* commander (to which fact, indeed, overwhelming testimony was produced at the Court of Enquiry), justified his action on the ground that what was required at so critical a moment was an officer of *extraordinary* ability. Grant on April 3rd appointed Warren to command the forces left in Petersburg and City Point.<sup>1</sup>

In anticipation of Sheridan's success Grant had ordered a general assault to be made by Parke, Wright, and Ord upon the Petersburg entrenchments as soon as it was light on the 2nd. Fearing, however, lest Lee in despair should withdraw during the night from his lines and fall upon Sheridan, who now lay across his right flank, he ordered his artillery to open fire along the whole length of his lines at 10 p.m. The Confederate guns replied, and for two hours a tremendous cannonade was maintained. It was indeed the death-knell of the Confederacy: for Lee's position on the morning of the 2nd was such that he could have but little chance of repelling a determined assault made all along the line. Pickett's defeat had necessitated the withdrawal of Field's division, accompanied by Longstreet in person, from the north bank of the James, and the Richmond defences were only held by two divisions under Ewell. The Bermuda Hundred lines were manned by Mahone's division. Had Grant on the night of the 1st massed troops on the north bank of the James, Richmond would have been in his hands on the morning of the 2nd. But he did not know that Field's division had been withdrawn, and preferred to secure the evacuation of Richmond by the capture of Petersburg. South of the Appomattox Gordon's Corps, over 7,000 strong, held the entrenchments opposite the 9th Corps' lines.<sup>2</sup> But from Gordon's right to Hatcher's Run only four brigades were available to meet the attack of Wright's and Ord's commands. South of Hatcher's Run four more brigades

<sup>1</sup> Sheridan, in his *Memoirs*, is very unfair to Warren. He says (ii. 161) that Warren on the 1st exhibited distinct apathy and gave the impression that he wished the sun to go down before the battle could be begun. But as a matter of fact Warren attacked about 4 p.m., and it seems clear that Sheridan mistook for apathy an attitude of concentrated thought. Again, Sheridan complained that portions of the 5th Corps gave way owing to Warren making no effort to inspire his troops with confidence. But Sheridan was with Ayres' division and saw nothing of Warren, who was on the right with Crawford's and Griffin's divisions. No one after reading Sheridan's account would expect to find that Crawford's division suffered more heavily than either of the other two. For the finding of the Court of Enquiry, ordered in December, 1879, see 4 B. & L., 723-4, and Humphreys, 357-361. For an eulogy of Warren's conduct at Five Forks, see Swinton, 598-600.

<sup>2</sup> Humphreys, 363.

held the White Oak road and Claiborne road entrenchments. At Sutherland Station on the Southside line Anderson had four infantry brigades as well as Pickett's infantry and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry. The weakest spot in the Confederate lines was on the north side of Hatcher's Run in front of the 6th Corps and Ord's divisions: and if the line were broken there both the forces on the south side of Hatcher's Run and Anderson at Sutherland Station would be cut off from Petersburg.

At 4.40 a.m. the 6th Corps advanced to the assault. The advanced position captured on March 25th now proved invaluable as affording cover for concentrating a column of attack within striking distance of the enemy's lines. In fifteen minutes the 6th Corps carried the lines in its front with a loss of 1,100 killed and wounded.<sup>1</sup> Some of the victorious Federals made their way across the Boydton road to the Southside Railway, and it was by one of these parties probably that General A. P. Hill was killed as he was riding from Lee's headquarters to rally the soldiers of his Corps. Sweeping down the entrenchments to the left, the 6th Corps pressed on towards Hatcher's Run, where they met part of Ord's command, which had carried the entrenchments on the north bank of the Run. The two Corps were directed to march straight on Petersburg with Ord's troops leading. About 4.30 a.m. Parke had assaulted the lines held by Gordon's Corps with two columns moving from either side of Fort Sedgwick. He carried the first line of entrenchments, capturing twelve guns and 800 prisoners, and secured possession of the Confederate lines for a distance of nearly a quarter of a mile on either side of the Jerusalem plank road, but found himself confronted by a second line of works which he vainly endeavoured to carry. Later in the day Gordon made several attempts to recover the lines lost in the morning, but Parke repulsed all his attacks.<sup>2</sup>

On the south side of the Run the 2nd Corps had unsuccessfully attacked the Confederate works on the night of the 1st. Humphreys was afterwards ordered to send one of his divisions to report to Sheridan. It was not intended that he should attack on the 2nd, but finding that the lines on the north side of the Run had been carried, he attacked in his front with his two remaining divisions.<sup>3</sup> The entrenchments on the south side of the Run were carried, and the Confederates withdrew from the White Oak road works, as their position was now rendered untenable by the breaking of their lines to the east. Humphreys was called off from the pursuit of this force and ordered to march direct on Petersburg. Miles' division of the 2nd Corps, however, which Sheridan on the

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 365.

<sup>2</sup> Humphreys, 366.

<sup>3</sup> Humphreys, 366. He had been ordered not to attack the Crow House redoubts because one of his divisions (Miles') was absent with Sheridan.



morning of the 2nd had sent back to join Humphreys, came up with Heth's retreating brigades, and after two unsuccessful attempts carried the entrenchments which they had hastily thrown up.<sup>1</sup> The Confederates retreated in great disorder westwards, a part crossing the Appomattox, but the majority joined Anderson's command, which was moving along the south bank of the river in the direction of Amelia Court House (Map VII.). Sharp skirmishing went on throughout the day between Sheridan's cavalry and Anderson's rearguard.

Lee in Petersburg was now forced back into his last line of entrenchments within the suburbs of the city. On the west side, where the hostile pressure was heaviest, his line ran from the Appomattox along the east bank of Old Town Creek (Map VIII.). On the further bank were some advanced works, the strongest of which were Forts Gregg and Whitworth. Grant determined to crown the day's work by capturing these two redoubts, and Ord was directed to assault them. Fort Gregg was captured after a desperate struggle. Its garrison of 300 was either killed or captured, and the Federal loss was over 700. Fort Whitworth was more easily gained possession of, as Wilcox, to save useless bloodshed, ordered his troops to abandon it.<sup>2</sup> A final assault was ordered to be made upon Lee's lines both at Petersburg and Richmond early on the 3rd, but during the night the Army of Northern Virginia withdrew from its works and commenced its retreat westwards.

Lee had sent a message to President Davis immediately after the 6th Corps carried his lines, that Richmond would have to be abandoned.<sup>3</sup> All that he could possibly hope to do was to hold on to the Petersburg lines till night, and thus gain time for organising the retreat. To attempt to hold Richmond after the loss of Petersburg was not to be thought of for a moment. For Sheridan would have quickly secured the Danville Railroad, and the fate of the Southern capital would then have been sealed. By abandoning Richmond forthwith there was at any rate a chance that the Army of Northern Virginia might yet be saved for active operations in the field. At 8 p.m. the evacuation commenced. As the southern bank of the Appomattox was now in the hands of the Federals, Lee had to withdraw his troops in Petersburg to the north bank, and march along it until he could recross out of reach of Grant's army. Longstreet with Field's division and what still remained in Petersburg of Heth's and Wilcox's divisions led the way. Gordon with the 2nd Corps followed: Mahone withdrew during the night from Bermuda Hundred and marching by Chesterfield Court House crossed the Appomattox after Gordon at Goode's bridge (Map VII.), where Longstreet's troops had also

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 368.

<sup>2</sup> Humphreys, 370.

<sup>3</sup> Humphreys, 371.

crossed. Ewell withdrew his two divisions across the James and crossed the Appomattox by the Danville railway bridge. Anderson's command marched along the south bank of the river. Amelia Court House was named as the point of concentration.<sup>1</sup>

Very early on the 3rd the Federals discovered that the enemy had retired, and Petersburg was quietly taken possession of. In Richmond during the night fires broke out in different parts of the city in consequence of the destruction of the military stores which Ewell had ordered.<sup>2</sup> The same fate which had overtaken Columbia threatened the late capital of the Confederacy. At 8.15 a.m. on the 3rd the city was formally surrendered by its mayor to General Weitzel, and Federal troops quickly extinguished the flames and restored order. On the following day Abraham Lincoln visited the city which had so long defied him, and almost unattended, leading his little boy by the hand, walked through its streets, amid the adoring salutations of the negroes, to the Grey House, where his rival had so lately ruled. Jefferson Davis had left Richmond on the evening of the 2nd for Danville, which was proclaimed as the new seat of government. Lee hoped to lead his army to the same place, whence a junction could be effected with Johnston's army by the railroad through Greenboro.

Grant bent all his energies to prevent his enemy from making good his escape. Sheridan with the cavalry and the 5th Corps was directed to reach the Danville Railroad at some point between the Appomattox and its junction with the Southside line.<sup>3</sup> Meade with the 2nd and 6th Corps followed, moving west in the direction of Amelia Court House, whilst Ord with his command, to be followed by the 9th Corps, marched towards Burkesville along the line of the Southside Railway.

Lee had hoped to get all his army concentrated at Amelia Court House on the night of the 4th. But Longstreet's Corps was the only one which actually reached the Court House on that day: and Ewell and Anderson did not come up till the following morning.<sup>4</sup> Lee has stated that he was delayed a whole day at the Court House, because the provisions, which he had ordered to be sent from Danville, were not forthcoming, and a day had consequently to be spent in collecting food and forage for the men and animals. But whatever were the facts about the missing rations—and the Danville authorities denied that any requisition from Lee for supplies ever reached them<sup>5</sup>—it seems plain that Lee was not able to effect his

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 371.

<sup>2</sup> The fire seems to have been caused by the Confederates setting fire to the stores of tobacco (Lee's *Lee*, 381).

<sup>3</sup> Sheridan was to keep near to the Appomattox, "so as to feel Lee's army constantly" (Humphreys, 373).

<sup>4</sup> Ewell did not arrive before noon.

<sup>5</sup> Lee's *Lee*, 383; Swinton, 642.

concentration at as early an hour as he had hoped. There had not been time before the hasty flight from Richmond to see that the trains were made as light as possible and only ammunition and medical supplies carried in the wagons. The roads were still very bad, and the speed of the retreat was delayed by the slow progress of the heavily laden trains. The loss of a day proved fatal to Lee. For Sheridan with the cavalry and 5th Corps reached Jetersville on the Danville Railroad, some eight miles south-west of Amelia Court House, on the afternoon of the 4th.<sup>1</sup> The infantry entrenched a position, and the 2nd and 6th Corps were pushed forward as fast as possible to reinforce Sheridan. They did not, however, reach Jetersville till the afternoon of the 5th, and Meade gave orders for an advance to be made against Lee's army at 6 a.m. on the 6th.

Lee had himself moved out from Amelia Court House on the afternoon of the 5th to sweep Sheridan out of his path, of whose presence he had learnt the previous evening. But on receiving information that he had not merely cavalry to deal with, but that a strong infantry force was entrenched across his road, he turned to his right and directed his line of march towards Rice's Station and Farmville.<sup>2</sup> Though forced to abandon the direct route to Danville, he still hoped that he might be able to reach that place by a round-about route, passing through Prince Edward Court House, whilst if that road was also found to be blocked he could still continue to retreat from Farmville to Lynchburg.

But already Stoneman's cavalry of Thomas' army was tearing up the railway on the further side of Lynchburg, and the 4th Army Corps was advancing in the same direction from East Tennessee. These forces would have been able to hold the mountain passes long enough to enable Grant to catch up the rear of Lee's retreating army. Consequently Lee's only chance of escape was to reach Danville and join Johnston. As Meade was advancing towards Amelia Court House on the morning of the 6th, the rearmost Confederate columns could be seen in motion on the left. The order of march was changed, and the three Army Corps were soon heading west in pursuit. Longstreet's Corps, to which Mahone's division had been assigned, reached Rice's Station by a night march at sunrise of the 6th.<sup>3</sup> But the progress of the other three Corps, which were encumbered with the trains, was very much slower. Sheridan's cavalry was hanging on their left flank and rear, making dashes, when opportunity offered, at the trains, whilst Gordon's Corps, which formed the rearguard, was hard pressed by the 2nd Corps.

At Sailor's Creek the Confederates were finally brought to bay. A mile on the north side of the Creek the road forks: one branch

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 374.

<sup>2</sup> Rice's station was on the Lynchburg Railway.

<sup>3</sup> Humphreys, 377.



goes straight on across the Creek to Rice's Station, the other runs west and crosses the Creek close to its junction with the Appomattox. This latter road was taken by the Confederate trains and Gordon's Corps. The 2nd Corps followed in close pursuit. In the running fight, which continued till nightfall, Gordon lost heavily. A great part of the trains, which he was endeavouring to save, were captured, and in his own Corps he lost 1,700 prisoners and four guns.<sup>1</sup> During the night he marched to High Bridge on the Appomattox.

Anderson's and Ewell's Corps had kept straight on the road to Rice's Station, but anxiety for the safety of the trains and the rearguard caused them to halt after crossing Sailor's Creek.<sup>2</sup> Sheridan's cavalry seized the opportunity, and secured the road in advance of Anderson's Corps, whilst the 6th Corps closed in upon Ewell. The Confederates had no artillery. Ewell's Corps being attacked in front by the 6th Corps and on the flank by a cavalry brigade, in spite of a brave resistance, found itself forced to surrender, when Anderson's Corps in its rear was driven from its temporary entrenchments by Sheridan's cavalry. Very nearly the whole of Ewell's Corps was captured: out of a total force of 3,600 not more than 250 escaped. Anderson did not lose so heavily, as his line of retreat was not entirely cut off, but of about 6,000 men in his command he probably lost 2,600.<sup>3</sup> Ewell, with eleven general officers, was amongst the prisoners.<sup>4</sup> Johnson's division of Anderson's Corps retained its organisation, and on rejoining Lee was assigned to Gordon's Corps. But the battle of Sailor's Creek virtually destroyed two out of Lee's four small Corps.

Throughout the day Longstreet's Corps with Lee in person had been waiting for the other Corps to come up. At length Lee took Mahone's division and returned towards Sailor's Creek to see what had become of the rest of his army. Shortly before dusk, on reaching the crest on the south side of the Creek, he discovered the appalling nature of the disaster which had overtaken his rear. Longstreet was ordered to march from Rice's Station to Farmville, where he crossed the Appomattox on the morning of the 7th. At

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 381.

<sup>2</sup> It does not seem quite clear whether Sheridan's cavalry gained possession of the Rice's Station road before or after Anderson's force halted on the south side of Sailor's Creek. Sheridan (*2 Memoirs*, 180) claims that Merritt's and Crook's divisions (three in all) secured the road and cut off Anderson from Longstreet, and that also one cavalry brigade and a battery cut in between Ewell's rear and the head of Gordon's column, forcing the latter to take the right-hand road. Ewell (4 B. & L., 721) states that it was the presence of Federal cavalry in force on the road which compelled Anderson to halt. Humphreys, 382, says that "Crook moving to the left found General Anderson strongly posted with temporary breastworks running across the Rice's Station road, and sent Gregg to take possession of and form across the road."

<sup>3</sup> For these figures see Humphreys, 383-4.

<sup>4</sup> 4 B. & L., 722.

Farmville a supply of rations had been accumulated, and the starving Confederates got their first regular meal since the retreat began.<sup>1</sup> Gordon and Mahone crossed the river at High Bridge below Farmville. Ord after reaching Burkesville had marched on the 6th along the Lynchburg railroad and found Longstreet's Corps encamped at Rice's Station. But it was then too late in the day to organise a line of battle. A small force, which he had sent on in advance, before he knew of Longstreet's position, consisting of two infantry regiments and the Headquarters' cavalry, less than 600 men in all,<sup>2</sup> to destroy High Bridge and the bridges at Farmville, was overtaken by Rosser's and Munford's cavalry divisions, and after a brave resistance forced to surrender to overwhelming numbers. By the morning of the 7th Lee's army, now reduced to two infantry Corps and one cavalry Corps, was once again on the north bank of the Appomattox. To delay pursuit the bridges were set on fire. But the 2nd Federal Corps, which resumed the pursuit at 5.30 a.m. on the 7th, arrived in time to save the railway and wagon bridges at High Bridge.<sup>3</sup> The Farmville bridges were destroyed, and the ford, by which Crook crossed his cavalry over the river, was too deep for the passage of infantry.

Lee, having marched four miles along the Lynchburg road, halted and formed line of battle.<sup>4</sup> His object was to give his trains time to get on in advance. But the delay proved fatal. Humphreys, with two divisions of his Corps, attacked the Confederate line. Though Miles' division was roughly handled by Mahone, Humphreys succeeded in detaining Lee, and thus gave time to Sheridan to head him off at Appomattox Station. Crook's cavalry, having crossed by the ford above Farmville, had some fighting with Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry. The Federals were driven back, and General Gregg, commanding the leading brigade, was taken prisoner. On the night of the 7th Lee resumed his march. Had he not felt himself obliged to halt and offer battle to Humphreys' Corps, he could have reached Appomattox Station on the 8th, where he would have found rations waiting him, and Lynchburg on the following day.<sup>5</sup> For the two infantry Corps<sup>6</sup> under Ord would not have been up in time to prevent Sheridan's cavalry from being driven out of Lee's path.

The Federal cavalry reached Appomattox Station on the evening of the 8th, and captured four trains, which had been sent with supplies from Lynchburg.<sup>7</sup> Sheridan took up a position for the

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 386; Lee's *Lee*, 385.

<sup>3</sup> Humphreys, 387.

<sup>5</sup> Humphreys, 391.

<sup>2</sup> Humphreys, 385.

<sup>4</sup> Lee's *Lee*, 386.

<sup>6</sup> The 5th and the 24th.

<sup>7</sup> The presence of these trains at Appomattox Station was due to a telegram sent to Lynchburg by Sheridan in Lee's name (2 Sheridan's *Memoirs*, 176, 189).

night across the road, which Lee was marching on, south-west of Appomattox Court House, which was occupied by Lee's advance-guard that same night. During the day's march Gordon's Corps had exchanged places with Longstreet's, which now formed the rearguard. Though there was no heavy fighting on the 8th, Humphreys' Corps was all the time in close pursuit, and went into camp for the night within three miles of Longstreet."<sup>1</sup>

Communications had already been opened between the two commanding generals as regards the surrender of the Confederate army. On the 7th Grant had written to Lee, pointing out the hopelessness of further resistance, and asking for the surrender of his army to avoid needless bloodshed. To this Lee replied that, though he did not share Grant's view of the hopelessness of his position, yet he should like to know what terms Grant would offer in the possible event of his surrender. Grant's answer on the 8th was to the effect that he should be satisfied if the army surrendering was disqualified for bearing arms against the United States until duly exchanged. To this Lee replied late the same day that he did not think that the time had yet come to treat of surrender, but, as the object of both was peace, he should be glad to meet Grant, and discuss any propositions which might tend to the desired end. Not unnaturally Grant declined the proposed interview: as he stated in his answer of the morning of the 9th, he had no authority to treat on the subject of peace. Lee, though several of his general officers were pressing him to surrender,<sup>2</sup> determined to make one last effort. Fitzhugh Lee and Gordon were directed as early as possible on the 9th to move out against Sheridan. If only cavalry were encountered, they were to attack and clear a way for the rest of the army. But if, as Lee feared, Sheridan had been reinforced by a strong body of infantry, then they must abandon the attempt, and no alternative would be left but to surrender.

At daybreak Fitzhugh Lee and Gordon, with thirty guns, moved out against the Federal cavalry, and it was Lee's intention, if the attack on Sheridan was successful, to send the bulk of his trains and part of his artillery to Lynchburg, and with the rest of his artillery and the ammunition wagons to march his army to Campbell Court House with the purpose of ultimately reaching Danville.<sup>3</sup> At first the attack seemed likely to be successful. Sheridan only had cavalry at his disposal, and in spite of an obstinate resistance they were being gradually forced back. But between 9 a.m. and 10 a.m., Ord, with the 5th and 24th Corps, reached the battlefield. From Ord's report it would seem that he was only just in time.<sup>4</sup> The Federal

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 392. There was some skirmishing in the vicinity of Appomattox Station.

<sup>2</sup> Lee's *Lee*, 392.

<sup>3</sup> Lee's *Lee*, 387.

<sup>4</sup> Humphreys, 397.



cavalry were falling back in confusion before the advance of Gordon's infantry. But on the appearance of such heavy reinforcements, the Confederate leaders, in accordance with their instructions, began to withdraw their troops from the engagement.

The contingency, which Lee had feared, had come to pass. Close on his rear was the 2nd Corps: in front a strong force of infantry and cavalry blocked the road: the time for surrender had arrived. The closing scene of the long duel between the Armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia took place at Appomattox Court House about 1 p.m., and at 4 p.m. the surrender of the Confederate army was formally announced to the Army of the Potomac.<sup>1</sup> Grant proved himself a generous foe: the terms which he had offered on the 8th formed the basis of the capitulation. Rations were distributed from the Federal stores to the hungry Confederates: and those of the Confederate cavalry and artillery who owned their own horses were allowed to retain them. The total number of officers and men paroled on the 9th was 28,356. To such meagre proportions was the once great Army of Northern Virginia reduced.

With the surrender of Lee's army, the Confederacy collapsed. The only organised army left in the field was Johnston's, in North Carolina (Map XII.). On April 10th Sherman moved out from Goldsboro against it, and on the 13th occupied Raleigh, Johnston slowly retiring before him. The following day the Confederate general opened negotiations for an armistice, and military operations came to an end. The assassination of Abraham Lincoln in Ford's theatre at Washington, on the night of the 14th, though by depriving the South of one of its best friends, it greatly complicated the political situation, had no effect upon the military position. It tended to make Sherman and Johnston, both of whom were sincerely desirous of peace, more eager to come to terms. Between these two generals an armistice and a convention, which they fondly hoped might serve as a basis for the general pacification of the South, were arranged. But the Federal Government refused to ratify either armistice or convention. Stanton, who was at the moment predominant in Washington, charged Sherman with treachery, and ordered Grant to hasten to Raleigh and take charge of the negotiations with Johnston. On April 26th Johnston formally surrendered his army at Greenboro on the same terms that had been granted to Lee. The number of officers and men paroled amounted to 37,047. But about 8,000 men had already deserted the ranks since the armistice of the 18th, for fear of being made prisoners of war.<sup>2</sup>

Further south, General Wilson had conducted a very successful cavalry expedition into Alabama, defeating Forrest and capturing

<sup>1</sup> Humphreys, 399.

<sup>2</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 243.

Selma (Map X.), the last great manufacturing arsenal of the South,<sup>1</sup> on April 2nd. General Canby, commanding the Department of the Gulf, reinforced by the 16th Corps of Thomas' army, had commenced a campaign against Mobile, the last stronghold on the Gulf held by the Confederates. On April 9th Fort Blakeley was taken by storm, and Mobile itself surrendered on the 12th. On May 4th General Richard Taylor surrendered the remaining Confederate forces in Mississippi and Alabama to General Canby. In the Trans-Mississippi Department the last actual fighting of the war took place on May 13th in Texas, and on May 26th General Kirby Smith, commanding in that Department, surrendered all his forces. On May 10th a squadron of Wilson's cavalry had captured Jefferson Davis near the Florida border-line.<sup>2</sup>

With the capture of its President, and the surrender of all its forces in the field, the resistance of the South came to an end. The Restoration of the Union and the Abolition of Slavery were accomplished facts.

<sup>1</sup> Cox's *March to the Sea*, 204.

<sup>2</sup> Jefferson Davis was imprisoned for two years, and then indicted for treason, but in May, 1867, he was released on bail, and the case never came to trial. He lived more than twenty years longer at his home in Mississippi (Schouler, 621, note 1).

## CHAPTER XXVIII

### RETROSPECT

WHEN the great struggle came to an end, the exhausted combatants on either side might well marvel at the vast proportions which it had assumed. This had been no ninety days' affair, no picnic march to Richmond ; but for four years the North had been pouring out its blood and treasure in an endeavour, which had often seemed hopeless but at last was crowned with signal success, to force back into the Union the seceding States, whose military resources had at first been regarded with a contempt wholly unjustifiable in the light of subsequent events. The South, too, must have realised that it had altogether failed to grasp at the outset the dogged resistance, the inflexible determination, the obstinate refusal to bow to disasters, however heavy and however numerous, of an opponent whose strength and staying power had been greatly underestimated.

The struggle had been colossal, a war of giants : no previous war had ever in the same time entailed upon the combatants such enormous sacrifices of life and wealth : <sup>1</sup> and perhaps no previous war had ever been so completely decisive in its results. To the men of that day who saw the Southern Confederacy beaten to its knees after almost superhuman efforts and in spite of many a victory, the greatest marvel of all was perhaps that the South had held out so long against such enormous resources and overwhelming odds. Those who contrasted the total disappearance of the Confederate armies with the fact that the North had in 1865 over a million of men under arms might indeed feel wonder that the struggle had not terminated long ago. The utter collapse of the Confederacy caused men for the time to blind themselves to the tremendous power which the defeated combatant had wielded, and to ignore

<sup>1</sup> Dodge gives the deaths in the Federal armies during the war at 359,528, and this estimate does not include "the great number who died at home, from the results of exposure, wounds, or diseases contracted in the line of duty. Counting all losses directly due to the war, it would be safe to say that half a million men were lost in the North and close upon the same number in the South." The same authority estimates the total cost of the war to the North at 3,400,000,000 dollars or nearly two and a half millions a day *A Bird's-Eye View of our Civil War*, 324-6).



the enormous difficulties of the task which the victor had at last triumphantly surmounted.

But to men of a later generation the wonder rather is that the North ever succeeded in the gigantic work of subjugation which had been imposed upon it. The conquest of such a vast expanse of territory, held by a nation in arms, has no parallel in history. The feat which the North achieved was a greater one than that which Napoleon attempted to his own undoing, when he invaded Russia in 1812.

A brief survey, therefore, of the various stages through which this mighty conflict passed, and of the causes of the ultimate triumph of the North, will not be out of place. As has been already pointed out, the two combatants at the outset of the war were by no means unequally matched. The superior numbers of the North were counterbalanced by the fact that the South was standing on the defensive in an enormous theatre of war. Both powers had practically to create a volunteer army. Had either side been able to put into the field during the first half-year of the war a single Army Corps of regular troops, the issue would probably have been decided with as great rapidity as the most sanguine supporter of either cause anticipated.<sup>1</sup> But the North found itself unable to make any effective use of its regular army. In spite of President Lincoln's call for an increase of regulars in May, 1861, there were never as many as 26,000 regulars on the rolls, and always less than 20,000 "present for duty."<sup>2</sup> The volunteer service was much the more popular, and the chief function of the regular army was to provide officers for the volunteer regiments and to fill the posts in the Staff Departments. In some respects it proved an actual advantage to the Confederacy that it had no regular troops to rely upon. Its fighting force was necessarily of a single type, whereas in the North, as long as General Scott remained at the head of the United States' armies, an attempt was made to differentiate between the regulars and volunteers, which proved prejudicial to the organisation as a whole. McDowell's army, which took the field in the summer of 1861, was, in consequence of General Scott's neglect of the volunteer forces, a less efficient instrument of warfare than that which confronted it under Johnston and Beauregard on the banks of Bull Run.

But the North possessed one tremendous advantage over its opponent in being a naval power. The task of maintaining an effective blockade of three thousand miles of coast might well have seemed an impossible one, but nevertheless it was accomplished with very tolerable success, because the Confederacy was

<sup>1</sup> I Henderson, 207.

<sup>2</sup> General F. V. Greene's "The United States Army," *Scribner's Magazine*, November, 1901.

incapable of producing any force which could contend with the Federal navy on the sea. But the command of the sea was not necessarily decisive of the issue. It isolated the South, and caused it to be gravely inconvenienced during the first year of the war by the lack of necessary military material. But most of these deficiencies had been made good by the middle of 1862, and the Southern territories were quite capable of providing subsistence for their population for an indefinite period. The really decisive factor in the war was the adaptation of the naval resources of the North to *river* warfare. The vast extent of the theatre of war, the only partially developed railway system of the South, and the configuration of the country, caused the river system of the North American Continent to become of commanding importance in the operations of the war. It was in the West, where the Red River (Map I.), the Mississippi, the Tennessee, and the Cumberland offered a waterway through the very heart of the Confederacy, that the really decisive campaigns of the war were fought out.

The military genius of the great Confederate leaders, Lee and Jackson, the unrivalled fighting capacity of the Army of Northern Virginia, and the close proximity of the rival capitals, have caused a disproportionate attention to be concentrated upon the Eastern theatre of war. But it was in the West that the decisive blows were struck. The capture of Vicksburg and Port Hudson in July, 1863, was the real turning-point of the war, and it was the operations of Sherman's Grand Army of the West which really led to the collapse of the Confederacy at Appomattox Court House.<sup>1</sup> The Confederate authorities were fully alive to the danger with which a Federal advance by the great rivers threatened them. An attempt was made to equip a river fleet, which might contest with the Federal vessels the possession of the rivers of the South, but it was quickly found that the inferiority of the South in material appliances and mechanical skill was a fatal handicap in the struggle.

An attempt was next made to close the rivers to the Federal fleets by the construction of heavily armed works on their banks. But in this new departure a grave mistake was committed when these works were constructed on altogether too extensive a scale, so that they more nearly resembled entrenched camps, and required armies to hold them. Consequently when these fortresses were eventually forced to capitulate, the Confederacy suffered a loss in the men captured in them which it could ill afford. At Vicksburg the number of troops surrendered exceeded thirty thousand, the largest capture that up to that time had been made

<sup>1</sup> The Armies of the Potomac and the James brought about the evacuation of Petersburg and Richmond and the capitulation of Lee's army, but it was the operations of Sherman's and Thomas' armies which made these successes absolutely decisive.

in modern warfare.<sup>1</sup> At Port Hudson, a few days later, seven thousand more Confederates surrendered. And these heavy losses were incurred in the summer of 1863, when already the shrinkage in numbers was beginning to make itself felt, and the Confederate authorities were finding themselves unable, at all the different decisive points in the theatre of war, to meet the Federal advance with forces of approximate strength.

The neutrality of Kentucky, which was maintained till September, prevented any extensive operations in the West during the first year of the war. It was quite impossible for Albert S. Johnston, the commander of the Confederate forces in that region, to assume the offensive with the troops at his disposal, of whom all were raw recruits, and a great number still without the necessary equipment. Federal operations were limited to restoring the authority of the United States Government in Missouri, and holding Kentucky, after the fiction of neutrality was abandoned, for the Union.

In the Eastern theatre of war McClellan's overwhelming superiority of strength made short work of the Confederate forces, which were endeavouring to hold West Virginia, and gained so firm a hold upon that section of the country that General Lee later in the year found himself unable to recover the lost ground. The central feature of the first year's operations consequently became the Bull Run campaign, and the strategic question is, whether the Confederate Government made full use of the victory gained on July 21st. It may be fairly admitted that the expectation of so many Southerners, that the victory of Bull Run ought to have led to the capture of Washington, was ill-founded. But, on the other hand, it can hardly be denied that the Confederate Government made a grave mistake in not assuming the offensive at a later period of the year and forcing the Army of the Potomac to fight a decisive battle before McClellan had had time to thoroughly organise it. A Confederate victory won on Northern soil would have had a great effect upon public opinion both in America and in Europe. But President Davis and his chief military adviser, General Lee, had commenced the war with the determination, sound enough at that early stage of events, of standing on the defensive; and, after Lee was despatched to West Virginia, Davis still adhered to the strictly defensive policy, even when the circumstances, under which it had originally been decided on, had wholly altered.

The result of the inactivity of the victorious Confederate army in the autumn of 1861 was that in the following spring the Federal armies assumed the offensive all along the line. In the West the immense advantage, which the naval superiority of the Federals

<sup>1</sup> Fiske, 247.



conferred, was quickly made plain. The advance up the Tennessee and the Cumberland broke through the centre of the Confederate first line of resistance, and led at once to the abandonment of the capital of Tennessee and of the strong position on the Mississippi which the Confederates had established at Columbus. A further advance of the Federal forces, coupled with Johnston's failure to crush the opposing armies in detail at Shiloh, led to the abandonment of the second line of Confederate resistance, and the Memphis and Charleston Railroad fell into the hands of the victors, whilst the Mississippi was opened as far south as Vicksburg. Earlier in the year Farragut had captured New Orleans, the commercial capital of the South, and his vessels now ran past the batteries of Vicksburg and joined the flotilla which was descending the river. Had Halleck displayed ordinary energy, Vicksburg, which at the time was only partially fortified and weakly garrisoned, would have fallen early in the summer, and the Mississippi throughout its entire length would have passed under the unchallenged control of the Federals. But Halleck at Corinth reached out neither to his right against Vicksburg nor to his left against Chattanooga, and allowed Bragg to move his troops *viâ* Mobile to Chattanooga, to forestall Buell's advance against that fortress and himself assume the offensive. The invasion of Kentucky by Bragg's and Kirby Smith's armies called Buell back in hot haste from his advanced position to the Ohio, but a great opportunity was lost when the Confederate commander allowed Buell to regain his base at Louisville without a battle. His one chance of gaining a decisive success was to have barred Buell's road at Munfordville and forced him to fight a battle against superior numbers, and on ground not of his own choosing, in order to regain his communications. Later in the year, when the containing force under Van Dorn had been defeated at Corinth, Grant found himself in a position to assume the offensive, and commenced the first of his unsuccessful attempts against Vicksburg. At the very end of the year Rosecrans, with the Army of the Cumberland, advanced against Bragg, and at Murfreesborough a battle was fought, which, though tactically drawn, was strategically a Federal victory, as Bragg was obliged to abandon Murfreesborough.

In the East McClellan moved the Army of the Potomac by water to the Yorktown Peninsula. Hampered by the crude strategical conceptions of his Government, and too often pausing to take counsel of his fears, he nevertheless approached within four miles of the Confederate capital. But by that time Lee had concentrated his forces, and promptly assuming the offensive, compelled McClellan to abandon the line of the York River and retreat across the Peninsula to the James. Here he was in a very favourable position for renewing the campaign with the James as an

absolutely safe line of communications. But the Federal Government had long since lost all confidence in their general, and insisted upon the abandonment of the campaign and the transference of a great part of the Army of the Potomac to serve with Pope. Lee, assuming the offensive against his new opponent, completely out-generalled him, and drove his demoralised army to seek refuge within the fortifications of Washington. The invasion of Maryland, with which Lee followed up his successful campaign against Pope, had a political as well as a strategical object. The Confederate Government hoped that the sight of Southern troops in Maryland would cause its inhabitants to rise in favour of secession, and that with the accession of that State to the Southern cause the northern boundary of Maryland might become the line along which the military operations of the next year would be conducted. But McClellan resumed command of Pope's beaten troops, and after a drawn battle with Lee at the Antietam, compelled the Army of Northern Virginia to recross the Potomac without having accomplished its purpose. McClellan having served their turn, the Federal Government superseded him for Burnside, and the costly experiment of Fredericksburg was the result, when the Federal attempt to resume the offensive and reach Richmond by yet another route was rudely checked with terrible loss.

The summer of 1862 saw the Confederacy attain its high-water-mark of success. Both in East and West its armies had assumed the offensive, but the autumn found Lee driven from Maryland and Bragg from Kentucky. Both attempts to win fresh States to the Confederate cause proved failures.

1863 was the critical year of the conflict. The Federals assumed the offensive both in East and West. But Hooker's defeat at Chancellorsville, coupled with Grant's repeated failures against Vicksburg and the inactivity of the Army of the Cumberland, gave the Confederate Government an excellent opportunity of again throwing their opponents on the defensive. But the opportunity was badly used. Lee preferred to make a second invasion of the North, and it is within the limits of possibility that, had he been loyally served by his chief lieutenant, the Army of the Potomac might have been crushed in detail, and the North forced to make peace. Whether, however, Lee could have won any victory which would have counterbalanced Grant's success at Vicksburg is, at any rate, an open question, and it would probably have been a wiser course to transfer a considerable part of the Army of Northern Virginia to the West after the victory of Chancellorsville, and either by reinforcing Bragg against Rosecrans, or Johnston against Grant, to have thrown the Federal armies of the West back upon the Ohio, and thereby kept the Mississippi open between Vicksburg and Port Hudson. "The drums that beat for the advance

into Pennsylvania seemed to many of us to be beating the funeral march of the dead Confederacy."<sup>1</sup> With Lee's defeat at Gettysburg and the fall of Vicksburg, the Confederate cause might well be considered as ultimately doomed. The control of the Mississippi enabled the Federals to cleave the Confederacy in twain, and the resources of Western Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas, States rich both in men and cattle, were for ever lost to the Richmond Government.

Rosecrans' advance forced Bragg out of Chattanooga, and it was only the despatch of two divisions from Lee's army which prevented the Federals from marching into Georgia. The reinforcements from the East had come too late and, though Chickamauga was a Southern success, Grant was enabled to concentrate a superior force against Bragg, and compelled that unlucky general to abandon all the advantages of his dearly won victory.

Only a desperate effort by the Southern armies could stave off the fast approaching disaster in 1864. Both in East and West the Federals in superior strength were confronting the two remaining Confederate armies. Had President Davis allowed his generals to concert some joint plan of campaign by which the Confederates might have taken the offensive in one or other of the theatres of war, the Southern cause would not have been utterly hopeless. But by forcing both armies to pursue an isolated defensive policy he allowed the Federal armies in both fields to make full use of their numerical superiority, and to steadily near their respective goals. The substitution of Hood for Johnston in the West only hastened the catastrophe, and Atlanta, "the gate-city of the South," was soon in Sherman's hands. Hood's ill-judged invasion of Tennessee enabled Sherman to march practically unopposed through Georgia and reach the Atlantic coast before the end of the year: and the crushing defeat of the Army of Tennessee by Thomas at Nashville left the Confederacy with only one army in the field. That army, under the indomitable Lee, offered a splendid resistance to its old foe, the Army of the Potomac. Grant, in spite of an enormous expenditure of life, found himself unable to reach Richmond by the direct route, and after the appalling slaughter of Cold Harbour moved his troops across the James and sought to find an entrance to the Confederate capital by the "back-door" of Petersburg. During the latter part of the year the Federal commander was extending his left towards the railways, on which Richmond and Lee's army depended for subsistence. But his progress was slow, and the decisive blow of the campaign was struck in the Shenandoah Valley, where Sheridan completely out-generalled Early and opened the road for a movement, if necessary, against the Confederate railways from the right.

<sup>1</sup> D. H. Hill in 3 B. & L., 639.



By the beginning of 1865 the Confederate position was hopeless. Too late Lee was appointed Generalissimo and the resolve taken to abandon Richmond. The condition of the roads prevented the evacuation taking place until Grant had matured his plans, and was ready to make the final movement against Lee's lines of communication.

The triumphant advance of the Western armies was depriving the Confederacy of section after section of its territory. The process had begun with the fall of Vicksburg. Sherman's march through Georgia was a fitting continuation of it.

Practically nothing was left to the Confederate Government at the beginning of 1865 except south-west Virginia and the Carolinas. Sherman was already sweeping through the Carolinas, and Johnston, who had been placed in command of the remnants of Hood's army and such other forces as could be found on the Atlantic coast, could only offer a feeble resistance and do nothing more than delay the irresistible advance of an overwhelmingly superior army.

Had Lee succeeded in bringing his troops safely off from Richmond and joining hands with Johnston in North Carolina, it is hard to see how any other advantage would have been gained except to postpone the inevitable result for a few months at the most. The rapidity with which Grant took up the pursuit of Lee is a fairly good proof that he would not have left Sherman to contend single-handed against Lee and Johnston for any length of time: and it is altogether probable that Sherman would have been quite capable by himself of dealing with the Confederates' united forces.

The surrender of Lee's army, which had so long been the backbone of Confederate resistance, was followed by the almost instantaneous surrender of all the other forces in the field, even in distant Texas. That the close of regular warfare was not followed by a period of guerilla operations, which could only have served to embitter the feeling of the combatants, and however long continued could have only added to the sum total of human misery without affecting the political result, was due to the patriotic action of Lee, Johnston, and other Confederate leaders. President Davis, maddened at the failure of all his hopes, would not have hesitated to force upon his unhappy countrymen this further load of suffering, but Lee steadily set his face against any such proceeding.<sup>1</sup> The Confederate armies had been fairly and squarely beaten, and it

<sup>1</sup> For President Davis' desire to carry on what could only be under the circumstances guerilla warfare, see 4 B. & L., 764-5. For Lee's decision and the part played by General Wise in urging him to that decision, see the address delivered by Mr. C. F. Adams before the American Antiquarian Society on October 30th, 1901, entitled "Lee's Momentous Choice."

only remained for the defeated side to accept the verdict of the God of Battles and, beating their swords into ploughshares, to endeavour to play their part as good citizens under the new order of things.

This brief survey of the outlines of the war should serve to make it plain that the strategical views of the Confederate Government were largely responsible for the result. President Davis insisted upon maintaining a rigidly defensive policy and on applying in the New World the military methods of the Aulic Council, which had already been sufficiently discredited in Europe. Never able to comprehend the merits of an offensive-defensive policy, the Southern President threw away the advantage which his cause originally possessed in holding the interior lines. It was a real misfortune to the South that its official Head possessed a certain amount of military experience, and in consequence a greatly exaggerated opinion of his own military abilities. As General Grant phrased it, "on several occasions he came to the relief of the Union army by means of his *superior military genius*." The verdict of General Beauregard will probably be that ultimately accepted by history: "We needed for President either a military man of high order, or a politician of the first-class without military pretensions. The South did not fall crushed by the mere weight of the North; but it was nibbled away at all sides and ends, because its executive head never gathered and wielded its great strength under the ready advantages that greatly reduced or neutralised its adversary's naked physical superiority. It is but another of the many proofs that the passive defensive policy may make a long agony, but can never win a war."<sup>1</sup>

It is not, of course, claimed that the Northern Government made no mistakes. Lincoln, Halleck, and Stanton managed between them to commit plenty of strategical blunders. The most fatal mistake was probably the recall of McClellan from the banks of the James in the summer of 1862. But it does not necessarily follow that, because Richmond ought to have fallen in that year, therefore the ultimate issue of the war would have been decided any earlier. When once Grant had fairly established his reputation as the first soldier of the North, the Federal President gave him a free hand, and abstained from any interference with the military measures of his trusted commander.

Quite apart from his military mistakes, President Davis is open to severe criticism for his administrative methods. It has been freely charged against him that he altogether underestimated the probable duration of the struggle, and failed to take adequate measures for providing his forces in the field with the necessary equipment. He, however, stoutly denied this charge, and main-

<sup>1</sup> 1 B. & L., 226.

tained that the lack of military material at the beginning of the war was not due to any want of foresight on his part, but to the action of the British Government, which prevented his agents from carrying out in their entirety the commissions with which he charged them. It cannot, however, be seriously denied that President Davis made a very grave mistake in not providing a full treasury by a liberal exportation of cotton during the first twelve months of his administration. Had such a policy been adopted the treasury of the Confederacy would have been richer than that of the Federal States, and the means would have been retained up to the end of the war of paying the soldiers. But instead the Confederate Government contented itself with establishing a paper currency, which soon was depreciated in value. It was, in General Joseph Johnston's opinion, the want of pay that caused the rank and file of the Confederate armies to melt away in the closing year of the war. When the currency became worthless the Southern soldier had to choose between his duty to his country and the claims of his starving wife and children. The sanctity of the family tie proved stronger even than his patriotism, and the stream of desertion steadily increased.<sup>1</sup>

An attempt has been sometimes made to explain the fall of the Confederacy by the loss of certain eminent generals during the course of the war. Albert Sidney Johnston fell on the field of Shiloh in April, 1862. His military record had been a good one, and the South regarded him at the commencement of the struggle as their ablest general. He enjoyed President Davis' confidence to an extent probably unequalled by any other general in the Confederate service; and no doubt his loss was a great blow to Confederate hopes in the West. "The West perished with Albert Sidney Johnston, and the Southern country followed."<sup>2</sup> No one realised the severity of the blow more fully than the President himself. "The fortunes of a country hung by the single thread of the life that was yielded on the field of Shiloh." General Richard Taylor expressed himself in hardly less emphatic language: "With him at the helm there would have been no Vicksburg, no Missionary Ridge, no Atlanta: had it been possible for one heart, one mind, and one arm to save her (the Confederate) cause, she lost them when Albert Sidney Johnston fell on the field of Shiloh."<sup>3</sup>

But, in spite of such testimony to Johnston's military ability, it must be said that the single campaign in the Civil War which he directed does not bear out the high opinion entertained at the South of his generalship. General Grant pronounced him vacillat-

<sup>1</sup> For an indictment of Davis' policy, see Johnston's *Narrative*, Cap. XIII., and Mr. Barnwell Rhett's article in *1 B. & L.*, 99-110.

<sup>2</sup> General R. L. Gibson, *C.S.A.*, quoted in *1 B. & L.*, 568.

<sup>3</sup> *Destruction and Reconstruction*, 232-3.



ing and undecided in his actions. It may be freely conceded that the Confederate cause in the West suffered greatly from his loss, that, had he been spared, probably the failures of Bragg's campaigns, and certainly the disaster which befell Pemberton's army at Vicksburg, would have been avoided. But it is altogether probable that the loss which the Confederacy sustained in Stonewall Jackson's death at Chancellorsville was a much heavier blow than Johnston's fall at Shiloh. With Jackson Lee lost his right arm, and from that time victory ceased to follow the banners of the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee's own judgment was that if he had had Stonewall Jackson at Gettysburg he would have won a great victory, and have forced the North to concede peace and independence to the South. Whether the campaign of Gettysburg could have under any circumstances led to such a result is certainly open to question. But it is a fascinating speculation, what would have been the fate of Grant's Vicksburg campaign had Jackson survived Chancellorsville and been sent to take the chief command in the West, or how it would have fared with Rosecrans' army at Chickamauga, had Jackson been there in place of Bragg.

But could Jackson in the distant fields of the West have repeated the earlier triumphs won in his native Virginia? Could any one man—Lee, or Jackson, or A. S. Johnston—by his military genius have saved the Confederacy from succumbing ultimately to the superior resources of the North? Whenever the Confederate armies assumed the offensive pure and simple, defeat was the result. Twice Lee invaded the North, but in either case without success. Bragg's invasion of Kentucky was a distinct failure, and Hood's invasion of Tennessee in the autumn of 1864 was nothing less than a disaster. By standing on the defensive, with an intelligent use of the advantages of the interior lines and a watchful eye for any opportunity of delivering a counterstroke, the life of the Confederacy would have been prolonged. But without foreign intervention, and as long as Abraham Lincoln held the reins of power at the North, the Confederacy would have gone on losing ground: and time at last, coupled with an empty treasury, would have brought the inevitable result. Against the great military genius of certain of the Southern leaders Fate opposed the unbroken resolution and passionate devotion to the Union, which he worshipped, of the great Northern President. As long as he lived, and ruled the people of the North, there could be no turning back. The preservation of the Union was a sacred charge committed to his care, and though he yielded up his life before the surrender of all the Confederate forces in the field, yet he had lived long enough to see his work crowned with abiding success. He knew that the end had come with the surrender of Lee and

his army. The Union was restored, the future of the United States assured, and in that knowledge he passed to his rest.

#### NOTE ON RECONSTRUCTION

President Lincoln, in his Second Inaugural Address, had expressed the desire to "bind up the wounds of the nation." But many weary years elapsed before the wounds of the conquered South were healed. Lincoln had proclaimed that in any one of the seceding States, in which one-tenth of the voters would take an oath to support the Constitution, the laws, and the emancipation proclamations, and would set up a republican form of government, the Federal Government would recognise that government as the legally established government of that State.<sup>1</sup> In accordance with that promise, three Southern States—Arkansas, Tennessee, and Louisiana—had been "reconstructed" in 1864. President Johnson proposed to pursue his predecessor's policy. As a Southerner himself and an old State Rights' supporter, he held that the seceding States were entitled to resume their political rights under the Constitution. But Congress was not inclined to let the South off so easily. It held that the Southern States had by rebellion forfeited their place in the Union and were degraded to the position of Territories, and that it was the duty of Congress to impose conditions upon them before they could be readmitted to the Union. As the Republicans had a two-thirds majority in both Houses, they were able to override the President's veto. The President fiercely inveighed against Congress, denouncing it as no true Congress at all, because the Southern States were unrepresented, and the conflict between President and Congress on the reconstruction policy continued with increasing violence throughout Johnson's term of office, and led ultimately to his impeachment.

By the end of 1865 all the Southern States (except Texas)<sup>2</sup> had set up new Governments, and their respective Legislatures had accepted the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, abolishing slavery throughout the United States. But their acceptance of this Amendment was coupled with various laws dealing with "vagrancy" and the regulation of negro labour, which to the North seemed an attempt to revive the old slavery under the new form of forced labour.

In March, 1865, a Freedmen's Bureau had been established for one year, under the supervision of the War Department, to provide for the protection and support of liberated negroes.

In July, 1866, an Act was passed continuing the operations of the Bureau for another two years and conferring upon it somewhat enlarged powers. This Act "practically superseded the legislation of the reconquered States regarding the coloured people."<sup>3</sup> A month earlier Congress had passed, and proposed for ratification by the State Legislatures, the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. This Amendment conferred "citizenship, State as well as Federal, on all persons born or

<sup>1</sup> Channing, 562.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Bryce, 472.

<sup>3</sup> 2 Bryce, 474.

naturalised in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, forbade legislation by a State abridging the privileges or immunities of a citizen of the United States, and provided for reducing the representation in Congress of any State in proportion to the number of its citizens excluded from the suffrage." It also provided for the disqualification "from voting or office [of] all persons, who having ever taken an oath to support the Constitution of the United States had been concerned in insurrection or rebellion against the same."<sup>1</sup> Thus at the same time as full political rights were conferred upon the black population the vast majority of the Southern whites were disfranchised. It was inevitable, if this Amendment were carried, that political power in the South would be transferred to the negro, and that the white would be at the mercy of his former slaves. It is not surprising, therefore, that all the Southern Legislatures except Tennessee rejected this Amendment. Thereupon Congress, in March, 1867, proceeded to pass the Reconstruction Act, the object of which was to create provisional Governments in those States not yet readmitted to the Union (thus ignoring the State Governments already established in the South by the whites) and to fix the conditions for their readmission. This Act divided up all the South (except Tennessee) into five Military Districts, to be administered by Federal military officers, which should continue until a State Convention should have framed a new Constitution and the State Legislature should have ratified the Fourteenth Amendment. Then and then only could the State be readmitted to the Union.<sup>2</sup>

In consequence of this Act a swarm of Northern whites poured into the South, hoping to make their fortunes there under the new régime. Then ensued the era of "carpet-bag" administrations. The white adventurers easily led the negro by the nose and secured for themselves the chief administrative functions in the various States. "Such a Saturnalia of robbery and jobbery has seldom been seen in any civilised country."<sup>3</sup> The terrible consequence to the South of these corrupt administrations may be gauged by the appalling increase in the different State debts.

In 1868, under the Reconstruction Act, six Southern States were readmitted to the Union. In the same year the Fourteenth Amendment, having been accepted by three-quarters of the States, became part of the Constitution. The Presidential Election of that year turned upon the reconstruction policy. The Democratic party had adopted Johnson's plan,<sup>4</sup> but General Grant defeated the Democratic candidate, Horatio Seymour, by 215 electoral votes to 79. The result of the Republican victory was the Fifteenth Amendment, which forbade the suffrage "to be denied or abridged on account of race, colour, or previous condition of servitude," the acceptance of which, as well, as of the Fourteenth Amendment, was now made the price of readmission for the four Southern States—Virginia, Texas, Georgia, and Mississippi—still remaining outside the Union.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 2 Bryce, 474.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Bryce, 475. Negroes were admitted as voters and delegates to the Conventions.

<sup>3</sup> 2 Bryce, 476.

<sup>4</sup> Channing, 568.

<sup>5</sup> Channing, 569.



By 1871 these four States were brought into the Union, and the Fifteenth Amendment became part of the Constitution (March, 1870). These three Amendments, which were added to the Constitution as the result of the Civil War, finally defined the legal position of the negro in the reconstructed Union.<sup>1</sup> But in 1872 a general Amnesty Act restored the great mass of Southern whites to the enjoyment of full political rights. These now made use of their recovered privileges to eject the carpet-bag administrations, and this was the easier to accomplish, as a political reaction had begun to set in at the North in favour of leaving the reconstructed States to work out their own salvation. By 1876 in all the Southern States the whites had regained control of the State Governments, and in order to secure their supremacy, successfully adopted various devices for suppressing the black vote.<sup>2</sup>

In 1877 the last Federal troops left in the South were recalled by President Hayes.

<sup>1</sup> The Thirteenth Amendment gave the negro emancipation, the Fourteenth gave him political rights, and the Fifteenth confirmed him in them.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Bryce, 480.

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